People v. Jeffries CA3 ( 2023 )

Filed 6/9/23 P. v. Jeffries CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C092875
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 12F01615)
v.
ANDREW JEFFRIES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Andrew Jeffries appeals from denial of his postconviction petition for
relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 Counsel for defendant filed a brief seeking our
independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 to determine whether
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant filed his petition under section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no change in the text.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the statute by its current number.
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there are any arguable issues on appeal. Defendant also filed a supplemental brief in
propria persona. Disagreeing with defendant’s claims of error, we will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We need not repeat the detailed recitation of the facts in our unpublished opinion
on defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Haven (Aug. 28, 2019, C074940) [nonpub.
opn.].) Suffice it to say that in the early hours of March 28, 2012, defendant and his
codefendant Robert Haven lured the victim to a remote area under the pretense that
together they were going to steal a car, and then shot and killed the victim. (Ibid.) A jury
found defendant guilty of first degree murder with the special circumstance of lying in
wait. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury found not true the allegation that
defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), but further found defendant
guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), domestic violence
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)), possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377,
subd. (a)), and falsifying a document (§ 134). The trial court sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate term of life in prison without the possibility of parole on the murder count,
plus a consecutive determinate term of seven years on the remaining counts. (People v.
Haven, C074940, supra.)
In December 2019, defendant filed a form petition seeking resentencing under
section 1172.6. He checked boxes on the form declaring that he was convicted of murder
under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and
could not now be convicted of murder under the changes made to sections 188 or 189,
effective January 1, 2019, because he was not the actual killer, did not act with intent to
kill, and was not a major participant in the crime acting with reckless indifference to
human life. Defendant also stated: “I have new evidence to provide 100% factual proof I
had no involvement in this murder. I have filed all this evidence in Dept #41 of the
Superior Court in my writ of habeas corpus. Everything is factual.”
The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant on his petition.
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The People’s response to the petition argued that defendant was not eligible for
relief because the jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Further, the People contended defendant was unable to show that
he could not be convicted under the newly amended sections 188 and 189, because the
jury found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance, which necessarily established that
defendant was the actual killer or committed murder while acting with intent to kill.
The trial court found defendant’s petition failed to make a prima facie showing for
relief under section 1172.6. The court explained that defendant’s jury was not instructed
on the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine but was
instructed on aider and abettor liability. Noting that the jury did not find that defendant
or Haven personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), the court concluded
jurors were unable to determine which of the two men fired the fatal shot. Nonetheless,
the guilty verdicts established that defendant was either the actual killer or aided and
abetted Haven, and either way defendant could still have been convicted under the
amendments to sections 188 and 189.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Wende requesting that we independently review the entire record and stated
defendant had been advised of the right to file a supplemental brief to raise any issues he
believed deserved review. We dismissed the appeal as abandoned, and our Supreme
Court granted defendant’s petition for review and deferred the matter pending the high
court’s decision in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. After deciding that case,
the high court transferred this case back to this court, with directions to vacate our order
dismissing the appeal and reconsider whether to exercise our discretion to conduct an
independent review or provide any other relief under Delgadillo.
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We vacated our order dismissing the appeal, and informed defendant by letter that
appellate counsel had filed a no-issue brief under Wende but that because this case arose
from an order denying postconviction relief, he was not constitutionally entitled to
counsel or independent review of the record. We notified defendant that, under
Delgadillo, he had 30 days to file a supplemental brief or letter raising any issue he
wished us to consider. We advised that if we did not receive a supplemental letter or
brief, the appeal may be dismissed as abandoned. Defendant timely filed a supplemental
brief in propria persona.
DISCUSSION
Under Delgadillo, we must “evaluate the specific arguments presented in
[defendant’s supplemental brief],” but we are not compelled to undertake an
“independent review of the entire record to identify unraised issues.” (People v.
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.)
Defendant raises three issues. First, he argues that where a jury cannot determine
which codefendant was the actual killer and which the aider and abettor, it is unlawful to
convict one of the defendants for aiding and abetting murder unless the jury was
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Second, he argues that,
since the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the
jury was improperly instructed with CALCRIM No. 416 on conspiracy in its place, which
was insufficient. Third, defendant asserts that he was improperly denied the opportunity
to present new evidence at the prima facie stage of his petition, referring to evidence he
claims was not presented at trial but was submitted in a habeas petition to the superior
court. We address each of these issues in turn.
The first issue defendant raises is irrelevant to section 1172.6, which provides a
path to resentencing for defendants convicted of murder by application of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or felony murder rule. (People v. Farfan (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 942, 952.) Defendant does not argue that he was convicted under either
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doctrine. Rather, he concedes in his supplemental brief that the jury at his trial was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Had the jury been so
instructed, defendant would have a basis to claim that the trial court erred in denying his
petition at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 859;
People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055-1056.) In any event, People v. Culuko
(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, on which defendant relies, does not, as defendant asserts,
stand for the proposition that an instruction on the natural and probable doctrine is
required for a murder conviction when the jury cannot determine who is the perpetrator.
Culuko concerns the established principle that jurors need not determine which defendant
is the perpetrator and which is the aider and abettor in order to find both guilty of murder.
(See Culuko, at p. 323; see also People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120 [“The
aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices’
actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and
abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which role”].) This
principle applies to direct aiding and abetting liability, a theory that continues to be valid
after the amendments to sections 188 and 189. (See People v. Williams (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1252 [citing McCoy].)
Defendant’s second claim is that CALCRIM No. 416 (Evidence of Uncharged
Conspiracy) was insufficient to replace the natural and probable consequences instruction
that defendant incorrectly claims was required to convict him of murder. While this issue
is also irrelevant to the requirements of section 1172.6, it touches on whether CALCRIM
No. 416 is equivalent to an instruction on aiding and abetting under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. It is not. CALCRIM No. 416 as given required the jury
to find that “the defendant intended to agree and did agree with one or more of the other
defendants to commit murder” and “that the defendant and one or more of the other
alleged members of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit
murder.” (See People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 185 [to prove conspiracy
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to commit an offense, the prosecution must show that the conspirators intended “ ‘to
commit the elements of that offense’ ”].) Significantly, the trial court did not give
CALCRIM No. 417 (Liability for Coconspirators’ Acts), which would have implicated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine by instructing the jury that a member of
the conspiracy to commit one crime can also be found guilty of another crime if it “is a
natural and probable consequence of the common plan or design of the conspiracy.” (See
People v. Farfan, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 956-957 [observing the claim of error in
denying petition a prima stage where the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 417
“might have merit” but for other findings made by the jury.)
Finally, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in prohibiting him
from presenting new evidence in support of his petition at the prima facie stage. At the
prima facie stage, the trial court does not evaluate evidence. (People v. Duchine (2021)
60 Cal.App.5th 798, 815.) Rather, “true factfinding should be reserved and exercised
only after an order to show cause is issued and the parties are permitted to supplement the
record with new evidence, including, if requested, through an evidentiary hearing.”
(Ibid.) We note the California Supreme Court in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
assumed that petitioners may not present new evidence at the prima facie stage. (Id. at
p. 974, fn. 7.) Further, although Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) provides that, at the
evidentiary hearing on the petition, “[t]he prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer
new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens,” no similar provision
appears in section 1172.6, subdivision (c), which discusses the prima facie determination.
No error appears in the trial court’s determinations and ruling.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under section
1172.6 is affirmed.
/s/
Duarte, J.
We concur:
/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.
/s/
Earl, J.
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