Zheng v. Garland ( 2022 )


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  •      19-3435
    Zheng v. Garland
    BIA
    Cassin, IJ
    A208 167 168
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    4   New York, on the 1st day of February, two thousand twenty-
    5   two.
    6
    7   PRESENT:
    8            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    9            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
    10            MYRNA PÉREZ,
    11                 Circuit Judges.
    12   _____________________________________
    13
    14   JINLONG ZHENG,
    15            Petitioner,
    16
    17                      v.                                  19-3435
    18                                                          NAC
    19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    21            Respondent.
    22   _____________________________________
    23
    24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Gerald Karikari, Esq., Karikari &
    25                                      Associates, P.C., New York, NY.
    26
    27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant
    28                                      Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
    1                                Assistant Director; Elizabeth R.
    2                                Chapman, Trial Attorney, Office of
    3                                Immigration Litigation, United
    4                                States Department of Justice,
    5                                Washington, DC.
    6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    9    is DENIED.
    10       Petitioner Jinlong Zheng, a native and citizen of the
    11   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 7,
    12   2019 decision of the BIA affirming a February 26, 2018
    13   decision   of   an   Immigration   Judge   (“IJ”)   denying   asylum,
    14   withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
    15   Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Jinlong Zheng, No. A 208 167
    16   168 (B.I.A. Oct. 7, 2019), aff’g No. A 208 167 168 (Immig. Ct.
    17   N.Y.C. Feb. 26, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity
    18   with the underlying facts and procedural history.
    19       We consider the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.
    20   See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
    21   We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination for
    22   substantial evidence.       See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Hong
    23   Fei Gao v. Sessions, 
    891 F.3d 67
    , 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
    24       “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
    2
    1   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
    2   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
    3   the applicant or witness, . . . the consistency between the
    4   applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
    5   [and] the internal consistency of each such statement . . .
    6   without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
    7   falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any
    8   other relevant factor.”      
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).         “We
    9   defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
    10   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
    11   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
    12   ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir.
    13   2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
    14       Zheng argues that he presented a           credible claim       of
    15   religious persecution.     We conclude that substantial evidence
    16   supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination.            The
    17   agency     reasonably    relied   on    multiple   inconsistencies
    18   regarding Zheng’s statements and evidence as to his wife’s
    19   location,    his   introduction   to   Christianity,   his   fear    of
    20   sterilization, his efforts to obtain documents to flee China,
    21   and his arrest.         See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(ii).            In
    3
    1   addition, the agency reasonably relied on the fact that
    2   Zheng’s 2012 tourist visa to visit the United States was
    3   revoked because his visa application contained fraudulent
    4   documents.     See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).              The agency
    5   did   not   err   in     concluding   that    his   willingness   to   use
    6   fraudulent documents undermined his credibility because Zheng
    7   applied for his tourist visa before his alleged introduction
    8   to Christianity and persecution.             Cf. Siewe v. Gonzales, 480
    
    9 F.3d 160
    , 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (listing circumstances where
    10   false documents may not undermine credibility, including
    11   where       “fraudulent        documents       . . .    were      created
    12   to escape persecution”).         The agency did not err in declining
    13   to credit Zheng’s explanation for these inconsistencies.               See
    14   Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
    15   petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation
    16   for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must
    17   demonstrate       that     a   reasonable      fact-finder     would    be
    18   compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks
    19   omitted)); Siewe, 480 F.3d at 167 (holding that where there
    20   are “two permissible views of the evidence,” we defer to the
    21   agency’s choice “so long as the deductions are not illogical
    4
    1   or implausible” (quotation marks omitted)).                  Finally, the
    2   agency    reasonably   relied    on     Zheng’s    failure     to   provide
    3   documentary evidence corroborating events in China or his
    4   practice of Christianity in the United States.                See 8 U.S.C.
    5   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273
    6   (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or
    7   her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of
    8   corroboration    in    general   makes     an     applicant    unable    to
    9   rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into
    10   question.”).
    11       In sum, given the multiple inconsistencies and lack of
    12   corroboration, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
    13   adverse     credibility     determination.             See     8      U.S.C.
    14   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 
    534 F.3d at 167
    ; see also
    15   Likai Gao v. Barr, 
    968 F.3d 137
    , 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)
    16   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from
    17   showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.
    18   Multiple    inconsistencies      would     so     preclude     even    more
    19   forcefully.”).    The     adverse     credibility     determination      is
    20   dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
    21   because all three forms of relief relied on the same factual
    5
    1   predicate.    See Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d
    2   Cir. 2006).
    3       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    4   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
    5   stays VACATED.
    6                               FOR THE COURT:
    7                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
    8                               Clerk of Court
    9
    6