People v. Gatison CA1/3 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 1/13/14 P. v. Gatison CA1/3
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION THREE
    THE PEOPLE,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    A137180
    v.
    KENNETH GATISON,                                                         (Contra Costa County
    Super. Ct. No. 5-120821-4)
    Defendant and Appellant.
    This is an appeal from final judgment following entry of a no contest plea by
    appellant Kenneth Gatison after the trial court denied his combined motion to suppress
    (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) and to dismiss the information (Pen. Code, § 995).1 We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On May 30, 2012, an information was filed charging appellant with one felony
    count of possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359).2 This charge
    stemmed from appellant’s arrest on the afternoon of May 2, 2011 near the campus of
    Riverview Middle School in Bay Point. At about 2:20 p.m. on that date, just as students
    were being dismissed, Officer Leah Stabio, the school resource officer, was on duty in
    1
    Unless otherwise stated, all statutory citations herein are to the Penal Code.
    2
    On August 15, 2011, a complaint based on the same charge was filed in criminal
    court. Appellant pleaded not guilty to this charge and, on December 5, 2011, filed a
    motion to suppress evidence (§ 1538.5). This motion was heard by a magistrate in
    conjunction with a preliminary hearing on December 7, 2011. Following the magistrate’s
    denial of this motion, the district attorney filed the above-referenced information on
    May 30, 2012.
    1
    uniform with the assignment to ensure students safely left school. Officer Stabio was
    approached by Rhonda Moncrief, a school employee who also helped ensure student
    safety during afternoon dismissal. Moncrief directed Officer Stabio’s attention towards
    appellant, an adult male standing on school grounds whom she identified as “Kenny.”
    Specifically, Moncrief told Officer Stabio: “[T]here was a gentleman that sells drugs on
    campus. She pointed in the direction of a certain gentlemen that was crossing the street.
    She said, ‘That’s him right there. That’s Kenny. He sells weed to all the kids at
    school.’ ”
    Based on this information, Officer Stabio walked towards appellant to investigate
    whether he was a student at the school and whether he was on school grounds for an
    unlawful purpose. As Officer Stabio explained, “nonstudents are not allowed on
    campus.” However, when Officer Stabio approached, appellant looked at her and walked
    off campus in the direction of an ice cream truck. Officer Stabio confronted him there,
    introducing herself and asking in a conversational tone why he was on campus and
    whether he had identification. When appellant queried why he needed to provide
    identification since he had done nothing wrong, Officer Stabio explained that, for her
    own safety, the school’s safety and the public’s safety, she had a duty to identify
    nonstudents on campus to make sure they were not violent or the subject of any active
    warrants.3 Officer Stabio also explained to appellant that she had received information
    from a school employee identifying him as a possible drug dealer.
    Appellant cooperated with Officer Stabio’s request by providing his high school
    identification card, which Officer Stabio used to search the CLETS database for
    information confirming his identity and the existence of any outstanding warrants (there
    were none). Officer Stabio then asked appellant whether he was carrying any drugs.
    Appellant responded, “no,” and Officer Stabio then asked whether he “had any weed on
    him,” to which appellant responded that he may have “a little.” Officer Stabio asked
    whether she could search him for the marijuana, and appellant stated: “I don’t care.” As
    3
    Riverview Middle School is a “closed campus” from which nonstudents are
    generally barred.
    2
    such, Officer Stabio conducted a search, finding, among other things, a plastic container
    in appellant’s right vest pocket with a pill bottle and 19 individual baggies of marijuana.
    Officer Stabio thus arrested appellant for possessing marijuana for sale, read him
    his Miranda rights and placed him in her patrol car. During the drive to the station,
    Officer Stabio continued to question appellant, asking whether he was selling the
    marijuana. Appellant responded, “no.” When Officer Stabio then asked him how much
    one of the baggies of marijuana found on his person sold for, he answered: “sometimes
    ten, sometimes eight.” Officer Stabio continued questioning, asking how much appellant
    could make in a single day selling marijuana. Appellant answered: “I don’t know,
    sixty.”
    On August 1, 2012, appellant filed the combined motion to suppress the evidence
    seized from his person on the afternoon in question and to dismiss the information, which
    is now the subject of appeal. At the August 16, 2012 hearing on appellant’s combined
    motion, the trial court accepted argument from both parties before ultimately denying it.4
    In doing so, the trial court found that “the evidence clearly shows that the defendant
    voluntarily consented to the search. Because his consent was voluntary, and his detention
    was lawful, the court declines to suppress the evidence. It does not do so, and the motion
    to dismiss is denied.”
    On November 5, 2012, appellant withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded no
    contest to the charge. The trial court thereafter sentenced appellant to two years of
    probation. This timely appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    Appellant raises one issue on appeal. He contends Officer Stabio lacked
    reasonable suspicion to detain him and, thus, that her subsequent search of his person was
    illegal. As such, appellant reasons, his motion to suppress all evidence derived from her
    4
    Officer Stabio testified regarding appellant’s detention and arrest at the
    December 7, 2011 combined preliminary hearing and suppression motion hearing. No
    further evidence was presented at the August 16, 2012 hearing on appellant’s motion to
    suppress that was heard by the trial court in conjunction with his related motion to
    dismiss the information.
    3
    illegal search should have been granted. He thus asks this court to reverse the judgment
    and remand the matter to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his no contest plea. The
    following legal principles govern his contention.
    “When reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court
    must uphold the [lower] court’s express or implied findings of fact if the facts are
    supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Lim (2000) 
    85 Cal.App.4th 1289
    , 1296.)
    We then employ our independent judgment to decide whether, under those facts, the
    search and seizure was legal. (People v. Ruiz (1990) 
    217 Cal.App.3d 574
    , 580; People v.
    Ayala (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 225
    , 255.) Otherwise stated, the legality of a search or seizure is
    measured by “the facts, as found by the trier [of fact], against the constitutional standard
    of reasonableness. [Citations.] Thus, in determining whether the search or seizure was
    reasonable on the facts found by the [trier of fact], we exercise our independent
    judgment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 
    11 Cal.4th 354
    , 362 [
    45 Cal.Rptr.2d 425
    , 
    902 P.2d 729
    ].)” (People v. McDonald (2006) 
    137 Cal.App.4th 521
    , 529.)
    Slightly altering this procedure, in cases like this one, where “a magistrate rules on
    a motion to suppress . . . raised at the preliminary examination, he or she sits as the finder
    of fact with the power to judge credibility, resolve conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
    inferences. In reviewing the magistrate’s ruling on a subsequent motion under Penal
    Code section 995, the superior court sits as a reviewing court — it must draw every
    legitimate inference in favor of the information, and cannot substitute its judgment for
    that of the magistrate on issues of credibility or weight of the evidence. On review of the
    superior court ruling by appeal or writ, we in effect disregard the ruling of the superior
    court and directly review the determination of the magistrate. In doing so we draw all
    presumptions in favor of the magistrate’s express or implied factual determinations and
    must uphold them if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Shafrir
    (2010) 
    183 Cal.App.4th 1238
    , 1244-1245 [fn. omitted].)
    With respect to the substantive law, “state and federal claims relating to exclusion
    of evidence on grounds of unreasonable search and seizure are measured by the same
    standard. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 
    8 Cal.4th 68
    , 76 [
    32 Cal.Rptr. 2d 33
    , 
    876 P.2d 519
    ]; In re
    4
    Lance W. (1985) 
    37 Cal.3d 873
    , 886-887 [
    210 Cal.Rptr. 631
    , 
    694 P.2d 744
    ].) ‘Our state
    Constitution [Cal. Const., art. I, § 13] thus forbids the courts to order the exclusion of
    evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure unless that remedy is
    required by the federal Constitution [U.S. Const., 4th Amm.] as interpreted by the United
    States Supreme Court.’ (In re Tyrell J., supra, at p. 76.)” (People v. Camacho (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 824
    , 830.)
    Under binding United States Supreme Court authority, Terry v. Ohio (1968) 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 19, “the judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of a detention is a dual one –
    whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
    related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
    (People v. Brown (1998) 
    62 Cal.App.4th 493
    , 496.) Consistent with this rule and
    relevant to our case, the officer is justified in briefly detaining an individual if, at its
    inception, the officer had “a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the
    individual is involved in criminal activity.” (California v. Hodari D. (1991) 
    499 U.S. 621
    , 636, fn. 10; People v. Hernandez (2008) 
    45 Cal.4th 295
    , 299.) In other words, even
    where “there is no probable cause to make an arrest,” an officer can initially detain an
    individual for purpose of an investigation if the officer reasonably suspects unlawful
    activity has or will occur. (Terry v. Ohio, 
    supra,
     392 U.S. at p. 22.)
    Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we thus must determine whether
    Officer Stabio had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant based on the information she
    received from Rhonda Moncrief that he sold drugs to students on campus.5 (People v.
    White (2003) 
    107 Cal.App.4th 636
    , 642.) Affording all presumptions in favor of the
    lower court’s factual findings, as the law requires (People v. Shafrir, supra, 183
    Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1245), we conclude that she did.
    5
    The People do not dispute the meeting between appellant and Officer Stabio was a
    detention rather than a consensual encounter. (See In re Manuel G. (1997) 
    16 Cal.4th 805
    , 821 [unlike consensual encounters, detentions require an articulable suspicion that
    the person has committed or is about to commit a crime].)
    5
    First, with respect to Officer Stabio’s initial encounter with appellant, it is “well
    settled that a police officer may approach a citizen, identify himself as a police officer
    and ask questions even without any objective justification.” (People v. Rosales (1989)
    
    211 Cal.App.3d 325
    , 330; see also People v. Vibanco (2007) 
    151 Cal.App.4th 1
    , 14.)
    “Detention, not questioning, is the evil at which Terry’s second prong is aimed.
    [Citation.]” (People v. Brown, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 496.) “ ‘[A]n officer has
    every right to talk to anyone he encounters while regularly performing his duties . . . .’
    (People v. Castaneda (1995) 
    35 Cal.App.4th 1222
    , 1227 [
    42 Cal.Rptr.2d 18
    ].) [¶] . . .
    ‘[A]sking questions is an essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a
    police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth
    Amendment.’ (Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cty. (2004) 
    542 U.S. 177
    , 185 [
    159 L.Ed.2d 292
    , 
    124 S.Ct. 2451
    ] (Hiibel).)” (People v. Vibanco, supra,
    151 Cal.App.4th at p. 13.) As such, Officer Stabio was undoubtedly entitled, as a school
    resource officer on duty and in uniform, to approach appellant after seeing him on
    campus to ask him for identification and whether he was a student. (See In re Joseph F.
    (2000) 
    85 Cal.App.4th 975
    , 986 [“unlike the rules applicable to public places in general,
    school officials, including police who assist in maintaining general order on school
    campuses, need not articulate a specific crime which appears to be violated in order to
    detain an outsider for the limited purpose of determining the fundamental factors
    justifying an outsider’s presence on a school campus, such as who he is, why he is on
    campus, and whether he has registered”]; see also § 626.7 [“If a person who is not a
    student . . . of a public school, and who is not required by his or her employment to be on
    the campus . . . enters a campus or facility outside of the common areas where public
    business is conducted, and it reasonably appears to . . . an officer or employee designated
    by the chief administrative officer to maintain order on the campus or facility, that the
    person is committing any act likely to interfere with the peaceful conduct of the activities
    of the campus or facility, or has entered the campus or facility for the purpose of
    committing any such act, the chief administrative officer or his or her designee may
    direct the person to leave the campus”].)
    6
    Further, with respect to Officer Stabio’s subsequent questions regarding whether
    appellant was carrying drugs or marijuana, the law is likewise clear that a “detention is
    reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific
    articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide
    some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal
    activity.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 
    50 Cal.4th 99
    , 145-146.) Here,
    appellant’s detention was justified because, as the record reflects, Officer Stabio had
    discovered specific, articulable facts that, considered in light of the surrounding
    circumstances, indicated appellant may have been present on school grounds to sell drugs
    to students. These facts, quite simply, were that appellant, who was standing on campus
    just as students were being dismissed, “sells weed to all the kids at school.”
    Appellant, of course, disputes these “facts,” received by Officer Stabio from
    Rhonda Moncrief, were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Rather, appellant
    insists that, because Moncrief was “not a witness to any crime,” her statements to the
    officer were mere hearsay and too conclusory and non-specific to justify a detention. We
    disagree.
    As the People accurately note, Officer Stabio testified at the preliminary hearing
    that Moncrief was a school employee whose responsibilities included helping to ensure
    students safely left school at dismissal time. Officer Stabio also confirmed Moncrief was
    present at school daily, and was regularly in contact with Officer Stabio, who, like
    Moncrief, was responsible for the students’ safe departure. On the day in question,
    Moncrief specifically told Officer Stabio “there was a gentlemen that sells drugs on
    campus,” and that, in fact, this “gentleman” was presently on campus. Moncrief then
    pointed to this person, and identified him to Officer Stabio by the name of “Kenny.”
    When Officer Stabio testified under oath regarding the information she received
    from Moncrief, Officer Stabio did not indicate that Moncrief had told her she learned
    about “Kenny” and his student drug sales from another person. Rather, her testimony
    reflects that Moncrief directly told her the information in a manner suggesting that it was
    based on firsthand knowledge; and nothing she said on cross-examination suggested
    7
    otherwise. As such, the magistrate hearing Officer Stabio’s testimony could reasonably
    have interpreted it to have come from Moncrief’s personal observations of appellant
    during the course of her daily school duties. Given that the magistrate, unlike this court,
    observed this testimony firsthand, we decline to second guess his judgment that it was
    “reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 
    26 Cal.3d 557
    , 578;
    see also In re Arturo D. (2002) 
    27 Cal.4th 60
    , 77 [“ ‘the power to judge the credibility of
    the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual
    inferences, is vested in the trial court’ ”].)
    Accordingly, based on this factual record, we conclude that Officer Stabio did in
    fact have grounds to reasonably suspect appellant was on campus to sell drugs, thereby
    justifying her decision to detain him for purposes of an investigation. The law required
    nothing more. 6 (In re Justin K. (2002) 
    98 Cal.App.4th 695
    , 699-700 [the law requires a
    reasonable suspicion, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, to warrant an investigatory
    stop]. Compare In re Joseph G. (1995) 
    32 Cal.App.4th 1735
    , 1741 [information from an
    unnamed mother of a student that her son had seen the appellant at a school event the
    previous week in possession of a gun was sufficiently reliable to demonstrate reasonable
    6
    We easily distinguish appellant’s authority, Bailey v. Superior Court (1992) 
    11 Cal.App.4th 1107
     (Bailey). There, information from a citizen informant was held
    unreliable, and thus insufficient to establish probable cause for obtaining a search
    warrant, where there were no facts showing that the informant personally observed
    criminal activity. (Id. at pp. 1111-1113; see also People v. French (2011) 
    201 Cal.App.4th 1307
    , 1317-1318 [an informant’s mere “assertions of criminality” held
    insufficient to support a probable cause showing to obtain a warrant].) Here, of course,
    we are concerned with whether Moncrief’s statements to Officer Stabio (which, in any
    event went beyond mere assertions of criminality based on hearsay) sufficed to establish
    reasonable suspicion, not, as in Bailey, probable cause. As such, appellant’s authority is
    inapposite. (Adams v. Williams (1972) 
    407 U.S. 143
    , 145 [“The Fourth Amendment does
    not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable
    cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to
    escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work
    to adopt an intermediate response. [Citation.] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
    order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining
    more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the
    time”].)
    8
    suspicion justifying a search of the appellant’s locker].) Moreover, because the facts as
    found by the lower court provided an objective legal basis for Officer Stabio’s decision to
    detain appellant for a possible drug offense, there was no violation of appellant’s Fourth
    Amendment rights.
    DISPOSITION
    The judgment is affirmed.
    _________________________
    Jenkins, J.
    We concur:
    _________________________
    Pollak, Acting P. J.
    _________________________
    Siggins, J.
    9