People v. Ocegueda ( 2023 )

Filed 6/14/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G061077
v. (Super. Ct. No. 20CF1661)
DARRICK PATRICK OCEGUEDA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary S.
Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew A. Siroka, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Darrick Patrick Ocegueda appeals his jury-trial conviction for first degree
murder. He contends that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the theory of
provocation as it related to the premeditation and deliberation elements of the offense
and, relatedly, that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a clarifying pinpoint
instruction. Ocegueda maintains the combination of some of the standard instructions
given (CALCRIM Nos. 521, 522 & 570) might have misled the jury to believe that
provocation could negate the elements of first degree murder only if it satisfied an
objective, “person of average disposition” standard. Additionally, Ocegueda claims the
evidence was insufficient to support the elements of premeditation and deliberation.
As discussed below, we conclude the instructions were correct, complete,
and unambiguous in instructing the jury on premeditation and deliberation. We further
conclude the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
I. The Information
An information charged Ocegueda with the June 2020 murder of Daniel
Bahena. The information also alleged that Ocegueda personally used a knife in the
commission of the murder for purposes of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b)(1),
and that he had sustained a prior conviction that qualified as a strike and as a serious
felony.
II. The Evidence at Trial
On the day of the murder, Bahena and his friend Enrique Morales were
drinking and riding their skateboards together around Garden Grove and Santa Ana. In
the late afternoon, the two went to a CVS store in Santa Ana to get more alcohol.
Ocegueda and a companion, Joanna Santana, were inside the store at the time. While
inside the store, Bahena had a conversation with Santana. After all four exited the store,
Bahena approached Santana’s SUV and exchanged words with Ocegueda, who was
sitting in the passenger seat, and the two agreed to fight each other.
2
Ocegueda got out of the SUV, and he, Bahena, and Morales walked behind
a nearby store. There, Ocegueda and Bahena started fighting. Ocegueda soon gained the
upper hand and placed Bahena in a headlock while continuing to punch him. Morales
then stepped in and hit Ocegueda in the head with a skateboard two or three times,
causing him to release Bahena. Ocegueda was angry and told Bahena, “‘Oh, you fucked
up, why you let your homie get in?’” Security camera video showed the group walking
behind the store at 4:52 p.m. and Ocegueda retreating about 30 seconds later.
Ocegueda walked back to Santana’s SUV and retrieved two knives.
Bahena and Morales started “half walking, half running,” and Ocegueda returned to the
SUV, which began driving in the same direction. Ocegueda saw the pair when they
reached the parking lot of Cozy Corner, a fast-food restaurant down the street from CVS.
Santana dropped Ocegueda off at a parking lot across the street, and he started running
across multiple lanes of traffic toward Cozy Corner. Santana drove away.
Security camera video showed Ocegueda reaching the Cozy Corner parking
lot at 4:55 p.m. Ocegueda, who was holding a knife in each hand, charged at Bahena.
Bahena hit Ocegueda with his skateboard, and Ocegueda made a slashing or stabbing
motion with his right hand. Bahena began retreating, and Ocegueda attempted to slash
1
him with the knife in his left hand, but missed. After Bahena managed to get about three
feet away from Ocegueda, he and Morales began running away and separated. In the
video, Ocegueda could be seen walking calmly after them, still holding a knife in each
hand, and later jogging after Bahena. Bahena ran toward the Grecian Gardens apartment
complex, about a quarter of a mile away, and Ocegueda continued after him.
Minutes after the group left the Cozy Corner parking lot, a large man was
walking around the lot and then threateningly confronted an apparently unrelated person
1
At trial, Morales testified he thought Ocegueda had punched Bahena, but he
admitted he could not see if Ocegueda had anything in his hands because he “came out of
nowhere.”
3
holding a skateboard, while Santana’s SUV waited nearby. After a brief exchange
between the two, the large man entered the SUV, which began driving in the direction of
the Grecian Gardens.
In the meantime, Bahena entered the Grecian Gardens courtyard. Security
camera video from a nearby apartment showed him talking to two men and showing them
2
a slash wound on his chest. Bahena called his girlfriend and asked her to come get him.
At around 5:08 p.m., Ocegueda approached Bahena with another man.
Bahena and the men he had been speaking with ran away in different directions, but
Ocegueda and his accomplice caught up with Bahena and stabbed him twice: once in the
lower back and once in the chest. The chest wound perforated Bahena’s lung and heart.
Bahena ran a short distance but collapsed to the ground and died shortly thereafter.
Ocegueda and the accomplice fled the scene, but police later identified and arrested
Ocegueda.
III. The Jury Instructions
After the close of evidence, the trial court gave the jury the standard
instructions pertaining to, inter alia, first and second degree murder, the concept of
provocation, and voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. As relevant here, the
court instructed the jury on the elements of murder and informed them that murder is of
the second degree, unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it was
first degree murder as defined in CALCRIM No. 521. In turn, CALCRIM No. 521 (first
degree murder) provided that Ocegueda was guilty of first degree murder only if he acted
“willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.” This instruction further explained that
“[a] decision to kill made rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not
deliberate and premeditated.”
2
It is unclear whether Bahena had sustained this wound during his
confrontation with Ocegueda at the Cozy Corner parking lot or at a different time.
4
CALCRIM No. 522 (effect of provocation on degree of murder) instructed
the jury: “Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and may
reduce a murder to manslaughter. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any,
are for you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was
provoked, consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second
degree murder. Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant
committed murder or manslaughter.”
And CALCRIM No. 570 (voluntary manslaughter: heat of passion)
instructed that murder was reduced to voluntary manslaughter if Ocegueda was provoked,
acted rashly as a result, and “[t]he provocation would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion rather than
from judgment.” This instruction further provided: “In order for heat of passion to
reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the
direct and immediate influence of provocation as I have defined it. While no specific
type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient. . . . [¶] It is
not enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set
up his own standard of conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was provoked
and whether the provocation was sufficient. In deciding whether the provocation was
sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in the same situation and
knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from judgment. [¶]
[If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing for a person of average
disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the
killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this basis.]” In addition, the trial
3
court instructed the jury on a theory of direct aiding and abetting (CALCRIM No. 401).
3
Under the theory of direct aiding and abetting, a defendant can be found
guilty of a crime if he or she knew of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, intended to aid
5
IV. Closing Arguments
In its closing argument, the prosecution argued Ocegueda was guilty of first
degree murder because he had acted deliberately and with premeditation. The prosecutor
noted that Ocegueda did not kill Bahena soon after he was hit with the skateboard, and
argued: “With each step that [Ocegueda] took from [the initial fight], he had the
opportunity to either abandon his decision to kill or continue forward. At each step
[Ocegueda] made additional choices and continued with his decision to kill.” The
prosecutor said that “[t]here are courses of actions during this 17-minute hunt to kill that
an average reasonable person would consider,” yet “upon reflection[,] . . . at each turn[,
Ocegueda] went ahead and continued towards killing [Bahena].” Later, in arguing that
the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter did not apply, the prosecutor
reminded the jury: “Do not consider any subjective factors related to [Ocegueda]. If you
think that he was hot-headed or jealous, that is not something you can consider. It’s the
average person.”
Ocegueda’s trial counsel offered different defense theories in her closing
argument, including that Ocegueda did not personally commit the killing, that the killing
was accidental, that it was committed in perfect or imperfect self-defense, and that it was
committed in a heat of passion. In addition, counsel referenced CALCRIM No. 521’s
instruction that to be guilty of first degree murder, the defendant must have acted
“[w]illfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” and asserted that nothing showed
Ocegueda had “weighed the considerations for and against his choice” and that he “was
still mad” and “was not thinking clearly” at the time.
V. The Verdict and the Sentence
Following trial, the jury found Ocegueda guilty of first degree murder and
found the allegation that he personally used a knife in the commission of the offense to be
in the commission of that crime, and did aid in the commission of that crime. (People v.
Chavez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 663, 682.)
6
true. In a bifurcated proceeding, Ocegueda admitted to the prior conviction allegation.
The trial court sentenced him to a total of 56 years to life. Ocegueda timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ocegueda challenges his conviction for first degree murder, contending:
(a) the trial court misinstructed the jury on the theory of provocation as it related to the
premeditation and deliberation elements of the offense and, relatedly, his trial counsel
was ineffective by failing to seek a clarifying pinpoint instruction; and (b) the evidence
was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation. As
discussed below, we perceive neither instructional error nor ineffective assistance of
counsel, and we conclude the evidence amply supported the elements of first degree
murder.
I. The Jury Instructions
A. Applicable Principles
1. Jury Instructions and the Standard of Review
“The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the general
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citation.]” (People v.
Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1331 (Hernandez).) Additionally, “[e]ven if
the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on a particular legal point, when it does
choose to instruct, it must do so correctly.” (People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009,
1015.) But “[o]nce the trial court adequately instructs the jury on the law, it has no duty
to give clarifying or amplifying instructions absent a request.” (Hernandez, at p. 1331.)
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the context of the
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We assume the jurors are intelligent
7
people and are capable of understanding and correlating the instructions given. (People
v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088 (Ramos).)
2. Murder and Provocation
“First degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought,
premeditation, and deliberation. [Citation.]” (Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1332.) A decision to kill is premeditated if considered beforehand and deliberate if
resulting from careful thought and weighing of competing considerations. (People v. Lee
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.)
Second degree murder is an unlawful killing with malice, but without the
additional elements of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Chun (2009) 45
Cal.4th 1172, 1181.) A heat of passion arising from provocation can negate those
elements and thus reduce the murder to second degree if it precluded the defendant from
deliberating or premeditating. (Hernandez, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.) This is a
subjective test pertaining to the defendant’s mental state. (People v. Fitzpatrick (1992)
2 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1295-1296.) Provocation in this context is not a “defense” but
merely a theory of reasonable doubt as to required elements of first degree murder.
(People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1733-1734.) Because an instruction on
provocation relates to the legal elements of premeditation and deliberation, it is a
“‘pinpoint instruction’” that a court need not give on its own motion. (People v. Rogers
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 878-879.)
If the provocation that drove the defendant to passion also meets an
objective criterion—if it is sufficient to cause a person of average disposition to act rashly
and without deliberation—the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and is
guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 108
(Lasko).) That the defendant was subjectively aroused to passion is insufficient to reduce
murder to voluntary manslaughter.
8
B. Analysis
We conclude the trial court committed no instructional error.
CALCRIM No. 521 properly instructed the jury on the elements of first degree murder,
including the requirement that the murder be deliberate and premeditated. It explained
that a decision to kill was not deliberate and premeditated if it was made “rashly,
impulsively, or without careful consideration,” making no mention of an objective
standard. CALCRIM No. 522 correctly instructed that provocation may reduce murder
from first degree to second degree and may further reduce a murder to manslaughter.
Finally, CALCRIM No. 570 accurately instructed that to reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the provocation must meet an objective test. Thus, the court did not err in
giving these instructions.
The court in People v. Jones (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1001 (Jones),
reached the same conclusion when addressing a similar challenge to CALCRIM Nos.
521, 522, and 570, holding that these instructions correctly stated the law. The court
explained: “CALCRIM Nos. 521 and 522, taken together, informed jurors that
‘provocation (the arousal of emotions) can give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, and this
in turn shows no premeditation and deliberation.’ [Citation.] As the jury also was
instructed, a reduction of murder to voluntary manslaughter requires more. It is here, and
only here, that the jury is instructed that provocation alone is not enough for the
reduction; the provocation must be sufficient to cause a person of average disposition in
the same situation, knowing the same facts, to have reacted from passion rather than
4
judgment.” (Jones, at p. 1001.)
4
Ocegueda attempts to distinguish Jones on the ground that provocation
played a more central role in this case than it did in Jones. But the Jones court’s
conclusion that the instructions were correct was not based on the limited role
provocation played at trial. (Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1001.)
9
Ocegueda does not dispute that the trial court’s instructions were legally
correct, on their own, but argues their confluence might have misled the jury to believe
that to reduce murder from first to second degree, provocation must meet the same
objective test that leads to a reduction to voluntary manslaughter. He contends that
CALCRIM No. 522’s reference to provocation, without distinguishing between
provocation negating malice and provocation negating deliberation and premeditation,
implied that a single standard governed, regardless of the context, “and the difference
inhere[d] in the amount of provocation present.” (Italics omitted.) He asserts CALCRIM
No. 570 provided this single standard by: (a) purporting to “define[]” provocation as
containing an objective component, and (b) broadly stating that “[t]he defendant is not
allowed to set up his own standard of conduct.” We are unpersuaded.
As noted, CALCRIM No. 521 instructed that “[a] decision to kill made
rashly, impulsively, or without careful consideration is not deliberate and premediated”
and thus does not support a conviction for first degree murder. Nothing suggested that a
rash, impulsive, or unconsidered decision could nevertheless be deliberate and
premeditated based on some objective test.
Ocegueda’s contention that CALCRIM No. 522 implied a single standard
for provocation, with a difference only in “the amount of provocation,” is illogical. As
the Attorney General observes, “either an event is sufficiently provocative to cause an
ordinary person [of average disposition] to [act impulsively] or it is not.” And as the jury
was instructed, if the event was sufficiently provocative to a person of average
disposition, and the defendant was subjectively provoked, the defendant is guilty of
voluntary manslaughter, not murder. (Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 108; CALCRIM
No. 570.) Under Ocegueda’s reading of the instructions, there would be no
circumstances under which murder could be reduced from first to second degree based on
provocation without being further reduced to manslaughter. Yet CALCRIM No. 522
instructed that provocation could reduce the degree of murder. Thus, the jury would not
10
have understood CALCRIM No. 522 to say that the same standard governed provocation
as it related to both the elements of first degree murder and the heat of passion theory of
voluntary manslaughter. (See Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.)
As for CALCRIM No. 570, the language Ocegueda singles out pertained to
the provocation necessary “for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary
manslaughter.” We see no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have construed this
language in a voluntary manslaughter instruction to alter the requirement—plainly stated
in CALCRIM No. 521—that first degree murder must be deliberate and premediated.
(See People v. Mitchell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 579; Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1088.) The instructions were therefore clear that the existence of deliberation and
premeditation, including the theory that they were not present due to provocation, were
based on Ocegueda’s subjective mental state alone. Further supporting that conclusion is
Ocegueda’s trial counsel’s reliance on CALCRIM No. 521 to argue that Ocegueda was
not guilty of first degree murder based on a subjective standard: she reminded the jury
that the defendant must have acted “[w]illfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” and
asserted nothing showed Ocegueda had “weighed the considerations for and against his
5
choice” and that Ocegueda “was still mad” and “was not thinking clearly” at the time.
Ocegueda contends the prosecutor exacerbated the instruction’s alleged
lack of clarity by referencing a reasonable person standard in arguing that the murder was
deliberate and premeditated. But as discussed above, the instructions were correct and
unambiguous regarding the elements of first degree murder. Any erroneous argument
that an objective standard determined whether a murder was deliberate and premeditated
would have been contrary to the instructions. And Ocegueda disclaims any claim of
5
Given counsel’s argument that Ocegueda was not guilty of first degree
murder because there was no evidence of deliberation and premeditation, we reject
Ocegueda’s additional claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
argue for second degree murder.
11
prosecutorial error, recognizing he did not object to the prosecutor’s argument below.
(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 43-44 [“When a defendant believes the
prosecutor has made remarks constituting misconduct during argument, he or she is
obliged to call them to the court’s attention by a timely objection”].)
Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument focused on Ocegueda’s own actions
and state of mind, noting that “[a]t each step [Ocegueda] made additional choices and
continued with his decision to kill.” While the prosecutor referenced the “average
reasonable person” in asserting there were other courses of action to consider during
Ocegueda’s prolonged hunt after Bahena, he did so in arguing that “upon reflection,” and
“at each turn,” Ocegueda “went ahead and continued towards killing [Bahena].” In
context, the prosecutor’s argument invoked a subjective standard and was not misleading.
It was only in discussing the heat-of-passion theory of voluntary manslaughter that the
prosecutor asked the jury not to consider subjective factors. This was not error. (See
Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 108.)
Having adequately instructed the jury on the law, the court was not required
to add any clarifying instructions absent a request by Ocegueda. (Hernandez, supra,
183 Cal.App.4th at p. 1331.) Ocegueda made no such request. And contrary to
Ocegueda’s claim, his counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to request
an additional instruction on provocation .
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a “[d]efendant must show
that counsel’s performance was both deficient and prejudicial . . . .” (People v. Castillo,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1014-1015.) “[I]f the record sheds no light on why counsel acted
or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject the claim on appeal unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there could be no
satisfactory explanation for counsel’s performance.” (Id. at p. 1015.) Here, counsel
could reasonably have concluded the instructions given adequately advised the jury, as
we have, and that no further instruction was necessary. (Id. at p. 1018 [counsel could
12
reasonably conclude pinpoint instruction relating evidence of intoxication to
premeditation was unnecessary because instructions adequately advised jury and counsel
relied on them to argue that defendant did not act with premeditation because he was
intoxicated].) As noted, counsel relied on the instructions in arguing that Ocegueda was
not guilty of first degree murder due to his subjective mental state.
II. The Sufficiency of the Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation
A. Applicable Principles
In assessing the sufficiency of evidence of premeditation and deliberation,
courts often consider three factors discussed in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15,
26-27: planning, motive, and manner of killing. (People v. Shamblin (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 1, 10 & fn. 16.) “Anderson does not require that these factors be present in
some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is the list
exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate court’s assessment
whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of
preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse.” (People v. Pride (1992)
3 Cal.4th 195, 247.) “In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence challenge, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653.) “We presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer
from the evidence.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
B. Analysis
Ample evidence supported the jury’s finding of premeditation and
deliberation. Initially, the record included evidence supporting all three Anderson
factors. There was strong evidence of planning: After the first fight, Ocegueda returned
to his car, armed himself with two knives, and pursued Bahena to the area of the Cozy
Corner parking lot. There, he was dropped off across the street and ran across multiple
13
traffic lanes to intercept and attack Bahena. When Bahena managed to escape, Ocegueda
chased him into the apartment complex, obtained reinforcement, and proceeded to
commit the murder. That Ocegueda took multiple steps in the process to kill Bahena,
6
using each break in action to increase his lethality, supports an inference of planning.
(People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129 [after first knife broke, defendant searched
for and obtained second knife, which gave him time to reflect and indicated planning];
People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [evidence suggestive of planning where
defendant returned to his car to get rifle before committing murders and had to manually
reload rifle between shots].)
Turning to motive, the evidence suggested Ocegueda had decided to kill
Bahena because the latter allowed Morales to hit him with the skateboard when they were
supposed to fight one-on-one, in addition to his exchange of words with Bahena before
the fight. Ocegueda argues that for purposes of the Anderson factors, motive entails a
prior relationship, and he contends that “[a]nger that arises on the spot because of
confrontation . . . is not a premeditated motive to kill.” Proof of motive, however, does
not require a prior relationship. (People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 557.) Nor must
the motive be longstanding. (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1026 [“simple
revenge because [robbery victim] did not relinquish money” was motive supporting
deliberation and premeditation].)
6
The parties disagree on whether the evidence showed it was Ocegueda who
fatally stabbed Bahena, but we need not decide the matter. The jury found Ocegueda
guilty of murder as either the perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. “An aider and
abettor who knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to kill someone could be
found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, having formed his
own culpable intent. Such an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required for
first degree murder.” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167.) The Anderson factors
apply equally to the perpetrator and a direct aider and abettor. (See People v. Gonzales
and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 295-296 [assessing sufficiency of evidence to support
premeditation and deliberation as to both perpetrator and aider and abettor under
Anderson factors].)
14
As for the manner of killing, Ocegueda pursued Bahena for many minutes
and had ample opportunity for reflection. Yet, as noted above, he used each break in
action to prepare for and intensify the next round of violence. From Ocegueda’s
prolonged hunt after Bahena, a reasonable jury could infer that he acted deliberately and
7
with premeditation. (See People v. Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1029 [“A theory that a
person killed in a fit of rage is undermined by proof that, after ample opportunity for
reflection, the person decided that continuing a violent attack was appropriate”]; People
v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 244 [manner of killing suggested premeditation and
deliberation where “defendant’s acts occurred in stages”].)
Moreover, the Anderson factors aside, there was direct evidence in the
record suggesting Ocegueda acted in a cold and calculated manner in hunting Bahena.
The video of the attack at Cozy Corner showed that after Ocegueda attempted to slash
Bahena and Bahena started running away, Ocegueda calmly walked after him—holding a
knife in each hand—and ultimately began a light jog in his direction. Ocegueda’s cool
demeanor in pursuing Bahena before the final, fatal attack further supported the jury’s
finding of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 232
[“‘calm,’ ‘cool,’ and ‘focused’” manner of shooting supported finding of premeditation
and deliberation].)
In support of his contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove first
degree murder, Ocegueda cites People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1274.
7
Ocegueda asserts there was no evidence he tried to attack Bahena with a
knife during the confrontation at Cozy Corner, pointing to Morales’s testimony that he
thought Ocegueda had punched Bahena there. Thus, he contends his intent to kill was
formed no earlier than “a few minutes before the fatal stab wound.” However, the video
of Ocegueda’s attack at Cozy Corner shows him holding a knife in each hand and
attempting to slash Bahena. Morales admitted he could not see if Ocegueda had anything
in his hands at the time because Ocegueda “came out of nowhere.” The jury could
therefore infer that Ocegueda had formed the intent to kill following the initial fight,
when he retrieved the knives from the SUV.
15
That case is distinguishable. In Boatman, the defendant shot his girlfriend in the face
while they were alone in his bedroom. The defendant initially claimed the victim shot
herself, then claimed he had accidentally shot her. (Id. at pp. 1258-1259.) There was no
evidence of planning: nothing suggested the defendant had left the bedroom to get the
gun, and following the shooting, he tried to resuscitate the victim, directed his brother to
call the police, cried, and made suicidal remarks, behaving like “someone horrified and
distraught about what he had done, not someone who had just fulfilled a preconceived
plan.” (Id. at p. 1267.) As for motive, the only evidence was a text message from the
victim to a friend, saying she was having a fight with the defendant, which the court
stated was, “at most, weak evidence of a motive suggesting premeditation and
deliberation.” (Id. at p. 1268.) Finally, the manner of killing did not suggest an
execution-style murder, which the court said was necessary, absent evidence of planning
or motive. (Id. at pp. 1269-1270.)
The evidence discussed above renders Boatman inapposite. Unlike the
defendant in Boatman, Ocegueda engaged in a multi-step process in which he armed
himself and obtained reinforcement before the murder. Unlike the defendant in Boatman,
Ocegueda had a clear motive to kill Bahena, who had provoked the initial fight and
allowed Morales to intervene and hit Ocegueda in the head with a skateboard. And
unlike the defendant in Boatman, Ocegueda calmly pursued Bahena with two knives for
about a quarter of a mile, giving him ample opportunity to reflect. In short, the evidence
supported the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’LEARY, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOETHALS, J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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