Lizzie Mayfield v. R. James Nicholson , 20 Vet. App. 98 ( 2006 )


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  •             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS
    NO . 02-1077
    LIZZIE MAYFIELD ,                                              APPELLANT ,
    V.
    R. JAMES NICHOLSON ,
    SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,                                 APPELLEE.
    Before GREENE, Chief Judge, and KASOLD and MOORMAN, Judges.
    ORDER
    In the May 23, 2002, decision on appeal, the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) determined
    that the notice requirements of 
    38 U.S.C. § 5103
    (a) had been satisfied. On April 14, 2005, this Court
    affirmed the Board's decision, holding, in part, that a predecisional document in the record not
    discussed by the Board satisfied the requirements of section 5103(a). See Mayfield v. Nicholson,
    
    19 Vet.App. 103
     (2005) [hereinafter Mayfield I]. On April 5, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
    the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) reversed Mayfield I and remanded the matter for further
    proceedings consistent with its decision. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 
    444 F.3d 1328
    ,1333-34, 1336
    (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Federal Circuit instructed that, because the determination of whether the
    predecisional document satisfied the Secretary's notice obligation "was a substantially factual
    determination of the type that should have been made by the agency in the first instance," this Court
    "should have remanded the case to the Board." 
    Id. at 1334-35
     (also stating that "VA could have
    substantially complied with the VCAA by issuing a fully compliant section 5103 notification before
    readjudicating Mrs. Mayfield's claim").
    In light of the Federal Circuit's determination that this Court made a factual finding from the
    record that should have been made by the Board in the first instance, the Court will remand to the
    Board the question of whether the appellant was provided preadjudicatory notice that fulfills the
    requirements of section 5103(a) and 
    38 C.F.R. § 3.159
    (b) (2005). See 
    id. at 1336
     ("As we have
    emphasized, whether Mrs. Mayfield received appropriate notice is an issue that should be addressed
    by the agency in the first instance, under the proper legal standard. That has not yet happened in this
    case."). The Court will retain jurisdiction. Compare Zevalkink v. Brown, 
    102 F.3d 1236
    , 1244 (Fed.
    Cir. 1996) (suggesting remand to Board of question whether third party qualifies as an accrued-
    benefits beneficiary), and Erspamer v. Derwinski, 
    1 Vet.App. 3
    , 11-12 (1990) (Court retains
    jurisdiction over petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of a writ of mandamus until it is
    determined whether the Secretary adhered to time lines for claim processing), with Cleary v. Brown,
    
    8 Vet.App. 305
    , 307-08 (1995) ("the Court properly could not have retained jurisdiction over the
    reversed [Board] decision while the matter was being readjudicated" (emphasis added)). Given the
    limited nature of this remand, it is appropriate to set a response time. See GAO v. GAO Pers.
    Appeals Bd., 
    698 F.2d 516
    , 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (remanding for consideration of certain
    questions and setting 90-day response time); Battle v. Anderson, 
    594 F.2d 786
    , 793 (10th Cir. 1979)
    (retaining jurisdiction, remanding for additional factfinding, and directing response by specific date).
    Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is
    ORDERED that the matter is remanded for a limited purpose. On remand, after affording
    the appellant an opportunity to be heard on the question of whether or not the notice under section
    5103(a) and § 3.159(b) was sufficient, the Board shall determine whether or not the Secretary
    provided preadjudicatory notice that complies with the requirements of section 5103(a) and
    § 3.159(b). Thereafter, the Board shall provide a supplemental statement of reasons or bases in
    support of its determination that notice was or was not sufficient. It is further
    ORDERED that the Secretary, not later than 60 days after the date of this order, provide the
    Court such supplemental statement of the Board. Regardless of the outcome of the Board's
    determination on this question, the Board shall not take any further action beyond the response
    required by this order unless and until the Court relinquishes jurisdiction over the matter.
    DATED: June 15, 2006                                   PER CURIAM.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-1077

Citation Numbers: 20 Vet. App. 98

Judges: Greene, Kasold, Moorman, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/15/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023