Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 5/2/23 Robertson v. Larkspur Courts CA1/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
    ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    J. MARTIN ROBERTSON,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    A166818
    v.
    LARKSPUR COURTS et al.,                                                (Marin County
    Super. Ct. No. CIV-1504551)
    Defendants and Respondents.
    This is our fourth opinion in this litigation, which has been pending for
    over seven years. Rather than resolving the merits of this appeal, however,
    we dismiss it under the disentitlement doctrine. That doctrine permits us to
    “dismiss an appeal where the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower
    court’s orders or engaged in obstructive tactics,” a standard amply met here.
    (Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 
    231 Cal.App.4th 750
    , 757–758 (Gwartz).)
    After discovering mold in his apartment, plaintiff J. Martin Robertson
    sued several entities, including respondents.1 Robertson and respondents
    entered a stipulation for settlement, and judgment was entered to enforce the
    Respondents, all of whom were involved in the management of
    1
    Robertson’s apartment complex, are Teachers Insurance and Annuity
    Association of America, Riverstone Residential Group, LLC, Greystar RS CA,
    Inc., and Greystar Real Estate Partners, LLC. The other four named
    defendants never appeared in the litigation.
    1
    stipulation’s terms. In 2018, we affirmed the judgment, which awarded
    Robertson $28,000, required the parties to accept a mutual release, and
    required Robertson to sign a dismissal of the action with prejudice.
    (Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (May 22, 2018, A152226) [nonpub. opn.]
    (Robertson I).) We also affirmed the trial court’s order awarding sanctions to
    respondents, and we awarded respondents their appellate costs. (Ibid.) Two
    further appeals ensued, the latter of which also resulted in an award of
    appellate costs to respondents. (Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Jun. 19, 2019,
    A154206) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson II); Robertson v. Larkspur Courts (Oct. 5,
    2021, A160942) [nonpub. opn.] (Robertson III).)
    Respondents paid Robertson the $28,000 they owed him, but he refused
    to comply with his obligations under the judgment to enter a mutual release
    and dismiss the lawsuit. He refused to comply with these obligations even
    though respondents offered not to pursue the sanctions award and both
    orders awarding appellate costs, no parts of which have ever been paid. In
    response, the trial court entered an order deeming respondents’ proposed
    release signed by all the parties and dismissing the case with prejudice.
    Robertson now appeals from that order, claiming that (1) the trial court
    lacked authority to deem the release signed; (2) the release was inconsistent
    with the judgment; and (3) dismissal of the case deprived him of his rights.2
    We agree with respondents, however, that the disentitlement doctrine
    applies, and we therefore grant their motion to dismiss the appeal.
    2Robertson filed a request for judicial notice of 29 “matters,” all of
    which are federal materials that do not require a request for judicial notice
    and/or are irrelevant to the remaining issues in this case. Thus, we deny the
    request in full.
    2
    I.
    BACKGROUND
    A.    Robertson’s Previous Appeals
    We begin by summarizing the case’s facts and history through our
    October 2021 decision in Robertson III. Robertson, who is a lawyer, filed this
    suit in December 2015 alleging that respondents and other entities
    inappropriately responded to the discovery of mold in his Larkspur
    apartment. Robertson and respondents reached a settlement and signed an
    agreement under which Robertson agreed to dismiss his claims in exchange
    for $28,000. In May 2017, the trial court entered judgment to effectuate the
    settlement’s terms. Robertson unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment,
    and the court awarded $1,280 in sanctions to respondents, concluding that
    the motion to vacate was frivolous. The following May, we affirmed the
    judgment and sanctions order in Robertson I. We also awarded respondents
    their costs on appeal, which they then sought in the amount of $463.20.
    Meanwhile, both before and after the judgment was entered,
    respondents tried to pay the $28,000 to Robertson, but he refused to provide
    his social security number and other personal information (social security
    information), which respondents believed their insurer needed to comply with
    Medicare reporting requirements. In February 2018, while Robertson I was
    pending, the trial court granted respondents’ motion to enforce the judgment
    and ordered Robertson to provide the social security information.
    Robertson appealed that order, initiating Robertson II. In our
    June 2019 opinion, we vacated the order on the basis the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to enter it while Robertson I was pending. In doing so, we did not
    reach the merits of Robertson’s claim that the court erred by ordering him to
    disclose the social security information.
    3
    On remand, Robertson filed motions seeking postjudgment attorney
    fees, postjudgment costs, and interest on the judgment, and respondents filed
    a second motion to enforce the judgment. While those motions were pending,
    respondents’ insurer paid Robertson the $28,000 despite his failure to provide
    the social security information. In August 2020, the trial court denied
    Robertson’s motions and granted respondents’ motion to enforce the
    judgment. The court ordered the parties to “jointly lodge a signed mutual
    release[,] if they agree on [one,] or . . . each separately lodge a proposed
    mutual release if they do not agree on [one].” It also ordered Robertson “to
    sign a standard form Dismissal of Prejudice of this action.”
    Robertson again appealed, claiming that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction to consider respondents’ second motion to enforce the judgment
    and that it erred by denying him postjudgment attorney fees, costs, and
    interest. In October 2021, we issued our Robertson III opinion affirming the
    court’s rulings. In doing so, we explicitly rejected Robertson’s challenge to
    the court’s findings that (1) respondents made an “unconditional tender” of
    the $28,000 settlement payment, despite their request for the social security
    information before making it; and (2) respondents’ delay in paying was due to
    his “vexatious and obstructionist conduct.”
    B.     The Proceedings Leading to This Appeal and Respondents’ Motion
    to Dismiss
    In September 2020, around the time Robertson III was initiated, each
    side submitted a proposed mutual release to the trial court. Respondents’
    proposed release stated that Robertson and respondents, “along with each of
    their respective affiliates, predecessor entities, and successor entities . . . ,
    hereby mutually release one another from all claims arising in any way out
    of, or related to, [Robertson’s] occupancy of the [Larkspur] apartment.” In an
    accompanying case management statement, respondents reported that
    4
    Robertson objected to their proposed release because he wanted (1) “a ‘carve-
    out’ ” to permit him to pursue “fees/costs/damages/interest allegedly incurred
    during the [post-settlement] time period where the parties were attempting
    to negotiate a long-form release agreement” and (2) a term “address[ing] the
    so-called ‘non-appearing’ defendants in this matter, including their alleged
    relationship to the ‘appearing’ defendants.”
    Reflecting these demands, Robertson’s proposed release stated that
    Robertson would discharge his claims against respondents “and their
    affiliates, subsidiary and predecessor entities except” for five categories of
    claims, including postjudgment interest on the settlement amount, costs and
    fees incurred litigating the social security information issue, and potential
    federal and state claims involving that issue. (Boldface omitted.) His release
    also left spaces for describing respondents’ “form of organization” and
    affiliates.
    In summer 2022, several months after the Robertson III remittitur
    issued, respondents filed a case management statement reporting that
    Robertson continued to refuse to agree to a mutual release and still “ha[d] not
    paid outstanding sanctions and appellate costs.” Respondents also filed
    another proposed release that was similar to their previous release.
    At the case management conference that September, the trial court set
    an order to show cause (OSC) hearing for October 19, 2022, to address why
    respondents’ proposed release should not be deemed signed by all the parties.
    It allowed the parties to submit their positions on this issue by September 30.
    Respondents filed a statement arguing it was appropriate to deem the release
    signed, but Robertson did not file anything by the deadline. Instead, on
    October 13, he filed three ex parte applications seeking orders (1) requiring
    respondents to provide more details about their insurer’s claim to need the
    5
    social security information to comply with Medicare reporting requirements,
    even though the insurer had already paid him without obtaining that
    information; (2) requiring respondents to provide information about their
    form of organization and affiliates so he could ensure a release “of the claims
    of all named defendants”; and (3) staying the case to permit him to file a
    federal lawsuit “concerning federal questions that [respondents’] and the
    [California] courts’ decisions have raised.” (Boldface and italics omitted.)
    On October 17, 2022, the date for which Robertson noticed a hearing on
    his ex parte applications, the trial court held a hearing and denied all three
    applications. Two days later, the court held the OSC hearing on its
    scheduled date. After hearing argument by the parties, the court entered an
    order “deem[ing] the release as proposed by [respondents] signed by all
    parties” and dismissing the case with prejudice. Robertson appealed the
    order on December 15.
    Before the appellate record was filed, respondents filed a motion to
    dismiss the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. After receiving three
    extensions of time on his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Robertson filed
    the opposition in conjunction with his opening brief.
    II.
    DISCUSSION
    A.    General Legal Standards
    “An appellate court has the inherent power to dismiss an appeal by a
    party that refuses to comply with a lower court order.” (Gwartz, supra,
    231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) “Courts cannot function if their orders and
    judgments are routinely ignored by litigants or their counsel,” and “litigants
    are [not] free to ignore or refuse to comply with subsequent trial court orders”
    when their lawful attempts to challenge a court’s rulings are unsuccessful.
    (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians (2021) 
    69 Cal.App.5th 736
    ,
    6
    756.) Rather, “ ‘[a] trial court’s judgment and orders, all of them, are
    presumptively valid and must be obeyed and enforced. [Citation.] They are
    not to be frustrated by litigants except by legally provided methods.’ ” (Ibid.)
    The disentitlement doctrine “is not jurisdictional” but is instead “a
    discretionary tool that may be used to dismiss an appeal when the balance of
    the equitable concerns makes dismissal an appropriate sanction.” (Gwartz,
    supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.) It is based on the principle that “ ‘[a] party
    to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court
    in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of contempt to legal
    orders and processes of the courts of this state.’ ” (Stoltenberg v. Ampton
    Investments, Inc. (2013) 
    215 Cal.App.4th 1225
    , 1230, quoting MacPherson v.
    MacPherson (1939) 
    13 Cal.2d 271
    , 277; see Polanski v. Superior Court (2009)
    
    180 Cal.App.4th 507
    , 538 [party cannot “seek[] relief from the courts while
    ‘insulating [himself] from the consequences of an unfavorable result’ ”].)
    We may dismiss an appeal under the disentitlement doctrine “where
    the appellant has willfully disobeyed the lower court’s orders or engaged in
    obstructive tactics,” even if the appellant has not been formally held in
    contempt. (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 757–758.) The doctrine
    has been repeatedly applied in cases where the appellant “has frustrated or
    obstructed legitimate efforts to enforce a judgment” (id. at p. 758), and it “ ‘is
    particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order
    . . . the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica,
    Inc. (2015) 
    238 Cal.App.4th 259
    , 265.) “[T]he merits of the appeal are
    irrelevant to the application of the doctrine.” (Ibid.)
    B.    Dismissal Under the Disentitlement Doctrine Is Justified.
    Respondents argue that dismissal under the disentitlement doctrine is
    warranted because Robertson has violated multiple court orders. These
    7
    include orders requiring him to dismiss the underlying case with prejudice,
    sign a standard mutual release, and pay sanctions and appellate costs.
    Respondents also argue that Robertson violated the trial court’s order setting
    the OSC hearing by filing ex parte applications after the deadline to submit
    position statements and setting the hearing on those applications two days
    before the OSC hearing.
    We agree with respondents that the equities favor dismissing the
    appeal under the disentitlement doctrine. We affirmed the judgment
    requiring Robertson to sign a release and dismiss the action with prejudice
    almost five years ago. Regardless of whether his position about the social
    security information was reasonable, by mid-2020 he received the $28,000
    settlement payment without having to provide that information. Even
    though respondents thus fulfilled their primary obligation under the
    judgment nearly three years ago, Robertson refused to negotiate a mutual
    release in good faith or take any other action to help finally bring this
    litigation to a close. By now challenging the mutual release that was deemed
    signed only because of his intransigence, Robertson is clearly “seeking the
    benefits of an appeal while willfully disobeying the trial court’s valid orders
    and thereby frustrating [respondents’] legitimate efforts to enforce the
    judgment.” (Gwartz, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 761.)
    In arguing otherwise, Robertson reiterates his objections to the mutual
    release’s terms and his views on matters that are not at issue in this case.
    We decline to address the merits of the appeal, which are irrelevant to
    application of the disentitlement doctrine, or his ongoing concerns about the
    social security information. He also claims that respondents have unclean
    hands because they want to dismiss this appeal “to cover up their ongoing
    concealment of material information,” namely the information about
    8
    Medicare reporting requirements that he sought below through one of his
    late-filed ex parte applications. Discovery about the social security
    information has no conceivable relevance at this point, and we agree with
    respondents that Robertson’s attempt to seek it below violated at least the
    spirit of the trial court’s order permitting position statements before the OSC
    hearing.
    Moreover, as Robertson admits, he has never paid the amounts due
    under the trial court’s July 2017 sanctions order or this court’s May 2018
    award of appellate costs in Robertson I.3 The failure to pay sanctions and
    other awards of fees and costs is a common ground for applying the
    disentitlement doctrine, and we conclude it supports dismissal here. (See,
    e.g., Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 757; United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
    
    36 Cal.App.5th 142
    , 166–167.)
    In arguing otherwise, Robertson claims he is not in violation of any
    court orders since respondents “offered to waive their rights to collect the
    sanctions and costs” and the mutual release deemed signed is “broad enough
    to cover releases of [respondents’] claims” for those charges. This position is
    specious. First, respondents offered to waive the sanctions and costs, which
    were clearly not contemplated under the original stipulation for settlement,
    to incentivize Robertson to fulfill his obligations to enter a mutual release
    and dismiss the lawsuit. In other words, his refusal to comply with the
    judgment was the only reason respondents offered not to seek payment.
    Second, in this appeal Robertson seeks to overturn the mutual release, which
    3We also awarded respondents their appellate costs in Robertson III,
    but they state that they never pursued those costs “in hopes of mitigating
    disputes and being done with this case.”
    9
    the trial court deemed signed only after he failed to negotiate in good faith.
    He cannot simultaneously contend that the very release he challenges
    insulates him from having to comply with other court orders.
    In short, Robertson has persistently refused to comply with the
    judgment or pay the sanctions and costs he owes respondents. Despite our
    entreaty in Robertson I that he work constructively to resolve this case, he
    has unreasonably prolonged the litigation while burdening respondents, the
    trial court, and us with his voluminous filings and meritless arguments. We
    decline to entertain yet another appeal by someone who displays such
    disregard for court orders and the legal process.
    III.
    DISPOSITION
    The appeal is dismissed. Respondents are awarded their costs on
    appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
    10
    _________________________
    Humes, P.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    _________________________
    Margulies, J.
    _________________________
    Banke, J.
    Robertson v. Larkspur Courts A166818
    11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A166818

Filed Date: 5/2/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/2/2023