People v. Martin CA2/2 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 2/10/21 P. v. Martin CA2/2
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION TWO
    THE PEOPLE,                                                         B306008
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. KA089862)
    v.
    JOEL MARTIN,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    Appellant and petitioner Joel Martin (defendant) appeals
    from an order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to
    Penal Code section 1170.95.1 His appointed counsel filed a brief
    pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 
    25 Cal.3d 436
    , raising no
    issues. On October 27, 2020, we notified defendant of his
    counsel’s brief and gave him leave to file, within 30 days, his own
    1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
    unless otherwise indicated.
    brief or letter stating any grounds or argument he might wish to
    have considered. Because defendant's appeal is from an order
    denying post-conviction relief, he is not entitled to our
    independent review of the record. (See People v. Cole (2020) 
    52 Cal.App.5th 1028
    , 1038-1039, review granted Oct. 14, 2020,
    S264278; People v. Serrano (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 496
    , 503.)
    However, as defendant has filed a supplemental brief, he is
    entitled to our evaluation of the arguments presented in that
    brief. (See People v. Cole, supra, at p. 1040.) We have done so,
    and affirm the order.
    BACKGROUND
    In 2010, defendant was charged with murder in the
    shooting death of Carlos Espinoza (Espinoza), in violation of
    section 187, subdivision (a). The information alleged pursuant to
    section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), that defendant
    personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime and
    that he personally and intentionally discharged the firearm,
    causing the victim’s death.2 A jury convicted defendant of second
    degree murder, but deadlocked on the firearm allegations, and
    after declaring a mistrial, a second trial was held solely as to
    those allegations. The second jury found the allegations to be
    true. (Martin I, supra, B232642 at p. 2.) Defendant was
    sentenced to 15 years to life for the murder and a consecutive
    term of 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d) for
    his use of a firearm causing death. Terms for the remaining
    firearm enhancements were imposed and stayed. (Ibid.)
    2     To the extent necessary, we consider the facts and
    procedure set forth in our opinion in People v. Martin (B232642,
    February 6, 2013 [nonpub. opn.]), Martin I., affirming the
    judgment entered against defendant.
    2
    The evidence at the first trial showed that two men pulled
    up in a van close to Espinoza and a friend. The passenger pulled
    out a gun, asked, “You Carlos?” When Espinoza acknowledged he
    was, the passenger said, “Fuck you, Carlos,” and fired his weapon
    at Espinoza five times. Before Espinoza died, he told
    investigators that he knew the shooter from the neighborhood as
    “Huero.” After a two-year search, defendant was found living in
    New Mexico, detained, and interviewed. Defendant admitted
    that his nickname was “Huero” and that he shot Espinoza.
    (Martin I, supra, B232642 at pp. 3-4.) The same evidence was
    presented at the second trial, after which the jury found the
    firearm allegations to be true. (Id. at p. 4.)
    In March 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
    pursuant to section 1170.95, alleging that defendant was
    convicted of murder under the felony murder rule or the natural
    and probable consequences doctrine, and could not be convicted
    today under the amendments to sections 188 and 189. The trial
    court summarily denied the petition on April 8, 2020, based upon
    the first jury’s verdict of second degree murder and the second
    jury’s finding that defendant personally used and discharged a
    firearm in the commission of the murder, causing death.
    Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
    DISCUSSION
    In his supplemental brief on appeal, defendant argues that
    the trial court erred in considering the preliminary hearing
    transcript instead of the trial transcript. Though the trial court
    did not indicate specifically what documents the court reviewed,
    it does not appear from the record that the court relied on the
    preliminary hearing transcript. There is no explanation for the
    3
    reason the superior court clerk included the preliminary hearing
    transcript in the record on appeal.
    Defendant also contends that the jury would not have
    convicted him of second degree murder if it had determined that
    he was the actual killer, but would instead have found him guilty
    of first degree murder. We disagree. An actual killer is guilty of
    murder of the first degree if it was proved that the killing was
    willful, deliberate, and premeditated, or committed in the
    perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate certain crimes not
    relevant here. (See § 189, subd. (a).) When the evidence is
    insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation, but
    “‘there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human
    being,’” the actual killer is guilty of second degree murder.
    (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 
    8 Cal.5th 548
    , 642, quoting
    People v. Swain (1996) 
    12 Cal.4th 593
    , 601; see § 189, subd. (b).)
    Second degree murder may be based upon a finding of “implied
    malice”; that is, the intent to kill is implied when the defendant
    commits an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous
    to life, knowing that his act endangers the life of another and acts
    with conscious disregard for life. (People v. Soto (2018) 
    4 Cal.5th 968
    , 974.)3
    3     Defendant apparently confuses implied malice murder with
    the natural and probable consequences doctrine, although the
    two theories are different. Under the natural and probable
    consequence doctrine an aider and abettor of an intended lesser
    crime could be found guilty of a more serious but unintended
    crime committed by an accomplice, if the more serious crime was
    the natural and probable consequences of the intended crime.
    (See People v. Chiu (2014) 
    59 Cal.4th 155
    , 161.) Following the
    2018 amendments to section 188 and 189 enacted by Senate Bill
    1437, in order to convict a person of murder, he or she must be
    4
    When a defendant is convicted of second degree murder, a
    finding that the he personally and intentionally used a firearm to
    commit the crime supports a further finding that the defendant
    was an “actual killer.” Since the changes to sections 188 and 189
    are inapplicable to the actual killer, such a person is ineligible for
    resentencing under section 1170.95. (People v. Cornelius (2020)
    
    44 Cal.App.5th 54
    , 58 (Cornelius), review granted Mar. 18, 2020,
    S260410.) Defendant argues that the first jury rejected the
    firearm allegations, suggesting a finding that he was not the
    actual shooter, but an aider and abettor of the actual shooter.
    However, the first jury did not reject the firearm allegations, but
    was unable to reach a unanimous decision. The second jury, after
    hearing the evidence, unanimously found, beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that defendant had used a firearm to murder the victim.
    A court may properly look to the record of conviction to
    determine whether a defendant is eligible for relief under section
    1170.95, or whether he is ineligible as a matter of law. As the
    record of conviction in this case showed that defendant was
    ineligible for section 1170.95 relief as a matter of law, the court
    did not err in summarily denying the petition. (See Cornelius,
    supra, 
    44 Cal.App.5th 54
     at pp. 57-58; People v. Verdugo (2020)
    
    44 Cal.App.5th 320
    , 328-330, review granted Mar. 18, 2020,
    S260493.)
    shown to have harbored an express or implied intent to kill,
    which may imputed only if the person was a major participant in
    the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to
    human life. (See § 189, subd. (e); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying the petition is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
    ____________________________________________________________
    LUI, P.J.           ASHMMAN-GERST, J.           CHAVEZ , J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B306008

Filed Date: 2/10/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/10/2021