In re Moawad ( 2022 )


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    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 21-BG-778
    IN RE EDWARD EMAD MOAWAD
    2017 DDN 337
    A Suspended Member of the Bar of the
    District of Columbia Court of Appeals
    Bar 
    Registration No. 998775
    BEFORE: Thompson * and Easterly, Associate Judges, and Ferren, Senior Judge.
    1
    ORDER
    (FILED—February 3, 2022)
    On consideration of the certified order from the state of Maryland disbarring
    respondent from the practice of law in that state; the November 18, 2021, order
    suspending respondent from the practice of law in this jurisdiction and directing him
    to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, respondent’s
    response thereto wherein he states reciprocal discipline should not be imposed; the
    statement of Disciplinary Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline; respondent’s
    reply thereto; and it appearing that respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, §14(g)
    affidavit on December 15, 2021, it is
    ORDERED that Edward Emad Moawad is hereby disbarred from the practice
    of law in the District of Columbia nunc pro tunc to December 15, 2021. Although
    respondent is correct that the state of Maryland presumptively disbars an attorney
    for any intentional dishonesty, a presumption this court does not apply, we review
    *
    Judge Thompson’s term expired on September 4, 2021; however, she will continue to
    serve as an Associate Judge until her successor is confirmed. See 
    D.C. Code § 11-1502
     (2012
    Repl.). She was qualified and appointed on October 4, 2021, to perform judicial duties as a Senior
    Judge and will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a date to be determined after her successor
    is appointed and qualifies.
    No. 21-BG-778
    the findings of the originating state to determine, without consideration of the
    Maryland presumption, the range of discipline this court would impose for the
    misconduct if this were an original action. See D.C. Bar R. XI, §11(c)(4). In doing
    so we accept the factual findings and aggravating circumstances of the state of
    Maryland, as described in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moawad, 
    257 A.3d 611
     (Md. 2021), and apply our case law to that misconduct, see In re Guberman,
    
    978 A.2d 200
     (D.C. 2009).
    Although we have limited the sanction of presumptive disbarment to cases
    involving reckless or intentional misappropriation and the conviction of crimes
    involving moral turpitude, we have also disbarred counsel in those cases where the
    underlying facts and aggravating circumstances require such a sanction including
    when we have determined that the attorney’s intentional dishonesty rises to the level
    of flagrant dishonesty. See, e.g., In re Bleecker, 
    11 A.3d 1224
     (D.C. 2011)
    (disbarring an attorney as reciprocal discipline where the state of Maryland disbarred
    respondent after it found that in filing a civil complaint he misrepresented the day of
    the injury to hide his failure to file a complaint within the statute of limitations and
    that his actions were detrimental to his client and wasted court time). Contrary to
    respondent’s arguments, we have previously held that flagrant dishonesty does not
    require an associated misappropriation or that the dishonest statement be made either
    under oath or as part of a court proceeding. See, e.g., In re Bynum, 
    197 A.3d 1072
    ,
    1074 (D.C. 2018) (court accepted the Board’s findings and conclusion that
    respondent’s multiple violations rose to flagrant dishonesty absent a lack of an
    attempt to fraudulent obtain client or public funds, where the intentional dishonesty
    is aggravated or prolonged, continues through the disciplinary process, and where
    respondent demonstrates no remorse and attempts to shift blame for his misconduct
    on others). While many prior cases have involved additional misconduct, we look
    to the totality of the misconduct in determining whether the dishonesty was flagrant
    and have considered whether the intentional dishonesty was an attempt to hide other
    misconduct and blame others for his misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kanu, 
    5 A.3d 1
    (D.C. 2010) (although other factors were present, the court found flagrant dishonesty
    where counsel failed to return his fee to clients if their visa applications were not
    successful, failed to communicate the outcome of the visa proceedings or respond to
    clients’ request for the refund of their fees, and subsequently lied to both his clients
    and Disciplinary Counsel about his efforts to return the fees, and where numerous
    aggravating factors were present including the vulnerability of the clients, his failure
    to return fees, and counsel’s failure to take any responsibility for his misconduct);
    In re McClure, 
    144 A.3d 570
     (D.C. 2016) (adopting Board recommendation of
    No. 21-BG-778
    disbarment for protracted dishonesty in a single probate case where he showed no
    remorse and no mitigating circumstances were present). We have also considered
    whether during the disciplinary proceedings respondent acknowledged his
    misconduct, showed remorse, or showed any willingness to pay restitution or return
    his client’s unearned fees. In this case the state of Maryland found that respondent
    failed to competently represent three vulnerable clients in their immigration cases to
    the clients’ detriment, failed to communicate with his clients to the point of
    abandonment by failing to respond to their inquiries, and failed to return unearned
    fees once his clients terminated his representation. Further, once disciplinary
    proceedings began, respondent failed to cooperate and then submitted multiple false
    statements and prepared false statements for another to sign. These false statements
    denied any misconduct, argued that he did not represent the clients, falsely attributed
    his failure to provide competent representation or effective communication to his
    clients to another, and falsely claimed his fees were not excessive, he did not owe
    them any fees and his clients owed him additional unpaid fees. Throughout the
    Maryland proceedings respondent denied responsibility, showed no remorse, and
    made no attempts at restitution. Reviewing the full scope of respondent’s
    misconduct, as well as the long list of aggravating factors, irrespective of the
    presumption applied by the state of Maryland, we conclude that respondent’s
    misconduct constitutes flagrant dishonesty and disbarment is within the range of
    discipline this court would impose if this were an original matter. Accordingly,
    respondent has not shown why substantially different discipline would be imposed
    by this court or why identical discipline should not be imposed.
    PER CURIAM
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-BG-778

Filed Date: 2/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022