Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Baass ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 5/1/23
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    (Sacramento)
    ----
    CRESTWOOD BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, INC.,                           C094882
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                    (Super. Ct. No.
    34201980003129CUWMGDS)
    v.
    MICHELLE BAASS, as Director, etc., et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    ROYALE HEALTH CARE CENTER, INC.,                             C095532
    Plaintiff and Appellant,                    (Super. Ct. No.
    34201980003351CUWMGDS)
    v.
    MICHELLE BAASS, as Director, etc., et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    WEST ANAHEIM EXTENDED CARE et al.,                           C095533
    Plaintiffs and Appellants,                  (Super. Ct. No.
    34201980003238CUWMGDS)
    v.
    MICHELLE BAASS, as Director, etc., et al.,
    Defendants and Respondents.
    1
    APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Laurie
    M. Earl, Judge. Affirmed.
    Hooper, Lundy & Bookman, Stanton J. Stock, Alicia W. Macklin, Sansan Lin,
    Jeffrey Lin and Mark E. Regan for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, Gregory D. Brown and Christine M. Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for
    Defendants and Respondents.
    Appellants Crestwood Behavior Health, Inc. (Crestwood), West Anaheim
    Extended Care and Extended Care Hospital of Westminster (West Anaheim), and Royale
    Health Care Center dba South Coast Post Acute (South Coast) (together, appellants)
    operate skilled nursing facilities serving beneficiaries of the California Medical
    Assistance Program (Medi-Cal). Respondent Department of Health Care Services (the
    Department) administers Medi-Cal. (Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Kent (2018)
    
    25 Cal.App.5th 811
    , 815-816; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 14000-14198.2; Cal. Code Regs.,
    tit. 22, § 50004.)1 As relevant here, the Department also administers the “Skilled Nursing
    Facility Quality and Accountability Supplemental Payment System” (QASP), which
    authorizes supplemental payments, over and above Medi-Cal reimbursement rates, to
    skilled nursing facilities meeting certain performance standards. (§ 14126.022.)
    These consolidated appeals challenge the Department’s method for calculating
    QASP payments. Appellants argue they have not received all the QASP payments to
    which they are entitled and blame the alleged underpayment to the Department’s practice
    of excluding certain Medi-Cal days—known as “special treatment program days” or
    “STP days”—from its calculations. They seek writs of mandate directing the Department
    to include STP days in the calculation of QASP payments.
    1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    2
    We conclude, as did the trial court, that appellants have failed to identify an
    appropriate basis for writ relief. Section 14170, subdivision (a)(1), on which they
    currently rely, does not impose a mandatory or ministerial duty on the Department that
    could support the issuance of a writ of mandate. And appellants have not shown any
    abuse of discretion by the Department. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgments.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     Statutory and Regulatory Framework
    Medicaid is a cooperative federal-state program under which the federal
    government and participating state governments share the costs of providing health care
    services to qualified low-income persons. (County of Colusa v. Douglas (2014) 
    227 Cal.App.4th 1123
    , 1126; 
    42 U.S.C. § 1396
     et seq.) “States are not required to participate
    in Medicaid, but all of them do.” (Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Servs. v.
    Ahlborn (2006) 
    547 U.S. 268
    , 275.)
    “Medicaid is jointly financed by the federal and state governments and is
    administered by state governments through state ‘plans,’ which are approved by the
    federal Secretary of Health and Human Services.” (B.K. ex rel. Tinsley v. Snyder (9th
    Cir. 2019) 
    922 F.3d 957
    , 963; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b); California Hospital Assn. v.
    Maxwell-Jolly (2010) 
    188 Cal.App.4th 559
    , 564 [“Although state participation is
    voluntary, if a state chooses to participate, it must prepare and submit a plan for approval
    to the federal government, describing its Medicaid program”].) State plans must establish
    payment rates for the various services provided under the plan. (42 U.S.C. §
    1396a(a)(30); California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health
    Services (2007) 
    148 Cal.App.4th 696
    , 701 [“The Medicaid Act requires each
    participating state to adopt a state plan describing the policy and methods to be used to
    set payment rates”].) Compliance with the state plan is mandatory. (42 U.S.C. §
    1396a(a)(1); Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center v. Shewry (2008) 
    168 Cal.App.4th 460
    , 470 [“The state plan is mandatory”].)
    3
    California participates in the federal Medicaid program through Medi-Cal. (§
    14000 et seq.; County of Colusa v. Douglas, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1126;
    Olszewski v. Scripps Health (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 798
    , 804.) The Department administers
    Medi-Cal in accordance with California’s state plan (State Plan), which specifies the
    methods and standards used to set reimbursement rates for services provided to Medi-Cal
    beneficiaries. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 50004; California Assn. for Health Services at
    Home v. State Dept. of Health Services, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 700-701; see also
    
    42 C.F.R. § 447.252
    (b).)
    1.     Skilled Nursing Facilities and Special Treatment Program Services
    Skilled nursing facilities provide 24-hour skilled nursing and supportive care to
    patients who require such care on an extended basis. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1250, subd.
    (c)(1).) Skilled nursing facilities may also operate “optional service units,” which
    provide specific types of patient care. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72401, subd. (a).)
    Optional service units may provide physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech
    therapy, speech pathology, audiology, social work services, or special treatment program
    (STP) services. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72401, subd. (b).) We are concerned here
    with the last of these, STP services.
    STP services are provided to patients who have chronic psychiatric impairments
    and whose adaptive functioning is moderately impaired. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §
    72443, subd. (a).) “Special treatment program services are those therapeutic services,
    including prevocational preparation and prerelease planning, provided to mentally
    disordered persons having special needs in one or more of the following general areas:
    self-help skills, behavior adjustment, interpersonal relationships.” (Ibid.) Appellants
    provide STP services at their skilled nursing facilities.
    Skilled nursing facilities are licensed by the Department for specific numbers and
    types of beds. For example, Crestwood Manor Modesto is licensed for 194 beds, 118 of
    which are ordinary skilled nursing facility beds (SNF beds), and 76 of which are STP
    4
    beds. SNF beds and STP beds are not interchangeable. They are located in physically
    separate and distinct parts of the skilled nursing facility, and patients are assigned to one
    or the other, depending on their condition. Despite these distinctions, patients assigned to
    STP beds receive the same baseline set of services as patients assigned to SNF beds.
    (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 72301, subds. (a)-(b).) Thus, patients assigned to STP beds
    receive both skilled nursing facility services and STP services.2 (Ibid.)
    2.     Reimbursement Rates and Rate Setting Audits
    “ ‘The Medi-Cal program does not directly provide services; instead, it reimburses
    participating health care plans and providers for covered services provided to Medi-Cal
    beneficiaries.’ ” (Dignity Health v. Local Initiative Health Care Authority of Los Angeles
    County (2020) 
    44 Cal.App.5th 144
    , 152.) Prior to 2004, providers received a fixed
    amount per patient per day that provided “no incentive for quality care while reimbursing
    [them] about $5[,]000 a year less than it costs to care for these residents.” (Assem. Floor
    Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1629 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 24, 2004, p.
    6.) The Legislature adopted the Medi-Cal Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act
    (Reimbursement Act) in September 2004. (See §§ 14126-14126.035.) The purpose of
    the Reimbursement Act was to devise a Medi-Cal reimbursement methodology that
    “more effectively ensures individual access to appropriate long-term care services,
    promotes quality resident care, advances decent wages and benefits for nursing home
    workers, supports provider compliance with all applicable state and federal requirements,
    and encourages administrative efficiency.” (§ 14126.02, subd. (a).)
    The Reimbursement Act requires the Department to calculate reimbursement rates
    for facilities participating in the Medi-Cal program based on their actual costs of
    providing health care services to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. (§ 14126.02, subd (b) [directing
    2As we shall discuss, skilled nursing facilities that provide STP services receive an
    additional reimbursement amount known as the “STP patch.”
    5
    the Department to “implement a facility-specific rate[ ]setting system . . . that reflects the
    costs and staffing levels associated with quality of care for residents in nursing
    facilities”].) Skilled nursing facilities report their costs to the Department in annual cost
    reports, which include information concerning the number of days of care that have been
    provided to Medi-Cal beneficiaries (sometimes called “patient days” or “bed days”), and
    the payor type for days of care provided (e.g., Medi-Cal, Medicare, private payor). (§
    14126.023, subds. (i) and (j).) Reimbursement rates are set using information contained
    in annual cost reports, and expressed as the amount received by each facility per patient
    per day. (§ 14126.023, subds. (i) and (j).) For example, a facility with a reimbursement
    rate of $100 would receive $100 for each day of care provided to a Medi-Cal
    beneficiary.3
    The Department audits annual cost reports as part of the rate setting process.
    During an audit, the Department may review invoices and insurance plans to verify
    reported expenses, or request patient census data to verify numbers of patient days. The
    results of the audit are summarized in auditor’s work papers and shared with the audited
    facility, which may propose adjustments or provide additional information, as
    appropriate. The Department then issues a final audit report. The Department’s final
    audit report reflects the facility’s total patient days, fee-for-service days, and managed
    care days.4 The final audit report may also reflect STP days; however, STP days are not
    audited. This point will become important later.
    3Crestwood’s reimbursement rates during the relevant period ranged from $187 to $272
    per day.
    4 Medi-Cal reimburses participating health care plans and providers “using two systems:
    fee-for service and managed care. [Citations.] [¶] Medi-Cal beneficiaries in the fee-for-
    service system may obtain services ‘from any provider that participates in Medi-Cal, is
    willing to treat the beneficiary, and is willing to accept reimbursement from [the
    Department] at a set amount for the services provided.’ ” (Dignity Health v. Local
    6
    Skilled nursing facilities offering STP services receive an additional
    reimbursement amount of $5.72 per patient day, known as the “STP patch.” (Cal. Code
    Regs., tit. 22, § 51511.1.) Thus, returning to our earlier example, a skilled nursing
    facility with a reimbursement rate of $100 would receive $105.72 for each day the
    facility provided STP services to a Medi-Cal beneficiary. The State Plan describes the
    STP patch as “[a] flat add-on rate determined to be the additional cost for facilities to
    perform [STP] services.” The State Plan also clarifies that STP services “do[] not
    constitute a separate level of care.”
    3.     The QASP Program
    In 2010, the Legislature amended the Reimbursement Act by adding section
    14126.022. (Stats. 2010, ch. 717, § 152, eff. Oct. 19, 2010.) Section 14126.022 directs
    the Department to develop the QASP program, subject to approval by the federal Centers
    for Medicare and Medicaid Services. (§ 14126.022, subd. (a)(1).) The purpose of the
    QASP program is to “provide supplemental payments to skilled nursing facilities that
    improve the quality and accountability of care rendered to residents in skilled nursing
    facilities . . . and to penalize those facilities that do not meet measurable standards.” (§
    14126.022, subd. (a)(2)(A).)
    Supplemental payments are based on performance measures that include
    immunization rates, facility acquired pressure ulcer incidence, the use of physical
    restraints, compliance with requirements regarding nursing or direct care service hours
    per patient day, resident and family satisfaction, and staff retention. (§ 14126.022, subd.
    (i)(2)(A).) Section 14126.022 does not say how QASP payments are to be calculated or
    Initiative Health Care Authority of Los Angeles County, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.)
    “In the managed care system, ‘[the Department] contracts with health maintenance
    organizations (HMOs) and other managed care plans . . . to provide health coverage to
    Medi-Cal beneficiaries, and the plans are paid a predetermined amount for each
    beneficiary per month, whether or not the beneficiary actually receives services.” (Ibid.)
    7
    awarded. These matters are instead left to the Department, subject to approval by the
    federal government. (§ 14126.022, subd. (a).) The Department has developed
    procedures for administering the QASP program, which are set forth in the State Plan.
    The State Plan establishes a three-tiered scoring methodology for supplemental
    payments under the QASP program. Skilled nursing facilities must meet certain
    performance criteria, placing them in either the second or third tier, to qualify for
    supplemental QASP payments. The Department sets a per diem rate for each tier, with
    the third tier per diem rate equal to 1.5 times the second tier per diem rate.5 A skilled
    nursing facility’s supplemental payment under the QASP program is calculated by
    multiplying the applicable per diem rate by the “number of Medi-Cal bed days (including
    Fee-For-Service and managed care days) for the audit period.” Thus, skilled nursing
    facilities with a higher number of bed days receive higher QASP payments.
    Here is where things get interesting. The State Plan provides: “The Department
    will utilize audited Medi-Cal Fee-For-Service and managed care bed days for
    determining payment amounts. The audited bed days are drawn from the audit reports
    used to establish . . . Fee-For-Service per diem rates.” As mentioned above, the audit
    reports used to establish reimbursement rates reflect the number of STP bed days
    reported by each skilled nursing facility, but those days are not audited. Because they are
    not audited, STP days are not included in the calculation of supplemental payments under
    the QASP program. As a result, appellants say, they have missed out on millions of
    dollars in QASP payments to which they would otherwise be entitled.
    B.     Petitions for Writ of Mandate
    Appellants filed separate, though substantially similar, petitions for writ of
    mandate against the Department and three former directors of the Department, Jennifer
    5 Appellants’ skilled nursing facilities appear to have been assigned to the second and
    third tiers during the relevant periods.
    8
    Kent, Richard Figueroa, Jr., and Bradley P. Gilbert. The petitions allege the Department
    should have included STP days in calculating appellants’ QASP payments, and the
    failure to do so undermines the legislative goal of incentivizing skilled nursing facilities
    to offer high quality care to Medi-Cal beneficiaries. What’s more, the petitions say, the
    practice of excluding STP days from QASP calculations disincentivizes skilled nursing
    facilities from offering STP services at all. The petitions seek writs of mandate ordering
    the Department to include STP days in the calculation and award of QASP payments.
    The petitions do not challenge the State Plan.
    The Department answered the first filed petition in the Crestwood action
    (Sacramento Superior Court case No. 34-2019-800003129CUWMGDS) and demurred to
    the petitions in the West Anaheim and South Coast actions (Sacramento Superior Court
    case Nos. 34-2019-800003238CUWMGDS and 34-2020-800003351CUWMGDS,
    respectively). The trial court ordered the cases related pursuant to California Rules of
    Court, rule 3.300, and exercised discretion to postpone the hearing on the demurrers in
    the West Anaheim and South Coast actions until after the hearing on the merits in the
    Crestwood action.
    The hearing on the merits in the Crestwood action took place in April 2021. The
    trial court took the matter under submission and ultimately entered an order denying the
    petition. The trial court entered judgment in the Department’s favor in June 2021.
    With the Crestwood action resolved, the trial court next turned to the petitions in
    the West Anaheim and South Coast actions. The trial court received and considered
    supplemental briefing, and then sustained the demurrers to both petitions without leave to
    amend. The trial court entered judgment in the Department’s favor in the West Anaheim
    and South Coast actions in October and December 2021, respectively.
    These appeals timely followed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.     Standards of Review
    9
    We are tasked here with reviewing two types of orders. First, we must review the
    order denying the petition for writ of mandate in the Crestwood action. Because
    appellants’ arguments are almost entirely geared to the Crestwood action, we will focus
    our discussion there as well. Second, we must review the orders sustaining the demurrers
    to the petitions in the West Anaheim and South Coast actions. These orders receive scant
    attention in appellants’ opening briefs, and we will likewise afford them only brief
    consideration. We set forth the applicable standards of review below.
    1.     Writ of Mandate
    A traditional writ of mandate lies “to compel the performance of an act which the
    law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.” (Code Civ.
    Proc., § 1085, subd. (a); Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 
    49 Cal.3d 432
    ,
    442 [“Mandamus will lie to compel a public official to perform an official act required by
    law”].) To obtain relief, the petitioner must establish the existence of a public officer’s or
    a public entity’s “clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a beneficial
    right to performance of that duty.” (California Assn. of Professional Scientists v.
    Department of Finance (2011) 
    195 Cal.App.4th 1228
    , 1236 (Professional Scientists); see
    County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 
    214 Cal.App.4th 643
    , 653.)
    Writ relief may be available in two circumstances, both of which are relevant here.
    (Glendale City Employees’ Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 
    15 Cal.3d 328
    , 344
    [“mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty or to correct an
    abuse of discretion”]; County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 214
    Cal.App.4th at p. 653 [“Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 permits judicial review of
    ministerial duties as well as quasi-legislative and legislative acts”].) First, “[a] court may
    issue a writ of mandate to compel a public agency or officer to perform a mandatory
    duty. [Citation.] ‘This type of writ petition “seeks to enforce a mandatory and
    ministerial duty to act on the part of an administrative agency or its officers.” ’ [Citation.]
    ‘ “[T]he writ will not lie to control discretion conferred upon a public officer or agency.”
    10
    ’ ” (Collins v. Thurmond (2019) 
    41 Cal.App.5th 879
    , 914.) Under this theory of relief,
    “[m]andamus may issue . . . to compel an official both to exercise his discretion (if he is
    required to do so) and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law.”
    (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 442.) “Often, the crucial
    issue when the petitioner seeks such relief is whether the act that the petitioner seeks to
    compel is a mandatory and ministerial duty, or, on the contrary, is a quasi-legislative and
    discretionary act. ‘ “ ‘[I]n most cases, the appellate court must determine whether the
    agency had a ministerial duty capable of direct enforcement or a quasi-legislative duty
    entitled to a considerable degree of deference. This question is generally subject to de
    novo review on appeal because it is one of statutory interpretation, a question of law for
    the court.’ ” ’ ” (CV Amalgamated LLC v. City of Chula Vista (2022) 
    82 Cal.App.5th 265
    , 279 (CV Amalgamated).)
    “Second, a court may issue a writ when a public agency has abused its discretion
    in carrying out a discretionary function. ‘Although traditional mandamus will not lie to
    compel the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, it is a proper remedy to
    challenge agency discretionary action as an abuse of discretion.’ ” (CV Amalgamated,
    supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 279.) “ ‘When a court reviews a public entit[y’s] decision for
    an abuse of discretion, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the public
    entity, and if reasonable minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the public entity’s
    discretionary determination, that decision must be upheld. [Citation.] Thus, the judicial
    inquiry . . . addresses whether the public entity’s action was arbitrary, capricious or
    entirely without evidentiary support, and whether it failed to conform to procedures
    required by law.’ ” (Id. at p. 280.)
    “With respect to both theories of writ relief, ‘[w]hen an appellate court reviews a
    trial court’s judgment on a petition for a traditional writ of mandate, it applies the
    substantial evidence test to the trial court’s findings of fact and independently reviews the
    trial court’s conclusions on questions of law, which include the interpretation of a statute
    11
    and its application to undisputed facts.’ ” (CV Amalgamated, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p.
    280.)
    2.    Demurrer
    On appeal from a judgment based on an order sustaining a demurrer, we assume
    all the facts alleged in the complaint (or petition) are true. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma
    Stores, Inc. (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 524
    , 528.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts,
    but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley
    (2006) 
    38 Cal.4th 1
    , 6.) We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Ibid.)
    We determine de novo whether the complaint (or petition) alleges facts sufficient to state
    a cause of action under any legal theory. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara
    County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 32
    , 42.) We read the complaint (or petition)
    as a whole and its parts in their context to give the pleading a reasonable interpretation.
    (Evans v. City of Berkeley, 
    supra, at p. 6
    .)
    When a trial court has sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, “we decide
    whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it
    can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
    abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 
    39 Cal.3d 311
    , 318.) “The
    burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Ibid.)
    B.      Crestwood Action
    Appellants spend most of their time on issues related to the Crestwood action. Of
    these, only two warrant serious discussion. First, appellants—or rather, Crestwood—
    suggest section 14170 imposes a mandatory and ministerial duty on the Department to
    include STP days in the calculation and award of QASP payments. Second, Crestwood
    suggests the Department abused its discretion in failing to include STP days in QASP
    calculations. We consider—and reject—these arguments momentarily.
    Before we continue, we should note that Crestwood expends considerable energy
    rehashing arguments that do not demonstrate error. Indeed, Crestwood devotes two
    12
    sections of its opening brief—more than eight pages—to things the trial court supposedly
    got right. For example, Crestwood tells us the trial court properly rejected the
    Department’s argument that California Code of Regulations, title 22, section 51511.1
    (which authorizes the STP patch) precludes the Department from including STP days in
    the QASP calculation. Crestwood also says the trial court was right to reject the
    Department’s argument that section 14126.022 exempts STP days from the QASP
    program. And Crestwood agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that Assembly Bill No.
    81 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2020, ch. 13, § 10) (Assembly Bill 81), which states
    that STP services “shall continue to be exempt” from the QASP program, “is ‘a factor’
    for the [c]ourt to consider, but is neither binding nor conclusive.”6 (See generally
    McClung v. Employment Development Department (2004) 
    34 Cal.4th 467
    , 473 [“ ‘a
    legislative declaration of an existing statute’s meaning’ is but a factor for a court to
    consider and ‘is neither binding nor conclusive in construing the statute’ ”].) These
    arguments miss the mark.
    That the trial court was unmoved by the Department’s stated reasons for excluding
    STP days from the QASP program does not establish any error in denying the petition.
    The trial court was crystal clear that Crestwood’s policy arguments about whether the
    Department could or should include STP days in QASP calculations were no substitute
    for the requirement that Crestwood identify a mandatory and ministerial duty requiring
    the Department to do so. As the trial court observed: “Crestwood spends most of its time
    attacking various arguments the Department has made about why STP days are not
    6 Assembly Bill 81 became effective during the pendency of this case and added a new
    subsection to section 14126.022, which reads: “Notwithstanding any other law, special
    program services for the mentally disordered that are entitled to receive the supplemental
    payment under Section 51511.1 of Title 22 of the California Code of Regulations shall
    continue to be exempt from the Skilled Nursing Facility Quality and Accountability
    Supplemental Payment System.” (§ 14126.022, subd. (a)(2)(C).)
    13
    included when calculating QASP payments, and very little time explaining why the law
    requires those days to be included. Some of Crestwood’s arguments are quite
    convincing. None of them, however, demonstrate that the Department is required by law
    to include STP days when calculating QASP payments. Thus, Crestwood fails to meet its
    burden.” So too here.
    1.     Mandatory and Ministerial Duty
    Crestwood’s search for a mandatory and ministerial duty begins and ends with
    section 14170, which requires the Department to implement an auditing system ensuring
    that federal and state funds are spent responsibly. (§ 14170, subd. (a)(1).) Specifically,
    Crestwood argues support for the existence of a mandatory and ministerial duty can be
    found in section 14170, subdivision (a)(1). That subdivision provides, in pertinent part,
    that cost reports and other data “shall be considered true and correct unless audited or
    reviewed within three years after the close of the period covered by the report.” (Ibid.)
    Crestwood’s argument, which was only belatedly articulated in the trial court, fails to
    identify any clear duty that could be remedied by the issuance of a writ of mandate.7
    (Professional Scientists, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)
    Section 14170 vests the Department with discretion to decide which cost reports
    and cost data should be audited. (§ 14170, subd. (a)(1) [“Amounts paid for services
    provided to Medi-Cal beneficiaries shall be audited by the department in the manner and
    form prescribed by the department”].) “Section 14170 does not prescribe a particular
    form required for an audit. Instead, the scope of an audit is a matter left to the
    Department’s discretion.” (Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Belshé (1997) 
    54 Cal.App.4th 7
     Crestwood mentioned section 14170 in its opening brief to the trial court but made no
    serious attempt to argue subdivision (a)(1) imposed any mandatory and ministerial duty
    on the Department. That argument was not fully developed until the hearing on the
    petition. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to consider the untimely argument on
    the merits.
    14
    1547, 1558 (Kaiser).) As we shall discuss, the Department has exercised discretion to
    exclude STP days from rate setting audits.
    Subdivision (a)(1) limits the Department’s discretion by providing that cost reports
    and other data “shall be considered true and correct unless audited or reviewed within
    three years after the close of the period covered by the report.” (§ 14170, subd. (a)(1);
    Palmdale Hospital Medical Center v. Department of Health Services (1992) 
    8 Cal.App.4th 1306
    , 1313 [“Plainly, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies, the
    Department cannot question the information submitted by the provider once the three-
    year period has expired”]; Redding Medical Center v. Bonta (2004) 
    115 Cal.App.4th 1031
    , 1041 [the Department “may not question the veracity of cost reports outside the
    prescribed review period of three years” unless an exception applies].) However,
    subdivision (a)(1) of section 14170 does not prescribe any “act” the Department must
    take with respect to unaudited or unreviewed cost reports. (Palmdale Hospital Medical
    Center, supra, at p. 1313 [“the sole consequence of the Department’s failure to audit or
    review a provider’s cost report or other data within three years is that such information
    ‘shall be considered true and correct’ ”].) Herein lies the problem for Crestwood.
    Contrary to Crestwood’s suggestion, subdivision (a)(1) of section 14170 does not
    impose a mandatory and ministerial duty on the Department to treat unaudited cost
    reports and data as though they had been audited. To say that unaudited cost reports and
    data “shall be considered true and correct” does not imply that they have been audited or
    must be considered to have been audited. Although audits “may take a range of forms”
    (Kaiser, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559), they definitionally involve “a formal
    examination of an organization’s or individual’s accounts or financial situation,” or “a
    methodical examination and review.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023)
     [as of April 18, 2023].)
    Nothing in section 14170 suggests the Legislature intended for unaudited cost reports or
    data to be “deemed audited” after three years, and nothing requires the Department to
    15
    take any particular action with respect to such reports or data. Section 14170 thus fails to
    establish the existence of a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the Department’s part
    to act in a particular way, or a clear, present, and beneficial right to performance of that
    duty on Crestwood’s part. (Professional Scientists, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)8
    Crestwood argues our interpretation of section 14170 would conflict with the State
    Plan.9 We perceive no conflict. Unaudited cost reports and data are “considered true and
    correct” after three years in the limited sense that they are no longer subject to being
    audited under section 14170. (See Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center v. Belshé (1996)
    
    13 Cal.4th 748
    , 756 [“the statutory language [of § 14170, subd. (a)(1)] reflects an
    apparent legislative intent simply to require the Department to perform an audit within
    three years from the date of the filing of the provider’s cost reports”].) That does not
    mean unaudited cost reports and cost data become audited with the passage of time. If
    that were so, QASP payments could be calculated using bed days that had never been
    formally examined or methodically reviewed, which would violate the State Plan.10 (See
    8 Crestwood does not argue the language of section 14170, subdivision (a)(1) is
    ambiguous. We therefore decline to consider Crestwood’s argument that extrinsic
    evidence supports an alternate interpretation of the statute. (Williams v. Superior Court
    (2001) 
    92 Cal.App.4th 612
    , 623 [“Courts may look to extrinsic evidence to construe a
    statute only when the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable
    interpretation”].)
    9 Crestwood also suggests that its reported STP days may have been audited after all.
    This argument has been forfeited. The trial court specifically found that Crestwood’s
    STP days were not audited, and Crestwood does not argue the evidence was insufficient
    to support the finding. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 
    48 Cal.App.5th 1014
    ,
    1075 [when an appellant raises an issue “but fails to support it with reasoned argument
    and citations to authority, we treat the point as forfeited”].)
    10Again, the State Plan provides that only audited bed days are used to calculate QASP
    payments. STP days are not audited; therefore, they are not used to calculate QASP
    payments.
    16
    County of San Luis Obispo v. Superior Court (2001) 
    90 Cal.App.4th 288
    , 292
    [“ ‘Mandamus will not lie to compel the performance of any act which would be void,
    illegal or contrary to public policy’ ”].) Such an interpretation would create the very
    conflict Crestwood urges us to avoid.
    Crestwood also argues that excluding STP days from QASP calculations would
    create “absurd results.” This is so, Crestwood says, because the Department could refuse
    to audit any and all cost reports, and thereby avoid making any QASP payments. We
    need not address such hypothetical scenarios because they are not before us. Even so, we
    note the State Plan requires the Department to audit skilled nursing facilities “a minimum
    of once every three years.” Thus, the Department would not have discretion to refuse to
    conduct any audits at all. Under the circumstances, we do not believe that our
    construction of section 14170 would be likely to produce absurd results.
    For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude section 14170, subdivision (a)(1)
    does not impose a mandatory and ministerial duty on the Department to deem unaudited
    cost reports and data as having been audited after three years. It follows that the
    Department does not have a mandatory and ministerial duty to include unaudited STP
    days in QASP calculations.11 We therefore reject Crestwood’s contention that writ relief
    should have been granted to compel the performance of a mandatory, ministerial act.
    2.     Abuse of Discretion
    Crestwood next argues the Department’s practice of excluding STP days from
    QASP calculations constitutes an abuse of discretion.12 Although not entirely clear,
    11As the trial court observed, the only mandatory and ministerial duty suggested by the
    petition is the duty to comply with the State Plan, and the State Plan says only audited
    bed days are used to calculate QASP payments.
    12  Contrary to Crestwood’s contention, the petition in the Crestwood action does not
    allege any abuse of discretion by the Department. We note, however, that the petitions in
    the West Anaheim and South Coast actions mention an alleged abuse of discretion, albeit
    17
    Crestwood appears to argue that an abuse of discretion occurred because the Department
    mistakenly believed and unsuccessfully argued that STP days were exempt from the
    QASP program under section 14126.022 and/or excluded by California Code of
    Regulations, title 22, section 51511.1. Crestwood also appears to argue the Department
    abused its discretion in choosing not to audit STP days. Neither argument is persuasive.
    While “traditional mandate will lie to correct abuses of discretion, a party seeking
    review under traditional mandamus must show the public official or agency invested with
    discretion acted arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or without due regard for his
    rights, and that the action prejudiced him.” (Gordon v. Horsley (2001) 
    86 Cal.App.4th 336
    , 351; see also Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 
    111 Cal.App.4th 1255
    , 1265 [“Mandamus may issue to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative
    power, but only if the action taken is so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to show
    an abuse of discretion as a matter of law”].) We cannot say the practice of excluding STP
    days from QASP calculations constitutes an abuse of discretion.
    Here, though the trial court may have rejected some of the Department’s reasons
    for excluding STP days, the court accepted another reason as dispositive, and so do we.
    As previously discussed, the State Plan provides that only audited bed days may be used
    to calculate QASP payments. The trial court found, and substantial evidence supports,
    that STP days are not audited. The Department could not exercise discretion to include
    unaudited STP days in QASP calculations because doing so would have violated the
    State Plan. The provisions of the State Plan being mandatory, the Department was not
    free to choose some other approach to calculating QASP payments. (Mission Hospital
    Regional Medical Center v. Shewry, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 470.) The Department
    only briefly, and appellants suggest they could amend the petitions to clarify that they
    seek writ relief to correct the alleged abuses. Accordingly, we will again exercise our
    discretion to consider Crestwood’s untimely arguments.
    18
    was instead obliged to follow the approach spelled out in the State Plan.13 (Ibid.) That
    approach implicitly foreclosed the possibility of STP days being included. The
    Department thus reasonably determined that STP days could not be used to calculate
    QASP payments. (Ibid.) That the Department may have offered or entertained other,
    less convincing explanations for excluding STP days does not establish any prejudicial
    abuse of discretion.
    Crestwood next argues the Department abused its discretion by choosing not to
    audit STP days. Again, we disagree. The trial court received evidence that STP days are
    not audited because they are not used for rate setting purposes. That evidence was
    undisputed. Given that STP days are not used for rate-setting purposes, there is nothing
    unreasonable about not auditing them during rate-setting audits. The Department could
    reasonably exercise discretion to decline to audit STP days.14
    “With more than 2,000 providers submitting cost reports, the Department does not
    have enough resources to conduct a comprehensive audit of each Medi-Cal provider. In
    some cases, an audit may consist of a desk review and acceptance of the cost report as
    filed. . . . In other situations, a more comprehensive audit may be required. It is left to
    the Department to determine the scope of audit required in any particular case.” (Kaiser,
    supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1559.) Here, the Department acted within its discretion in
    declining to audit STP days that would not be used for rate setting purposes, and
    13   Again, Crestwood’s petition does not purport to challenge the State Plan.
    14 The Department suggests the reason that STP days are not used in rate setting can be
    found in the State Plan, which provides: “Freestanding STP facilities are excluded from
    the determination of freestanding [nursing facility] rates due to their different staffing
    requirements and the complexity of their reporting costs by level of care and services.
    The cost reports for these facilities often comingle the data related to [nursing facility],
    Short-Doyle [Mental Health Medi-Cal Program,] and special county programs.”
    19
    choosing, instead, to rely on audited bed days that could be drawn from readily available
    rate setting audit reports. No abuse of discretion appears.
    C.     West Anaheim and South Coast Actions
    As previously discussed, appellants’ opening brief focuses almost entirely on the
    Crestwood action and makes little mention of the West Anaheim or South Coast actions.
    Indeed, the argument section of the opening brief mentions the West Anaheim and South
    Coast actions only once, in a footnote. That footnote reads, in pertinent part: “Petitioner
    can amend their Petition here to clarify allegations that the Department abused its
    discretion by failing to count STP days and/or audit STEP [sic] days, and thus to include
    STP days in the QASP calculation. . . . In addition, allegations can be added that clarify
    that the Department further abused its discretion by formulating and relying on an
    erroneous legal conclusion whereby STP days were exempt from the QASP Program.”
    These afterthoughts fail to demonstrate error. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
    8.204(a)(1)(B) [appellant must [“[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
    subheading summarizing the point”]; Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 
    10 Cal.App.5th 172
    , 179
    [“Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but
    are not clearly identified by a heading”].)
    In any case, we have already rejected the same arguments in the context of the
    Crestwood action. We therefore conclude that West Anaheim and South Coast have
    failed to carry their burden of showing that the trial court abused its discretion in
    sustaining the Departments demurrers without leave to amend. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra,
    39 Cal.3d at p. 318; T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 
    4 Cal.5th 145
    , 162.)
    20
    III. DISPOSITION
    The judgments are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.
    (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
    /S/
    RENNER, J.
    We concur:
    /S/
    HULL, Acting P. J.
    /S/
    McADAM, J.*
    * Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    21