People v. Iverson CA4/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 2/25/21 P. v. Iverson CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THE PEOPLE,                                                          D077556
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE394250)
    TONY IVERSON,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Steven E. Stone, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
    with directions.
    Robert V. Vallandigham, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
    Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Heather
    Arambarri and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    A jury convicted Tony Iverson of burglary of an inhabited dwelling
    (Pen. Code,1 §§ 459, 460) and using the personal identification information of
    another person (§ 530.5, subd. (a)). Iverson admitted two prior serious felony
    prior convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and three prior strikes (§ 667, subds. (b)-
    (i)).
    The trial court dismissed the strike priors and one of the serious felony
    priors. The court selected a determinate term of 11 years eight months in
    prison. The court determined the term would be served consecutively to the
    two-year term Iverson was currently serving in a separate case (case No.
    SCE388312), for a total of 13 years eight months.
    Iverson appeals challenging only the sentence imposed. Iverson
    argues, and the People agree, the court failed to comply with section 1170.1,
    subdivision (a) in the calculation of the aggregate term for the two cases.
    Iverson also contends, and the People again agree, the court erred in the
    calculation of custody credits and that the abstract of judgment must be
    amended to delete reference to a 15 percent custody credit limitation. After
    reviewing the record, we agree with the parties as to each issue. We will
    vacate the sentence and remand the case to the trial court for a new
    sentencing hearing.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The facts of the offenses are not relevant to the resolution of the issues
    in this appeal. We will include the short summary of the facts as set forth in
    the respondent’s brief to provide context for the case.
    In June 2019, Scott J. discovered that his wallet, which included a
    credit card and driver’s license, had been taken from his car.
    1       All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    2
    On July 3, 2019, a person purporting to be Scott J. rented a U-Haul
    truck.
    On July 11, 2019, Megan F. arrived at her home in Ramona to discover
    a man and a woman in the process of burglarizing it. When she confronted
    them outside the house, they drove off in a U-Haul truck in which they had
    already loaded many of her possessions. A black bandana that they left
    behind contained DNA, which was later shown to match appellant’s DNA.
    San Diego police officers discovered the U-Haul, which had by now been
    reported as stolen, in Ocean Beach. Appellant’s DNA was discovered on the
    steering wheel of the U-Haul truck. A wallet found in the truck contained
    personal identifying information for both Scott J. and appellant.
    DISCUSSION
    A. Aggregate Term
    The parties contend the trial court erred by imposing a full-strength
    consecutive term for case No. SCE388312. We agree with the parties.
    Section 1170.1, subdivision (a) provides:
    “(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, and subject
    to Section 654, when any person is convicted of two or more
    felonies, whether in the same proceeding or court or in
    different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment
    rendered by the same or by a different court, and a
    consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed
    under Sections 669 and 1170, the aggregate term of
    imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of
    the principal term, the subordinate term, and any
    additional term imposed for applicable enhancements for
    prior convictions, prior prison terms, and Section 12022.1.
    The principal term shall consist of the greatest term of
    imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes,
    including any term imposed for applicable specific
    enhancements. The subordinate term for each consecutive
    offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of
    imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction
    3
    for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed,
    and shall include one-third of the term imposed for any
    specific enhancements applicable to those subordinate
    offenses. Whenever a court imposes a term of
    imprisonment in the state prison, whether the term is a
    principal or subordinate term, the aggregate term shall be
    served in the state prison, regardless as to whether or not
    one of the terms specifies imprisonment in a county jail
    pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.”
    (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.452(a).)
    Where there are two separate cases, each with a determinate term, the
    sentencing court has the obligation to determine a single, aggregate term for
    both cases, applying the appropriate rules for such calculation.
    B. Custody Credits
    Once the court calculates an aggregate term, it must then determine
    the total custody credits the defendant should receive as to the new term.
    (People v. Saibu (2011) 
    191 Cal.App.4th 1005
    , 1013.)
    The abstract of judgment makes reference to credits being limited to 15
    percent under section 2933.1, subdivision (a) which limits such credits where
    the conviction is for a felony under section 667.5, subdivision (c). As the
    parties contend, the burglary conviction here does not qualify for such
    limitation. Such limitation would only apply if “it is charged and proved that
    another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence
    during the commission of the burglary.” (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)). No such
    charge was alleged or proved in this case.
    The burglary in case No. SCE388312 was second degree burglary, to
    which section 2933.1 does not apply.
    DISPOSITION
    The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a new
    sentencing hearing. At such hearing, the trial court shall select an aggregate
    4
    term for both cases and determine the total custody credits for the aggregate
    term. The abstract of judgment should not reference the 15 percent
    limitation.
    Once the sentencing hearing is completed, the court shall prepare a
    new abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections
    and Rehabilitation. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
    HUFFMAN, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    BENKE, Acting P. J.
    HALLER, J.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D077556

Filed Date: 2/25/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/25/2021