Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara CA2/6 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 7/19/23 Anderson v. County of Santa Barbara CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    CHRISTOPHER ANDERSON                                         2d Civil No. B322465
    et al.,                                                  (Super. Ct. No. 22CV01299)
    (Santa Barbara County)
    Plaintiffs and Respondents,
    v.
    COUNTY OF SANTA
    BARBARA et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    The Superior Court may not enjoin a public officer,
    here the county Road Commissioner, from enforcing the law. The
    injunction at issue here allows adjacent landowners to encroach
    upon a public right-of-way, a misdemeanor offense. Any claimed
    “failure” to follow the California Environmental Quality Act
    (CEQA) (Pub. Res. Code, § 2100 et seq.) 1 is not a defense to the
    All statutory references are to the Public Resources Code
    1
    unless otherwise stated.
    commission of a crime. We will reverse the Superior Court’s
    grant of a preliminary injunction.
    The County of Santa Barbara (County) appeals from
    the entry of a preliminary injunction prohibiting its Road
    Commissioner from removing unpermitted encroachments placed
    in the public right of way along a portion of East Mountain Drive
    in Montecito. East Mountain Drive leads to the trailhead of a
    popular hiking trail in Hot Springs Canyon. The encroachments,
    which include landscaping, boulders and at least one
    unpermitted “No Parking” sign, block what would otherwise be
    public parking spaces. Respondents contend the County violated
    the CEQA by ordering the encroachments’ removal without
    considering the environmental impact of increased public parking
    in their neighborhood. The trial court agreed and issued a
    preliminary injunction prohibiting removal of the encroachments
    pending a trial on the merits of the CEQA claims.
    While this appeal was pending, the County filed a
    cross complaint alleging causes of action for public nuisance and
    trespass against respondents. The parties also filed briefs in the
    trial court addressing the merits of respondents’ petition for writ
    of mandate. After entertaining oral argument on the writ
    petition, the trial court issued a statement of decision granting
    the petition and stating that it would issue a “peremptory writ of
    mandate . . . compelling [the] County to comply with its CEQA
    obligations with respect to its trailhead parking creation project.”
    The statement of decision further explained that, “[T]he
    peremptory writ to be issued by the Court will also suspend all
    efforts by County to enforce the right-of-way encroachments
    (acting to effectively extend the existing preliminary injunction)
    2
    until this Court has determined, by way of a Return provided by
    the County, that County has complied with CEQA.”
    We conclude the trial court erred because
    respondents are not correct on the merits of their CEQA claim
    and will not be irreparably harmed by removal of encroachments
    installed without permits in the public right of way of an existing
    road. The County Road Commissioner is authorized by statute
    and local ordinance to remove any encroachment on a public right
    of way. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 1481.) CEQA is not “a limitation or
    restriction on the power or authority of any public agency in the
    enforcement or administration of any provision of law which it is
    specifically permitted or required to enforce . . . .” (Pub.
    Resources Code, § 21174.) Respondents will suffer no irreparable
    harm because “a party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by
    being prohibited from violating the law . . . .” (People v. Uber
    Technologies, Inc. (2020) 
    56 Cal.App.5th 266
    , 306 (Uber
    Technologies).)
    Facts
    East Mountain Drive winds through the enclave of
    Montecito and leads to the trailhead of the Hot Springs Trail, a
    very popular hiking trail open to the general public. There are a
    handful of parking spaces near the trailhead. Members of the
    public may also legally park on some public roads in the area. In
    the spring of 2021, the County removed about 50 parking spaces
    along Riven Rock Road near the trailhead after the fire
    department raised concerns about fire risks and access for
    emergency vehicles. East Mountain Drive remains available for
    public parking.
    Some property owners have installed landscaping,
    boulders, smaller rocks, trees, bushes and signs in the public
    3
    right of way along East Mountain Drive, to discourage or prevent
    members of the public from parking in front of their properties.
    These encroachments, and related parking problems, were
    reported to the traffic engineer for Santa Barbara County’s Public
    Works Department (Department). The County began efforts to
    restore public parking on East Mountain Drive.
    In September 2021, the Board of Supervisors
    appropriated $100,000 for Hot Springs Trailhead access
    improvement studies and implementation. The agenda letter
    supporting that decision explained that the Department sought
    funding to study and “plan improvements to trailhead access
    within the public road rights-of-way adjacent to the Hot Springs
    Trailhead.” The Department identified an “urgent need” to
    “address the imbalance” between demand for parking and the
    spaces available at the trailhead given that the popularity of the
    trail had “skyrocketed” during the pandemic and “dozens” of
    parking spaces were removed from Riven Rock Road as a fire
    safety measure. Funding would “provide for studies and initial
    implementation of parking improvements” near the trailhead.
    The public right-of-way on East Mountain Drive “is currently
    unusable for parking due to private encroachments . . . .”
    Funding would be used to define and stake the right of way and
    “document the obstacles to creating public parking.” The
    Department would then work with the Parks Department and
    adjacent owners to “create public parking while minimizing the
    impacts to their property frontage.”
    Members of the public continued to park on the
    street, despite the encroachments. Because the encroachments
    occupy much of the public right of way, people park in a way that
    partially obstructs the travel lane. This effectively converts
    4
    swaths of the two-lane road into a one-lane road. The
    encroachments also create a safety hazard for pedestrians,
    bicycles and equestrians, especially at night.
    After staking the right of way, the County’s
    Transportation Division sent notices to three properties
    instructing the owners to remove unpermitted encroachments
    within 60 days. Thereafter, the Department filed a Notice of
    Exemption for restoring the right of way, finding that the
    restoration was categorically exempt pursuant to CEQA
    Guidelines. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15301(c).)2
    The Notice of Exemption referred to the project as,
    “Montecito Right of Way Restoration,” and explained the project
    included “implementation of right of way restoration, repair,
    maintenance and operation of existing facilities to allow for
    public parking and continued use near the trailhead access
    within the public right of way adjacent to the Hot Springs
    Trailhead along East Mountain Drive.” The work was needed
    because the public right of way “is currently unusable for public
    parking in many areas due to encroachments . . . installed in the
    public road right of way without the required road encroachment
    permits.”
    The Department determined the project was exempt
    from CEQA under Guideline section 15301(c) because it “involves
    the restoration of the existing roadway to maintain the safe
    traveling condition of the roadway right of way. The minor
    alteration of existing public facilities will allow for safe public
    2 CEQA’s implementing regulations, the “Guidelines,” are
    found in California Code of Regulations, title 14, section 15000, et
    seq. All subsequent regulatory citations to the Guidelines are to
    title 14 of the Code of Regulations.
    5
    parking for the pedestrians and also cyclists going to the adjacent
    public trails.” Because the right of way areas to be restored to
    public use are within the existing developed roadway, the
    Department concluded the work would have no impact on the
    environment.
    The Writ Petition.
    Respondents, who own property in the area but are
    not owners of the properties that received notices, filed a petition
    for writ of mandate. They sought to prevent removal of the
    encroachments until Santa Barbara County complied with
    CEQA. Respondents alleged removal of the encroachments
    would have a significant impact on the environment because it
    would create additional parking spaces which would lead to more
    hikers using the trail and would make it more difficult to
    evacuate the neighborhood in the event of a wild fire.
    The Preliminary Injunction.
    Agreeing with respondents, the trial court issued a
    preliminary injunction prohibiting the removal of encroachments
    “within 0.5 miles of the Hot Springs Canyon trailhead, pending
    trial of this action.” It disagreed with the County’s determination
    that removal of encroachments was categorically exempt from
    CEQA review because the exemptions apply only where the
    project “involve[s] negligible or no expansion of . . . use,” or only a
    “minor . . . alteration[ ]in the condition of land, water, and/or
    vegetation . . . .” (Guidelines, §§ 15301, 15304.)
    The trial court concluded instead that the project to
    remove encroachments from the public right of way “was
    developed for the express purpose of creating substantial new
    and/or additional parking spaces to accommodate the
    skyrocketing increase in hikers on the Hot Springs Trial . . . .”
    6
    This larger project might expand use of the trail or otherwise
    have a significant impact on the environment. “Under these
    circumstances, the Court cannot find that there is no possibility,
    or no likelihood, that [respondents] will prevail on the merits” by
    showing the exemptions do not apply.
    The trial court also declined to apply the exemption
    for “enforcement of a law, general rule, standard, or objective,
    administered or adopted by the regulatory agency.” (Guidelines,
    § 15321.) It found instead that focusing only on the removal of
    encroachments “would impermissibly require dissecting the
    greater project as a whole into discrete pieces, since the fact that
    the County may have enforcement authority over unpermitted
    encroachments could not and should not apply to exempt from
    CEQA review a greater project which involves as one of its
    element[s] the clearing [of] unpermitted encroachments, which
    could potentially have a direct or indirect significant
    environmental impact on an area other than that where the
    encroachments are being removed.”
    The trial court further concluded that the balance of
    harm favored respondents. It gave little weight to the County’s
    interest in providing roads that are safe for motorists, cyclists,
    pedestrians and equestrians, or safe parking near the trailhead
    because the County had tolerated the encroachments for many
    years. By contrast, “destruction of encroachments which have
    existed for many years with County’s express or implied
    permission, will cause irreparable harm to the properties at
    issue. Many of the longstanding encroachments consist of
    mature landscaping which, once removed, will likely be gone
    forever.” The trial court was not convinced County would have
    acted to remove the encroachments had “the issue of the demand
    7
    for increased trail parking not become a significant issue. They
    are being removed specifically to provide trail access parking.”
    Once cleared, the right of way would be immediately available for
    public parking, “with potential instantaneous significant impacts
    to the sensitive trail environment caused by increased hiker
    counts.”
    The Peremptory Writ.
    The trial court also ordered a peremptory writ to
    issue making a finding of fact that the County’s order to remove
    encroachments was actually a “parking creation project” that was
    “capable of causing direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect
    effects on the trail environment and is therefore a ‘project’ within
    the meaning of CEQA.” It rejected County’s arguments that the
    Road Commissioner is not a public agency subject to CEQA and
    that the removal of encroachments was not a “project” within the
    meaning of CEQA. Because the removal of encroachments was,
    in the trial court’s view, only one segment of a larger “parking
    creation” project for Hot Springs trail, the trial court concluded it
    was not properly viewed as a project to enforce or administer the
    encroachment laws.
    The trial court rejected County’s unclean hands
    defense because it concluded the County had acquiesced in the
    installation and maintenance of the encroachments. In addition,
    the harm created by respondents’ conduct in violating the
    encroachment laws, “bears little to no relationship to the claimed
    injuries sustained by the petitioners, i.e., the failure [of] County
    to fulfill its independent legal duty to comply with CEQA for its
    project to create parking to accommodate hikers seeking to access
    the Hot Springs Trail trailhead, given the potential that the
    8
    resulting increased hiker traffic on the trail could cause a change
    to the trail environment.”
    The trial court conceded that respondents “legally
    cannot” be “granted the exclusive use of public property,” even
    though its writ would prevent the County from exercising control
    over the public right of way pending completion of a CEQA
    review. “Once it has complied with its CEQA obligations, and
    assuming that the project that is thereafter adopted still involves
    the creation of parking through the removal of rights-of-way
    encroachments, County will be free to proceed with such project,
    including enforcing the right-of-way encroachment laws.”
    The trial court concluded it would grant the writ of
    mandate because, “County failed to proceed in a manner required
    by law when it determined to proceed with the project of creating
    additional parking in the vicinity of the Hot Springs Trail
    trailhead without engaging in environmental review pursuant to
    CEQA.” It explained that its decision would void any definitive
    determination made by the County to create parking for the
    trailhead area, and would “suspend all efforts by County to
    enforce the right-of-way encroachments (acting to effectively
    extend the existing preliminary injunction)” pending the trial
    court’s determination that County had complied with CEQA. The
    trial court further declared that it would retain jurisdiction over
    the matter until the County has complied with CEQA, “or the
    Court of Appeal has reversed this Court’s suspension order.”
    Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice
    and to Dismiss Appeal as Moot
    Respondents request that we take judicial notice of
    the trial court’s statement of decision dated May 3, 2023, and
    that we dismiss the appeal as moot because the statement of
    9
    decision represents a final judgment on the merits of their writ
    petition. We grant the request to take judicial notice of the
    statement of decision. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
    We decline, however, to dismiss this appeal as moot.
    But, a final judgment granting a permanent injunction renders
    an appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction
    moot. (People v. Rath Packing Co. (1978) 
    85 Cal.App.3d 308
    ,
    314.) Final judgment has not yet been entered. County’s cross-
    complaint has not been resolved and the trial court’s statement of
    decision indicates that its peremptory writ is intended to extend
    the preliminary injunction pending County’s compliance or this
    Court’s reversal of the “suspension order.” Our reversal of the
    preliminary injunction will impact the peremptory writ
    envisioned by the statement of decision and resolution of the
    County’s cross-complaint. The matter is not moot. (See, e.g.,
    Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 
    77 Cal.App.4th 880
    , 888 [case is not moot where ruling by court of
    appeal could have a “practical impact or provide the parties
    effectual relief”].)
    Mootness aside, we have discretion to consider any
    matter, “(1) when the case presents a issue of broad public
    interest that is likely to recur . . . ; (2) when there may be a
    recurrence of the controversy between the parties; and (3) when a
    material question remains for the court’s determination . . . .”
    (Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of
    Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 
    82 Cal.App.4th 473
    , 479-480.) This
    case involves issues of public interest relating to local
    governments’ enforcement of encroachment laws and their
    obligations under CEQA. (Leenay v. Superior Court (2022) 
    81 Cal.App.5th 553
    , 573 [“The proper interpretation of a statute
    10
    presents a matter of public interest”]; see also, Cundall v.
    Mitchell-Clyde (2020) 
    51 Cal.App.5th 571
    , 575, fn.1.) We will
    exercise our discretion to decide this appeal.
    Standard of Review
    “When ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction,
    ‘trial courts should evaluate two interrelated factors when
    deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The
    first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits
    at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely
    to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm
    that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction
    were issued. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Best Friends Animal
    Society v. Macerich Westside Pavilion Property LLC (2011) 
    193 Cal.App.4th 168
    , 174.)
    Our review of a preliminary injunction “may trigger
    any or all of the three standards of appellate review.” (Huong
    Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 
    150 Cal.App.4th 400
    , 408.) The trial
    court’s evaluation and weighing of the parties’ likelihood of
    success on the merits and the balance of harm is reviewed for
    abuse of discretion. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 
    35 Cal.3d 63
    , 69-70 (IT Corp.).) We review de novo the trial court’s
    application of legal principles and we review its findings of fact
    under the substantial evidence standard. (Huong Que, Inc.,
    supra, at pp. 408-409.)
    Although the trial court has broad discretionary
    powers to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, it has no
    discretion to act capriciously or in a manner that “‘transgresses
    the confines of the applicable principles of law . . . .’” (Sargon
    Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 
    55 Cal.4th 747
    , 773, quoting City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207
    
    11 Cal.App.3d 1287
    , 1297-1298.) “In other words, judicial discretion
    must be measured against the general rules of law and, in the
    case of a statutory grant of discretion, against the specific law
    that grants the discretion.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of
    California State University (2005) 
    132 Cal.App.4th 359
    , 393.)
    Code of Civil Procedure section 526 provides: “An
    injunction cannot be granted . . . to prevent the execution of a
    public statute by officers of the law for the public benefit.” (§ 526,
    subd. (b)(4); see also Alfaro v. Terhune (2002) 
    98 Cal.App.4th 492
    ,
    500 (Alfaro).) As we explain, the trial court’s order is at variance
    with this rule. The statute is subject to exceptions, including
    “where the public official’s action exceeds his or her authority.”
    (Alfaro, supra, at p. 501.) But that is not the situation here.
    CEQA
    CEQA is designed to protect and maintain
    California’s environmental quality by compelling
    “‘“‘“‘government at all levels to make decisions with
    environmental consequences in mind. . . .’”’”’” (Citizens for a
    Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist.
    (2014) 
    226 Cal.App.4th 1572
    , 1586.) Consistent with that
    legislative purpose, “we interpret CEQA to afford the most
    thorough possible protection to the environment that fits
    reasonably within the scope of its text.” (California Building
    Industry Assn. v. Bay Area Air Quality Management Dist. (2015)
    
    62 Cal.4th 369
    , 381.) Although it requires that “‘“environmental
    considerations play a significant role in governmental decision
    making[,]” . . .’” (Joshua Tree Downtown Bus. Alliance v. County
    of San Bernardino (2016) 
    1 Cal.App.5th 677
    , 683 (Joshua Tree)),
    CEQA is not a “limitation or restriction on the power or authority
    of any public agency in the enforcement or administration of any
    12
    provision of law which it is specifically permitted or required to
    enforce or administer . . . .” (§ 21174.)
    With limited exceptions, CEQA requires a public
    agency to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR)
    “‘whenever substantial evidence supports a fair argument that a
    proposed project “may have a significant effect on the
    environment.” . . .’” (Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento
    (2004) 
    124 Cal.App.4th 903
    , 927.) Certain activities are,
    however, categorically exempt from CEQA review. (Berkeley
    Hillside Preservation v. City of Berkeley (2015) 
    60 Cal.4th 1086
    ,
    1092 (Berkeley Hillside); Guidelines, § 15300, et seq.)
    County contends three categorical exemptions apply
    here. First, a project to repair or maintain existing facilities,
    including existing highways and streets, is categorically exempt
    if the project “involve[s] negligible or no expansion of . . . use.”
    (Guidelines, § 15301, subd. (c).) Second, “minor public or private
    alterations in the condition of land . . . ” are exempt. (Id.,
    § 15304.) Finally, the Guidelines exempt actions by a regulatory
    agency that involve the “enforcement of a law, general rule,
    standard or objective, administered or adopted by the regulatory
    agency.” (Id., § 15321.)
    These categorical exemptions are subject to the
    exceptions listed in section 15300.2 of the Guidelines. As
    relevant here, this Guideline provides, “A categorical exemption
    shall not be used for an activity where there is a reasonable
    possibility that the activity will have a significant effect on the
    environment due to unusual circumstances.” (Id., subd. (c).)
    The Vehicle Code provides that public parking is
    allowed on any street or road unless the relevant local governing
    body adopts an ordinance prohibiting or restricting it. (Veh.
    13
    Code, §§ 21, subd. (a), § 22507, subd. (a).) The County has
    adopted no such ordinance with regard to East Mountain Drive.
    Public parking is therefore allowed on that road.
    By contrast, both state law and County ordinances
    prohibit encroachments on the right of way of any public road.
    The Streets and Highways Code authorizes the county road
    commissioner to remove, after appropriate notice, any
    encroachment placed without a permit in any public right of way.
    (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 1480.5, 1481.) Property owners may not,
    consistent with state law, maintain unpermitted encroachments.
    (Id., § 1460.)
    Santa Barbara County has adopted an ordinance
    requiring a permit to install or maintain any “facilities or
    substructures in, on, over, or under any road right of way.”
    (Santa Barbara County Code of Ordinances, section 28-3(b); Ord.
    No. 1491, § 4.) A County ordinance also provides that it is a
    misdemeanor to perform “any of the acts for which a permit is
    required by this article without first obtaining such permit.” (Id.,
    section 28-53(c); Ord. No. 1491, § 54.)
    In addition, the Department has adopted engineering
    design standards requiring that a “clear zone,” of between 7 to 10
    feet from the edge of pavement be maintained along county
    roads. The clear zone is defined as an “unobstructed, relatively
    flat area beyond the edge of the traveled way provided for the
    recovery of errant vehicles.” The Montecito Fire Department’s
    clearance standards also require that horizontal clearance of
    vegetation “shall be maintained, at a minimum, to the road right-
    of-way or the edge of the pavement depending on individual
    easements to maintain maximum traffic circulation in the event
    of emergency evacuation.”
    14
    Likelihood of Success on the Merits.
    “A trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction,
    regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some
    possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the
    merits of the claim.” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 
    4 Cal.4th 668
    , 678.) Here, the trial court found that the project to remove
    encroachments was part of a larger project to increase the
    number of hikers using Hot Springs Trail by increasing parking
    on East Mountain Drive. Because it concluded this “larger”
    project could have a significant environmental impact, the trial
    court found the “smaller” project – removing encroachments from
    the public right of way – was not categorically exempt from
    CEQA review.
    It further concluded that the road commissioner’s
    authority to remove encroachments “cannot and should not
    immunize County from injunctive relief or legal responsibility
    under CEQA, simply because such actions are ordinarily within
    the County’s enforcement authority.” If the “larger project”
    violated CEQA, smaller projects undertaken without adequate
    environmental review to complete it “would no longer be lawful,”
    and could be enjoined, “if the factors supporting issuance of an
    injunction otherwise exist.”
    The County meritoriously contends the trial court
    erred because CEQA does not limit its authority to enforce
    encroachment laws and because there is no substantial evidence
    of a larger project. The current project is properly considered a
    stand-alone project because it has independent utility.
    Considered in its proper context as a stand-alone project, the
    right of way restoration project is categorically exempt from
    CEQA because it involves the maintenance or repair of an
    15
    existing road and the enforcement of statutes and ordinances
    prohibiting unpermitted encroachments in the public right of
    way. In addition, there is no substantial evidence that the
    project presents unusual circumstances.
    Road Commissioner’s Authority to Enforce
    Encroachment Laws
    The Streets and Highways Code and Santa Barbara
    County ordinances forbid property owners from maintaining
    unpermitted encroachments in the public right of way. (Sts. &
    Hy. Code, § 1460; Santa Barbara County Ordinance No. 1491,
    section 4.) Compliance with these legal standards is not
    discretionary for property owners. Maintaining unpermitted
    encroachments is a misdemeanor and the Road Commissioner is
    authorized to remove such encroachments. (Sts. & Hy. Code,
    §1480.5; Santa Barbara County Ordinance No. 1491, section 54.)
    The trial court may not allow CEQA to trump the criminal law.
    CEQA is not “a limitation or restriction on the power or
    authority” of the Road Commissioner to enforce the
    encroachment laws. (§ 21174.)
    “In general, a trial court may not grant an injunction
    ‘[t]o prevent the execution of a public statute by officers of the
    law for the public benefit.’ [Citations.]” (Jamison v. Department
    of Transportation (2016) 
    4 Cal.App.5th 356
    , 363-364 (Jamison);
    Alfaro, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 500-501.) One recognized
    exception to this general rule provides that an enforcement action
    may be enjoined where “the public official’s action exceeds his or
    her authority.” (Alfaro, supra, at p. 501.) Here, the trial court
    erroneously concluded respondents might succeed on the merits
    of their contention that the Road Commissioner exceeded his
    authority because a “larger project” might violate CEQA.
    16
    Categorical Exemptions
    The County determined this project was categorically
    exempt from CEQA review because it consisted of repairing and
    maintaining an existing road (Guidelines, § 15301, subd. (c)) and
    involved only minor alterations to land or vegetation. (Id.,
    § 15304.) County further contends the project is also
    categorically exempt because it enforces the Streets and
    Highways Code and county ordinances prohibiting unpermitted
    private encroachments in a public right of way. (Id., § 15321,
    subd. (a).)
    Respondents contend County’s reliance on these
    exemptions is a pretext because its “real” motivation is to
    increase hikers’ access to Hot Springs Canyon by increasing
    parking on East Mountain Drive. But the County’s “motivation”
    to recover public parking spaces is not inconsistent with its
    reliance on the CEQA exemptions. Public parking has always
    been allowed on East Mountain Drive. Respondents and other
    property owners thwarted access to it by installing unpermitted
    encroachments. Removing the encroachments does not “increase”
    or add new parking; it restores access to parking spaces that have
    always existed.
    The trial court declined to apply the categorical
    exemptions because it found a “larger project” would involve an
    expansion of use (Guidelines, § 15301), and more than minor
    alterations. (Id., § 15304.) It found the exemption for
    enforcement actions (id., § 15321) did not apply here because “the
    fact that the County may have enforcement authority over
    unpermitted encroachments could not and should not apply to
    exempt from CEQA review a greater project which involves as
    one of its element[s] the clearing [of] unpermitted encroachments,
    17
    which could potentially have a direct or indirect significant
    environmental impact on an area other than that where the
    encroachments are being removed.”
    Each of these legal conclusions depends on the trial
    court’s finding that the current project is one segment of a larger
    project that may have a significant environmental effect. In
    reaching this conclusion, the trial court erred. The County’s
    project to restore public use of the public right of way by
    removing unpermitted and illegal private encroachments has
    independent utility and need not be linked to any future, as yet
    unannounced project.
    “Project” is a term of art that refers to “‘the whole of
    an action,’” rather than to each individual component of it.
    (County of Ventura v. City of Moorpark (2018) 
    24 Cal.App.5th 377
    , 385; Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach
    (2012) 
    211 Cal.App.4th 1209
    , 1220 (Banning Ranch); Guidelines,
    § 15378, subd. (a).) The potential environmental impacts of a
    project are to be measured against a baseline that describes
    existing environmental conditions. (Neighbors for Smart Rail v.
    Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (2013) 
    57 Cal.4th 439
    , 452; see also Riverwatch v. County of San Diego (1999) 
    76 Cal.App.4th 1428
    , 1453 [“environmental impacts should be
    examined in light of the environment as it exists when a project
    is approved”].) The lead agency involved in approving a project
    has discretion to determine that baseline. (Neighbors for Smart
    Rail, supra, at p. 452; Communities for a Better Environment v.
    South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 
    48 Cal.4th 310
    ,
    328.)
    CEQA forbids “piecemeal” review of the
    environmental effects of a project. (McCann v. City of San Diego
    18
    (2021) 
    70 Cal.App.5th 51
    , 84 (McCann); Communities for a Better
    Environment v. City of Richmond (2010) 
    184 Cal.App.4th 70
    , 98.)
    Environmental review under CEQA cannot be avoided by
    chopping up a large or cumulative project that has significant
    environmental effects into ‘bite-size pieces’ that have
    insignificant effects individually.” (El Dorado County Taxpayers
    for Quality Growth v. County of El Dorado (2004) 
    122 Cal.App.4th 1591
    , 1599.) We review piecemealing claims de
    novo. (Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of
    California (2023) 
    88 Cal.App.5th 656
    , 683 (Make UC a Good
    Neighbor); Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.)
    Improper piecemealing occurs where “the purpose of
    the reviewed project is to be the first step toward future
    development.” (Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1223.) An environmental analysis must consider “the
    environmental effects of future expansion or other action if (1) it
    is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the initial project; and
    (2) the future expansion or action will be significant in that it will
    likely change the scope or nature of the initial project or its
    environmental effects. Absent these two circumstances, the
    future expansion need not be considered in the EIR for the
    proposed project. Of course, if the future action is not considered
    at that time, it will have to be discussed in a subsequent EIR
    before the future action can be approved under CEQA.” (Laurel
    Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California
    (1988) 
    47 Cal.3d 376
    , 396 (Laurel Heights).)
    Laurel Heights concluded that an EIR improperly
    segmented a university’s decision to relocate its school of
    pharmacy to a specific building. Although the EIR stated the
    school would occupy 100,000 square feet of the building, it did not
    19
    mention that the school intended to occupy the remaining
    254,000 square feet when the existing tenant moved out.
    Because school officials had already publicly announced their
    intention to use the whole building, the EIR should have
    analyzed that eventuality. (Laurel Heights, supra, 47 Cal.3d at
    pp. 396-397.)
    Piecemealing may also occur when “the reviewed
    project legally compels or practically presumes completion of
    another action.” (Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1223.) For example, the court concluded in Tuolumne County
    Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Sonora (2007) 
    155 Cal.App.4th 1214
    , that a proposed home improvement center and
    the realignment of a road were part of a single project because
    the home improvement center could not be completed and opened
    without the realigned road. (Id. at p. 1231.)
    A project may properly be considered separately from
    potential future projects, however, when the two “have different
    proponents, serve different purposes or can be implemented
    independently.” (Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.
    1223; see also, Make UC a Good Neighbor, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
    at p. 684.) A project may also be reviewed without reference to
    potential future projects when it has “significant independent or
    local utility” and would be implemented with or without approval
    of the future project, even if the two are related in some other
    respects. (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake
    Water Agency (2009) 
    180 Cal.App.4th 210
    , 237; Sierra Club v.
    West Side Irrigation Dist. (2005) 
    128 Cal.App.4th 690
    , 699.)
    In Banning Ranch, supra, for example, appellants
    contended that an EIR for a public park and access road should
    also have considered the impact of future residential and
    20
    commercial development on an adjacent property. The court of
    appeal rejected this contention because the park and the
    residential development served different purposes and each had
    independent utility. The park would provide recreational
    opportunities for existing residents while the future project would
    develop new housing and commercial buildings. In addition, the
    park had independent utility because “the City can and will build
    the park regardless of any development” on the adjacent
    property. (Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226.)
    Similarly, in McCann, supra, 
    70 Cal.App.5th 51
    , the
    City of San Diego announced a group of projects to convert
    overhead utility wires to an underground system with each
    undergrounding project covering a different geographical area.
    The City declared one undergrounding project exempt from
    CEQA and adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND) for
    another. A resident contended the City violated CEQA by
    segmenting what should have been a single, citywide project into
    smaller projects.
    The court of appeal rejected this piecemealing claim.
    “Here, each utility undergrounding project was independently
    functional and did not rely on any other undergrounding project
    to operate.” (McCann, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 85.) The
    functionality of each completed undergrounding project would not
    be affected by the completion or abandonment of other
    undergrounding projects. “Although similar in nature, each
    undergrounding project stands alone such that it is not the ‘first
    step’ toward additional projects and does not ‘legally compel[] or
    practically presume[] completion of another action.’” (Id. at p. 85,
    quoting Banning Ranch, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1223.)
    21
    Here, the Road Commissioner described the project
    as the “Montecito Right of Way Restoration” project, explaining
    that it would also improve access to the Hot Springs trailhead.
    As defined by the Road Commissioner, the project would restore
    the right of way by removing unpermitted private
    encroachments. This would maintain the safe traveling condition
    of the road for vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists and restore
    public parking near the trailhead.
    To carry out the project, the Road Commissioner sent
    notices to three property owners to remove unpermitted
    encroachments from the public right of way. Respondents and
    the trial court inferred that these notices were the first step of a
    “larger project,” which involves encouraging many more hikers to
    use the Hot Springs trail by making it easier for them to park
    near the trailhead. Because respondents had at least some
    chance of demonstrating that a “larger project” might have
    significant environmental effects, the trial court concluded
    respondents had at least some chance of succeeding on the merits
    of their claim that the project is not categorically exempt from
    CEQA.
    We conclude the trial court erred as a matter of law.
    The current project as defined by the Road Commissioner has
    independent utility, regardless of whether notices are sent to
    other property owners in the future or other, as yet unannounced
    actions are taken to increase access to or use of the Hot Springs
    trail. Removing encroachments brings the properties into
    compliance with the Streets and Highways Code and county
    ordinances and engineering standards by restoring the “clear
    zone” in front of these properties. It also recovers space for public
    parking. These results occur regardless of whether other
    22
    homeowners are later notified to remove encroachments or other
    steps are taken to increase hikers’ access to Hot Springs trail.
    Exception to Categorical Exemptions.
    Guidelines section 15300.2 provides, “A categorical
    exemption shall not be used for an activity where there is a
    reasonable possibility that the activity will have a significant
    effect on the environment due to unusual circumstances.” (Id.,
    subd. (c).) Respondents contend that unusual circumstances exist
    here because East Mountain Drive is adjacent to environmentally
    sensitive Hot Springs Canyon. They contend removing the
    encroachments will have an environmental impact because it will
    create more parking which will draw more hikers to the canyon.
    The trial court agreed with this analysis. We conclude the trial
    court erred.
    Assessing whether the unusual circumstances
    exception applies requires us to engage in the analysis developed
    in Berkeley Hillside, 
    supra,
     
    60 Cal.4th 1086
    . There, our Supreme
    Court instructed that, where a project is otherwise categorically
    exempt, “a party challenging the exemption has the burden of
    producing evidence supporting an exception. [Citations.] . . . [T]o
    establish the unusual circumstances exception, it is not enough
    for a challenger merely to provide substantial evidence that the
    project may have a significant effect on the environment, because
    that is the inquiry CEQA requires absent an exemption.
    [Citation.] . . . On the other hand, evidence that the
    project will have a significant effect does tend to prove that some
    circumstance of the project is unusual.” (Id. at p. 1105.)
    The challenger “may establish an unusual
    circumstance without evidence of an environmental effect, by
    showing that the project has some feature that distinguishes it
    23
    from others in the exempt class, such as its size or location. In
    such a case, to render the exception applicable, the party need
    only show a reasonable possibility of a significant effect due to
    that unusual circumstance. Alternatively, under our reading of
    the guideline, a party may establish an unusual circumstance
    with evidence that the project will have a significant
    environmental effect. That evidence, if convincing, necessarily
    also establishes ‘a reasonable possibility that the activity will
    have a significant effect on the environment due to unusual
    circumstances.’ (Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (c).)” (Berkeley
    Hillside, 
    supra,
     60 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)
    Under either line of analysis, the party challenging
    the exemption has the burden to establish by substantial
    evidence either that the project presents an unusual
    circumstance or that it will have a significant environmental
    effect. (Walters v. City of Redondo Beach (2016) 
    1 Cal.App.5th 809
    , 820; Citizens for Environmental Responsibility v. State ex rel.
    14th Dist. Ag. Assn. (2015) 
    242 Cal.App.4th 555
    , 575-576
    (Citizens for Environmental Responsibility).) “This standard
    requires that we ‘“resolv[e] all evidentiary conflicts in the
    agency’s favor and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable
    inferences to uphold the agency’s finding.”’” (Walters, supra, at p.
    820.) Substantial evidence “includes facts, reasonable
    assumptions predicated upon facts, and expert opinion supported
    by facts. [Citations.] It does not include ‘[a]rgument,
    speculation, unsubstantiated opinion or narrative, [or] evidence
    which is clearly inaccurate or erroneous . . . .’” (North Coast
    Rivers Alliance v. Kawamura (2015) 
    243 Cal.App.4th 647
    , 673.)
    “‘[R]eviewing courts, after resolving all evidentiary
    conflicts in the agency’s favor and indulging in all legitimate and
    24
    reasonable inferences to uphold the agency’s finding [of no
    unusual circumstances], must affirm that finding if there is any
    substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support
    it. . . .’” (Citizens for Environmental Responsibility, supra, 242
    Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) As a reviewing court, we are required to
    give the lead agency “‘the benefit of the doubt on any legitimate,
    disputed issues of credibility. . . .’” (Joshua Tree, supra, 1
    Cal.App.5th at p. 692.)
    The trial court found there was an unusual
    circumstance here because of the project’s location adjacent to
    Hot Springs Canyon. But the Road Commissioner and the
    County considered the setting in reaching their conclusion that
    the project was categorically exempt. Like many roads in
    Montecito, East Mountain Drive is an existing, developed road
    portions of which are located near an Environmentally Sensitive
    Habitat (ESH) area overlay zone. The public may park on all
    county roads in Montecito, unless they are otherwise posted. By
    definition, this includes a county road like East Mountain Drive
    that is adjacent to an ESH area overlay zone. East Mountain
    Drive’s proximity to the overlay zone does not make it unique in
    Montecito, nor is it evidence of an unusual circumstance. The
    County determined that the project would involve only the
    “restoration of existing roadway” to “maintain the safe traveling
    condition” of the road and “allow for safe public parking for the
    pedestrians and also cyclists going to the adjacent public trails.”
    This is substantial evidence supporting the County’s
    determination of no unusual circumstances. The absence of
    unusual circumstances “‘means the exception does not apply.’”
    (Banker’s Hill, Hillcreast Park West Community Preservation
    Group v. City of San Diego (2006) 
    139 Cal.App.4th 249
    , 278.)
    25
    Irreparable Harm.
    The second factor that must be considered in
    determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction is “the
    relative balance of harms that is likely to result from the
    granting or denial of interim injunctive relief.” (White v. Davis
    (2003) 
    30 Cal.4th 528
    , 554.) Like the trial court, we are required
    to consider whether respondents have shown they “would suffer
    grave or irreparable harm from the issuance of the preliminary
    injunction and, if so, to balance the relative actual harms to the
    parties, while taking into account the degree of certainty of the
    outcome on the merits.” (Uber Technologies, supra, 56 Cal.5th at
    pp. 302-303.) The ultimate goal of this balancing process is “to
    minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may
    cause.” (IT Corp, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 73.)
    In balancing the relative harms here, the trial court
    gave no weight to either the County’s interest or the public
    interest in enforcing the encroachment laws. Instead, it found
    County’s arguments about irreparable harm “relate more to its
    perceptions of the benefits of proceeding with the project, than
    they do to any legitimate harm which it or the public would suffer
    if the status quo were preserved . . . . Indeed, the Court sees
    little, if any, harm to County should the injunction issue.”
    Allowing the encroachments to remain, the trial court reasoned,
    would not cost the County any money or prevent it from enforcing
    the encroachment laws if the petition is ultimately denied.
    Respondents, in the trial court’s view, would be
    harmed if their encroachments were removed. “[P]ermitting the
    destruction of encroachments which have existed for many years
    with County’s express or implied permission, will cause
    irreparable harm to the properties at issue. Many of the
    26
    longstanding encroachments consist of mature landscaping
    which, once removed, will likely be gone forever.”
    We conclude the trial court abused its discretion
    when it found County had no legitimate interest in enforcing the
    laws against encroachments and that respondents would be
    irreparably harmed by complying with those laws. First, the
    record includes substantial evidence that encroachments in the
    public right of way present both fire safety risks and public safety
    risks to motorists, pedestrians and cyclists. Even without that
    evidence, the encroachment statutes and ordinances themselves
    represent a legislative determination that the public interest is
    served by prohibiting and authorizing the removal of
    unpermitted encroachments in the public right of way. The
    public interest is served by their enforcement. (IT Corp, supra,
    35 Cal.3d at p. 72; see also Carson Mobilehome Park Owwners’
    Assn. v. City of Carson (1983) 
    35 Cal.3d 184
    , 195 [“courts lack
    jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of a validly adopted
    constitutional ordinance”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 526.)
    Second, the record contains no substantial evidence
    that respondents will be irreparably harmed by removal of the
    encroachments. The plants and other objects they have installed
    in the public right of way can presumably be moved off public
    property and onto respondents’ private property. In any event,
    respondents have an obligation to obey the law, including the
    encroachment laws. (Jamison, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 365-
    366.) “[A] party suffers no grave or irreparable harm by being
    prohibited from violating the law . . . .” (Uber Technologies,
    supra, 56 Cal.5th at p. 306; see also People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna
    (2010) 
    182 Cal.App.4th 866
    , 882 [party “cannot claim harm” from
    27
    restrictions imposed by a gang injunction on “activities that
    constitute the public nuisance”].)
    Conclusion
    The request for judicial notice is granted. The order
    granting a preliminary injunction is reversed. This matter is
    remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion. Appellants shall recover their costs
    on appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    YEGAN, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P. J.
    BALTODANO, J.
    28
    Thomas P. Anderle, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Lina Somait,
    Sr. Deputy, for Defendants and Appellants.
    Jennifer Bacon Henning, for amicus curiae on behalf
    of appellants.
    Cappello & Noël and A. Barry Cappello, David L.
    Cousineau, G. Michael Brelje, for Plaintiffs and Respodents.