Schreiber v. Lee ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • Filed 4/9/20
    CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    MARTHE SCHREIBER,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A149969
    v.
    STEPEHEN K. LEE et al.,                     (San Francisco City & County
    Super. Ct. No. CGC 13534301)
    Defendants and Appellants.
    MARTHE SCHREIBER,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A150093
    v.
    GOLDEN PROSPERITIES                         (San Francisco City & County
    MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC,                    Super. Ct. No. CGC 13534301)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Plaintiff Marthe Schreiber was seriously injured when she fell through
    a skylight built into the deck of her apartment. Defendant Stephen K. Lee
    built the three-unit apartment building and previously owned the property.
    At the time of the accident, Lee’s adult children owned the property, and it
    was managed by defendant Golden Prosperities Property Management
    Company LLC (Golden Prosperities). Prior to trial, Schreiber settled with
    the Lee children for $2.5 million.
    *Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110,
    this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts IIIA.–F.
    1
    At the close of Schreiber’s case, Lee moved for nonsuit on the ground
    her claims against him were based on a patent construction defect and
    therefore barred by the statute of repose set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
    section 337.1. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury thereafter
    awarded Schreiber damages totaling just over $2.6 million. The jury also
    apportioned fault, allocating 12 percent to Schreiber, 54 percent to Lee, 16
    percent to Golden Prosperities, and 18 percent collectively to the Lee children
    (allocations Schreiber does not challenge on appeal).
    After reducing the verdict to reflect Schreiber’s percentage of fault, the
    trial court offset the entirety of the economic damages by the amount of the
    settlement attributable to such damages. However, it denied any credit to
    Lee and Golden Prosperities as to the noneconomic damages and entered
    judgment against Lee for $756,000 and against Golden Prosperities for
    $224,000.
    Lee and Golden Prosperities make numerous claims of error during
    trial, and also claim they are entitled to a full settlement credit as to
    noneconomic damages. We affirm in all respects except as to the settlement
    credit, concluding Golden Prosperities, but not Lee, is entitled to a credit
    against both economic and noneconomic damages. We publish our discussion
    of the settlement credit issue given the somewhat unusual circumstances,
    namely that the Lee children were not only found independently negligent
    but also bore imputed liability for Golden Prosperities’ negligence.
    II. BACKGROUND1
    Schreiber has resided in the apartment building at issue since it was
    built in 1980. Lee, who then owned the property, did the development work.
    1  We only briefly summarize the facts here, discussing them in more
    detail in connection with the issues defendants raise on appeal.
    2
    The building has a garage on the ground floor and three residential units on
    the upper floors. Schreiber’s apartment has a deck atop the roof of the
    garage, with an imbedded skylight that lets light into the garage.
    In the late 1980’s, Lee and his wife transferred ownership of the
    property to their six children. Although Schreiber sought to have the deed
    declared invalid, the trial court found the Lee children were, indeed, the
    lawful owners of the property.
    In 2005, Golden Prosperities was formed and took over management of
    the property. It was a “member-owned management company,” with Lee and
    the Lee children serving as board members. Lee was also chairman of the
    board and chief executive officer. Sons Gordon Lee and Peter Lee handled
    day-to-day operations, and were the only ones paid.
    At some point, Schreiber hired a contractor to install planter boxes
    around the skylight because she was concerned it might pose a danger to
    visiting children playing on the deck. She never thought the skylight was
    strong enough to stand on, and never put anything on it.
    In 2013, Schreiber and an employee of hers were gardening on the
    deck. As she was handing him a “six-pack of flowers from one end of the
    skylight to the other,” she fell through the skylight.
    Schreiber was hospitalized at San Francisco General Hospital for about
    two weeks, and at Laguna Honda for approximately five weeks. She had no
    insurance at the time, and was billed $230,843.06 by San Francisco General
    and $56,841 by Laguna Honda. Schreiber later became retroactively eligible
    for Medi-Cal, and under Medi-Cal’s contract with San Francisco General and
    Laguna Honda, the medical bills were resolved for far lesser amounts,
    $43,243.64 for San Francisco General and $14,283.45 for Laguna Honda.
    3
    Schreiber subsequently filed the instant action, eventually naming as
    defendants Lee, Golden Prosperities, the Lee children, and Stephen K. Lee
    Enterprises, a partnership formed around 1988 that previously managed the
    property.2 Prior to trial, she settled with the Lee children and Stephen K.
    Lee Enterprises for $2.5 million.
    Following the close of Schreiber’s case-in-chief, Lee moved for nonsuit,
    asserting her claims against him were based on a patent construction defect
    and therefore barred by the four-year statute of repose. The court denied the
    motion.
    The jury eventually awarded Schreiber just over $2.63 million in
    damages: $1.23 million in economic damages and $1.4 million in
    noneconomic damages.3 It allocated 12 percent of the fault to Schreiber, 54
    percent to Lee, 16 percent to Golden Prosperities, and 18 percent collectively
    to the Lee children (3 percent each).
    Prior to entry of judgment, Lee and Golden Prosperities moved for an
    offset for the full amount of the settlement. Following further briefing on
    whether the Lee children, as the owners of the property, had a nondelegable
    duty with respect to its condition, the court denied the motion. Thereafter,
    the court offset the economic damages in full and entered judgment against
    Lee for $756,000 (his proportional share of the noneconomic damages) and
    against Golden Prosperities for $224,000 (its proportional share). The court
    2 Lee, himself, had no ownership interest in, nor was he otherwise
    involved with, this partnership.
    3   We have rounded the amounts for ease of reference.
    4
    also denied motions for a new trial, to set aside the verdict, and for judgment
    notwithstanding the verdict.4
    III.   DISCUSSION
    A. Denial of Nonsuit Based on Statute of Repose
    Lee continues to maintain that Schreiber’s claims against him are
    barred by the four-year statute of repose set forth in Code of Civil Procedure
    section 337.1.5
    Our standard of review of a nonsuit ruling is well-established: “Rulings
    on motions for nonsuit and for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] are
    reviewed for the existence of substantial evidence. (Kidron v. Movie
    Acquisition Corp. (1995) 
    40 Cal.App.4th 1571
    , 1580 . . . [nonsuit]; Stubblefield
    Construction Co. v. City of San Bernardino (1995) 
    32 Cal.App.4th 687
    , 703
    . . . [judgment notwithstanding the verdict].) . . . [W]e examine the entire
    record for substantial evidence to support them. Whereas the body of
    evidence pertinent to nonsuit is that identified in the plaintiff’s opening
    statement or case-in-chief [citation], the entire body of evidence presented at
    trial is pertinent to a [judgment notwithstanding the verdict] motion.” (OCM
    Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007)
    
    157 Cal.App.4th 835
    , 845.)
    4  Lee and Golden Prosperities separately appealed. On our own
    motion, we consolidated the appeals for purposes of oral argument and
    opinion.
    5 “[A] statute of limitations creates ‘a time limit for suing in a civil
    case, based on the date when the claim accrued.’ . . . [¶] A statute of repose,
    on the other hand, puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action.
    That limit is measured not from the date on which the claim accrues but
    instead from the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.”
    (CTS Corp. v. Waldburger (2014) 
    573 U.S. 1
    , 7–8, superseded by statue on
    other grounds as stated in In re Dowling (6th Circ. 2015) 
    778 F.3d 545
    , 533,
    fn. 2.)
    5
    Code of Civil procedure section 337.1 provides in pertinent part:
    “(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no action shall be
    brought to recover damages from any person performing or
    furnishing the design, specifications, surveying, planning,
    supervision or observation of construction or construction of an
    improvement to real property more than four years after the
    substantial completion of such improvement for any of the following:
    (1) Any patent deficiency in the design, specifications, surveying,
    planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction
    of an improvement to, or survey of, real property;
    (2) Injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any such
    patent deficiency; or
    (3) Injury to the person or for wrongful death arising out of any such
    patent deficiency. [¶] . . . [¶]
    “(d) The limitation prescribed by this section shall not be asserted by
    way of defense by any person in actual possession or the control, as
    owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time any
    deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the proximate cause of
    the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action.
    “(e) As used in this section, ‘patent deficiency’ means a deficiency which
    is apparent by reasonable inspection.”6 (Code Civ. Proc., § 337.1, subds.
    (a)(1)–(3), (d), (e).)
    Whether a patent defect exists is determined by an objective standard:
    “The test to determine whether a deficiency is patent is based on the average
    consumer’s reasonable expectations. The test is thus objective rather than
    subjective; it is not applied to each individual user.” (Tomko Woll Group
    Architects, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 
    46 Cal.App.4th 1326
    , 1339.) “ ‘The
    6 Thus, while Golden Prosperities “joins” in all issues Lee raises on
    appeal, the statute of repose defense applies only to Lee, who previously
    owned the property and built the apartment building.
    6
    use of an objective test for a patent defect effectuates the broad protection
    afforded contractors by the statute by eliminating the possibility that a defect
    could be deemed patent as to some plaintiffs and latent as to others
    depending on the circumstances of each person injured as a result of the
    defect.’ ” (Id. at p. 1339, fn. 6, italics omitted.) “Whether a defect is apparent
    by reasonable inspection is a question of fact.” (Winston Square Homeowner’s
    Assn. v. Centex West, Inc. (1989) 
    213 Cal.App.3d 282
    , 290.)
    Lee maintains Schreiber’s claims against him were based on a patent
    defect because she knew the skylight was dangerous. In other words, even
    assuming the defect in the skylight “may have [originally] been latent,”
    according to Lee, Schreiber’s “discovery of its defective and dangerous
    qualities, caused it to become patent.” (Italics omitted.)
    However, “under [Code of Civil Procedure] sections 337.1 and 337.15,
    even actual observation of a deficiency or its immediate effects will not make
    it patent if the average consumer would not have fully understood its
    physical cause or known it to be a deficiency. A design deficiency, for
    example, resulting in inadequate drainage of a deck was held arguably latent
    because the nonexpert owners and occupants could have reasonably thought
    better maintenance would prevent the periodic flooding (Geertz v. Ausonio
    [(1992)] 4 Cal.App.4th [1363,] 1371–1372.); a defect in an office building’s
    heating and air conditioning system was likewise held latent because the
    precise mechanical cause of the malfunction could not be determined (Baker
    v. Walker & Walker, Inc. (1982) 
    133 Cal.App.3d 746
    , 762–763. . .).”
    (Chadwick v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1993) 
    17 Cal.App.4th 1112
    , 1123.) “[I]f a
    reasonable inspection would reveal only the manifestation of a defect but not
    its cause, i.e., the defect itself, then the defect is not necessarily patent.”
    (Geertz v. Ausonio, at p. 1368, italics omitted.)
    7
    In urging that the skylight was a patent defect, Lee relies on
    Schreiber’s testimony that she placed planter boxes around it because she
    “thought that [visiting] kids might want to play on it, and I thought that
    might be dangerous, and so I thought I would try to make it safer.” She
    further testified that when she moved into the unit in 1980, she “had no idea
    that the skylight was dangerous at that time. . . . [A]fter nine years, when I
    had little children coming up on the deck, I reconsidered that. But when I
    moved in, I would have never imagined . . . I was moving into a defective
    building.” “[M]y testimony’s been that I thought putting the barriers would
    make it safer. I don’t know that I thought it was ever completely safe. . . .
    But after I put the planter boxes, I no longer thought it was dangerous for the
    children to play there.”
    Two expert witnesses testified on behalf of Schreiber about the
    skylight. Gerald Fulghum, a safety engineer, testified that, “based on the
    Cal/OSHA rules that applied the day that [Lee] finished construction” there
    should have been “a skylight screen[, a] skylight capable [of] supporting 200
    pounds, or the perimeter protected by a 42-inch high standard guardrail.” He
    explained “[i]f it was a skylight constructed with sufficient strength of 200
    pounds, it would look just like that. If it had the screen, a skylight screen, we
    would see that across the top. If it had the other type of skylight screen that
    goes underneath it, which we also call burglar bars, you wouldn’t be able to
    see it. And of course if it had a guardrail, you’d be able to see the railings
    around the four sides.” Robert Benz, a forensic architect and general
    contractor, testified that the skylight should have had a 42-inch high guard
    rail around it, as required by the building code.
    The jury was specifically asked to find whether the asserted
    deficiencies in the skylight were patent and thus answered the following
    8
    question on the special verdict form: “Would the deficiency in the skylight
    which caused the injury to Ms. Schreiber be apparent to an average person
    during the course of a reasonable inspection?” It answered in the negative—
    thus finding a latent, rather than patent, defect.
    There was, as we have recited, ample evidence to submit the issue to
    the jury. Although the existence and placement of the skylight, itself, was
    patent, the deficiencies in the skylight testified to by Schreiber’s experts—its
    inability to support 200 pounds, the lack of a 42-inch barrier, and the absence
    of a “skylight screen”—were latent inadequacies. Accordingly, the court did
    not err in denying Lee’s motion for nonsuit.
    B. Admission of Medical Bills
    Lee and Golden Prosperities contend the trial court erred in admitting
    Schreiber’s medical bills without redacting the amounts billed. They also
    maintain the court concomitantly erred in instructing the jury it could
    consider the “whole bills,” including the amounts billed, to “understand . . .
    the extent of [Schreiber’s] treatment.”
    Lee filed two motions in limine seeking to “exclude all evidence of billed
    amounts of [Schreiber’s] past medical expenses.” The first sought to exclude
    the billed amounts to establish Schreiber’s past medical expenses, and the
    second sought to exclude the billed amounts to establish the value of her
    future medical expenses. Following the court’s tentative ruling on the
    admission of the bills, Lee filed an additional written objection to admission
    of the bills “to demonstrate the severity of plaintiff’s injuries,” specifically
    objecting to their admission to establish noneconomic damages. The court
    denied the second motion concerning use of the billed amounts to establish
    Schreiber’s future medical expenses.
    9
    Accordingly, the court subsequently admitted Schreiber’s medical bills
    from San Francisco General and Laguna Honda. As we have recited, the bill
    from San Francisco General totaled $230,843.06, but was satisfied by Medi-
    Cal’s payment of $43,243.64. The bill from Laguna Honda totaled $56,841,
    but was satisfied by Medi-Cal’s payment of $14,283.45. In short, the billed
    amounts far exceeded the amounts actually paid for Schreiber’s medical care.
    The court also instructed the jurors, in pertinent part, that the medical
    bills “may not be considered by you in terms of what the actual medical
    expenses are. I’m admitting the whole bills . . . for you to consider the extent
    of the treatment. So it’s just to help you understand what the extent of the
    treatment is. . . . [¶] The only amounts that you can consider as past
    economic expenses are amounts that were actually paid.” No instruction,
    however, limited the jury’s consideration of the billed amounts in
    determining future economic damages or noneconomic damages.
    In Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 541
    (Howell), our Supreme Court held “an injured plaintiff whose medical
    expenses are paid through private insurance may recover as economic
    damages no more than the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer
    for the medical services received or still owing at the time of trial.” (Id. at
    p. 566.) Accordingly, “when a medical care provider has, by agreement with
    the plaintiff’s private health insurer, accepted as full payment for the
    plaintiff’s care an amount less than the provider’s full bill, evidence of that
    amount is relevant to prove the plaintiff’s damages for past medical expenses,
    and, assuming it satisfies other rules of evidence, is admissible at trial.” (Id.
    at p. 567.) And “[w]here the provider has, by prior agreement, accepted less
    than a billed amount as full payment, evidence of the full billed amount is not
    itself relevant on the issue of past medical expenses.” (Ibid.)
    10
    The court in Howell did not consider “whether evidence of the full
    amount billed was relevant or admissible on ‘other issues, such as
    noneconomic damages or future medical expenses.’ ” (Romine v. Johnson
    Controls, Inc. (2014) 
    224 Cal.App.4th 990
    , 1014 (Romine).) The Court of
    Appeal in Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 1308
     (Corenbaum),
    however, squarely did so.
    Corenbaum concluded: “Because the full amount billed for past medical
    services provided to plaintiffs is not relevant to the value of those services . . .
    the full amount billed for those past medical services can provide no
    reasonable basis for an expert opinion on the value of future medical
    services.” (Corenbaum, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331.) For the same
    reason, “evidence of the full amount billed is not admissible for the purpose of
    providing plaintiff’s counsel an argumentative construct to assist a jury in its
    difficult task of determining the amount of noneconomic damages and is
    inadmissible for the purpose of proving noneconomic damages.”7 (Id. at
    p. 1333.) Corenbaum remains the definitive decision as to the evidentiary
    issues it decided. (See Hill v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (E.D.Cal. 2013)
    
    944 F.Supp.2d 943
    , 964 & fn. 1 [after Howell and Corenbaum, the full
    7  Noneconomic damages “ ‘do not consist of only emotional distress and
    pain and suffering. They also consist of such items as invasion of a person’s
    bodily integrity (i.e., the fact of the injury itself), disfigurement, disability,
    impaired enjoyment of life, susceptibility to future harm or injury, and a
    shortened life expectancy.’ ” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 
    7 Cal.App.5th 276
    , 300.) “Noneconomic damages compensate the plaintiff for ‘pain,
    suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other
    nonpecuniary damage.’ ([Civ. Code,] § 3333.2, subd. (a).) [Civil Code,]
    [s]ection 1431.2, subdivision (b)(2) similarly defines noneconomic damages as
    ‘subjective, non-monetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering,
    inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and
    companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation.’ ”
    (Rashidi v. Moser (2014) 
    60 Cal.4th 718
    , 720, fn. 2.)
    11
    amount of medical bills is no longer admissible to prove noneconomic
    damages].)
    Schreiber nevertheless contends, as she successfully did in the trial
    court, that the San Francisco General and Laguna Honda bills were properly
    admitted in their entirety “to determine the type and number of healthcare-
    related treatments . . . [she] was forced to undergo.”
    In canvassing the history of the issues before it, Corenbaum observed
    that “[o]pinions by the Courts of Appeal prior to Howell . . . held that the rule
    . . . limiting the amount of a plaintiff’s recovery did not preclude the
    admission of evidence of the full amount billed for past medical care, and
    stated that such evidence provided the jury a more accurate indication and a
    more complete picture of the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Corenbaum,
    supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1334, citing Olsen v. Reid (2008)
    
    164 Cal.App.4th 200
    , 204, and Greer v. Buzgheia (2006) 
    141 Cal.App.4th 1150
    , 1157.) Corenbaum went on to point out, however, that given the often
    great disparity between the amounts billed and the amounts actually paid for
    medical services, the billed amounts are simply not a reliable guidepost for
    determining past or future medical expenses, or noneconomic damages.
    (Corenbaum, at p. 1333.)
    Schreiber’s assertion that the billed amounts were relevant to assessing
    the nature and extent of her injuries is simply another variation of the
    evidentiary proposition squarely rejected in Corenbaum. Indeed, the sole
    purpose of determining the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s injuries is to
    assist in the determination of the plaintiff’s economic and noneconomic
    damages. As Corenbaum made clear, it is not the medical billings, but the
    medical records—detailing the plaintiff’s injuries, treatment and prognosis—
    that are relevant to determining the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s
    12
    injuries. Accordingly, the trial court erred in admitting the San Francisco
    General and Laguna Honda medical bills without, at the very least, redacting
    the billed amounts. (See Romine, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1013 [trial
    court erred in admitting “full amount billed” for plaintiff’s medical care].)
    It is not enough, however, for defendants to show error. To obtain relief
    on appeal they must also show the error was prejudicial. (Romine, supra,
    224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1014.) “ ‘Claims of evidentiary error under California
    law are reviewed for prejudice applying the “miscarriage of justice” or
    “reasonably probable” harmless error standard of People v. Watson (1956)
    
    46 Cal.2d 818
    , 836. . . . Under the Watson harmless error standard, it is the
    burden of appellants to show that it is reasonably probable that they would
    have received a more favorable result at trial had the error not occurred.’ ”
    (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 855
    , 877.)
    We cannot, for several reasons, conclude it is “reasonably probable” the
    jury’s verdict would have been more favorable to the defendants had the trial
    court not admitted the amounts billed.
    To begin with, the jury was instructed that, in determining Schreiber’s
    past medical expenses, it could consider only the amounts actually paid for
    her care. And the jury appears to have done just that, awarding only the
    $57,527 in past medical expenses, very close to the amounts Medi-Cal
    actually paid for Schreiber’s medical care ($43,243.64) and the cost of her
    dental work ($3,500), and a far cry from the $273,086 billed by San Francisco
    General and Laguna Honda.
    As for future medical and dental expenses, Schreiber’s attorney urged
    the jury to award over $1.27 million. More than $1 million of this suggested
    amount was for a daily home health aide Schreiber claimed she needed
    because of a disabling neurologic injury. Whether Schreiber suffered such an
    13
    injury and would require daily assistance were the most hotly disputed
    aspects of her claimed injuries and future medical expenses. The jury
    awarded Schreiber only $684,612 in future medical expenses, indicating it
    rejected her claim of a permanently crippling neurologic injury requiring
    daily medical support. It appears the jury awarded the total amounts she
    claimed for future medical expenses (totaling $268,608) and future dental
    treatment ($12,000) and an amount for limited in-home health assistance,
    which defendants urged was all Schreiber could possibly need.
    Finally, with respect to noneconomic damages, Schreiber’s attorney
    urged the jury to award $5 million. The jury awarded only $1.4 million.
    Considering all of the above, we cannot conclude that had the amounts
    billed by San Francisco General and Laguna Honda not been erroneously
    admitted, it is reasonably probable defendants would have obtained a more
    favorable result.
    C. References to NFL Player Head Injuries and Suicides
    Lee and Golden Prosperities claim the trial court also erred in allowing
    the trial to become peppered with references to head injuries sustained by
    National Football League (NFL) players.
    This topic surfaced during the testimony of Dr. Jerome Barakos,
    Schreiber’s expert in neuroradiology. Dr. Barakos testified Schreiber
    suffered a “diffuse axonal shearing” brain injury. He explained this type of
    injury cannot be seen on an MRI or CT scan, but can be observed on
    microscopic examination of the brain, which cannot be performed on a live
    patient.
    During Dr. Barakos’s testimony, the trial court asked, sua sponte,
    about head injuries suffered by NFL players: Court: “So doctor, we’ve seen a
    lot in the press about football players that have had brain injuries that have
    14
    developed. Are those brain injures normally observable or not on CT?
    [¶] [Lee’s counsel]: Your Honor––[¶] The Court: So this is a general question.
    It doesn’t have to do with this case at all. It’s just a general question.
    [¶] [Dr. Barakos]: So to answer your question, Your Honor, you’re right. So
    you’ve probably heard in the press, the NFLs–– the brain injuries, it’s
    referred to as CTE, or chronic traumatic encephalomalacia or
    encephalopathy. That is not typically identifiable on imaging. On [CT] scans
    or MRIs the brains tend to look normal. And actually there was been several
    suicides by several of the players––[¶] [Lee’s counsel]: Your Honor, I have to
    object and move to strike all of that testimony.” The court responded: “I’ll
    accept the motion and strike it at this time. So it may be something that can
    be brought up later on. But I think you’re—defense objects, and I think
    they’re correct. Stricken.”
    Schreiber’s counsel continued questioning Dr. Barakos about diffuse
    axonal shearing, and Dr. Barakos went on to explain that the gray matter
    and the white matter of the brain are different densities. As a result, “when
    the brain is bouncing around with a traumatic event, you have back and forth
    as well as rotational forces that cause these materials to move at slightly
    different velocities. . . . And that causes a shearing . . . between the gray and
    the white matter. . . .[¶] So the NFL injuries or someone that has a brain
    injury, the biggest concerns are . . . these forces that are propagated through
    the brain that result in the shearing. . . .[¶] [A]t the shearing level you get
    neurons that die, which is very hard to see on MR[I] or on [CT] scan.” Lee’s
    counsel did not object to, or move to strike, this reference to NFL player
    injuries.
    15
    Schreiber’s attorney then asked Dr. Barakos: “And have you read
    accounts of NFL . . . players killing themselves so that their brains can be
    studied?” Lee’s attorney objected, and the court sustained the objection.
    Next, in response to a question about how neuronal reserves in the
    brain can be depleted, Dr. Barakos responded, in pertinent part: “Multiple
    head injuries have a cumulative effect. . . . And so that’s kind of the basis of
    the NFL chronic traumatic encephalopathy. The more injuries you have has
    a cumulative effect.” Lee’s attorney again objected, and the court again
    sustained the objection.
    Later during Dr. Barakos’s testimony, and again sua sponte, the court
    asked: “To determine whether someone had brain stress, have there been
    studies on individuals that have died where the brains have actually been
    examined for brain stress?” Barakos responded: “Yes. [¶] . . . [¶] What they
    find is . . . as you’ve described as the stress. We call it shearing. It’s areas of
    axonal death due to the stretching and the death of the cells. . . . [¶] So the
    histologic studies as well as in the NFL players, you see the damage to. . . .”
    Lee’s counsel again objected: “Your Honor, I’m going to object to that and
    have the answer stricken.” This time, however, the court overruled the
    objection, stating, “So in this case I’ve sustained your objection to the NFL
    players several times. This time I’m going to overrule it because I’m not
    suggesting that . . . we have anything that’s comparable here to an NFL-type
    injury. What I’m interested in finding out is whether he has scientifically
    some additional evidence in the way of actual physical studies of the brain to
    show that this stress that the doctor’s testified today about is, in fact, true.”
    In response to a question on cross-examination, Dr. Barakos again
    referred to the brain injuries seen in NFL players: Lee’s counsel: “You said
    there was no bruising of the brain and no bleeding in 2013 after the accident,
    16
    but you said there was a delayed effect?” Barakos: “Yes. So, in other words,
    the idea is we don’t have acute bruising of the brain. But in the setting of
    diffuse axonal injury or these rotatory forces, you get damage to the brain
    that of course is not showing up acutely as a bruise or a penetrating injury;
    but then you have axonal loss over time. So that would be the delayed effect.
    [¶] Same kind of thing with the NFL players. In other words, they’re losing
    brain tissue over time.” Lee’s counsel: “Objection. [¶] . . . [¶] Objecting to the
    answer.” The court again overruled the objection, stating, “Go ahead,” with
    Schreiber’s counsel commenting: “He [defense counsel] doesn’t like the
    answer.”
    Later, during the testimony of Dr. Arnold Greenberg, a neurologist
    called by Schreiber, the court asked, sua sponte, “what’s chronic
    encephalopathy? Greenberg responded “Chronic encephalopathy is a
    progressive brain disease which develop[s] in people with recurrent brain
    injuries.” The court then asked “It’s like football players, right?” Greenberg
    answered: “It’s just one example. The study represented at American
    Academy of Neurology was unique in the sense it’s been done on young
    functioning sports men and retired sports men who died of other causes,
    including suicide. It’s a unique study. And it’s now a rapidly evolved area in
    neurology.” Lee’s attorney objected and moved to strike the response. This
    time, the trial court sustained the objection, stating, “I think I’ll strike it. I
    don’t think that’s relevant here.”
    The trial court unquestionably erred in sua sponte questioning the
    physicians about NFL player head injuries and injecting this topic into the
    trial. Schreiber did not even attempt to lay a foundation that the
    commentary about these highly publicized injuries was relevant, let alone
    admissible, to prove the nature and extent of her own injuries.
    17
    Contrary to Schreiber’s assertion, Lee did not “invite” the trial court’s
    error in allowing the repeated references to NFL player head injuries. While
    she claims Lee’s attorney asked questions of her expert that elicited
    responses about NFL players, Lee’s attorney asked only, “You said there was
    no bruising of the brain and no bleeding in 2013 after the accident, but you
    said there was a delayed effect?” After answering the question, Dr. Barakos
    added, without any question pending, “So that would be the delayed effect.
    [¶] Same kind of thing with the NFL players. In other words, they’re losing
    brain tissue over time.” Lee’s counsel objected, but the court overruled the
    objection. Schreiber also claims Lee’s attorney “specifically questioned his
    [own] expert . . . about this matter.” What Lee’s counsel asked his expert
    about was the expert’s qualifications and experience. Dr. Brant-Zawadzki
    explained, in answering that inquiry, that the hospital at which he was
    employed had a memory and cognitive program as part of its Neuroscience
    Institute. Lee’s attorney followed up by asking, “And actually the . . .
    Institute has some relationship with the NFL Players Association?” Dr.
    Brant-Zawadzki replied “Yeah, we were fortunate to be selected as one of the
    six sites in the country to evaluate former NFL players. This benefit for
    them arose out of the settlement between the National Football League
    Players Association and the NFL around the concussion issue. So as part of
    the settlement a trust was established which provided the players with the
    benefit that . . . allows them to have their brains and bodies evaluated. [¶] . .
    .[T]hink of it as an executive physical that includes cognition as well as
    physical evaluation for these players.” Lee’s attorney then offered Dr. Brant-
    Zawadzki as an expert “in the area of neuroradiology and cognitive
    disorders,” and he was accepted as such.
    18
    Schreiber additionally claims Lee invited any error by “discuss[ing] the
    NFL testimony . . . in closing.” But at that point, all Lee’s attorney could do
    was try to neutralize the error that had already occurred, and she briefly
    referenced the NFL commentary in discussing the differences in the opinions
    of Dr. Barakos and Dr. Brant-Zawadzki, stating: “We heard about the NFL
    several times in connection with this case. And Dr. [Brant-Zawadzki’s]
    hospital, as you heard, obviously has a contract with the Players Association
    to evaluate players in connection with the concussion issues that are facing
    the NFL. [¶] What is being presented in this case is very different from what
    is being presented in the NFL. We are talking about two mild concussions
    seven years apart. Yes, [Schreiber] is . . . an older individual, but it is not the
    same kind of repeated constant trauma that takes place for an NFL player
    over the course of what is likely decades of playing football.” This argument
    did not “invite” any error.
    However, turning to whether the error in allowing repeated references
    to NFL player head injuries was prejudicial, we must again conclude, for a
    number of reasons, it was not.
    The court sustained several of Lee’s objections, including his objections
    to the most extensive commentary. Indeed, the court sustained four of his six
    objections in this regard and also ordered the responses stricken in two
    instances. It also instructed the jury, “If I sustained an objection to a
    question, ignore the question and do not guess as to why I sustained the
    objection. If the witness did not answer, you must not guess what he or she
    might have said. If the witness already answered, you must ignore the
    answer.” We must presume that the jurors understood and followed this
    instruction. (People v. Hernandez (2011) 
    200 Cal.App.4th 953
    , 969.)
    19
    As we have recited, the court stated several times that the commentary
    about the NFL player head injuries should not be construed to mean that
    Schreiber sustained the same type of injury. For example, the court stated,
    “So this is a general question. It doesn’t have to do with this case at all.”
    And it later stated, “So in this case I’ve sustained your objection to the NFL
    players several times. This time I’m going to overrule it because I’m not
    suggesting that . . . we have anything that’s comparable here to an NFL-type
    injury. What I’m interested in finding out is whether he has scientifically
    some additional evidence in the way of actual physical studies of the brain to
    show that this stress that the doctor’s testified today about is, in fact, true.”
    Lee also either failed to object, or failed to move to strike, several of the
    improper references to NFL player injuries.8 And while Lee complains the
    trial court failed to “exclude further references” to NFL player head injuries,
    he never asked the court to so instruct counsel and witnesses.
    The damage awards also indicate it is not reasonably probable the
    improper commentary about NFL player head injuries impacted the verdict.
    As we have discussed, Schreiber’s attorney argued in closing that Schreiber
    had suffered a disabling brain injury that would “impact her for the rest of
    her life, and it impacts her where she has no control or very little control of
    her emotional responses to everyday stimulation.” According to her attorney,
    Schreiber “now has to walk around and have these horrible emotional
    episodes. And they’re horrible. I mean, no one wants to act like this. No one
    8 In his reply brief, Lee asserts for the first time, that the trial court
    committed judicial misconduct and therefore the lack of an objection “is not a
    waiver if the misconduct was too serious to be cured by an admonition.”
    “Arguments raised for the first time in the reply brief are untimely and may
    be disregarded,” and we will not consider this belated argument here.
    (WorldMark, The Club v. Wyndham Resort Development Corp. (2010)
    
    187 Cal.App.4th 1017
    , 1030, fn. 7.)
    20
    wants to alienate people. And [Schreiber] does. She cannot help herself at
    this point.” He then urged the jury to award over $2.53 million in economic
    damages and $5 million in noneconomic damages, for total damages of over
    $7.5 million. Given that the jury awarded Schreiber a little over $2.63
    million in total damages, we cannot conclude that it is reasonably probable
    the improper references to NFL player head injuries factored into the
    outcome at trial.
    D. Failure to Instruct on Schreiber’s Potential Bias Against Lee
    Lee and Golden Prosperities also claim the trial court erred in refusing
    to instruct the jury with CACI No. 217. This instruction provides: “You have
    heard evidence that there was a settlement between [settling parties]. You
    must not consider this settlement to determine responsibility for any harm.
    You may consider this evidence only to decide whether [settling party] is
    biased or prejudiced and whether [his/her] testimony is believable.” (CACI
    No. 217.)
    “A party is entitled to request that the jury be instructed correctly on
    any of the party’s theories of the case that are supported by substantial
    evidence.” (Douglas v. Fidelity National Ins. Co. (2014) 
    229 Cal.App.4th 392
    ,
    408.) We review the denial of a jury instruction de novo.9 (Chicago Title Ins.
    Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 401
    , 418.) “A refusal to
    instruct the jury is reversible error if it is probable that the error
    prejudicially affected the verdict.” (Douglas, at p. 408.)
    9  Schreiber erroneously maintains the standard of review is abuse of
    discretion, claiming Lee’s “argument is at its core an evidentiary dispute,”
    and Evidence Code “section 352 requires this Court to review the trial court’s
    decision only for abuse of discretion.” The court, however, admitted evidence
    of the settlement agreement, and that admission is not challenged on appeal.
    21
    Schreiber was deposed about a year before her settlement with the Lee
    children, and at the time, Lee was not named as an individual defendant.
    Her deposition testimony was to the effect that Lee “ ‘went into the
    background’ ” as far as “ ‘managing the property’ ” when “ ‘the [Lee] children
    took over’ ” about ten years earlier, around 2005. She also agreed that “from
    a management standpoint at the property [she dealt] mostly with Peter Lee.”
    Schreiber thereafter added Lee as a defendant. At trial, Schreiber
    testified that, although Lee became less active in managing the property
    around 2005, she “always went to [Lee]” if she needed something because
    “Peter [Lee] was terrible with me from the beginning.”
    Lee then sought admission of evidence of the settlement with the Lee
    children and requested the jury be instructed with CACI No. 217, asserting
    Schreiber’s testimony regarding who was primarily managing the property
    changed between her deposition, when Lee was not a party, and trial, when
    Lee was a party and the Lee children had settled. Lee’s counsel maintained:
    “There’s a bias issue . . . in terms of what her testimony was at the time that
    she gave her . . . testimony, her testimony is geared to enhancing the focus on
    the people who she’s suing.”
    The trial court allowed an evidentiary stipulation as to the date of the
    settlement and the identity of the parties who settled. It refused, however, to
    instruct the jury with CACI No. 217, instead instructing with CACI No. 3926.
    That instruction stated: “You have heard evidence that Marthe Schreiber
    has settled her claim against Stephen K. Lee Enterprises, Peter Lee, Gordon
    Lee, Shacuan Sharon Lee Seto, Anne Lee, Eva Wong, and Patricia Lum. Any
    award of damages to Marthe Schreiber should be made without considering
    any amount that she may have received under this settlement. I will make
    the proper deduction from any award of damages.”
    22
    The court explained, “giving the instruction on bias and prejudice as to
    Ms. Schreiber would be more prejudicial than probative, and I’m not going to
    give it at this time. [¶] . . . I think if I give this instruction at this time, the
    spotlight will be focused on Ms. Schreiber, and it’ll be detrimental to her
    position. I don’t know what the Lees are going to say when they start to
    testify. So they can potentially testify in a way that I could get a request to
    give the instruction as to them. I don’t know. It might be that way. [¶] I’m
    not necessarily precluding or saying that I wouldn’t give the instruction
    again. I’d have to see what Ms. Schreiber testifies. I mean, right now you
    don’t have really terrific impeachment of her. If we have some other evidence
    that comes in, maybe I’d reconsider giving it. But as long as she’s fairly
    consistent with her deposition testimony, I’m not going to give the
    instruction. I think it’s apt to have a very powerful effect if I give this. So
    that’s the ruling right now.”
    We need not, and do not, decide whether the trial court erred in
    refusing to give the requested instruction. Even assuming the instruction
    should have been given, defendants’ assertion of bias, based on supposed
    differences between Schreiber’s deposition and trial testimony, is not borne
    out by the record. Schreiber testified at trial that, although Lee was less
    active in the management of the property, she preferred to contact him about
    property issues, rather than one of his sons. Lee’s testimony was not to the
    contrary. He testified that, although he stepped back from active
    management, he continued to perform some tasks. For instance, he
    contacted Schreiber in 2015 about a neighbor’s complaint that she had left
    the water running. In fact, in closing argument, Lee’s counsel stated, “When
    it comes down to the management of 71 Water Street, there actually isn’t
    very much of a dispute.” We therefore cannot say that had the instruction
    23
    been given, it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been more
    favorable to defendants.
    E. Evidence of Lee Family Financial Assets
    Lee and Golden Prosperities additionally claim the trial court
    erroneously allowed evidence related to the “Lee Family’s wealth [and]
    corporate interests.”
    Lee filed two motions in limine concerning Lee family financial assets.
    One sought to exclude “any evidence of the financial conditions of plaintiff or
    defendants.” The court granted that motion, stating “No evidence of value of
    any property or overall value of Lee’s holdings can be introduced into
    evidence. No mention of his wealth or holdings in opening statement. None
    at all. It’s without prejudice to your showing that he had other properties for
    other issues, such as a showing of control. That’s without prejudice. You can
    show that. But if you do it, you could only––you could use it for control
    only. . . . Not a word about what his overall—what he’s overall worth.”
    The second motion in limine sought to exclude any evidence of Lee
    family LLCs, receiverships, or lawsuits involving Lee family members. The
    court ruled, “That’s a grant. No mention of it at all. No mention in opening
    statement. It can be introduced for the purposes of cross-examination on
    witnesses if you need it.”
    Defendants maintain that despite these rulings, the court allowed
    references to Lee family assets and businesses. They point to the testimony
    of Lee’s daughter and a declaration she prepared regarding the family
    businesses. The court allowed this evidence, over Lee’s objection, on the
    ground it went to the issue of whether Lee personally controlled the premises,
    and it read the bulk of the declaration to the jury, as follows: “ ‘My father,
    who was the general contractor, built the subject property and has served as
    24
    chairman and manager for the entire’ [¶] ‘Lee family portfolio [that] he and
    my mother built.’ [¶] . . . [¶] ‘The subject property was originally owned by
    [Lee and his wife] as Stephen K. Lee Enterprises. In 1987 and 1988, my
    father and mother transferred ownership to their subject property to their six
    children in equal shares. . . . The six children now own the subject property
    as tenants in common with each having an undivided one-sixth interest.’
    [¶] . . . [¶] ‘On October 1, 2005, the six of us and our father formed Golden
    Prosperities Management Company. . . . I’m a member of Golden
    Prosperities as are my siblings, and I’ve been a member since 2005. The
    purpose of forming Golden Prosperities was the management of this and
    other business entities that generally owned real property and/or securities,
    which are owned by some or all of the members and have agreed to be
    managed by the company.’ [¶] . . . [¶] ‘Originally my father served as
    manager for . . . most of the properties from his own office. And that Peter
    [Lee] . . . was the manager up until about 2014.’ [¶] . . . [¶] ‘Golden
    Prosperities has managed the entire Lee family portfolio since it’s formation.
    One of the properties to be managed by Golden Prosperities was and is the
    subject property. Golden Prosperities takes management fees from all the
    entities in the Lee family portfolio including the subject property. . . .
    [¶] . . . [¶] ‘In approximately 2007, we, Golden Prosperities, hired my brother,
    Peter Lee, to work with my father in the office beginning with bookkeeping
    and gradually helping with the management of the various properties.
    Golden Prosperities paid Peter a salary for the services. Peter acted as the
    manager until 2014, when we lost confidence in Peter’s ability to properly
    manage the property.’ ”
    Defendants claim it was “undisputed the Lee children owned the
    property at the time of the incident . . . [and therefore] any minimal probative
    25
    value this prejudicial information may have had as to their investments was
    eliminated once they no longer remained parties to the case.” (Italics
    omitted.) To the contrary, “a defendant who lacks title to property still may
    be liable for an injury caused by a dangerous condition on that property if the
    defendant exercises control over the property.” (Alcaraz v. Vece (1997)
    
    14 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1158.) “ ‘[I]n identifying the party vulnerable to a verdict,
    control dominates over title. “The crucial element is control.” ’ ” (Id. at
    p. 1159.) “Those who own, possess, or control property generally have a duty
    to exercise ordinary care in managing the property in order to avoid exposing
    others to an unreasonable risk of harm.” (Annocki v. Peterson Enterprises,
    LLC (2014) 
    232 Cal.App.4th 32
    , 37.)
    Thus, one of Schreiber’s principal claims at trial was that regardless of
    who held record title to the property, the party who actually controlled and
    managed it was Lee, himself. Accordingly, in closing argument, Schreiber’s
    counsel relentlessly argued Lee pulled the strings and ultimately exhorted
    the jury to find him “100-percent responsible” for Schreiber’s injuries. In
    addition, whether Lee controlled the property was relevant to his statute of
    repose defense. As the jury was instructed, to succeed on that defense, Lee
    had to prove that “At the time of the incident, [he] did not control the
    skylight.” Accordingly, “control” remained a central issue throughout the
    trial.
    The declaration did make reference to the “ ‘entire’ [¶] . . . [¶] ‘Lee
    family portfolio’ ” and to “ ‘other business entities that generally owned real
    property and/or securities’ ”—facts fairly far afield from who actually
    controlled and managed the apartment property. However, while this
    evidence suggested the Lee family owned substantial assets, it did not reveal
    Lee’s or the Lee family’s net worth or financial assets as a whole. Thus,
    26
    defendants have not demonstrated that this evidence was more prejudicial
    than probative.
    Defendants next point to testimony by William Stephen Wilson,
    Schreiber’s expert witness on “real estate law including real estate
    management companies as well as on deeds.”
    Wilson explained that, among other things, he reviewed the minutes of
    Golden Prosperities’ board meetings, and he testified without objection that
    the company managed over a dozen buildings consisting of approximately 300
    dwelling units and a parking garage. According to Wilson, this made Golden
    Prosperities a “middle-tier management company,” which, in turn, meant it
    should have “[p]roperly written, generally lawyer-reviewed minutes that
    have a preset agenda, that have an orderly discussion of issues, that contain
    supporting information on which decisions can be based, and then formal
    votes on each of these issues.” Wilson then testified that instead of being
    proper minutes, “the minutes [of Golden Prosperities] ‘read like the notes of a
    family therapist,’ ” and indicated “Lee, and his family, paid ‘relatively little
    attention . . . to the condition of the properties or needs of [their] tenants,’ but
    instead [focused] on who had ‘control over the bank accounts.’ ”
    Defendants complain about Wilson’s reference to “the hundreds of
    residential units the Lee family owned, as well as commercial properties” and
    his commentary on the state of Golden Prosperities’ minutes. However,
    defendants made no objection to this testimony and therefore forfeited any
    complaint about it on appeal. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 
    56 Cal.4th 393
    ,
    438; People v. Dykes (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 731
    , 756.)
    Moreover, even if the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
    testimony, any error was not prejudicial. None of the complained of
    testimony directly related to Lee’s or the Lee family’s overall wealth, and, as
    27
    previously discussed, the jury did not award Schreiber close to the amount of
    damages she claimed. Defendants therefore have not shown it is reasonably
    probable the outcome would have been more favorable to them had these
    snippets of testimony been excluded.
    F. Alteration of Special Verdict Form During Deliberation
    Lee additionally complains about a modification the trial court made to
    the special verdict form while the jury was deliberating. Specifically, the
    court altered the form by adding, as to the Lee children, an option for the jury
    to allocate their percentage of fault either on the basis of their ownership of
    the property, or on the basis of their status as “agent[s] or employee[s]” of
    Golden Prosperities. The jury found the Lee children liable only as owners.
    Lee maintains the trial court erred because it did not accompany this
    change in the verdict form with any instructions on the liability of the Lee
    children as members of Golden Prosperities. He also asserts “the jury was
    not asked to answer questions which would allow it to find the Lee Children
    individually liable as members of [Golden Prosperities].” These errors
    supposedly “precluded the jury from allocating any fault to the Lee Children
    as members of [Golden Prosperities],” (italics omitted) causing the verdict
    form to be “hopelessly ambiguous” and “ensuring Lee was allocated a
    substantial, and unsupported, percentage of fault.”10
    However, the court instructed the jury on the requirements for finding
    the Lee children and/or Golden Prosperities negligent in allowing an unsafe
    condition on the property. That instruction provided in part: “Golden
    Prosperities . . . and/or [the Lee children] was negligent in the use or
    maintenance of the property if: [¶] 1. A condition on the property created an
    10This claim of error does not, of course, pertain to Golden
    Prosperities.
    28
    unreasonable risk of harm; [¶] 2. Golden Prosperities . . . and/or [the Lee
    children] knew or, through the exercise of reasonable care, should have
    known about it; and [¶] 3. Golden Prosperities . . . and/or [the Lee children]
    failed to repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or give
    adequate warning of the condition.” The court also instructed the jury that
    “After a tenant has taken possession, a landlord must take reasonable
    precautions to prevent injury due to any unsafe condition in an area of the
    premise under the landlord’s control if the landlord knows or reasonably
    should have known about it.”
    As to the personal liability of an officer or director of a company, the
    court instructed: “Generally, a director or officer of a corporation cannot be
    held personally liable for the negligence of the corporation. However[,] a
    director or officer can be held personally liable for damages caused to [a]
    person or entity if that director or officer specifically authorized, directed, or
    participate[d] in the allegedly tortious conduct; or that although they
    specifically knew or reasonably should have known that some hazardous
    condition or activity under their control could injur[e] plaintiff, they
    negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm.” The
    court also instructed the jury that “A corporation is responsible for harm
    caused by the wrongful conduct of its employees or agents while acting within
    the scope of their authority.”
    These instructions, as a whole, provided sufficient guidance to the jury
    to determine whether the Lee children were liable for the condition of the
    property as members or officers of Golden Prosperities. Accordingly, Lee
    cannot demonstrate any error in amending the special verdict form to give
    the jury the option of finding them liable and allocating fault to them on that
    basis or on the basis of their ownership of the property.
    29
    G. Settlement Credit
    Lee and Golden Prosperities lastly claim the trial court erred in
    providing a settlement credit only as to economic damages and not as to
    noneconomic damages. This is a significant issue, as a credit against both
    the economic and noneconomic damages would result in a zero net judgment
    given the size of the pre-trial settlement. (See Syverson v. Heitmann (1985)
    
    171 Cal.App.3d 106
    , 110, abrogated by statute on another ground as stated in
    Goodman v. Lozano 
    47 Cal.4th 1327
    , 1330.)
    As we explain, this is not a typical Proposition 51 case, where all
    defendants faced joint and several liability for economic damages, but only
    several liability for noneconomic damages in accordance with their
    percentages of fault. Here, the settling defendants faced joint and several
    liability not only for the entirety of the economic damages but also for that
    portion of the noneconomic damages attributable to a defendant for which
    they faced imputed liability, as well as several liability for that portion of the
    noneconomic damages attributable to their own negligence. As a result, a
    different settlement credit analysis is required from that employed in the
    usual Proposition 51 case. Under this analysis, Golden Prosperities is
    entitled to a full settlement credit, but Lee is not.
    To recap the salient facts, the Lee children, who owned the property,
    settled with Schreiber before trial for $2.5 million. The jury subsequently
    found Schreiber sustained past and future damages totaling just over $2.6
    million. It also apportioned fault, allocating 12 percent to Schreiber, 54
    percent to Lee (as the developer of the property), 16 percent to Golden
    Prosperities, and 18 percent collectively to the Lee children (as the owners of
    the property). Thus, taking into account Schreiber’s own comparative fault,
    30
    the jury found she was entitled to recover $2.3 million—an amount she had
    already recovered in full through the settlement.
    In resolving the settlement credit issue before us, we first examine the
    nature of the liability the Lee children faced as the owners of the property.
    Specifically, the question is whether the Lee children would have been
    entitled to the benefit of Proposition 51’s limitation on liability for
    noneconomic damages. (See Rashtian v. BRAC-BH, Inc. (1992) 
    9 Cal.App.4th 1847
    , 1851–1852 [first examining the nature of a vehicle owner’s liability for
    the negligence of a permissive driver in determining whether Proposition 51
    applied].)
    Henry v. Superior Court (2008) 
    160 Cal.App.4th 440
    , 448–450 (Henry),
    nicely summarizes the backdrop against which Proposition 51 was enacted:
    “ ‘Under well-established common law principles, a negligent tortfeasor is
    generally liable for all damage of which his negligence is a proximate
    cause. . . . A tortfeasor may not escape this responsibility simply because
    another act—either an “innocent” occurrence such as an “act of God” or other
    negligent conduct—may also have been a cause of the injury.’ (American
    Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 
    20 Cal.3d 578
    , 586 . . . (American
    Motorcycle).) [¶] ‘In cases involving multiple tortfeasors, [this] principle . . .
    has commonly been expressed in terms of “joint and several liability.” ’ ”
    (Henry, at p. 448, quoting American Motorcycle, at p. 586.)
    “In American Motorcycle the Court concluded its adoption of principles
    of comparative negligence in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 
    13 Cal.3d 804
     . . . ,
    which eliminated the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence, ‘does
    not warrant the abolition or contraction of the established “joint and several
    liability” doctrine; each tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of
    an indivisible injury remains individually liable for all compensable damages
    31
    attributable to that injury.’ (American Motorcycle, [supra, 20 Cal.3d] at
    p. 582.) However, to minimize the hardship on defendants from such a rule,
    ‘the American Motorcycle court held (1) that plaintiffs should no longer have
    the unilateral right to determine which defendant or defendants should be
    included in an action and that defendants who were sued could bring other
    tortfeasors who were allegedly responsible for the plaintiff’s injury into the
    action through cross-complaints [citation], and (2) that any defendant could
    obtain equitable indemnity, on a comparative fault basis, from other
    defendants, thus permitting a fair apportionment of damages among
    tortfeasors.’ ”11 (Henry, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 449, quoting
    Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 
    44 Cal.3d 1188
    , 1197.)
    Such “doctrinal advances went a considerable distance toward ensuring
    an injury caused by two or more tortfeasors would be apportioned according
    to their respective shares of comparative responsibility. Nonetheless, joint
    and several liability imposed on the remaining defendants the risk of paying
    more than their proportionate share if one or more tortfeasors liable for the
    plaintiff’s damages were insolvent or otherwise unavailable to respond to a
    judgment. (See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1199
    11   “[A]lthough American Motorcycle referred to ‘ “concurrent
    tortfeasors,” ’. . . , the term properly refers to both concurrent and successive
    tortfeasors: ‘[I]t matters not whether the tortfeasors acted in concert to
    create a single injury, or successively, in creating distinct and divisible
    injury.’ ([Blecker v. Wolbart (1985) 
    167 Cal.App.3d 1195
    ,] 1200, fn. 2, 1203
    [,abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in Henry v. Superior Court,
    supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 452]; see BFGC Architects Planners, Inc. v.
    Forcum/Mackey Construction, Inc. (2004) 
    119 Cal.App.4th 848
    , 852 . . .
    [‘[J]oint and several liability in the context of equitable indemnity is fairly
    expansive. . . . [I]t is not limited to “the old common term ‘joint tortfeasor”. . .
    .’ ‘It can apply to acts that are concurrent or successive, joint or several, as
    long as they create a detriment caused by several actors.’]. . . .)” (Henry,
    supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 453.)
    32
    [‘[a]lthough these various developments served to reduce much of the
    harshness of the original all-or-nothing common law rules, the retention of
    the common law joint and several liability doctrine produced some situations
    in which defendants who bore only a small share of fault for an accident could
    be left with the obligation to pay all or a large share of the plaintiff’s damages
    if other more culpable tortfeasors were insolvent’].)” (Henry, supra,
    160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 449–450.)
    “To ameliorate this ‘inequity and injustice,’ at least in part, in 1986 the
    California electorate passed Proposition 51.” (Henry, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th
    at p. 450, citing DaFonte v. Up–Right, Inc. (1992) 
    2 Cal.4th 593
    , 599
    (DaFonte).) Civil Code section 1431.2, subdivision (a), thus, provides: “In
    any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based
    upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-
    economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each
    defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages
    allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s
    percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that
    defendant for that amount.”12 Accordingly, “ ‘Proposition 51 . . . retains the
    joint liability of all tortfeasors, regardless of their respective shares of fault,
    with respect to all objectively provable expenses and monetary losses,’ but
    12  “Economic” damages encompass all “objectively verifiable monetary
    losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of
    property, costs of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute
    domestic services, loss of employment and loss of business or employment
    opportunities.” (Civ. Code, § 1431.2, subd. (b)(1).) “Non-economic” damages
    are such “subjective, non-monetary losses [as] . . . pain, suffering,
    inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and
    companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation.”
    (Id., § 1431.2, subd. (b)(2).)
    33
    ‘the more intangible and subjective categories of damage [are] limited . . . to a
    rule of strict proportionate liability. With respect to these noneconomic
    damages, the plaintiff alone now assumes the risk that a proportionate
    contribution cannot be obtained from each person responsible for the injury.’ ”
    (Henry, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 450, quoting DaFonte, at p. 600.)
    However, even in cases seeking recovery for personal injury, property
    damage, or wrongful death, there are some contexts in which Proposition 51
    does not limit a defendant’s liability for noneconomic damages. A number of
    courts have held Proposition 51 inapplicable where liability is imposed on a
    defendant solely because of his or her relationship with a co-tortfeasor, or
    because of statutory mandate or legal principle, and not because the
    defendant acted in a manner that caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s
    injury—that is, when liability is “ ‘imputed,’ ” rather than based on actual
    fault or culpable conduct. (Henry, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 458–459; see
    Rashtian, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1851 [Proposition 51 cannot “as a matter
    of logic or common sense, be applied to those who are without fault and only
    have vicarious liability by virtue of some statutory fiat”].)
    For example, in Miller v. Stouffer (1992) 
    9 Cal.App.4th 70
    , 85 (Miller),
    the court concluded, “Proposition 51 does not shield a vicariously liable
    employer who is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior from
    liability for noneconomic damages.” The doctrine of respondeat superior
    “imposes liability ‘irrespective of proof of the employer’s fault.’ [Citation.]
    Liability is imposed on the employer as ‘ “a rule of policy, a deliberate
    allocation of a risk.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 84.) Such “ ‘[v]icarious liability means that
    the act or omission of one person . . . is imputed by operation of law to
    another[.]’ ” (Ibid., italics omitted) “If . . . Proposition 51 shields every
    defendant from liability for noneconomic damages beyond that attributable to
    34
    that defendant’s own fault, it largely would abrogate the vicarious tort
    liability of persons for the acts of others. Nothing in the language or intent of
    Proposition 51 conveyed to the voters in June 1986 dictates such a drastic
    change in California tort law.” (Miller, at p. 85; see Rashtian, supra,
    9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1853–1854 [Proposition 51 not applicable where vehicle
    owner’s liability is not based upon culpability, but on status as owner
    pursuant to permissive user statute].) In effect, “vicariously liable
    defendants are viewed, for policy reasons, as a single entity.” (Arena v.
    Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998) 
    63 Cal.App.4th 1178
    , 1197 (Arena).)
    Courts have reached the same conclusion in some products liability
    cases, specifically as to defendants within the same chain of distribution of a
    single defective product. (E.g., Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc. (2007)
    
    147 Cal.App.4th 80
    , 93–95 (Bostwick); Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997)
    
    56 Cal.App.4th 618
    , 628–633 (Wimberly); see Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at
    pp. 1193–1199 [while defendants within the same chain of distribution of a
    single product remain jointly and severally liable, Proposition 51 applies in
    asbestos cases where multiple products cause the plaintiff’s injuries and the
    evidence provides a basis to allocate liability]; cf. Romine, supra,
    224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1011 [observing a “split in authority of sorts has
    developed over Proposition 51’s application to strict products liability
    actions”].)
    In Wimberly, for example, the court recounted the similarities between
    vicarious liability and strict products liability. As the Supreme Court had
    observed in Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 
    46 Cal.3d 796
    , 813,
    footnote 13: “ ‘In many instances—for example, strict product liability—tort
    law places “direct” liability on an individual or entity which may have
    exercised due care in order to serve the public policies of a fair allocation of
    35
    the costs of accidents or to encourage even greater safety efforts than are
    imposed by the due care standard. [Citation.] As a leading text on torts
    explains, the modern justification for vicarious liability closely parallels the
    justification for imposing liability on the nonnegligent manufacturer of a
    product: “What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious
    liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk. The losses caused
    by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the
    conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as
    a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer
    because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past
    experience involve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought
    to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent plaintiff, should
    bear them; and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute
    them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift
    them to society, to the community at large.” ’ ” (Wimberly, supra,
    56 Cal.App.4th at p. 630, italics omitted.) Wimberly thus concluded,
    “Proposition 51 has no application in a strict product liability case” because
    liability is not based on comparative fault. (Id. at p. 633.)
    The courts have similarly concluded Proposition 51 does not apply
    where a property owner’s liability is based on the doctrine of “nondelegable
    duty.” “Under this doctrine, a landlord cannot escape liability for failure to
    maintain property in a safe condition by delegating such duty to an
    independent contractor. [Citations.] Simply stated, ‘ “[t]he duty which a
    possessor of land owes to others to put and maintain it in reasonably safe
    condition is nondelegable. If an independent contractor, no matter how
    carefully selected, is employed to perform it, the possessor is answerable for
    harm caused by the negligent failure of his contractor to put or maintain the
    36
    buildings and structures in reasonably safe condition[.]” ’ ”13 (Srithong v.
    Total Investment Co. (1994) 
    23 Cal.App.4th 721
    , 726 (Srithong), quoting
    Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation (1943) 
    23 Cal.2d 256
    , 260.) “Thus,
    for example, a landlord’s duty to maintain elevators in a safe condition is
    nondelegable (Brown v. George Pepperdine Foundation, . . . at p. 259 ), as is
    the owner’s duty to maintain a water heater which is a fixture (Knell v.
    Morris (1952) 
    39 Cal.2d 450
    , 456–457 . . .), and the duty to maintain and
    repair a roof or other portions of the premises over which the landlord retains
    possession and control. (Poulsen v. Charlton [(1964)] 224 Cal.App.2d [262,]
    268.)” (Srithong, at p. 726.)
    Srithong accordingly concluded “the nondelegable duty rule is a form of
    vicarious liability because it is not based on the personal fault of the
    landowner who hired the independent contractor.” (Srithong, supra,
    23 Cal.App.4th at p. 727.) Rather, “the party charged with a nondelegable
    duty is ‘held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an
    employee or an independent contractor’ ”—the rationale being “there will be a
    financially responsible defendant available to compensate for the negligent
    harms caused by that defendant’s activity” (i.e., the ownership of commercial
    property). (Ibid., italics omitted, quoting Maloney v. Rath (1968) 
    69 Cal.2d 442
    , 446, abrogated by statute on other grounds as stated in SeaBright Ins.
    Co. v. US Airways, Inc. (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 590
    , 602.) The commercial property
    owner in Srithong was therefore not entitled to the benefit of Proposition 51’s
    13 The Restatement of Torts, section 422 likewise provides: “A
    possessor of land who entrusts the repair of a building or other structure
    thereon to an independent contractor is subject to the same liability to
    persons within or outside the land who are injured by the contractor’s
    negligent failure to put or maintain the building or structure in reasonably
    safe condition as though he had retained the making of the repairs in his own
    hands.”
    37
    limitation on noneconomic damages, but rather was “fully liable for” the
    negligence of the roofing contractor it had hired. (Srithong, at p. 728; accord
    Koepnick v. Kashiwa Fudosan America, Inc. (2009) 
    173 Cal.App.4th 32
    , 35
    [owner of commercial building fully liable for negligence of elevator
    contractor].)
    Accordingly, in cases where one of several defendants is vicariously
    liable for the wrongful conduct of another, the court must, in entering
    judgment, take into account that Proposition 51 does not apply to the
    vicariously liable defendant.14 In cases where there are only two defendants,
    one of which is vicariously liable for the negligence of the other, sorting out
    the extent of liability for purposes of entering judgment is straightforward—
    the vicariously liable defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entirety
    of both the economic and noneconomic damages, while the negligent
    defendant is also jointly and severally liable for the economic damages, but
    only severally liable for its proportional share of the noneconomic damages.
    The situation is more complicated where, in addition to two defendants
    of the sort described above, there are additional tortfeasors whose acts
    contributed in some way to the plaintiff’s injury. In Miller, the court
    addressed this situation after concluding a vicariously liable employer cannot
    seek the protection of Proposition 51 to avoid liability for an employee’s
    negligence. This does not mean, said the court, that a vicariously liable
    defendant is wholly deprived of the benefit of Proposition 51—a vicariously
    liable employer “does enjoy the benefit of Proposition 51 in that the
    employer’s liability for noneconomic damages is restricted to the percentage
    14 As have prior cases, we use the term “vicariously liable” broadly to
    include those circumstances in which liability is imputed, rather than based
    on the defendant’s own wrongful conduct.
    38
    of fault allocated to its employee.” (Miller, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 84.)
    Thus, “had [the plaintiff] also sued another motorist, a public entity, or a
    vehicle manufacturer, under Proposition 51 [the employer] would have been
    shielded from liability for noneconomic damages beyond those attributable to
    . . . her own employee.” (Ibid.)
    Citing Miller, a leading treatise on personal injury law, California
    Practice Guide: Personal Injury, states: “[I]f both employee and employer are
    joined as defendants (employee on a direct negligence theory and employer
    solely on a vicarious liability theory) along with other defendants whose fault
    is being compared, as between employer and employee, they would be jointly
    and severally liable for the employee’s share of noneconomic damages
    according to the employee’s fault (as well as for the employee’s full joint and
    several economic damages liability).” (Haning, Flahavan, Cheng & Wright,
    Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter Group 2019), ¶ 2:618,
    p. 2(II)-3.)
    This treatise further observes, “There may be cases where the employer
    can be sued on other theories as well—e.g., negligent entrustment, negligent
    supervision or perhaps negligent hiring. If there is an independent basis for
    holding the employer liable, it will usually be to the plaintiff’s advantage to
    plead both the respondeat superior and independent liability theories.
    Reason: In multidefendant cases, the trier of fact will have to make a
    separate determination of what percentage of fault is attributable to the
    employer under the independent theory; the employer, in turn, will be liable
    for that protion of noneconomic damages resulting from both the fault
    allocated to the employee and the fault allocated to the employer on the
    independent theory.” (Id., ¶ 2:619, at p. 2(II)-4.) The treatise then provides
    the following example: “In a multi-defendant work-related injury case, it is
    39
    determined that Defendant A is 10% at fault, Defendant B (Employee) is 70%
    at fault, and Defendant C (Employer) is 20% at fault (on a theory of negligent
    supervision of Employee). Employer, who presumably has the ‘deepest
    pockets,’ could be reached for 90% of the noneconomic damages (70% on the
    vicarious liability theory, plus 20% on the negligent supervision theory).”
    (Ibid.)
    The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions as to the
    nature, and extent, of the liability faced by the Lee children. As the owners
    of a commercial property, they not only faced liability for their own
    negligence, they also faced imputed liability, under the nondelegable duty
    doctrine, for any wrongdoing on the part of persons and entities assisting
    them in the care and management of their property. They therefore faced
    liability for both their own negligent acts and the acts of their property
    manager, Golden Prosperities.
    They did not, however, face imputed liability for Lee’s conduct as the
    developer of the property, including his constructing the defective sky light.
    They are, as the owners of the property, and as Lee points out, wholly
    responsible for maintaining the property in a reasonably safe condition and
    correcting, or warning of, dangerous conditions thereon, including pre-
    existing conditions they did not create. However, they are not liable beyond
    the confines of a traditional tort analysis. Rather, their liability as owners to
    maintain and repair is predicated on a duty of care that extends not to any
    dangerous condition, but to dangerous conditions of which they are aware or
    reasonably should be aware. (See Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 
    26 Cal.4th 1200
    , 1205–1207 [duty to exercise reasonable care encompasses only
    conditions known to the possessor of premises or which the possessor should
    reasonably discover, and only conditions the possessor should realize create
    40
    an unreasonable risk of injury]; Alcarez v. Vece (1997) 
    14 Cal.4th 1149
    , 1156–
    1159 [possessor’s duty to maintain property in reasonably safe condition
    arises regardless of whether possessor creates the dangerous condition]; see
    generally 6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2019) § 19:53, pp. 19-
    245–19-247 [landlord has affirmative duty to maintain premises in a
    reasonably safe condition and this duty includes an inspection to discover any
    dangerous condition that can be reasonably discovered].) In short, in contrast
    to the vicarious liability the Lee children bore for any acts of their property
    manager under the nondelegable duty doctrine, they were not liable,
    regardless of their own fault (i.e., their own duty of care and breach thereof),
    for Lee’s development and construction work.
    As a consequence of the nature of their liability, the Lee children were
    not entitled to the full benefit of Proposition 51, and they faced joint and
    several liability not only for all of Schreiber’s economic damages, but also for
    Golden Prosperities’ share of her noneconomic damages, as well as several
    liability for their own proportional share of those damages. Thus, using the
    jury’s allocation to illustrate, had the Lee children proceeded to trial, they
    would have been liable for all of Schreiber’s economic damages and also for 34
    percent of her noneconomic damages (based on the 18 percent of fault
    allocated to them, plus the 16 percent of fault allocated to Golden
    Prosperities). They would, however, have received the benefit of Proposition
    51 as to Lee, who was found individually liable solely on the basis of his prior
    ownership and development of the property (and not as a participant in
    Golden Prosperities).
    Having determined the nature and extent of the Lee children’s
    potential liability, we turn to the question of how their pretrial $2.5 million
    settlement should be credited.
    41
    The courts have long recognized that when Proposition 51 applies,
    nonsettling defendants are entitled to a settlement credit as to economic
    damages, but not as to noneconomic damages. (Espinoza v. Machonga (1992)
    
    9 Cal.App.4th 268
    , 275–276.) The rationale for this is as follows: Because
    Proposition 51 limits a tortfeasor’s liability for noneconomic damages to his or
    her own proportional share of these damages, “a personal injury plaintiff’s
    valid ‘claim’ against one such tortfeasor for noneconomic damages can never
    be the liability of ‘the other[]’ [tortfeasors].” (Id. at p. 274.) Accordingly,
    “[t]he payment of such a claim by one tortfeasor is not the payment of a claim
    for which ‘the other[]’ [tortfeasors] might ever be held jointly and severally
    liable.” (Id. at pp. 274–275.)
    In other words, when a defendant entitled to the full benefit of
    Proposition 51 settles, he or she is resolving, with respect to noneconomic
    damages, only his or her own share of those damages. (See generally Cal.
    Practice Guide: Personal Injury, supra, ¶ 4:85, at p. 4-11; Weil & Brown, Cal.
    Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019), ¶
    12:775, p. 12(II)-73.) And nonsettling defendants cannot look to that
    payment as resolving, in whole or in part, their proportional shares of those
    damages.
    This is so even when a defendant entitled to the full benefit of
    Proposition 51 overestimates his or her share of fault and “overpays” to
    resolve his or her share of the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages. (Hoch v.
    Allied-Signal, Inc. (1994) 
    24 Cal.App.4th 48
    , 65–67 (Hoch).) Rather, as to
    noneconomic damages, the parties must live with the bargain they struck. “If
    the settlement was ‘low,’ the plaintiff loses; he or she cannot recover the
    difference in noneconomic damages from the remaining defendants. If the
    settlement was ‘high,’ . . . the plaintiff wins; he or she retains the benefit of
    42
    the settlement bargain as well as receiving the amounts allocated by the jury
    to the nonsettling defendants. The nonsettling defendants bear no risk and
    can reap no benefit from divergence; the settlement does not affect their
    liability for noneconomic damages.” (Id. at p. 65.) Or stated another way,
    because the plaintiff bears the risk of recovery as to noneconomic damages
    (by having to look to each tortfeasor to fully recover these damages where
    Proposition 51 applies), equity dictates that the plaintiff “also be entitled to
    retain the benefit of [his or her] bargain when the settlement is generous”
    (i.e., where the settling defendant overestimates its degree of fault and
    overpays to settle its share of the noneconomic damages). (Id. at p. 66.)
    However, the fundamental predicate of the Espinoza/Hoch analysis—
    that the settling defendant is only severally liable for noneconomic damages
    and thus is resolving only his or her own proportional share of those
    damages—is absent where, as here, the settling defendant is not entitled to
    the full benefit of Proposition 51 and continues to face joint and several
    liability for some or all of the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages. In this
    situation, the settling defendant must resolve not only his or her own
    proportional share of those damages (based on the settling defendant’s own
    negligence), but also the share of those damages for which he or she is
    vicariously liable. In short, when a vicariously liable defendant settles, he or
    she is in a sense “pre-paying,” in whole or in part, the liability of the
    defendant for whom the settling defendant is vicariously liable.
    The conclusion that naturally follows is that full credit for such a
    settlement must be given to the defendant for whom the settling defendant
    bears imputed liability. Proposition 51 is not an impediment to such credit
    because, as we have discussed, it does not apply to a settling tortfeasor to the
    extent he or she bears imputed liability to the plaintiff. The equitable issue
    43
    addressed in Hoch likewise does not exist because the plaintiff and the
    vicariously liable defendant bargain to resolve a liability that exceeds the
    latter’s own proportion of fault.
    A credit for both economic and noneconomic damages in this context
    also fulfills the longstanding acknowledgment embedded in our law outside of
    Proposition 51, that a settlement, while not releasing other tortfeasors,
    reduces their liability by the amount of the settlement. Where a settlement
    is determined to be in “good faith,” this mandate is set forth in Code of Civil
    Procedure section 877, which additionally protects the settling party from
    any claims for contribution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877, subd. (a); see generally
    Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 291
    , 301, 303–304.)
    Where, as here, a trial court declines to find a settlement in “good faith,” a
    settlement credit is nevertheless required, but the settling party remains
    subject to claims for contribution.15 (Id. at pp. 307–308.)
    Ultimately, settlement credits are predicated on the principle that
    while a plaintiff is entitled to full compensation for his or her proven injuries,
    he or she is not entitled to a “double recovery” of these damages. (See Poire v.
    C.L. Peck/Jones Brothers Construction Corp. (1995) 
    39 Cal.App.4th 1832
    ,
    1840 [the “ ‘fundamental purpose’ ” of a settlement credit under Code of Civil
    Procedure section 877 “ ‘is to preclude a double recovery arising out of the
    same wrong.’ ”]; see also Bostick, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 111 [“one of the
    15  Several of the Lee children moved for a “good faith” settlement
    determination, but made a scant showing in support of their motion. Not
    surprisingly, the trial court denied the motion, including because they failed
    to carry their burden to demonstrate the extent of their liability and because
    several of the Lee children opposed the settlement. The dissenting members
    of the Lee family felt the entire case should have been resolved and believed
    their attorney (paid for by their insurance company) and the plaintiff’s
    attorney had agreed to a deal not in the Lee family’s best interests.
    44
    purposes of the setoff requirement . . . is to avoid an unjust double recovery”]
    (conc. opn. of Croskey, Acting P.J.).) “When multiple defendants are
    responsible for the same compensatory damages, a setoff . . . is required by
    the fundamental principle that ‘. . . a plaintiff may not recover in excess of
    the amount of damages which will fully compensate him for his injury.’ ”
    (Hoch, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 67, quoting Jaramillo v. State of
    California (1978) 
    81 Cal.App.3d 968
    , 970.) A “plaintiff cannot, by proceeding
    separately against each of several defendants, ‘ “convert a joint into a several
    [injury], and thereby secure more than one compensation for the same
    injury.” ’ (May v. Miller [1991] 228 Cal.App.3d [404,] 410, . . . .) In a case of
    joint liability, the damages for which each defendant is responsible to the
    plaintiff cannot be divided, and a settlement is rationally assumed to be
    intended to cover the entire damages.” (Hoch, at p. 67.)
    A vicariously liable defendant and a negligent defendant for whom the
    vicariously liable defendant bears liability, are responsible for the same
    damages. And while a plaintiff can look to either the vicariously liable
    defendant or the actively negligent defendant to pay these damages, the
    plaintiff cannot recover these same damages from both.
    It is for this reason that Golden Prosperities is entitled to full credit for
    the settlement by the Lee children, since, as the owners of the property, they
    were jointly and severally liable for the negligent conduct of their
    management company. Any other outcome would result in a double recovery,
    with Schreiber recovering the same noneconomic damages from both the Lee
    children and Golden Prosperities. Proposition 51 was intended to make the
    tort system more equitable by eliminating the “ ‘deep pocket’ rule” and
    requiring that noneconomic damages be paid by the party who is at fault for
    inflicting them. (DaFonte, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 599.) It was not designed to
    45
    allow double recovery for the same injury. We also observe that, taking into
    account Schreiber’s own percentage of fault, the jury found she sustained
    total damages of just over $2.3 million, an amount she fully recovered
    through her $2.5 million settlement with the Lee children. And while
    Schreiber cannot recover any additional amount from Golden Prosperities,
    she will recover an additional $756,000 from Lee and thus receive an amount
    considerably in excess of the total damages found by the jury.
    IV.   DISPOSITION
    The judgment as to Golden Prosperities is reversed and the trial court
    is directed to enter a net zero judgment. The judgment as to Lee is affirmed.
    Parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
    46
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    _________________________
    Margulies, J.
    A149969, A150093, Schreiber v. Lee
    47
    Trial Court: Superior Court of Francisco City and County
    Trial Judge: Hon. A James Robertson, II
    Counsel:
    Brent Fiol & Pratt LLP, Peter Joseph Brent, Wesley R. Pratt and David L. Fiol for
    Plaintiff and Respondent.
    Bledsoe, Diestel, Treppa & Crane LLP, Alison McNaboe Crane, Jamie Nicolas Bernate
    and Jocelyn S. Koo; Berding & Weil LLP, Arthur Fredrick Hagen and Daniel
    Rottinghaus for Defendants and Appellants.
    48