In re H.P. CA2/5 ( 2023 )

Filed 5/16/23 In re H.P. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re H.P., a Person Coming Under B323542
the Juvenile Court Law.
___________________________________ (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 19CCJP05986A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.P.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete R. Navarro, Judge Pro Tempore. Conditionally
reversed and remanded with directions.
Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Nancy Sarinana for the Minor.
__________________________________
B.P. (Father) appeals from a juvenile court order
terminating parental rights over H.P. (Minor) pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends
the juvenile court erred when it found the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its
obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and
related California law. Father, DCFS, and Minor have stipulated
to a conditional reversal and remand to the juvenile court to
permit compliance with ICWA and related California law. We
accept the parties’ stipulation.
Our ability to accept a stipulated reversal and remand in
the dependency context is discussed in In re Rashad H. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 376. The present case involves reversible error
because the parties agree, and we concur, there was
noncompliance with federal ICWA regulations and related
California law. Specifically, the record indicates the juvenile
court did not ask Father at his first court appearance whether he
had reason to know Minor was an Indian child. (25
C.F.R. § 23.107(a) [state courts must ask “each participant” in
child custody proceedings whether they know or have reason to
know that the child is an Indian child]; Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.2, subd. (c) [“At the first appearance in court of each party,
the court shall ask each participant present in the hearing
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whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the
child is an Indian child”].) In addition, there is equivocal
evidence in the appellate record as to whether Father possibly
has Indian ancestry, and it appears DCFS undertook no
investigation of whether H.P.’s mother has any Indian ancestry.
Because this case would be subject to reversal to permit
compliance with ICWA-related law absent the parties’
stipulation, a stipulated remand advances the interests identified
by Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8). That is
to say, we find the interests of non-parties and the public are not
adversely affected by our acceptance of the stipulation and the
remand will not erode public trust or reduce the incentive for
pretrial settlement. (See In re Rashad H., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th
at 379-382; Union Bank of California v. Braille Inst. of America,
Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1329-1330.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is conditionally
reversed and the cause is remanded solely for further proceedings
required by this opinion. The juvenile court is directed to
reappoint counsel for Father and to notice a hearing for the
purpose of questioning Father, if he appears, about whether he
has reason to know H.P. is an Indian child. In addition, the
juvenile court shall direct DCFS to ask available maternal
relatives of which DCFS is aware about whether there is reason
to know Minor is an Indian child, and to thereafter submit a
report to the court documenting the relatives’ responses. Nothing
in our disposition precludes the juvenile court from ordering
additional inquiry of extended family members or others having
an interest in Minor if the court deems it advisable.
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If the aforementioned inquiry results in information
indicating there is reason to know Minor is an Indian child, the
juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with ICWA and related
California law. If the aforementioned inquiry does not result in
information indicating there is reason to know Minor is an Indian
child, the court’s order terminating parental rights shall be
reinstated.
The remittitur shall issue forthwith.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
RUBIN, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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