Rosen & Associates, P.C. v. Meruelo CA2/7 ( 2023 )

Filed 3/13/23 Rosen & Associates, P.C. v. Meruelo CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ROSEN & ASSOCIATES, P.C., B311652
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
v. Nos. 19STCP03171;
19STCP04198)
RICHARD MERUELO et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Peter D. Gordon & Associates and Peter D. Gordon for
Defendants and Appellants.
Rosen & Associates, Robert C. Rosen, John B. Wallace, and
David Bleistein for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Richard Meruelo (Meruelo), individually and as trustee of
the Richard Meruelo Living Trust (Meruelo Trust), appeals from
a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of Rosen &
Associates, P.C. (Rosen), arising from the parties’ legal fee
disputes. Meruelo contends the trial court was required to vacate
the award because Rosen and the arbitrator allowed Meruelo, a
nonattorney trustee, to engage in the unauthorized practice of
law by representing the Meruelo Trust during the arbitration.
Meruelo argues the arbitrator therefore exceeded his powers and
the arbitration award was procured by Rosen’s fraud. Meruelo
also appeals from a postjudgment order awarding Rosen
attorneys’ fees and costs. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Engagement Agreements
On May 30, 2012, August 24, 2012, and August 28, 2013
Meruelo and Rosen (through attorney Robert Rosen) signed a
total of four attorney-client engagement agreements containing
identical arbitration provisions (and substantially the same
attorneys’ fees provisions). Meruelo signed one of the May 30,
2012 arbitration agreements on behalf of himself and the
Meruelo Trust; the other agreements were signed on behalf of
Meruelo individually as the client. Under the agreements, the
parties agreed to arbitrate all disputes involving Rosen’s
provision of legal services, including disputes over attorneys’ fees,
with Meruelo having the right to elect the fee arbitration
procedures of the State Bar of California (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6200 et seq.).
2
The 2012 engagement agreements also stated, “In the event
that an arbitration or lawsuit arises with respect to your
obligation to pay legal fees and/or costs under this Agreement,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the course of such proceeding
including filing fees and arbitration forum fees and other fees.
Such attorneys’ fees and costs shall also include any and all fees
and costs billed or incurred by attorneys of the Firm in
representing the Firm or attorneys of the Firm. California Law
may preclude the Firm from obtaining legal fees and costs in
representing itself. With this knowledge and with our advising
you to seek separate and independent counsel regarding this, you
waive the opportunity to assert such preclusion.” The 2013
agreement contained a slightly modified attorneys’ fees provision.
B. The Arbitration and Arbitration Award
In 2017 Rosen filed a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association, served on Meruelo, claiming
Meruelo and the Meruelo Trust owed it approximately $470,000
in unpaid legal fees, plus interest and attorneys’ fees and costs
for the arbitration. During the arbitration Rosen updated its
claim, ultimately seeking approximately $730,000. Meruelo and
the Meruelo Trust asserted, among other defenses, Meruelo had
filed for arbitration with the Los Angeles County Bar Association;
the fee dispute had been settled in 2015 and Rosen was paid all
the fees it was owed; Rosen’s bills had errors; Rosen charged a
usurious interest rate; Rosen had a conflict of interest; and Rosen
did not provide competent services.
The parties arbitrated their legal fee disputes before
arbitrator Peter K. Rundle over five days in November and
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December 2018. During the evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator
heard testimony from Meruelo, Rosen attorneys John Wallace
and Robert Rosen, and two attorneys who had previously
represented Meruelo and his affiliated businesses (Gregory
Salvato and Aimee Dominguez). Neither side called any experts.
Following post-hearing briefing and closing arguments, the
arbitrator took the matter under submission.
On June 26, 2019 the arbitrator issued a 39-page
arbitration award in favor of Rosen. The award noted that in the
arbitration Meruelo had represented his own interests and those
of the Meruelo Trust “in pro per.” (Italics omitted.) The
arbitrator found Meruelo was “a sophisticated and highly-
successful real estate developer” who co-founded Meruelo-
Maddux Properties, Inc. (MMPI). When that company went
public, Meruelo obtained a bank loan to purchase stock in the
new public company. The note was secured by a lien against
Meruelo’s MMPI stock. Subsequently, 1248 Figueroa Street, LLC
(Figueroa Street), an entity wholly owned by Meruelo’s mother
(with Meruelo as its managing member), purchased the note from
the bank. MMPI subsequently changed its name to EVOQ
Properties, with Meruelo as chief executive officer. EVOQ later
filed for bankruptcy. As part of the reorganization of the
company, a group of new shareholders ousted Meruelo from his
position as chief executive officer and proposed a reorganization
plan that included a forced sale of some of Meruelo’s stock.
EVOQ asserted claims in the bankruptcy proceeding against
Meruelo for fraud and other wrongdoing. Salvato, and later,
Dominguez, represented Figueroa Street in the bankruptcy
proceeding. At some point, Rosen represented Meruelo and the
Meruelo Trust in the bankruptcy proceeding.
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The arbitrator found Rosen established the existence of
contracts (the engagement agreements) between Rosen and
Meruelo, individually and as trustee of the Meruelo Trust; Rosen
performed services under the engagement agreements; Rosen
established claims against Meruelo and the Meruelo Trust based
on quantum meruit and account stated; and Meruelo and the
Meruelo Trust’s defenses lacked merit. Rosen sought legal fees in
connection with his (1) defense of Meruelo with respect to
EVOQ’s claims for fraud and wrongdoing; (2) defense of Meruelo
and the Meruelo Trust in connection with litigation over
repayment of the bank loan; (3) litigation over the price of
Meruelo’s MMPI shares he was forced to sell as part of the
bankruptcy reorganization; (4) Meruelo’s claims against EVOQ
for indemnity; and (5) other legal work for Meruelo.
The arbitrator ordered Meruelo to pay Rosen a total of
$667,414 for unpaid legal fees, interest, and attorneys’ fees and
costs. The arbitrator also ordered Meruelo, individually and as
trustee of the Meruelo Trust, jointly and severally, to pay Rosen
$705,427 for unpaid legal fees, interest, and attorneys’ fees and
costs. Further, the arbitrator ordered Meruelo, individually and
as trustee of the Meruelo Trust, jointly and severally, to bear the
costs of the American Arbitration Association’s administrative
fees of $8,900 and $48,480 in arbitrator compensation.
C. The Competing Petitions
On July 26, 2019 Rosen filed a petition to confirm the
arbitration award. On September 27, 2019 Meruelo, individually
and as trustee of the Meruelo Trust, and Merco Group-Roosevelt
Building, LLC (Merco), an entity managed and partly owned by
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Meruelo (collectively, the Meruelo defendants),1 filed a petition to
vacate the arbitration award. On January 28, 2020 the trial
court consolidated the two cases pursuant to the parties’
stipulation.
The Meruelo defendants opposed the petition to confirm the
arbitration award and argued the award should be vacated. They
asserted there were conflicts among Meruelo, the Meruelo Trust,
Merco, and Figueroa Street, but Rosen did not obtain conflict
waivers. Further, Rosen knew Meruelo, in his capacity as
trustee, could not represent the Meruelo Trust. The Meruelo
defendants explained that during the bankruptcy proceeding in
2012, a party had moved to strike Meruelo’s answer (as trustee of
the Meruelo Trust) by arguing California and federal law
prohibited Meruelo, a nonattorney trustee, from representing the
Meruelo Trust. Meruelo likewise could not represent Merco
because it was a limited liability corporation that must be
represented by legal counsel in the arbitration. Therefore,
Meruelo engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by
representing the Meruelo Trust and Merco.
The Meruelo defendants claimed neither Rosen nor the
arbitrator advised Meruelo that he could not represent the
Meruelo Trust and Merco in the arbitration. Even if the
arbitrator “‘unwittingly’’’ allowed Meruelo to represent the
Meruelo Trust and Merco, the arbitrator “lacked legal authority
over the unrepresented entities.” Therefore, the arbitrator
1 Although Merco joined in the petition to vacate the
arbitration award, the arbitrator noted in the arbitration award
that Merco was identified as a respondent but was not a party to
any of the four engagement agreements, and no evidence was
presented with respect to a claim against Merco.
6
should have dismissed the Meruelo Trust and Merco or found
they had defaulted.
In his supporting declaration, Meruelo stated Rosen did not
discuss with him any conflicts of interest between Meruelo as an
individual and the Meruelo Trust, or between Meruelo and
Merco. Further, Meruelo did not sign any conflict-of-interest
waivers among the parties. Meruelo also declared no Rosen
attorney had asked him about the beneficiaries of the Meruelo
Trust or for a copy of the June 10, 1999 restatement of trust,
which Meruelo signed with his wife, Maria Meruelo (Maria), as
co-settlors of the Meruelo Trust. Meruelo averred the 1999
restatement “established new trust provisions for the benefit of
[Meruelo and Maria’s] two young sons, Stephen and Anthony.”
Meruelo attached excerpts of the 1989 Meruelo Trust document
and 1999 restatement, although neither document contains the
purported beneficiary designations for Stephen and Anthony.
Meruelo claimed in his declaration that his interest was adverse
to the interests of his adult sons. Further, his interest was
adverse to Maria’s interest because on July 12, 2018 (four months
before the arbitration hearing), Maria filed for dissolution of
marriage seeking a division of community property, including all
trust assets.
Meruelo also submitted a declaration from Dominguez, in
which she stated she assisted Meruelo on the first day of the
arbitration by carrying his voluminous exhibit binders. However,
Dominguez was only “a witness and not counsel” at the
arbitration hearing. Dominguez averred the arbitrator excluded
her from the arbitration proceedings and she “was only invited
back for [her] own testimony as a percipient witness.” She
watched Salvato’s testimony and the closing arguments as “a
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spectator.” Dominguez did not provide any advocacy and “did not
appear on behalf of or represent any party” in the arbitration.
D. The Trial Court Ruling
On August 20, 2020 the trial court held a hearing on the
petitions and took the matter under submission. Following the
hearing, the court issued an order denying the Meruelo
defendants’ petition to vacate and granting Rosen’s petition to
confirm the arbitration award. The court sustained Rosen’s
evidentiary objections to most of Meruelo’s declaration and
accompanying exhibits. Specifically, the court sustained Rosen’s
objections to the paragraphs in Meruelo’s declaration stating
Maria was a co-settler and their sons were beneficiaries of the
Meruelo Trust (objection nos. 52, 53, and 56) on the basis, among
others, the information was not in the arbitration record. The
court likewise sustained objections to the 1989 Trust document,
1999 restatement of trust, Maria’s dissolution of marriage
petition, and the 2012 bankruptcy court motion as outside the
arbitration record and incomplete copies (objection nos. 83, 84,
85, 88). Meruelo does not challenge the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings on appeal.
The court found Merco lacked standing to contest the
arbitration award because the award did not include Merco. As
to Meruelo’s assertion the arbitration award should be vacated
because he engaged in the authorized practice of law on behalf of
the Meruelo Trust, the court found “this constitutes a mistake of
fact,” and “mistakes of fact are not grounds for review or vacating
on an arbitration award.” The court also found “Meruelo’s
declaration in support of the petition makes no explicit statement
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with respect to prejudice.” Further, the arbitration award did not
violate any California express public policy.
The trial court rejected Meruelo’s argument the arbitration
award should be vacated because Meruelo did not sign conflict
waivers, explaining the arbitrator determined “that the parties
entered into an agreement waiving a potential conflict of interest
between Meruelo as an individual and as trustee of the Trust”
and “the interests of Meruelo as an individual or as trustee of the
Trust were not adverse or even directly adverse.” The court ruled
the arbitrator’s finding on the conflicts issue was “res judicata,”2
and “the presence of a conflict of interest between the parties is
not a ground for vacating an arbitration award.” The court
corrected the award amount, confirmed the arbitration award,
and granted Rosen’s request for post-award interest of $143,278.
On October 2, 2020 the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Rosen and against Meruelo in the amount of $1,556,698,
comprised of the arbitration award for $1,413,420,3 plus post-
award prejudgment interest of $143,278. The judgment ordered
Meruelo to pay 10 percent annual postjudgment interest and any
2 Courts have sometimes “used ‘res judicata’ as an umbrella
term encompassing both claim preclusion and issue preclusion,
which” are “two separate ‘aspects’ of an overarching doctrine.”
(DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 823;
accord, Parkford Owners for a Better Community v.
Windeshausen (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 216, 225.) Neither claim
preclusion nor issue preclusion is at issue on appeal.
3 The trial court determined the arbitration award against
Meruelo and the Meruelo Trust totaled $36 more than the
specific amounts the arbitrator had ordered, so the court
corrected the award in favor of Rosen to reflect $1,413,420, plus
post-award interest.
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attorneys’ fees and costs that Rosen would incur in the future to
enforce the judgment.4
Meruelo, individually and as trustee of the Meruelo Trust,
timely appealed from the judgment (B311652).5 Meruelo,
individually and as trustee of the Meruelo Trust, separately
appealed from the March 1, 2021 order awarding Rosen
$354,495.50 in attorneys’ fees for work on the petitions
(B312966). On August 26, 2021 we granted the parties’ motion to
consolidate the two appeals under case number B311652.
However, because Meruelo does not argue that the trial
court erred in confirming the arbitration award against him as
an individual, nor does Meruelo, individually and as trustee of
the Meruelo Trust, challenge the March 1, 2021 award of
attorney’s fees in his appellate briefs, Meruelo and the Meruelo
Trust have forfeited or abandoned the issues. (See Tiernan v.
Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211,
216, fn. 4 [issue not raised on appeal “deemed waived”]; Swain v.
4 In his opening brief Meruelo refers to a May 10, 2021 first
amended judgment, noting “[t]here was no substantive change to
the Judgment.” We do not consider the referenced first amended
judgment because it was entered after Meruelo filed his notice of
appeal, and it therefore is not part of the appellate record (and
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the judgment
once it was appealed).
5 Although Merco is listed as an appellant in the appellate
briefs filed by Meruelo and the Meruelo Trust, Merco is not listed
as a party on the notice of appeal, nor does the judgment
appealed from name Merco. We therefore do not address the
argument in the opening brief that the arbitrator exceeded his
powers by allowing Meruelo to represent Merco in the
arbitration.
10
LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59,
72 [“‘“‘Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are [forfeited] or
abandoned.’”’”]; Eck v. City of Los Angeles (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 141, 146 [appellant forfeited or abandoned
challenge to order denying intervention by not addressing order
in her appellate briefs].) We therefore consider only Meruelo’s
arguments that the arbitration award must be vacated as to the
Meruelo Trust.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“‘Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces the
parties’ intent to bypass the judicial system and thus avoid
potential delays at the trial and appellate levels, arbitral finality
is a core component of the parties’ agreement to submit to
arbitration.’ [Citation.] Generally, courts cannot review
arbitration awards for errors of fact or law, even when those
errors appear on the face of the award or cause substantial
injustice to the parties.” (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015)
60 Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey); accord, Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase
(1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10-11.)
The California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et
seq.)6 provides limited bases for judicial review of an arbitration
award. (Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916; Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. Browne George Ross LLP (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 749, 763.)
Section 1286.2, subdivision (a), authorizes a court “to vacate an
6 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
11
award if it was (1) procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) issued by a corrupt arbitrator; (3) affected by
prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrator; or (4) in
excess of the arbitrator’s powers.” (Richey, at p. 916; accord,
Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 840, 868 (Cohen).)
“Arbitrators may exceed their powers when they act in a
manner not authorized by the contract or by law, act without
subject matter jurisdiction, decide an issue that was not
submitted to arbitration, arbitrarily remake the contract, uphold
an illegal contract, issue an award that violates a well-defined
public policy, issue an award that violates a statutory right,
fashion a remedy that is not rationally related to the contract, or
select a remedy not authorized by law.” (Cohen, supra,
31 Cal.App.5th at p. 868; accord, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
Hampton, LLP v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. (2018)
6 Cal.5th 59, 72, 87 [arbitrator exceeded authority in awarding
contractual fees because law firm’s ethical breach rendered the
engagement letter unenforceable as against public policy];
Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 916 [“Arbitrators may exceed their
powers by issuing an award that violates a party’s unwaivable
statutory rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative
expression of public policy.”]; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v.
Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 363, 375 [“Unless the parties ‘have
conferred upon the arbiter the unusual power of determining his
own jurisdiction’ [citation], the courts retain the ultimate
authority to overturn awards as beyond the arbitrator’s powers,
whether for an unauthorized remedy or decision on an
unsubmitted issue.”].) However, “‘[a]rbitrators do not ordinarily
exceed their contractually created powers simply by reaching an
12
erroneous conclusion on a contested issue of law or fact, and
arbitral awards may not ordinarily be vacated because of such
error because “‘[t]he arbitrator’s resolution of these issues is what
the parties bargained for in the arbitration agreement.’”’” (Cable
Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1360-
1361; see Richey, at p. 917.)
“‘“‘On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration
award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration
award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that
the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed
factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those
issues.’”’” (Roussos v. Roussos (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 962, 973;
accord, Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 383;
California Union Square L.P. v. Saks & Co. LLC (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 340, 349 [“We review de novo the question
whether the arbitrator ‘exceeded his powers,’ but we must give
‘substantial deference to the arbitrator[’s] own assessments of
[his] contractual authority.’”]; Cohen, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
p. 869.) We review a trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and
may affirm a ruling on any ground supported by the record.
(Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 514, 519;
Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 479.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Confirmed the Arbitration Award
Meruelo contends the trial court erred in confirming the
arbitration award because the arbitrator exceeded his powers
when he allowed Meruelo, a nonattorney trustee, to represent the
Meruelo Trust in the arbitration. Meruelo also contends the
arbitration award was procured by fraud because Rosen had
actual notice that Meruelo could not represent the Meruelo Trust
13
given that in 2012 a party in the bankruptcy proceeding had
moved to strike Meruelo’s answer as trustee of the Meruelo Trust
on this ground. Neither contention has merit.
Business and Professions Code section 6125 provides, “No
person shall practice law in California unless the person is an
active licensee of the State Bar.” In nonprobate actions, a
nonattorney trustee generally cannot represent the trust because
he or she “is representing and affecting the interests of the
beneficiary and is thus engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.” (Ziegler v. Nickel (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 545, 549; accord,
Aulisio v. Bancroft (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1524 [“Ziegler
articulates a general rule that nonattorneys who purport to
conduct litigation on behalf of others violate the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law.”] However, where the
nonattorney trustee “is also the sole settlor and trust beneficiary,
the rationale underlying the prohibition on a trustee’s in propria
persona representation does not apply. Simply put, a trustee
litigating on behalf of a trust in which he as the settlor has
designated himself the sole beneficiary is not representing the
interests of others. The interest he represents is his own.”
(Aulisio, at p. 1524; accord, Boshernitsan v. Bach (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 883, 894.)
Meruelo argues the arbitrator permitted him to engage in
the unauthorized practice of law by allowing him to represent the
Meruelo Trust in the arbitration even though his wife Maria was
a co-settlor and his two adult sons were beneficiaries of the
Meruelo Trust. But the trial court sustained Rosen’s evidentiary
objections to Meruelo’s averments that Maria was a co-settler
and his sons were beneficiaries of the 1999 restatement of trust,
as well as to Rosen’s objections regarding the 1989 Meruelo Trust
14
document, the 1999 restatement, and the motion filed in the
bankruptcy proceeding that Meruelo claimed placed Rosen on
notice of the co-settler and beneficiaries. Meruelo does not on
appeal challenge the court’s evidentiary rulings, thereby
forfeiting any challenge to the correctness of the rulings.
(Villanueva v. City of Colton (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1197;
Roe v. McDonald’s Corp. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1114.)
Nothing else in the record shows whether the Meruelo
Trust had a co-settlor or beneficiaries. Therefore, Meruelo has
failed to meet his burden to show the arbitrator exceeded his
powers by allowing Meruelo to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law in violation of public policy.7 (Royal Alliance
Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1106
[“The party seeking to vacate an arbitration award bears the
7 Because Meruelo has not met his burden to show he
improperly represented the Meruelo Trust because of the
existence of other settlers or beneficiaries, we do not reach
whether the unauthorized practice of law by a trustee requires
vacatur of an arbitration award. In Russell v. Dopp (1995)
36 Cal.App.4th 765, 780, relied on by Meruelo, the Court of
Appeal reversed a judgment against the defendant entered after
a jury trial where the defendant was unaware her attorney was
not authorized to practice law, and the defendant was prejudiced
as a result. Meruelo has not presented any authority supporting
his argument that Russell applies to support vacatur of an
arbitration award. We likewise do not reach Rosen’s argument
that principles of waiver and estoppel preclude Meruelo from
arguing Rosen or the arbitrator should have advised Meruelo he
could not represent the Meruelo Trust given that Meruelo was
aware of the motion filed in the bankruptcy proceeding that he
claimed placed Rosen on notice that Meruelo could not represent
the Meruelo Trust.
15
burden of establishing that one of the six grounds listed in
section 1286.2 applies and that the party was prejudiced by the
arbitrator’s error.”]; see Comerica Bank v. Howsam (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 790, 826.) The trial court did not err in finding
the arbitrator did not exceed his powers in awarding contractual
legal fees to Rosen.
Meruelo also contends the arbitration award must be
vacated because it was procured by fraud. Section 1286.2,
subdivision (a), requires a court to vacate an arbitration award
procured by fraud “perpetrated by either the arbitrator or a party
involved.” (Pacific Crown Distributors v. Brotherhood of
Teamsters (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1146-1147.) “Not every
incidence of fraud will be allowed a remedy; vacation of an award
will lie only for occurrences of ‘extrinsic’ fraud and not for
‘intrinsic’ fraud’. ‘Extrinsic’ fraud is that conduct which ‘results
in depriving either of the parties of a fair and impartial hearing
to their substantial prejudice.’” (Id. at p. 1147, fn. omitted;
accord, Baker Marquart LLP v. Kantor (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th
729, 803.) The focus “‘is upon whether the protesting party had
an opportunity to discover and reveal the purported fraud at the
arbitration hearing.’” (Pacific Crown Distributors, at p. 1148;
accord, Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 810, 832.)
Meruelo argues Rosen had actual notice that Meruelo, as a
nonattorney trustee, could not represent the Meruelo Trust
because in 2012 a party in the bankruptcy proceeding moved to
strike Meruelo’s answer as trustee of the Meruelo Trust on this
ground. However, as discussed, Meruelo has forfeited his
challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings sustaining
Rosen’s objections to Meruelo’s statements in his declaration
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describing the trust and the motion filed in the bankruptcy
proceeding, as well as Rosen’s objections to the trust documents
and bankruptcy motion. Further, Meruelo presented no evidence
that Rosen knew Maria was a co-settler and Meruelo’s adult sons
were beneficiaries of the Meruelo Trust. And significantly, even
if Meruelo was not authorized to represent the Meruelo Trust,
Meruelo cites no authority for his assertion Rosen had a duty to
inform the arbitrator of this fact, or that the failure to do so
constituted fraud.
DISPOSITION
The judgment confirming the arbitration award and order
granting Rosen attorneys’ fees and costs are affirmed. Rosen &
Associates, P.C., is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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