People v. Bronson CA2/6 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 1/27/21 P. v. Bronson CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B302855
    (Super. Ct. No. 19F-02628)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (San Luis Obispo County)
    v.
    ROBERT TROY BRONSON,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Robert Troy Bronson appeals the trial court’s denial of his
    motion to delete or permanently stay a $10,000 restitution fine
    imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4.1 We affirm the
    denial of the motion.
    FACTS
    Bronson pled no contest to continuous sexual abuse of a
    child (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)) and a lewd act on a child
    (§ 288, subd. (a)). Bronson sexually abused a child.
    1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    The trial court sentenced Bronson to 18 years in state
    prison and, in addition to other fines and fees, imposed a $10,000
    restitution fine. (§ 1202.4.) Bronson subsequently filed a motion
    seeking to delete or permanently stay the restitution fine. The
    motion was based on his claim that he lacked the ability to pay
    the fine. The trial court denied the motion.
    DISCUSSION
    Section 1202.4, subdivision (a)(3)(A) requires the trial court
    to impose a restitution fine on a person convicted of a crime. The
    amount of the fine is set at the discretion of the trial court and
    commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. (Id., subd.
    (b)(1).) The fine for a person convicted of a felony must be not
    less than $300 and not more than $10,000. (Ibid.) The court may
    determine the amount of the fine as the product of the minimum
    fine multiplied by the number of years of imprisonment
    multiplied by the number of felony counts of which the defendant
    is convicted. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Inability to pay “may be
    considered” only in increasing the amount of the fine above the
    minimum. (Id., subd. (c).)
    Bronson relies on People v. Dueñas (2019) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1157
    . In Dueñas, the Court of Appeal held that the imposition of
    criminal fines and fees without a hearing and a determination of
    the defendant’s ability to pay violates due process. The court
    recognized that section 1202.4, subdivision (c) prohibits the trial
    court from considering the defendant’s ability to pay the
    minimum restitution fine. The court held that the trial court
    must “stay the execution of the fine until and unless the People
    demonstrate that the defendant has the present ability to pay the
    fine.” (Dueñas, at p. 1172.)
    2
    Courts of Appeal have criticized Dueñas. They assert that
    due process is not implicated because the imposition of fines and
    fees does not deny criminal defendants access to the courts and
    does not, without more, result in incarceration for nonpayment.
    (See People v. Petri (2020) 
    45 Cal.App.5th 82
    , 91.) Under these
    cases, the proper framework for analysis is the excessive fines
    clause of the Eighth Amendment. (People v. Aviles (2019) 
    39 Cal.App.5th 1055
    , 1069-1072.) A court considers four factors in
    determining whether a fine is constitutionally excessive: (1) the
    defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm
    and the penalty; (3) the penalties imposed by similar statutes;
    and (4) the defendant’s ability to pay. (Id. at p. 1070.)
    We are persuaded that the cases applying an Eighth
    Amendment analysis are correct.2 Bronson is complaining that
    the restitution fine is excessive in light of his income or lack
    thereof. Where a particular constitutional amendment provides
    an explicit textual source of constitutional protection, that
    amendment, not the more generalized notion of due process, must
    be the guide for analyzing the claims. (Graham v. Connor (1989)
    
    490 U.S. 386
    , 395 [
    104 L.Ed.2d 443
    , 454-455] [claim of excessive
    use of force by police during an investigatory stop must be
    analyzed under Fourth Amendment, not due process].) Here the
    Eighth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
    constitutional protection for Bronson’s claim.
    Moreover, Dueñas makes the defendant’s ability to pay the
    sole factor in determining the reasonableness of the fine. Due
    process is not so rigid. (See People v. Ramirez (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 2
     The question is currently pending in our Supreme Court.
    (People v. Hicks (2019) 
    40 Cal.App.5th 320
    , review granted Nov.
    26, 2019, No. S258946.)
    3
    260, 268 [due process is flexible].) Even under a general due
    process analysis, there is no reason why ability to pay should be
    the sole factor. The trial court should be able to consider the
    same factors it considers under an Eighth Amendment analysis.
    Applying the Eighth Amendment excessive fine analysis:
    (1) As to the defendant’s culpability, Bronson continuously raped
    and molested a child. Short of premeditated murder, it is hard to
    get more culpable than that. (2) The harm Bronson did is
    incalculable. A $10,000 penalty is not excessive; it is too little.
    As the trial court judge stated, considering the facts of the case,
    “I’m not sure that there is a fine in the State of California that
    would run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.” (3) The parties
    point to similar statutes with which to compare the penalty. (4)
    The final element is the defendant’s ability to pay.
    Bronson admits that he can earn money in prison. He
    complains, however, that he can earn very little and the state will
    take half as payment on the restitution fine plus an
    administrative fee. But given the egregious nature of his offense
    and the continuing harm to his victim, it is not an excessive
    amount.
    The judgment (order) is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    GILBERT, P. J.
    We concur:
    YEGAN, J.              TANGEMAN, J.
    4
    TANGEMAN, J., Concurring:
    I agree with the result but not the reasoning of the majority
    opinion. It is unnecessary to criticize our colleagues’ opinion in
    People v. Dueñas (2019) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1157
     (Dueñas) to affirm
    the judgment. More fundamentally, the majority ignores the
    “‘cardinal principle of judicial restraint—if it is not necessary to
    decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.’ [Citation.]”
    (People v. Contreras (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 349
    , 381.)
    Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (d) provides that “[a]
    defendant shall bear the burden of demonstrating his or her
    inability to pay.” Bronson did not satisfy this requirement. In
    moving to delete or stay the restitution fine, Bronson supported
    his argument by referencing the probation report. But that
    report, written when he had been in custody for almost four
    months, stated only that he “reported no sources of income,
    outstanding debt or financial obligations.” It also noted that he
    was 38 years old and had been previously employed. This
    showing was plainly insufficient to meet his burden.
    At a subsequent hearing, defense counsel attached to his
    motion an unsworn letter from Bronson stating merely that he
    was in prison, had no money, and was unemployed. In the
    absence of a greater showing, the trial court did not err in
    declining to delete or stay the fine.
    Bronson relies on Dueñas, supra, 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1157
    . In
    Dueñas, our colleagues in Division Seven held that the imposition
    of criminal fines and fees without a hearing and a determination
    of the defendant’s ability to pay violated her right to due process.
    (Dueñas, at pp. 1168-1169.) In Dueñas, the evidence showed that
    the defendant had cerebral palsy and “because of her illness she
    dropped out of high school and does not have a job.” (Id. at p.
    1160.) She was a homeless mother of two children whose family
    relied on public benefits “but she cannot afford basic necessities
    for her family.” (Id. at p. 1161.) She owned only her clothing and
    a cell phone which was “frequently disconnected because she
    cannot afford the $40 per month payment.” (Ibid.) Dueñas had
    her license suspended because she was unable to pay $1,088 for
    three juvenile citations. She continued to drive and spent 141
    days in jail because she was unable to pay the fines. In 2015, she
    pled no contest to yet another misdemeanor charge of driving on
    a suspended license and was sentenced to a $300 fine and
    summary probation. Unable to pay the fine, she spent another
    nine days in jail.
    Unlike the factual scenario of Dueñas, Bronson has not
    shown that he is disabled, homeless, unable to work or support
    himself and his dependents when out of custody, or lacks any
    assets whatsoever. Dueñas is plainly inapposite. There was no
    error.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    2
    Timothy S. Covello, Judge
    Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
    ______________________________
    ,     Richard Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
    Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B302855

Filed Date: 1/27/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/27/2021