People v. Williams CA1/1 ( 2023 )

Filed 7/11/23 P. v. Williams CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A166550
v.
(Humboldt County Super.
ZACHARY LEE WILLIAMS, Ct. No. CR2100730)
Defendant and Appellant.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Zachary Lee
Williams (Williams) pleaded guilty to felony infliction of a corporal injury on
a person with whom he had a dating relationship (Pen. Code,1 § 273.5, subd.
(a)) and misdemeanor battery of the same person (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)). In this
appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him to four years’
probation instead of the three years’ probation contemplated by the written
plea agreement that the prosecution and the trial court had accepted. We
agree and therefore remand the matter for the trial court to correct the error.
The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does not meet
the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).)
Consequently, we resolve the cause before us, consistent with constitutional
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
1
otherwise noted.
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requirements, in an abbreviated opinion with reasons stated. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262 [“ ‘An
opinion is not a controversial tract, much less a brief in reply to the counsel
against whose views we decide. It is merely a statement of conclusions, and
of the principal reasons which have led us to them.’ [Citation.]”].)
I. DISCUSSION
Williams argues that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence
contrary to the terms of the written plea agreement the court had already
accepted. “Acceptance of [a plea] agreement binds the court and the parties
to the agreement.” (People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930, italics
added.) Here, the trial court accepted a plea agreement that specified a
three-year term of probation. Four weeks later, the trial court sentenced
Williams to four years’ probation. However, because the trial court had
accepted the terms of the negotiated plea, it lacked jurisdiction to alter them.
(Id. at p. 931.) For that reason, the trial court “erred by imposing a sentence
exceeding that to which defendant had agreed.” (People v. Kim (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1362.)
The People do not so much resist this straightforward analysis as
attempt to side-step it. First, they contend that our court lacks jurisdiction to
decide the question. Second, they argue that appellant forfeited any
appellate challenge to the four-year sentence by failing to object at the
sentencing hearing. And third, they claim that “the record does not
unambiguously support” the notion that the plea agreement was violated.
We find none of these arguments persuasive.
A. Jurisdiction
The People’s challenge to our jurisdiction concerns Williams’s notice of
appeal filed on Optional Judicial Council form CR-120. In that filing,
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Williams’s trial counsel indicated that the appeal attacked “the validity of the
plea,” and neglected to indicate that the appeal was “based on the sentence or
other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the
plea,” even though the notice form advised him to “check all [grounds] that
appl[ied].” With respect to his challenge to the validity of the plea, Williams
applied to the trial court pursuant to section 1237.5 for a certificate of
probable cause, which the trial court denied in turn. Williams’s appellate
counsel then filed his opening brief, raising for the first time the sentencing
issue we address here.
The People argue that the “notice of appeal’s omission of any reference
to the sentencing proceeding which appellant now challenges deprives this
court of jurisdiction.” To this end, they rely on Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222
Cal.App.4th 166, 170, for the proposition that appellate courts “have no
jurisdiction over an order not mentioned in the notice of appeal.” We reject
this argument because, in fact, the notice of appeal sufficiently identified the
sentencing proceeding.
Rules of Court rule 8.304, subdivision (a)(4), provides that the “notice of
appeal must be liberally construed. Except as provided in (b), the notice is
sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed.”
Here, the notice stated that appellant sought review of the “order or
judgment” issued by the trial court on September 29, 2022—when appellant
was sentenced.2 The notice thus identified “the particular judgment or order
being appealed” and was therefore sufficient under subdivision (a)(4) and its
requirement of liberal construction.
2“In a criminal case the sentence is the judgment.” (In re Phillips
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 55, 68; accord, People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 543, fn.
1.)
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Neither do the exceptions set forth in subdivision (b) place this appeal
beyond our reach. In relevant part, subdivision (b) provides that if “the
superior court denies a certificate of probable cause, the appeal will be
limited to issues that do not require a certificate of probable cause.” (Rules of
Court, rule 8.304, subd. (b)(3).) But “[n]o certificate of probable cause is
required for an appeal” from the sentence, so our inquiry here has not
exceeded the limits established by any prevailing appellate rule. (Rules of
Court, rule 8.304, subd. (b)(2).)
Finally, the People are mistaken to suggest that this appeal “not
‘operative.’ ” For this contention, they rely on People v. Jones (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1102, which applied a court rule no longer in effect. Under former
rule 31(d), an appeal on grounds “occurring after the entry of [a guilty] plea
which do not challenge [the plea’s] validity” “shall not be operative unless the
notice of appeal states that it is based upon such grounds.” (Jones, supra, 10
Cal.4th at p. 1106.) Because Williams’s notice of appeal failed to make such a
statement, the People argue that it became “not . . . operative” when the trial
court denied his request for a certificate of probable cause. As we have
already observed, however, rule 31(d) has been abrogated and the applicable
Rules of Court no longer impose any penalty for such a deficiency in the
notice of appeal.
For those reasons, we reject the People’s arguments challenging our
jurisdiction.
B. Forfeiture
The People next contend that Williams “forfeited the claim” underlying
this appeal because neither he “nor his counsel raised an objection to the
four-year term of probation . . . .” However, “under the unauthorized
sentence rule, a party does not forfeit the right to argue that a sentence is
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unlawful by failing to object in the trial court.” (People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 635.)3 Here, as we have already shown, the sentence is
unlawful because the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing
appellant to a four-year term of probation. Consequently, no forfeiture
resulted from Williams’s failure to object.
C. Ambiguities in the Record
According to the People, “ambiguities in the record” undercut
Williams’s attempt “to prove the negotiated plea agreement was violated.”
We disagree.
“A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted
according to general contract principles.” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th
759, 767.) “If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ.
Code, § 1638.)” (Ibid.) Here, the written plea agreement was filed on
September 1, 2022. Williams, his trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial
court all signed the plea form that same day. The first page of the plea form
contains the “plea agreement” in paragraph two, which specifies that in
exchange for William’s plea, “the court will sentence me as follows: …
“[p]robation for 3 years under conditions to be set by the court . . .”
Regarding the term of probation, the language in the written “plea
agreement” is clear.
3 There are exceptions to the unauthorized sentence rule, but none is
relevant here. According to the written plea form, the four-year probation
term the court imposed was not the specified sentence in return for which
Williams pleaded guilty. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) The
trial court did not expressly “withdraw[] its approval” of the plea agreement
at the sentencing hearing, which might have prompted Williams to
“withdraw [his] plea” under section 1192.5. (See People v. Villalobos (2012)
54 Cal.4th 177, 182.) And as we have already observed, we do not lack
jurisdiction. (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130.)
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Contrary to the People’s suggestion, the meaning of the words “3 years”
in the plea agreement is not somehow occluded by the probation officer’s
subsequent recommendation of four years’ probation, or by Williams’s failure
to object to that longer term at sentencing. While it is true that during the
on-the-record proceedings no precise length of probation was mentioned, both
the prosecutor and the court signed the plea form and acknowledged that
they had reviewed it.4 Moreover, this was a negotiated disposition the
parties reached under section 1192.5 which included “an agreement as to
probation” and dismissal of two other pending cases in exchange for Williams
pleading to the two charges in this case. Whatever ambiguities may arguably
exist in the record from the People’s perspective cannot be transmuted into
ambiguities in the contractual language contained in the written plea form.
In sum, Williams has shown that the negotiated plea agreement as
encompassed in the plea form was violated when the court selected a
probationary period greater than that to which he had expressly agreed.
D. The Appropriate Remedy
“When an error of this type is established on appeal, relief may take
any of three forms: a remand to provide the defendant the neglected
opportunity to withdraw the plea; ‘specific performance’ of the agreement as
made (e.g., People v. Mancheno[(1982)] 32 Cal.3d 855, 859, fn. 1); or
‘substantial specific performance,’ meaning entry of a judgment that, while
deviating somewhat from the parties’ agreement, does not impose a
4In the “District Attorney’s Statement” portion of the plea form, above
the prosecutor’s signature, is her averment that she had “read this form”,
“[understood] the terms of the plea agreement” and agreed to it. Likewise,
the “Court’s Findings and Order” portion contains a recitation that the trial
judge had also “reviewed this form . . . .”
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‘punishment significantly greater than that bargained for’ . . . .” (People v.
Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362.)
Williams urges us to order specific performance of the agreement, but
that remedy “is only appropriate ‘when it will implement the reasonable
expectations of the parties without binding the trial judge to a disposition
that he or she considers unsuitable under all the circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, what is unclear from the record is whether the change from three to
four years’ probation was a mere oversight on the part of the trial court and
both counsel, or an indication that the contents of the probation officer’s
report had occasioned an unspoken withdrawal of the trial court’s approval of
the negotiated plea agreement. Accordingly, we do not order specific
enforcement of the agreement as to the length of probation, but neither do we
foreclose the possibility that on remand the trial court will impose the three-
year period of probation that is contained in the written plea form.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to the length of the probationary period.
On remand, the trial court is directed either to sentence appellant in
accordance with the written plea agreement, or to withdraw its approval of
the negotiated disposition, thereby permitting Williams to withdraw his “plea
if he desires to do so.” (§ 1192.5, subd. (c).)
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BOWEN, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A166550N

Judge of the Contra Costa County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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