People v. Vallier CA2/8 ( 2020 )


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  • Filed 8/20/20 P. v. Vallier CA2/8
    (opinion following vacated opinion)
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                                                      B299428
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. BA453297)
    v.
    EARL VALLIER,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, David V. Herriford, Judge. Affirmed in part
    and remanded with directions.
    Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Stephanie A.
    Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    ____________________
    Earl Vallier and the People agreed to a plea deal with
    particular components. The court approved the negotiated plea
    but sentenced Vallier differently. We remand for resentencing
    consistent with the plea and otherwise affirm.
    All statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
    The facts are recited in the probation report. On June 22,
    2014, Vallier pointed a gun at a gas station store clerk and took
    money from the store’s cash register. He ordered the clerk to a
    back room. He took a customer’s wallet at gunpoint and ordered
    the customer to the back room, too. On August 28, 2014, Vallier
    punched a man’s face at a bus stop and searched the man’s
    pockets.
    On February 1, 2017, prosecutors filed a felony complaint
    charging appellant with two counts of second degree robbery
    (§ 211); kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)); and
    attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664, 211). As to the two
    second degree robbery counts and the kidnapping to commit
    robbery count, prosecutors alleged Vallier personally used a
    firearm. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a).) The
    information alleged Vallier had two prior convictions that
    qualified as serious felony priors and as strikes. (§§ 667, subds.
    (a)(1), (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d).) The information also
    alleged he had served six prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
    On April 16, 2018, Vallier waived his constitutional rights
    and entered a no contest plea. According to the reporter’s
    transcript of the plea, Vallier and the prosecution agreed to the
    mid-term, a base term of three years, for the robbery count. The
    three years would be doubled to six years due to a prior strike,
    plus 10 years for a firearm enhancement, and plus five years for a
    prior serious felony enhancement. The total sentence would be
    2
    21 years in state prison. The prosecution agreed to dismiss other
    counts and allegations.
    The prosecution took Vallier’s plea pursuant to the deal.
    Vallier pleaded no contest to the robbery count (§ 211), admitted
    he used a firearm during the robbery “within the meaning of
    Penal Code section 12022.53(a),” and admitted a 1994 conviction
    that qualified as a strike “within the meaning of Penal Code
    section 1170.12(a) through (d) and subsection 667(b) through (i)”
    and as prior serious felony “within the meaning of Penal Code
    section 667(a).” The court said it “accepts the plea and the
    admission of enhancement and finds him guilty thereon.”
    On May 23, 2018, the court sentenced Vallier. The court
    stated: “as to count 1, a violation of Penal Code section 211,
    probation is denied and Mr. Vallier is sentenced to the high term
    of five years in the state prison. [¶] The court selects the high
    term pursuant to the plea agreement. That is doubled under the
    provisions of Penal Code section 667(b) through (i) and 1170.12(a)
    through (e) for a total of 10 years. [¶] In addition, the court
    imposes 10 years pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5 and an
    additional one year for the 2005 strike prior.” The abstract of
    judgment reflects the one-year enhancement as a one-year prior
    prison term enhancement under section 667.5. The court did not
    sentence Vallier to a section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement.
    The court sentenced Vallier to the same total term of 21 years.
    The court did not acknowledge or explain its alteration of
    the sentence components. There were no objections. Vallier
    received 1,981 days of presentence custody credit. The court
    imposed various fines and fees. The court dismissed the
    remaining charges and allegations.
    On June 11, 2019, Vallier filed a timely notice of appeal.
    3
    We appointed counsel to represent Vallier on appeal. After
    examining the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising no
    issues and asking this court to review the record independently
    under People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    . In the brief, counsel
    informed the court he had filed a motion asking the trial court to
    strike Vallier’s one-year section 667.5 prior prison term
    enhancement due to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).
    Counsel did not set forth any argument on this issue for our
    court.
    On June 25, 2020, we issued an opinion affirming the
    judgment.
    Vallier filed a late pro. per. supplemental brief in two
    letters we received on July 6, 2020. He explained Coronavirus
    restrictions in the prison affected his ability to file a timely brief
    and he requested we file his late brief. We granted the request
    and vacated our June 25, 2020 opinion. In his supplemental
    brief, Vallier raised two issues. First, he argued the court
    sentenced him to terms to which he and the prosecution had not
    agreed. We address the second issue, which was without merit,
    at the end of this opinion.
    On July 13, 2020, we asked the parties to file supplemental
    letter briefs addressing whether we should remand for
    resentencing consistent with the plea agreement.
    In his letter brief, Vallier’s counsel stated “appellant seeks
    to have his sentence[] calculated as explained to him on April 16,
    2018.” The People agree we should remand for resentencing
    consistent with the plea agreement. We agree with the parties
    and remand for resentencing. The court had approved the
    negotiated plea and could “not proceed as to the plea other than
    as specified in the plea.” (§ 1192.5.) Because the court did not
    4
    impose the sentence the parties had agreed upon, the court must
    resentence Vallier consistent with the agreement.
    In the pro. per. brief Vallier filed after his counsel initially
    filed a Wende brief, Vallier raised a second issue. He challenged
    the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
    Vallier’s counsel had described the motion and ruling in his
    Wende brief but raised no issues. We did not request additional
    briefing about it.
    There is no arguable issue about the motion to suppress.
    The basis of the motion was the Harvey/Madden rule, which is
    named for People v. Harvey (1958) 
    156 Cal.App.2d 516
     and People
    v. Madden (1970) 
    2 Cal.3d 1017
    . The rule applies when an officer
    arrests or detains someone based on information from official
    channels. (Madden, supra, at p. 1021.) If, for example, an
    arresting officer relies on information from another officer, the
    prosecution must show the officer who originally furnished the
    information had probable cause for arrest. (Ibid.) Vallier had
    asked the trial court to apply the rule to suppress results of
    investigations stemming from a detective’s connection of Vallier
    to a car from the bus stop incident.
    The trial court properly denied Vallier’s motion because the
    Harvey/Madden rule did not apply. Police did not arrest Vallier
    based on information from official channels. Rather, as the trial
    court explained, police arrested Vallier after the two victims in
    the gas station incident identified his photo. We review facts
    related to rulings on motions to suppress for substantial
    evidence. (People v. Carter (2005) 
    36 Cal.4th 1114
    , 1140.)
    Evidence showed the arrests were based on the photo
    identifications and based on surveillance video from the gas
    station. Thus Vallier was not arrested based on undisclosed
    information from official channels. The trial court properly
    denied the motion.
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The case is remanded with directions to the superior court
    to resentence Vallier consistent with his plea and amend the
    abstract of judgment accordingly. At this remand hearing,
    Vallier has the right to be present and the right to assistance of
    counsel. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
    WILEY, J.
    We concur:
    BIGELOW, P. J.
    GRIMES, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B299428A

Filed Date: 8/20/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2020