Collie v. The Icee Co. ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 7/20/20
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    TARAUN COLLIE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                   E071654
    v.                                                   (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1611741)
    THE ICEE COMPANY et al.,                             OPINION
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Brian S.
    McCarville, Judge. Affirmed.
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre, Jeffrey S. Ranen, Erica
    Rocush and Aashish Bhargava for Defendants and Appellants.
    Protection Law Group, Heather Davis, Amir Nayebdadash and Priscilla Gamino
    for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    The Icee Company and J & J Snack Foods Corp. (collectively, Icee) appeal the
    trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a dispute with a former
    employee. The employee, Taraun Collie, alleged a single cause of action against Icee
    1
    under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) 1
    We hold that under Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles LLC (2014) 
    59 Cal. 4th 348
    (Iskanian) and Betancourt v. Prudential Overall Supply (2017) 
    9 Cal. App. 5th 439
    (Betancourt), an employee cannot be compelled to arbitrate a PAGA cause of action on
    the basis of a predispute arbitration agreement. 
    (Iskanian, supra
    , at pp. 386-387;
    
    Betancourt, supra
    , at pp. 445-446.) We also join Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc.
    (2019) 
    32 Cal. App. 5th 602
    (Correia) in holding that Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018)
    __ U.S. __ [
    138 S. Ct. 1612
    ] (Epic) does not undermine the reasoning of Iskanian and
    Betancourt. (Correia, at pp. 619-622.) We therefore affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Collie alleged that he worked for Icee from November 2014 to August 2015.
    When he began his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement, which stated in
    pertinent part: “The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of
    all claims or controversies (‘claims’), past, present or future, whether or not arising out of
    my employment (or its termination), that the Company may have against me or that I may
    have against the Company or against its officers, directors, employees or agents in their
    capacity as such or otherwise. . . . The claims covered by this Agreement include, but are
    not limited to, claims for wages or other compensation due . . . and claims for violation of
    any federal, state, or other governmental law, statute, regulation, or ordinance, except
    claims excluded elsewhere in this Agreement. [¶] Except as otherwise provided in this
    1      Further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
    2
    Agreement, both the Company and I agree that neither of us shall initiate or prosecute
    any lawsuit or administrative action . . . in any way related to any claim covered by this
    Agreement.” The agreement provided that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C.
    § 1, et seq.) would govern interpretation and enforcement of the agreement and all
    proceedings under it.
    In July 2016, Collie filed his PAGA complaint on behalf of himself and other
    aggrieved employees. Icee moved to compel arbitration of Collie’s “individual claim” in
    August 2018. It argued that the parties had agreed to bilateral arbitration only, so Collie
    had to arbitrate his PAGA cause of action on an individual basis—that is, he could not
    seek PAGA penalties on behalf of other Icee employees. And because Collie had agreed
    to arbitrate all claims or controversies with Icee, neither could he maintain a PAGA
    action on behalf of other employees in court. In other words, he had effectively waived
    his right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of other employees in any forum.
    The trial court denied Icee’s motion, concluding that our Supreme Court’s
    decision in 
    Iskanian, supra
    , 
    59 Cal. 4th 348
    required that result.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Because the trial court relied on a determination of law to deny Icee’s motion, we
    apply the de novo standard of review. (
    Betancourt, supra
    , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 444.) We
    are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and “may affirm the denial on any correct
    legal theory supported by the record.” (Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 
    17 Cal. App. 5th 853
    , 864.)
    3
    DISCUSSION
    The court did not err by denying Icee’s motion to compel arbitration. Under
    PAGA, “‘an “aggrieved employee” may bring a civil action personally and on behalf of
    other current or former employees to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations.’”
    
    (Iskanian, supra
    , 59 Cal.4th at p. 380.) Before bringing the PAGA action, the employee
    must give notice of the alleged Labor Code violations to the employer and the Labor and
    Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A); Iskanian, at
    p. 380.) The employee may bring the PAGA action only after the LWDA refuses to
    investigate or the agency’s investigation results in no citation. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A)-
    (B); Iskanian, at p. 380.) Most of the recovered civil penalties (75 percent) go to the
    LWDA, with the remainder going to the aggrieved employees. (§ 2699, subd. (i);
    Iskanian, at p. 380.) “All PAGA claims are ‘representative’ actions in the sense that they
    are brought on the state’s behalf. The employee acts as “‘the proxy or agent of the state’s
    labor law enforcement agencies’” and “‘represents the same legal right and interest as’”
    those agencies.” (ZB, N.A. v. Superior Court (2019) 
    8 Cal. 5th 175
    , 185 (ZB).) Thus, a
    PAGA action to “‘recover civil penalties “is fundamentally a law enforcement action
    designed to protect the public and not to benefit private parties.”’” (Iskanian, at p. 381.)
    We held in Betancourt that an employer cannot rely on an employee’s predispute
    arbitration agreement to compel arbitration of a PAGA claim. (
    Betancourt, supra
    , 9
    Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-449.) We explained that, generally, a nonparty to an arbitration
    agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate. (Id. at p. 445.) And given that a PAGA
    claim “‘is a dispute between an employer and the state,’” the employee’s “predispute
    4
    agreement to arbitrate does not bind the state to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 447; accord
    id. at p.
    449 [reasoning that the “‘state is the real party in interest’” and is not bound by the
    employee’s predispute arbitration agreement].) Several other courts considering the issue
    have reached the same conclusion. (Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 
    32 Cal. App. 5th 602
    , 622 (Correia) [“Without the state’s consent, a predispute agreement
    between an employee and an employer cannot be the basis for compelling arbitration of a
    representative PAGA claim because the state is the owner of the claim and the real party
    in interest, and the state was not a party to the arbitration agreement”]; Julian v. Glenair,
    
    Inc., supra
    , 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 872 [“[A]n arbitration agreement executed before an
    employee meets the statutory requirements for commencing a PAGA action does not
    encompass that action” because the employee entered into such an “agreement as an
    individual, rather than as an agent or representative of the state”]; Tanguilig v.
    Bloomingdale’s, Inc. (2016) 
    5 Cal. App. 5th 665
    , 678 [“Because a PAGA plaintiff,
    whether suing solely on behalf of himself or herself or also on behalf of other employees,
    acts as a proxy for the state only with the state’s acquiescence (see § 2699.3) and seeks
    civil penalties largely payable to the state via a judgment that will be binding on the state,
    a PAGA claim cannot be ordered to arbitration without the state’s consent”].)
    We see no reason to depart from Betancourt here. Collie signed the arbitration
    agreement when he began his employment with Icee and before his PAGA claim arose.
    He executed the agreement in his individual capacity. The state had not deputized him to
    act at the time, and he therefore could not agree to arbitrate on behalf of the state. It does
    not matter that Icee wants to compel arbitration of Collie’s cause of action on “an
    5
    individual basis,” as opposed to as a representative of other aggrieved employees. Either
    way, Collie is suing “as a proxy for the state [and] only with the state’s acquiescence.”
    (Tanguilig v. Bloomingdale’s, 
    Inc., supra
    , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 678.) His predispute
    arbitration agreement does not encompass this PAGA action.
    Icee argues that Betancourt and Iskanian are no longer good law after the United
    States Supreme Court’s decision in Epic. The argument is unpersuasive. Epic
    considered the relationship between the FAA and the National Labor Relations Act
    (NLRA; 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). (Epic, at p. 1619.) The employees argued that the
    NLRA’s provision guaranteeing workers the right to engage in concerted activity
    conflicted with the class action waiver in their arbitration agreements, thereby rendering
    the class action waiver illegal. (Id. at p. 1624.) The Epic court rejected the employees’
    argument, “reconfirmed . . . that the FAA requires enforcement of class action waivers,”
    and “determined the NLRA does not take precedence over the FAA on this issue.”
    
    (Correia, supra
    , 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 618, citing Epic, at pp. 1623-1630.)
    Betancourt relied on Iskanian’s discussion of the unique nature of a PAGA claim.
    But Epic does not address “the unique nature of a PAGA claim”—that is, the “‘PAGA
    litigant’s status as “the proxy or agent” of the state’ and his or her ‘substantive role in
    enforcing our labor laws on behalf of state law enforcement agencies.’” 
    (Correia, supra
    ,
    32 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) Epic, therefore, does not undermine Iskanian’s or
    Betancourt’s characterization of PAGA claims as law enforcement actions in which
    plaintiffs step into the shoes of the state. Indeed, even after Epic, our Supreme Court has
    6
    reiterated that employees bringing PAGA actions are acting as the proxy or agent of the
    state. 
    (ZB, supra
    , 8 Cal.5th at p. 185.)
    Moreover, to the extent that Epic reconfirmed the breadth of the FAA, our
    decision does not conflict with Epic. The FAA “requires courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce
    arbitration agreements according to their terms, including terms that specify with whom
    the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes.’” 
    (Epic, supra
    , __ U.S. at p. __ [138 S.Ct. at
    p. 1621].) And the FAA’s “saving clause allows courts to refuse to enforce arbitration
    agreements ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
    contract.’” (Id. at p. 1622, quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2.) We conclude that Collie’s predispute
    arbitration agreement is unenforceable for a reason that does apply to any contract: Icee
    cannot enforce a contractual provision to bind a nonparty.
    Icee also argues that Collie’s pursuit of “individual wage claims” under section
    558 shows that this is a “private dispute arising out of his employment contract,” which
    Collie must arbitrate. The argument lacks merit. Under section 558, any employer who
    violates overtime and other workday rules is subject to a civil penalty consisting of a
    fixed dollar amount per employee plus “an amount sufficient to recover unpaid wages.”
    (§ 558, subd. (a); accord 
    ZB, supra
    , 8 Cal.5th at p. 187.) But PAGA “does not authorize
    employees to collect section 558’s unpaid wages through a PAGA action.” (ZB, at
    p. 188.) Nor do employees have a private right of action under section 558. (ZB, at
    pp. 188, 197.) Under section 558, only the Labor Commissioner may issue citations for
    the fixed penalty plus unpaid wages. (ZB, at pp. 188, 197-198.) Accordingly, a PAGA
    claim seeking unpaid wages under section 558 includes an “impermissible request for
    7
    relief.” (ZB, at p. 198.) An impermissible request for relief cannot be compelled to
    arbitration any more than it can be litigated in court. (Ibid.) Thus, it is proper for the
    court to deny a motion to compel arbitration of a PAGA claim for unpaid wages under
    section 558. (ZB, at p. 198.)
    In sum, the court properly denied Icee’s motion to compel arbitration of Collie’s
    PAGA action. The state—the real party in interest—is not bound by Collie’s predispute
    agreement to arbitrate. (
    Betancourt, supra
    , 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 446.)
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying Icee’s motion to compel arbitration is affirmed. Collie shall
    recover his costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    MENETREZ
    J.
    We concur:
    McKINSTER
    Acting P. J.
    MILLER
    J.
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: E071654

Filed Date: 7/20/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/20/2020