In re A.M. CA3 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Filed 4/1/21 In re A.M. CA3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (Sacramento)
    ----
    In re A.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile                                             C090016
    Court Law.
    THE PEOPLE,                                                                   (Super. Ct. Nos. JV139601,
    52008770)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    A.M.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found the minor,
    A.M., committed battery against a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b)),1 battery
    against a school employee (§ 243.6), and other offenses. On appeal, A.M. contends there
    was insufficient evidence of battery. We disagree and affirm.
    1    Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
    1
    I. BACKGROUND
    A March 2019 Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition (petition)
    alleged that A.M. committed four misdemeanors at a high school when she was 14 years
    old: possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11375, subd. (b)(2));
    battery against a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (b)); resisting, obstructing, or delaying a
    peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); and battery against a school employee (§ 243.6).
    A.M., the peace officer, and the school employee all testified at the contested
    jurisdictional hearing, and footage from the peace officer’s body camera was admitted
    into evidence.
    A.     Peace Officer
    The peace officer, a member of the Rocklin Police Department, testified that on
    September 17, 2018, while responding to a high school’s request for assistance (and
    wearing a uniform which had “the full markings, with the badge and patches” reflecting
    his status) he was “told that there was another student that possibly was under the
    influence of something.”
    The officer turned his attention to A.M. and noted that her demeanor was
    “consistent with being under the influence of something.” But he was unable to confirm
    his observations because A.M. “was defiant” and called her mother. While on speaker
    phone, A.M.’s mother was “confrontational” with the officer, saying at one point that the
    officer was “fuckin’ ridiculous.”
    While waiting for A.M.’s mother to come to the school, A.M. refused to surrender
    her phone to school staff and called the officer a “bitch.” The officer responded: “Watch
    the language. I’m not . . . addressing you that way so please be polite.” During that same
    conversation, after the officer told A.M. that she was being “defiant,” she replied, “I’m
    being defiant because you guys are accusing me of shit and I already have anger issues.”
    2
    When A.M.’s mother arrived, a school employee explained that A.M. would be
    suspended for “being under the influence.” A.M.’s mother was “not receptive” to the
    information. She cursed at the school employee, and—as she walked through the
    school’s administrative office area—caused a “crashing sound” and made something
    “fly[] off of the counter where . . . the receptionist or secretary was sitting.”
    Concerned that A.M.’s mother may have committed “vandalism” and “assault
    and/or battery” the officer followed A.M.’s mother to the school parking lot so that he
    could “conduct a criminal investigation.”
    The officer’s body camera footage reflects that the officer confronted A.M.’s
    mother in the parking lot and told her that “what [she] did was not right.” A.M.’s mother
    can be heard speaking into her cell phone, telling A.M. to come to her immediately. The
    officer tells A.M.’s mother: “I’m not here to arrest you. I’m here to talk to you because,
    I don’t know—. That’s not okay to do. I don’t know if anything’s broken or anyone’s
    hurt.” A.M.’s mother does not respond to the officer.
    A.M. joined her mother and the officer in the parking lot.
    When it appeared to the officer that A.M.’s mother “was going to try and get
    inside . . . [a] vehicle,” he “grabbed the back of” her “sweat shirt to stop her.” A.M.’s
    mother “was not cooperating,” and the officer feared she might head-butt him, so he put
    his forearm underneath A.M.’s mother’s chin “to restrain her head so that [he] wouldn’t
    be head-butted as [he] was trying to get her hands behind her back to put handcuffs on.”
    A.M.’s mother repeatedly refused the officer’s instructions to put her hands behind her
    back.
    While the officer was telling her to put her hands behind her back, A.M.’s mother
    can be heard in the body camera footage screaming “I didn’t do anything”; “[y]ou’re
    choking me”; “[l]et me go”; and “I can’t breathe.”
    The footage does not show where the officer’s arm was in relation to A.M.’s
    mother’s neck.
    3
    As the officer struggled with A.M.’s mother, A.M. said, “[d]on’t touch my mom
    like that” and, “[s]he’s not even fuckin doing anything. Let her the fuck . . . go dick.”
    The officer testified that, at some point, A.M. “reached around and hit” his arm, which,
    “a day or two later,” had “bruising . . . in the area where [he] was hit.”
    B.     School Employee
    After a school employee heard a “loud crash . . . outside the door” of an office she
    was in, she followed the officer and A.M.’s mother out of the school’s administrative
    area “to make sure that everything was okay.” The school employee saw A.M. moving
    towards the officer in the parking lot and “stepped in between” the officer and A.M., who
    “became belligerent,” “mad[e] statements of what she wanted to do physically to” the
    school employee, and “shove[d]” the employee with both hands, pushing her back “[a]
    few steps.”
    On cross-examination, the school employee said she didn’t know if A.M. just
    “wanted to get to her mom or whether she wanted to hurt” the employee.
    During an interview with an officer immediately after the incident, the school
    employee said that A.M. was trying to get to her mother, not assault her.
    Footage from the officer’s body camera reflects the school employee’s presence
    on the scene (standing between A.M. and the officer and A.M.’s mother), and A.M. can
    be seen pushing the employee moments before she says, “[b]itch stop,” “I’ll slap the fuck
    outta you.”
    C.     A.M.
    A.M.’s mother called A.M.’s cell phone and told A.M. to come to their car in the
    parking lot because “she was going to get arrested.” When A.M. got to the parking lot,
    she saw the officer “grab[]” her mother “by her neck.” A.M. thought her mom was
    choking. A.M.’s father died during an altercation with police not long before the incident
    at issue here, and seeing her mother struggle with the officer, A.M. feared she would
    “lose [her] mom the way [she] lost [her] dad.” A.M. “wanted to protect her” mother, and
    4
    she pushed the school employee “[b]ecause she was . . . trying to keep [A.M.] away from
    [her] mom.”
    A.M. denied hitting the officer on the arm.
    On cross-examination, A.M. said she did not hear her mom say “no,” when the
    officer ordered her to put her hands behind her back, but she did hear her mother: ask for
    help; tell the officer, “I didn’t do anything”; and say “he is choking me,” and “I am going
    to puke.”
    During closing arguments, counsel for A.M. argued the People did not prove that
    A.M. “was not acting in defense of her mother” vis-à-vis the allegation of battery of a
    peace officer. “As far as [A.M.] knew, her mother was being choked. [¶] The mother
    was making sounds that she was being choked. She was calling for help. [A.M.] had just
    lost her father . . . she believes at the hands of law enforcement. . . . I think that any 14-
    year-old girl in the circumstances that [A.M.] was [in] would have perceived things that
    way.” “She had to act to protect her mother in her belief.”
    As for the allegation of battery of a school employee, counsel for A.M. argued,
    A.M.’s “force was reasonable,” because A.M. “was simply trying to get around” the
    school employee to reach her mother.
    In April 2019, the juvenile court sustained all four allegations in the petition,
    explaining that A.M.’s “testimony in the hearing was not credible on several issues.”
    Relevant here, the juvenile court “[did] not find credible [A.M.’s] testimony that she was
    afraid that her mother was going to be killed by a police officer. There [was] no evidence
    to support a reasonable belief of defense of others.”
    The juvenile court explained that it had considered the officer’s body camera
    footage and was “tak[ing] into consideration [A.M.’s] behavior at the time that she was in
    the school office, the timing of everything in determining credibility.” “[A.M.’s]
    behavior in the [school] office and the language she used, her behavior towards school
    5
    personnel and the police officer [was] . . . very shocking.” “Her behavior did not change
    when her mother arrived and, actually, things escalated.”
    In a June 2019 disposition hearing, the juvenile court placed A.M. on six months
    court probation.
    A.M. timely appealed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.     Battery Against an Officer
    A.M. argues there was insufficient evidence of battery against the officer.
    Specifically, A.M. contends there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt that she “did not act in lawful defense of another, her mother.” A.M. “acted as any
    reasonable 15-year-old girl . . . , seized the opportunity to defend her mother against what
    she perceived to be a very real . . . imminent life-threatening danger.”
    The People argue the juvenile court’s credibility finding (that A.M. was not
    credible when she testified she was afraid the officer was going to kill her mother)
    “precludes” A.M.’s claim.
    We conclude there was sufficient evidence of battery against the officer.
    Section 242 provides: “A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or
    violence upon the person of another.”
    Section 243, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: “When a battery is
    committed against the person of a peace officer . . . engaged in the performance of his or
    her duties . . . and the person committing the offense knows or reasonably should know
    that the victim is a peace officer . . . the battery is punishable by a fine not exceeding two
    thousand dollars ($2,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or
    by both that fine and imprisonment.”
    When using excessive force, a peace officer is not engaged in the performance of
    his or her duties for purposes of section 243, subdivision (b). (People v. Delahoussaye
    (1989) 
    213 Cal.App.3d 1
    , 7; People v. White (1980) 
    101 Cal.App.3d 161
    , 167.)
    6
    Accordingly, defense of another who is suffering from excessive force by a peace
    officer is a defense to a charge of battery on that peace officer. (People v. White, supra,
    101 Cal.App.3d at p. 168.)
    CALCRIM No. 3470, containing the elements for self-defense or defense of
    another, provides that one acted in lawful self-defense or defense of another if: (1) she
    reasonably believed that she or someone else was in imminent danger of suffering bodily
    injury; (2) she reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to
    defend against that danger; and (3) she used no more force than was reasonably necessary
    to defend against that danger.
    To justify an act of self-defense the belief in the need to commit the act “must both
    subjectively exist and be objectively reasonable.” (People v. Brady (2018)
    
    22 Cal.App.5th 1008
    , 1014.)
    On appeal from the juvenile court’s adjudications after a contested jurisdictional
    hearing, “ ‘[t]he test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether
    the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Our sole function is
    to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
    crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in
    cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (In re Arcenio
    V. (2006) 
    141 Cal.App.4th 613
    , 615-616.)
    “ ‘Evidence of . . . state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but
    circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support’ ” sustaining an
    allegation. (People v. Rios (2013) 
    222 Cal.App.4th 542
    , 568.)
    A trial court’s credibility determinations “are subject to extremely deferential
    review.” (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 570
    , 582.)
    Here, the juvenile court sustained the allegation of battery on a peace officer after
    finding not credible A.M.’s testimony that she feared her mother was in imminent danger
    of choking to death at the officer’s hands. In making that credibility finding, the juvenile
    7
    court considered A.M.’s “very shocking” behavior in the school office, before the
    parking lot confrontation, wherein A.M. refused to surrender her phone to school staff,
    called the officer “bitch,” and said she was “being defiant because” she was being
    accused “of shit and [she] already ha[d] anger issues.”
    We will not disturb that plausible credibility finding, which is consistent with the
    notion that A.M.’s battery on the officer in the parking lot was a continuation of the
    defiant and antagonistic behavior that A.M. exhibited in the school building before the
    officer ever tried to handcuff her mother.
    And given that credibility finding, substantial evidence supports the juvenile
    court’s ruling that A.M. committed battery on a peace officer, because a subjective belief
    that her mother was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury is a necessary
    precondition to any right that A.M. might have had to defend her mother from a
    perceived excessive use of force.
    B.     Battery Against a School Employee
    A.M. argues there was insufficient evidence of battery against a school employee,
    when she shoved the employee, because A.M. was “trying to come to the defense of her
    mother” and not “acting in anger toward” the employee, and not “attempting to harm or
    injure” the employee. The People argue there was substantial evidence for this battery.
    We agree with the People.2
    2 A.M. argues that her behavior “did not warrant a criminal prosecution.” A.M. also
    argues that “[i]n light of recent events of police behavior against citizens for minor
    infractions or misdemeanor behavior, our society is now calling into question the use of
    physical restraint by police officers in situations where a citation could have been just as
    effective in getting the job done rather than escalating the encounter into a violent
    assault.” The wisdom of the decision to pursue battery charges in the petition and the
    propriety of the officer’s use of force are not questions that we must decide to resolve this
    appeal. Accordingly, we state no opinion on those issues.
    8
    The trial court’s adverse credibility finding resolves this argument. If A.M. did
    not actually believe that her mother was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury,
    then A.M. did not have an arguable right to shove the employee out of the way to reach
    her mother.
    And even if A.M. was not attempting to harm or injure the employee, the record
    reflects that A.M. purposefully shoved her (moments before she threatened to “slap the
    fuck outta” the employee). Battery requires nothing more. (See People v. Thornton
    (1992) 
    3 Cal.App.4th 419
    , 423 [“Battery is committed whenever there is the slightest
    intentional touching, even though there is no intent to harm, and even though the degree
    of force used is unlikely to cause harm”].)
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    /S/
    RENNER, J.
    We concur:
    /S/
    BLEASE, Acting P. J.
    /S/
    DUARTE, J.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C090016

Filed Date: 4/1/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/1/2021