Anthony D. v. S.C. CA1/1 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 3/26/21 Anthony D. v. S.C. CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    ANTHONY D.,
    Petitioner,
    A161883
    v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE                                              (San Francisco City & County
    CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN                                                 Super. Ct. No. JD20-3304)
    FRANCISCO,
    Respondent;
    SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
    SERVICES AGENCY,
    Real Party in Interest.
    A.D. (Father) challenges an order of the San Francisco Superior Court,
    Juvenile Division, made January 22, 2021, in which the juvenile court
    declined to provide Father with reunification services and set a hearing
    under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 to select a permanent
    plan for the minor, J.D. (Minor). Father objects to the finding that he is not
    entitled to reunification services. We conclude substantial evidence supports
    the denial of reunification services and deny Father’s petition for an
    extraordinary writ on the merits.
    1   All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Minor and her mother (Mother) tested positive for methamphetamines,
    cannabis, and opiates at the time of Minor’s birth. Two days later, the San
    Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under
    section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The juvenile court held a contested
    detention hearing and ordered that Minor be detained.
    Prior to the current petition, the Agency removed Minor’s sibling, M.D.,
    from both parents due to general neglect. Father was offered reunification
    services as to M.D., which included parenting classes, participation in
    individual therapy, and a substance abuse assessment. Father objected to
    participating in therapy and did not complete the substance abuse
    assessment. He subsequently failed to reunify with M.D. and those services
    were terminated.
    With regard to Minor, the Agency’s disposition report recommended
    denying reunification services to Father because he “has not completed any
    services or demonstrated behavioral changes (continues to be hostile and
    resistant to suggestions or advice regarding parenting skills) and continues to
    lack protective capacities.” Specifically, the report stated Father “refused to
    meet with the [social worker] regarding the family’s current situation,”
    refused to participate in virtual visitation with Minor, and attempts to
    contact Father went unanswered. The Agency also noted Father has “not
    benefited from previous interventions” to address parenting skills.
    The court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing. At that
    hearing, Father testified he was unaware of Mother’s drug use during
    pregnancy and he understood “it is terrible.” Father testified that he and
    Mother had “talked about addressing the issues,” and she was willing to
    move out of the family home. He also testified he was working fewer hours so
    2
    there was a low risk of him leaving Minor without proper supervision. When
    asked whether he would participate in therapy, Father responded, “I am not
    opposed to it, but I don’t see, like, how that has to do with being able to
    parent.” However, he also indicated he would participate in services if
    provided.
    Following the hearing, the juvenile court sustained certain
    jurisdictional allegations as to Father under section 300, subdivision (b).
    Specifically, Father had been “unable to provide proper care, shelter, and
    supervision for [Minor] [and] as a result [Father] has failed to protect [Minor]
    from abuse and neglect from the mother, which place [Minor] at risk for
    further neglect and abuse.” Father also “has a history of leaving [Minor]’s
    oldest sibling, [M.D.] . . . in care of the mother despite knowing the mother
    has an extensive substance abuse problem that impacts her ability to safely
    care for the child, which puts [Minor] at risk of neglect and abuse.” The court
    also sustained allegations under section 300, subdivision (j), that M.D. is
    “placed out of their care due to general neglect and parent’s failure to
    supervise, protect and provide for the child,” Father’s reunification services
    were terminated, and a section 366.26 hearing was scheduled. The court
    found Father had made minimal to no effort to address the issues giving rise
    to Minor’s detention and denied reunification services pursuant to section
    361.5, subdivision (b)(10). Father subsequently filed the current petition.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying him
    services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), because he
    acknowledged the problems which led to the removal of M.D. We disagree
    and deny the petition.
    3
    A. Relevant Law
    “[U]p until the time the section 366.26 hearing is set, the parent’s
    interest in reunification is given precedence over the child’s need for stability
    and permanency.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 
    5 Cal.4th 295
    , 310.) The juvenile
    court is required to order family reunification services whenever a child is
    removed from the custody of his or her parent or guardian unless that court
    finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the enumerated exceptions
    set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b) applies. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b);
    Rosa S. v. Superior Court (2002) 
    100 Cal.App.4th 1181
    , 1188.) “These
    enumerated ‘bypass’ provisions are the specific instances in which the
    Legislature has recognized ‘that it may be fruitless to provide reunification
    services,’ and once the court has found one of these specific instances
    applicable, ‘the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative
    assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental
    resources.’ ” (Melissa R. v. Superior Court (2012) 
    207 Cal.App.4th 816
    , 821.)
    Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) authorizes the court to deny
    reunification services to a parent if “the court ordered termination of
    reunification services for any siblings . . . of the child because the parent . . .
    failed to reunify with the sibling” after the sibling was removed, and the
    parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
    that led to removal of the sibling . . . .” We review the juvenile court’s order
    denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b), for
    substantial evidence: “[W]e must decide if the evidence is reasonable,
    credible, and of solid value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
    court’s order was proper based on clear and convincing evidence.” (Curtis F.
    v. Superior Court (2000) 
    80 Cal.App.4th 470
    , 474.)
    4
    If the juvenile court finds section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applies,
    then the court “shall not order reunification [for the parent] unless the court
    finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
    interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “We review a juvenile court’s
    best interest determination in this context for abuse of discretion.” (Jennifer
    S. v. Superior Court (2017) 
    15 Cal.App.5th 1113
    , 1124–1125.)
    B. Analysis
    Father contends the juvenile court erred in finding that section 361.5,
    subdivision (b)(10) applied because he made reasonable efforts to treat the
    problems that led to Minor’s sibling, M.D., being removed from his care. In
    support of his position, Father cites to his testimony in which he
    acknowledged the risk posed by Mother’s substance abuse and her need for
    treatment, stated Mother would move out of the family home, claimed he
    would be a more present parent, and expressed a willingness to engage in
    services. His argument is not persuasive.
    Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father
    has not made reasonable efforts to address the problems that led to M.D.’s
    removal. The record indicates M.D. was removed due to Mother’s substance
    abuse and mental health issues and Father’s inability to protect M.D. from
    Mother. Father was ordered to complete a parenting class, substance abuse
    assessment, and therapy, but failed to do so and reunification services were
    terminated.
    Here, Minor was removed due to identical concerns. Rather than
    acknowledge those concerns and work toward a different outcome, Father’s
    conduct indicates a complete lack of awareness and engagement. Father
    refused to speak to the social worker at the hospital after Minor tested
    positive for methamphetamine, opiates, and cannabis at birth. He failed to
    5
    return any telephone calls or texts sent by the Agency’s social worker
    regarding Minor. And he refused to participate in virtual visitation with
    Minor. Moreover, Father denied the prior allegations that led to M.D.’s
    removal and testified he had not, in fact, left M.D. unsupervised with Mother
    and “that was a totally false accusation and a lie.” As summarized by the
    Agency, Father “failed to benefit from pervious interventions,” “refused to
    meet with the [social worker] regarding the family’s current situation[,] and
    was unable to demonstrate his ability to provide care and protection for
    [Minor].”
    Father’s testimony at the disposition hearing regarding his willingness
    to protect Minor was undermined by his repeated failure to acknowledge
    Mother’s substance abuse problems. He stated the Agency had made
    “accusation[s]” Mother was using drugs, but repeatedly denied ever seeing
    Mother using or on drugs. When challenged about his relationship with
    Mother, Father responded by calling the petition allegations “made-up.”
    Similarly, Father continued to express reluctance about the need for therapy,
    stating he “do[es]n’t see the reason” and is “kind of still against” therapy
    because he is “not too comfortable just talking to somebody about my
    problems like that.” The only concrete step Father identified taking was
    speaking with Mother about her moving out of the family home while she
    sought substance abuse treatment. Mother had not, however, actually left
    the family home, the record did not identify where Mother would live once
    she left the family home, and the parents reiterated their intent to stay
    married.
    The Agency also expressed concern Father had “failed to demonstrate
    that he has capacity to independently care for an infant.” In response,
    Father stated his lighter work schedule would allow him to better supervise
    6
    Minor. However, he offered no concrete plan for doing so apart from taking
    Minor “to the park” while Mother was “doing her own thing.” He did not
    identify any resources he could utilize to ensure his ability to parent
    independently. Nor did he explain how he would continue to do so if, for
    example, he obtained more demanding employment in the future.
    While “[t]he ‘reasonable effort to treat’ standard ‘is not synonymous
    with “cure,” ’ ” “[t]o be reasonable, the parent’s efforts must be more than
    ‘lackadaisical or half-hearted.’ ” (K.C. v. Superior Court (2010)
    
    182 Cal.App.4th 1388
    , 1393.) Here, Father demonstrated no meaningful
    effort to address the issues that led to the prior removal of M.D. Nor has he
    raised any argument that reunification is in the best interests of Minor.
    Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
    section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) applies, and the court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying Father reunification services.
    III. DISPOSITION
    Father’s petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. Our
    decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court,
    rules 8.450(a), 8.490(b)(2)(A).).
    7
    MARGULIES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HUMES, P. J.
    BANKE, J.
    A161883
    Anthony D. v. Superior Court
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A161883

Filed Date: 3/26/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/26/2021