Breslin v. Breslin ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 4/5/21 (opinion following rehearing)
    See dissenting opinion
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    DAVID BRESLIN, as Trustee,                     2d Civ. No. B301382
    etc.,                                        (Super. Ct. No. 56-2018-
    00521839-PR-TR-OXN)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                  (Ventura County)
    v.                                           OPINION FOLLOWING
    REHEARING
    PAUL G. BRESLIN et al.,
    Defendants and
    Respondents;
    PACIFIC LEGAL
    FOUNDATION et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    The legal historian Frederic William Maitland is reputed to
    have said, “The law is a seamless web.” He didn’t. 1
    “Such is the unity of all history that anyone who
    1
    endeavors to tell a piece of it must feel that his first sentence
    tears a seamless web.” (Maitland, A Prologue to a History of
    English Law (1898) 14 L.Q.Rev. 13.)
    The phrase, however, applicable to the law in general, is
    particularly apt here. This case began and ended in probate
    court. But the law concerning mediation also applies. The
    proceeding here is made from the seamless fabric of probate and
    mediation law.
    The trustee of a decedent’s trust petitioned the probate
    court to determine the trust beneficiaries. The potential trust
    beneficiaries received notice of the petition. The probate court
    ordered the matter to mediation. The same potential
    beneficiaries received notice of the mediation, but some did not
    participate. The participating parties reached a settlement that
    excluded the nonparticipating parties as beneficiaries. The
    probate court approved the settlement. The nonparticipating
    parties Pacific Legal Foundation et al. 2 (collectively “the Pacific
    parties”) appeal. We affirm. A party receiving notice under the
    circumstances here, who fails to participate in court-ordered
    mediation, is bound by the result.
    FACTS
    Don Kirchner died in 2018 leaving an estate valued at
    between $3 and $4 million. Kirchner had no surviving wife or
    children, but he was survived nieces and nephews.
    Kirchner’s estate was held in a living trust dated July 27,
    2017. 3 The trust was amended and restated on November 1,
    2 The nonparticipating parties are: Pacific Legal
    Foundation, Judicial Watch, Save the Redwoods League,
    Concerned Women of America, Catholics United for Life, Catholic
    League, Sacred Heart Auto League, National Prolife Action
    Center, doing business as Liberty Counsel, and Orbis
    International.
    3
    The parties take issue with case title, often referred to as
    the caption. They believe it should be “In the matter of the Don
    2.
    2017 (restated trust). David Breslin (Breslin) was named the
    successor trustee in the restated trust.
    Breslin found the restated trust, but initially could not find
    the original trust. The restated trust makes three $10,000
    specific gifts and directs that the remainder be distributed to the
    persons and charitable organizations listed on exhibit A in the
    percentages set forth.
    The restated trust did not have an exhibit A attached to it,
    and no such exhibit A has ever been found. But in a pocket of the
    estate planning binder containing the restated trust, Breslin
    found a document titled “Estates Charities (6/30/2017).” The
    document listed 24 charities with handwritten notations that
    appear to be percentages.
    Breslin filed a petition in the probate court to confirm him
    as successor trustee and to determine the beneficiaries of the
    Kirshner Living Trust.” Apparently, the parties did not consult
    the California Style Manual. This is what they would have
    learned: “Similar to estates . . . , trusts are not recognized as
    legal entities and cannot sue or be sued. Only trustees can be
    named as parties, thus it is improper to name ‘The ABC Trust’ as
    a party. (See Prob. Code, §§ 17200, subd. (a), 17200.1; see also
    Code Civ. Proc., § 369, subd. (a)(l).) Additionally, the description
    ‘Trustee of the ABC Trust’ is not properly listed as a party name;
    the trustee's name is listed followed by ‘as Trustee, etc.’ ‘Trustees
    of the California State University’ is an official board name, not a
    description, so it is properly used in titles (see Ed. Code, § 66600).
    Trust administration cases do not use a nonadversary title, such
    as ‘In re the Matter of the Charles G Adams Trust,’ to identify
    the trust. In addition, the lower court designations of ‘Petitioner’
    and ‘Respondent’ are changed to ‘Plaintiff’ and ‘Defendant’ in
    accordance with [California Style Manual] section 6:42.” (Cal.
    Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) § 6:47.)
    3.
    trust in the absence of an attached exhibit A. Breslin served each
    of the listed charities, including the Pacific parties. Only three of
    the listed charities filed formal responses. The Pacific parties did
    not.
    The probate court confirmed Breslin as successor trustee
    and ordered mediation among interested parties, including
    Kirchner’s intestate heirs and the listed charities. The
    mediator’s fees were to be paid from the trust. One of the listed
    charities, the Thomas More Law Center (TMLC), sent notices of
    the mediation to all the interested parties, including the Pacific
    parties. Approximately four notices of continuances were sent to
    all the parties, including the Pacific parties, before the mediation
    took place.
    The mediation notice included the following:
    “Mediation may result in a settlement of the matter that is
    the subject of the above-referenced cases and of any and all
    interested·persons' and parties' interests therein. Settlement of
    the matter may result in an agreement for the distribution of
    assets of the above-referenced Trust and of the estate of Don F.
    Kirchner, Deceased, however those assets may be held.
    Settlement of the matter may also result in an award of
    attorneys' fees to one or more parties under Smith v. Szeyller
    (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 450
    . Interested persons or parties who do
    not have counsel may attend the mediation and participate.
    “Non-participating persons or parties who receive notice of
    the date, time and place of the mediation may be bound by the
    terms of any agreement reached at mediation without further
    action by the Court or further hearing. Smith v. Szeyller (2019)
    
    31 Cal.App.5th 450
    . Rights of trust beneficiaries or prospective
    4.
    beneficiaries may be lost by the failure to participate in
    mediation.
    “All represented parties (or his, her or their counsel) and all
    unrepresented parties that intend to participate in the mediation
    are requested to advise the undersigned of his, her or their
    intention to be present and participate by making contact via
    either email . . . or U.S. Mail. Notice to participate in mediation
    will not be accepted via telephone.”
    Only five of the listed charities appeared at the mediation,
    including TMLC. The intestate heirs also appeared. The Pacific
    parties did not appear. The appearing parties reached a
    settlement. The settlement agreement awarded specific amounts
    to various parties, including the appearing charities, and
    attorney fees with the residue to the intestate heirs. The
    agreement did not include the Pacific parties.
    TMLC filed a petition to approve the settlement. When the
    Pacific parties received notice of this petition, they filed
    objections.
    Prior to the hearing on the petition, Breslin filed a
    supplemental declaration stating that he found the original trust
    document. The restated trust had no exhibit A attached, but he
    found attached to the original trust an exhibit A listing the same
    charities as were found on the document in the binder with the
    restated trust.
    The probate court granted Breslin’s petition to approve the
    settlement. The court denied the Pacific parties’ objections on the
    grounds that they did not file a response to Breslin’s petition to
    determine the beneficiaries and did not appear at the mediation.
    The Pacific parties appeal.
    5.
    DISCUSSION
    I
    Standard of Review
    The Pacific parties contend that because the issues here do
    not involve findings of fact, the standard of review is de novo.
    The standard of review for the probate court’s approval of a
    settlement is abuse of discretion. (Estate of Green (1956) 
    145 Cal.App.2d 25
    , 28.) The dispute is academic, however. The
    result is the same under either standard.
    II
    Forfeiture of Rights
    The probate court has the power to order the parties into
    mediation. (See Prob. Code, 4 § 17206 [“The court in its discretion
    may make any orders and take any other action necessary or
    proper to dispose of the matters presented by the petition”].) The
    court did so here. The Pacific parties received notice of the
    mediation, but chose not to participate.
    In Smith v. Szeyller, supra, 
    31 Cal.App.5th 450
    , 458, we
    held that a party who chooses not to participate in the trial of a
    probate matter cannot thereafter complain about a settlement
    reached by the participating parties. The Pacific parties point
    out that there was no trial here. True, but the mediation ordered
    by the probate court, like the trial in Smith, was an essential part
    of the probate proceedings. The Pacific parties may not ignore
    the probate court’s order to participate in the proceedings and
    then challenge the result. The probate court’s mediation order
    would be useless if a party could skip mediation and challenge
    the resulting settlement agreement.
    4   All statutory references are to the Probate Code.
    6.
    The Pacific parties complain they were denied an
    evidentiary hearing. But the probate court has the power to
    establish the procedure. (§ 17206.) It made participation in
    mediation a prerequisite to an evidentiary hearing. By failing to
    participate in the mediation, the Pacific parties waived their
    right to an evidentiary hearing. It follows that the Pacific parties
    were not entitled to a determination of factual issues, such as
    Kirchner’s intent, and cannot raise such issues for the first time
    on appeal. (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 
    12 Cal.4th 854
    ,
    865, fn. 4 [court will not address issues raised for the first time on
    appeal].)
    Estate of Bennett (2008) 
    163 Cal.App.4th 1303
    , 1310, is of
    no help to the Pacific parties. There the Court of Appeal held
    that estate beneficiaries who petitioned to set aside a settlement
    agreement were entitled to an evidentiary hearing. But Bennett
    did not involve a party’s failure to respond to a mediation order.
    The Pacific parties argue the only way they can forfeit their
    interest is by filing a written disclaimer. They rely on section
    275. That section provides, “A beneficiary may disclaim any
    interest, in whole or in part, by filing a disclaimer as provided in
    this part.” (Ibid.) The disclaimer must be in writing signed by
    the disclaimant. (§ 278.) We agree the Pacific parties did not
    disclaim their interest. Instead, they forfeited their interest
    when they failed to participate in mediation as ordered by the
    court.
    Had the Pacific parties appeared at the initial probate
    hearing, for which they received notice, they would have had the
    opportunity to object to mediation. Instead, they waited until
    after the mediation, for which they also received notice, in
    addition to notices of continuances, to finally object to the result.
    7.
    The dissent expresses concern for the due process rights of
    parties who ignored these multiple notices, and apparently no
    concern for the parties who responded to the notices and spent
    time and effort complying with the probate court's order for
    mediation.
    III
    Trustee’s Duties
    (a) Impartiality
    The Pacific parties contend the trustee failed in his duty to
    deal impartially with all beneficiaries. (§ 16003 [“If a trust has
    two or more beneficiaries, the trustee has a duty to deal
    impartially with them”].)
    But all interested parties received notice of the mediation
    and had an opportunity to participate. The Pacific parties’
    failure to participate was not the fault of the trustee.
    (b) Trustee’s Personal Profit
    The Pacific parties contend the trustee breached fiduciary
    duties by approving large gifts to Kirchner family members,
    including himself, who stood to gain little or nothing under the
    trust.
    But all parties who participated in the mediation approved
    the settlement, not just the trustee. And the probate court
    approved the settlement. The Pacific parties may not refuse to
    participate and then complain that they received nothing.
    Moreover, the Pacific parties’ argument assumes the
    beneficiaries of the trust are known. The court did not determine
    the identity of the beneficiaries. The Pacific parties may have
    requested an evidentiary hearing on the matter had they abided
    by the probate court’s order and participated in the mediation.
    They chose not to do so.
    8.
    (c) Notice
    The Pacific parties contend that the trustee failed to keep
    them reasonably informed about the mediation and his intent to
    execute the settlement agreement.
    The Pacific parties do not claim they lacked notice of the
    mediation. Had they participated, they would have been
    informed of all the developments, including the trustee’s
    willingness to sign the settlement agreement.
    The Pacific parties apparently believe that after the trustee
    and participating parties have gone through mediation and
    reached a settlement, they should have been notified before the
    settlement was signed. Then they could have registered their
    objection. But that would defeat the purpose of the court-ordered
    mediation.
    The Pacific parties cite section 16060 for the proposition
    that the trustee has a duty to keep the beneficiaries of the trust
    reasonably informed of the trust and its administration. The
    information provided pursuant to section 16060 must be the
    information reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to
    enforce the beneficiary’s rights under the trust or prevent or
    redress a breach of trust. (Salter v. Lerner (2009) 
    176 Cal.App.4th 1184
    , 1187.)
    First, the probate court did not determine that the Pacific
    parties were beneficiaries of the trust. Second, assuming they
    were or could have been beneficiaries, the notice of mediation was
    all the information necessary for them to protect their interest.
    The Pacific parties argue that the mediation notice failed to
    inform them that they could forfeit their interest if they did not
    participate. But the notice stated that nonparticipating persons
    or parties may be bound by the terms of any agreement reached
    9.
    at the mediation, and the rights of trust beneficiaries or
    prospective beneficiaries may be lost by the failure to participate
    in the mediation. Synonym for lost is forfeiture.
    The Pacific parties argue that the loss of rights referred to
    in the notice may be read as only referring to procedural rights.
    But the notice says that nonparticipating parties may be bound
    by any agreement reached during mediation. The notice
    obviously refers to substantive rights.
    IV
    Extrinsic Fraud
    The Pacific parties contend the probate court’s order
    approving the settlement should be set aside for extrinsic fraud.
    The Pacific parties’ contention is based on TMLC’s response
    to the trustee’s petition to determine trust beneficiaries. TMLC
    urged the probate court to find that the charities listed on the
    paper found with the restated trust are the beneficiaries. TMLC
    also requested attorney fees if successful because all the charities
    listed would benefit by its success.
    TMLC was not claiming to be the legal representative for
    all the charities on the list. It was only claiming that by
    representing its own interest other parties will benefit and
    should share in the burden of attorney fees under the substantial
    benefit doctrine. (See Smith v. Szeyller, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at
    p. 460.) There was no extrinsic fraud.
    10.
    V
    Attorney Fees
    The intestate beneficiaries contend they should be awarded
    attorney fees under the substantial benefit doctrine. That is a
    matter to be decided by the probate court.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment (order) is affirmed. Costs are awarded to
    respondents.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    GILBERT, P. J.
    I concur:
    YEGAN, J.
    11.
    TANGEMAN, J., dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent. A trust must be administered
    according to the testator’s intent. (Prob. Code, 1 § 21102, subd.
    (a).) Administration consistent with that intent is the
    “paramount rule . . . to which all other rules must yield.”
    (Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 
    14 Cal.4th 126
    , 134.) That
    means honoring Don Kirchner’s final wishes above all else.
    Here, however, the probate court exalted principles of
    forfeiture over Kirchner’s express wishes, concluding that the
    Pacific parties forfeited their rights to the gifts Kirchner wanted
    them to have because they did not satisfy a requirement Kirchner
    did not impose: participation in mediation at their expense. In
    effect, the court imposed a terminating sanction against the
    nonappearing beneficiaries. The majority countenances this
    result. I would not.
    Equity abhors a forfeiture. (Hand v. Cleese (1927) 
    202 Cal. 36
    , 46.) And forfeiture is an especially harsh result here: It
    elevates the probate court’s power to order mediation (§ 17206)
    over myriad provisions of the Probate Code, including those
    related to notice requirements (§ 17203), hearings and objections
    (§ 1040 et seq.), and the approval of settlements (§ 9837), as well
    as their constitutional counterparts (Skelly v. State Personnel
    Board (1975) 
    15 Cal.3d 194
    , 208 [due process requires a notice
    and hearing in “every significant deprivation” of an interest in
    property]). It forces potential beneficiaries to participate in costly
    mediation (legal entities cannot appear except through counsel),
    something “antithetical to the entire concept” thereof. (Jeld-Wen,
    Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 
    146 Cal.App.4th 536
    , 543.) It
    permits a trustee to favor some beneficiaries over others—in
    1   Unlabeled statutory references are to the Probate Code.
    breach of the duty of impartiality (§ 16003)—simply because the
    latter did not participate in mediation. And perhaps most
    significantly, by permitting some beneficiaries to cut other
    beneficiaries out of trusts altogether, it defeats the express
    intentions of testators and negates the expectations testators
    hold knowing that their final wishes will be fulfilled without
    regard for the wishes of others.
    Smith v. Szeyller (2019) 
    31 Cal.App.5th 450
     (Smith) does
    not support the result the majority reaches here. In Smith, we
    held that a beneficiary who did not participate in trial forfeited
    her objections to the settlement reached by the litigants who did
    participate because that settlement did not impact her
    inheritance (ibid. at p. 458) and “preserved a common fund for
    the benefit of [her and] the [other] nonparticipating beneficiaries”
    (id. at p. 461). We also concluded that the nonparticipating
    beneficiary forfeited her objections because she did not submit
    them until after the probate court had approved the settlement.
    (Id. at p. 456.)
    In contrast, the settlement here disinherited the Pacific
    parties and redistributed their gifts to other parties contrary to
    the testator’s express directions. And the Pacific parties filed
    their objections before the probate court approved the settlement.
    Moreover, the “notice” that required the Pacific parties to attend
    the mediation at which the settlement was reached came from a
    party that unilaterally decreed that it could settle the case on
    their behalf. And unlike the situation in Smith, the facts here
    changed dramatically after mediation, when Breslin found a
    document—Exhibit A—that confirmed the Pacific parties’
    unqualified right to inherit funds from Kirchner.
    2.
    A charitable gift must be carried into effect if it “can
    possibly be made good.” (Estate of Tarrant (1951) 
    38 Cal.2d 42
    ,
    46.) The majority’s newfound requirement that a party
    participate in mediation before it can inherit ignores this
    command. It will reduce the number of gifts that “can possibly be
    made good” by encouraging parties to send out mediation notices
    whenever they desire to eliminate gifts to beneficiaries that don’t
    appear—for whatever reason. That will not advance the interests
    of testators, but will instead introduce uncertainty into probate
    proceedings, defeat express testamentary wishes, and lead to
    inequitable results. I would reverse the judgment of the probate
    court.
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.
    TANGEMAN, J.
    3.
    Robert L. Lund, Judge
    Superior Court County of Ventura
    ______________________________
    Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Joshua S. Hopstone and
    David B. Shea for Defendants and Appellants Pacific Legal
    Foundation, Judicial Watch, Save the Redwoods League,
    Concerned Women of America, Catholics United for Life, Catholic
    League, Sacred Heart Auto League, National Prolife Action
    Center, doing business as Liberty Counsel, and Orbis
    International.
    Staker Law Tax and Estate Planning Law Corporation,
    Kevin G. Staker and Brandon P. Johnson for Plaintiff and
    Respondent David Breslin, Trustee.
    Jones, Lester, Schuck, Becker & Dehesa, Mark A. Lester,
    Katherine H. Becker and Eric A. Hirschberg, for Defendants and
    Respondents Paul G. Breslin and Kathleen Breslin LaForgia.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B301382A

Filed Date: 4/5/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/5/2021