People v. Goubert CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 5/1/23 P. v. Goubert CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)
----
THE PEOPLE, C096027
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21CR002176)
v.
FRANKLIN ALAN GOUBERT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant Franklin Alan Goubert
guilty of two counts of arson of property and one count of arson of forest land.
Defendant appeals, arguing there is insufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti for
two of the counts and insufficient evidence to satisfy the burn element of arson for one of
the counts. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
findings and thus affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The prosecution charged defendant with four counts of arson of property and one
count of arson of forest land based on five separate fires.
The first fire occurred behind a grocery store on July 7, 2020, at approximately
2:00 a.m. The fire occurred near homeless encampments, and it burned the interior of a
recreational vehicle and less than one acre of vegetation consisting mostly of grass.
Chief Ray Barber of the Red Bluff Fire Department (the fire department) saw defendant
at the scene observing the fire.
The second fire, which occurred at approximately 12:00 a.m. on August 30, 2020,
was a small vegetation fire in an empty field near train tracks. The fire burned a
shopping cart and a pile of vegetation. Captain Matthew Shobash of the fire department
excluded potential causes of the fire—including cooking items, children, smoking
material, natural causes, equipment failure, and train malfunction—and expressed the
opinion that someone lit the fire. Defendant reported the fire, and Captain Shobash saw
defendant near the fire.
The third fire, located behind a restaurant, occurred on December 10, 2020 (the
restaurant fire). The fire burned a pile of items comprised of garbage, vegetation, and
sticks. Captain Shobash saw defendant at the scene of the fire, and defendant admitted he
“started the fire to clean up the area.”
On May 3, 2021, the fire department responded to the fourth fire, located inside a
drainpipe within a creek bed (the drainpipe fire). Chief Barber testified the pipe was not
“actually” damaged, but described approximately two feet of “heavy charring” on the
inside of the pipe and stated the fire burned the inside of the pipe. He also expressed the
opinion that someone built the fire by stuffing brush and twigs into the pipe, and then lit
the materials on fire. Defendant’s camp—where he was living at the time—was only a
few feet away from the drainpipe, and the fire department described the fire as an
“outside open fire for warming or cooking.” Chief Barber visited defendant’s camp later
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that day, and defendant stated he did not know about the fire. At a later interview with
Chief Barber and Detective Sean Baxter, defendant admitted he started the fire.
The final fire occurred near a railroad at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 13, 2021,
and burned grass, brush, and vegetation. Chief Barber saw defendant being escorted
away from the fire while holding a hoe and a rake. Homeless encampments were nearby,
including defendant’s camp, and after eliminating electrical and lightening causes, the
fire department determined a “hot start of some sort” caused the fire. Defendant initially
maintained he did not start the fire, but ultimately admitted to starting it.
At trial, Chief Barber testified it is uncommon to see the average citizen at
multiple fires, and Captain Shobash testified it is uncommon to see someone at multiple
fires unless they are affiliated with the fire department. The trial court also heard
testimony that defendant admitted to starting multiple fires. Defendant told Detective
Baxter he set fires for a purpose, either to clean up brush, improve the area, or for some
other purpose. Defendant also told Detective Baxter he normally used a lighter to start
fires, and he believed “he had above average knowledge of fire.”
The trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of arson of property,
pertaining to the restaurant and drainpipe fires, and one count of arson of forest land,
pertaining to the fire that occurred on July 13, 2021. The court sentenced defendant to
the midterm of four years for arson of forest land as the principal term and one-third the
midterm for each arson of property conviction, for a total of five years four months in
prison to be served consecutively.
Defendant appeals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant makes two assertions on appeal: (1) there is insufficient evidence to
prove the corpus delicti of the restaurant fire and the drainpipe fire; and (2) there is
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insufficient evidence to satisfy the burn element of arson as to the drainpipe fire. We find
no merit in these arguments.
“When the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is
challenged on appeal, ‘the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable
to the judgment below.’ ” (In re Jesse L. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 161, 165.) In doing so,
“ ‘we must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of
fact could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] Thus, if the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, . . . that the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal.’ ”
(In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) We cannot set aside a judgment of conviction
unless it “ ‘clearly appear[s] that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient evidence
to support it.’ ” (People v. Flores (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 855, 871.)
I
Corpus Delicti Of Arson
Under the corpus delicti rule, the prosecution must prove “the corpus delicti of a
crime . . . independently from an accused’s extrajudicial admissions.” (People v.
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 364.) “The corpus delicti consists of two elements: (1)
the injury or loss or harm; and (2) a criminal agency causing the harm.” (People v. Ott
(1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 118, 130.) Criminal agency requires proof that a human being’s
intentional act caused the injury or harm. (Id. at pp. 130-131.) Circumstantial evidence
may provide the requisite proof, and the prosecution need not prove the corpus delicti
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 404.) Rather, “ ‘a
slight or prima facie showing’ permitting an inference of injury, loss, or harm from a
criminal agency” is enough. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1181.)
When a defendant is charged with arson, “[a]ll that is needed to establish the
corpus delicti, in addition to the actual burning, is that the fire was intentional or of
incendiary origin.” (People v. Clagg (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 209, 212.) In this context,
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incendiary origin means the fire was deliberate and intentional, not accidental or
unintentional. (People v. Andrews (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 69, 75 (Andrews II).)
Circumstantial evidence such as the defendant’s proximity to the fire, the time and
method of the fire, and other “circumstances snapping the long arm of coincidence” may
also establish the corpus delicti. (People v. Andrews (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 242, 245
(Andrews I).) However, evidence that property is destroyed by fire alone is insufficient
to establish the corpus delicti. (People v. Simonsen (1895) 107 Cal. 345, 347.)
A
There Is Sufficient Evidence To Establish
The Corpus Delicti Of The Restaurant Fire
Defendant contends the prosecution did not establish the corpus delicti of the
restaurant fire because there was “no testimony regarding how the fire actually started”
and no determination “that a person had started the fire.” Defendant points to no
authority requiring specific testimony as to the cause of a fire to support a finding of the
corpus delicti in an arson case. To the contrary, evidence which establishes “ ‘[a] slight
or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed,
is sufficient.’ ” (People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 404.) That is the case here.
In arson cases, it is common for the defendant to place items in a pile and light the
pile on fire. (See, e.g., People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 80 [the defendant placed
weeds in a small pile, “poured ‘chainsaw mix’ on the pile . . . and lit the pile of weeds
with a disposable lighter”]; People v. Torres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 854 [the
defendant set fire to a “pile of furniture, clothing, and household goods”]; People v. Jones
(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 858 [the defendant was previously “convict[ed] for arson
after setting fire to a pile of ‘girlie books’ ”]; In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d
1054, 1058 [minors “made a pile of leaves and grass . . . and set it afire”]; People v.
Wolfeart (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 653, 654 [the defendant set fire to a pile of trash].) Here,
the fact that the garbage, vegetation, and sticks that caught fire were placed in a small pile
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permits a reasonable inference that someone created the pile and ignited it, thus
establishing criminal agency.
More importantly, the fire department saw defendant at the scene of the fire, and
the restaurant fire shared commonalities with the other fires. We may consider the
evidence presented regarding the other fires to determine whether the corpus delicti of the
restaurant fire was established because “ ‘[t]he coincidence of a series of fires tends to
rebut the possibility that the one in question was the result of an accident.’ ” (Andrews I,
supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at p. 246.)
The trial court heard testimony that the fire department saw defendant at four out
of the five suspicious fires, and that seeing someone at multiple fires is unusual. The fifth
suspicious fire further occurred near the camp where defendant was living. The five fires
occurred over a one-year span; the fires were relatively small; two occurred near a
railroad; at least three occurred in the middle of the night; four were near homeless
encampments; and all five fires involved the burning of vegetation. There was further
testimony that three of the fires were deliberately set and were not accidental or
unintentional. Based on defendant’s unusual presence at the restaurant fire (and the other
fires), and the similarities between the restaurant fire and the other fires, it is reasonable
to infer someone started the restaurant fire, and it was defendant who did so. (See
Andrews I, supra, 222 Cal.App.2d at pp. 245-246 [finding sufficient evidence to establish
the corpus delicti of arson when “[f]our fires within the same neighborhood, close in
point of date . . . , closer in point of time of day . . . , all started by an apparently similar
method, cumulate[d] to give to [the] circumstantial proof much more than prima facie
veracity”].)
The circumstantial evidence in this case “snapp[ed] the long arm of coincidence”
and established the corpus delicti for the restaurant fire. (Andrews I, supra,222 Cal.App.2d at p. 245.)
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B
There Is Sufficient Evidence To Establish
The Corpus Delicti Of The Drainpipe Fire
Defendant also contends the prosecution did not establish the corpus delicti of the
drainpipe fire because there was no testimony “that a person put the branches and twigs
in the drain pipe.” Defendant misrepresents the record in this regard. Chief Barber
testified the fire “had been built at the end of the pipe[,]” and “brush and twigs . . . had
been stuffed in [the pipe] and lit on fire.” The only reasonable inference to be gleaned
from this testimony is that a person built the fire by placing brush and twigs in the
drainpipe, and then started the fire. Moreover, the fact that the fire department described
the drainpipe fire as an “outside open fire for warming or cooking” leads to a reasonable
inference that a human ignited the fire, either to keep warm or to cook, supporting a
finding that the prosecution established the corpus delicti.
Defendant further asserts, “Nothing . . . rules out the possibility that the drain pipe
. . . might get clogged with brush and twigs naturally and without human intervention.”
The problem with defendant’s argument is that the corpus delicti rule does not require the
prosecution to consider every possible cause of a fire and then rule out each possibility in
turn. (Andrews II, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 76.) Indeed, the corpus delicti of a crime
may be satisfied if evidence “ ‘creates a reasonable inference that the [harm] could have
been caused by criminal agency [citation], even in the presence of an equally plausible
noncriminal explanation of the event.’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 405.)
Based on the evidence presented, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to
establish the corpus delicti of the drainpipe fire.
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II
There Is Sufficient Evidence To Satisfy The Burn Element Of Arson
With Regard To The Drainpipe Fire
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence “to satisfy the burn element of
arson” with regard to the drainpipe fire because the fire charred the pipe but did not burn
it. We disagree.
Under a sufficiency of the evidence standard of review, our role is “ ‘to determine
whether [the record] discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact would find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (In re Jesse L., supra,
221 Cal.App.3d at p. 165.) To be guilty of arson under Penal Code1 section 451, a person
must “willfully and maliciously set[] fire to or burn[] or cause[] to be burned . . . any
structure, forest land, or property.” (§ 451.) “[T]he setting of a fire which does not burn
the structure itself” does not constitute arson. (In re Jesse L., at p. 166.) To burn means
to consume or destroy by fire all or part of something, however small. (People v.
Haggerty (1873) 46 Cal. 354, 355.)
Defendant acknowledges that Chief Barber testified the inside of the drainpipe
“was charred and burned” and described approximately two feet of “heavy charring” on
the pipe. Defendant, however, cites Haggerty to support his assertion that “wood can be
blackened but still not considered to be burned for the purposes of an arson prosecution.”
(Citing People v. Haggerty, supra, 46 Cal. at p. 355.) In defendant’s view, the drainpipe
1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
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thus could be blackened but not burned within the meaning of section 451.2 Haggerty
does not assist defendant; it instead supports a finding of sufficient evidence.
In Haggerty, our Supreme Court held the evidence established the burn element of
arson based on charring of a wooden floor, even though “[t]o some of the witnesses . . .
the spot only appeared to be blackened, and not charred.” (People v. Haggerty, supra,
46 Cal. at p. 355.) Here, the evidence established the pipe “was charred and burnt”; the
evidence did not establish that the drainpipe was merely blackened. Thus, under
Haggerty, there was sufficient evidence to establish burning within the meaning of
section 451. (Haggerty, at p. 355.)
Defendant also relies on Mentzer to assert the damage to the drainpipe does not
rise to the level of the damage in that case—where the marble floor was buckling,
cracking, and chipping—and on that basis contends there was no actual damage to the
drainpipe. (People v. Mentzer (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 482, 484.) Defendant’s reliance
on Mentzer is misplaced. Mentzer does not stand for the proposition that marble and
other similar materials, such as cement, must be “broken, buckled, and cracked from the
heat” to establish the burn element of arson; it merely held the facts in that case were
sufficient to establish the burn element of arson. (Ibid.)
Based on the evidence presented, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to
satisfy the burn element of arson in the drainpipe fire.
2 In his opening brief, defendant mistakenly asserts the drainpipe was metal and
argues metal can be blackened but not burned. In his reply brief, defendant
acknowledges the drainpipe was concrete but contends this fact does not change the
substance of his argument.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, J.
/s/
EARL, J.
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