Washington International Insurance v. United States , 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173 ( 2003 )


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  •                          Slip Op. 03 - 100
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
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    WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE CO.,:
    Plaintiff,   :
    Consolidated
    v.                       :   Court No. 92-04-00252
    :
    UNITED STATES,
    :
    Defendant.
    :
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    Memorandum
    [Upon stipulation of the facts in lieu
    of trial regarding steel imports,
    judgment for the defendant.]
    Decided: August 8, 2003
    Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. (Beth C. Ring) for the
    plaintiff.
    Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; John J. Mahon,
    Acting Attorney in Charge, International Trade Field Office,
    Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of
    Justice (Aimee Lee); and Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, Inter-
    national Trade Litigation, U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
    Protection (Chi S. Choy), of counsel, for the defendant.
    AQUILINO, Judge:    This action consolidates claims by the
    plaintiff for refunds of duties assessed by the U.S. Customs
    Service on the full value of imports of stainless steel, as opposed
    to only on the value of its processing outside the United States
    per item 806.30 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States
    ("TSUS"), which duty exemption applied to
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                                 Page 2
    [a]ny article of metal (except precious metal) manufac-
    tured in the United States or subjected to a process of
    manufacture in the United States, if exported for further
    processing, and if the exported article as processed
    outside the United States, or the article which results
    from processing outside of the United States, is returned
    to the United States for further processing[.]
    I
    To be "manufactured in the United States", there "must be
    transformation; a new and different article must emerge, 'having a
    distinctive name, character, or use.'" Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n
    v. United States, 
    207 U.S. 556
    , 562 (1908).             An article may be
    "subjected to successive processes of manufacture, each one of
    which is complete in itself, but several of which may be required
    to make the final product." Tide Water Oil Co. v. United States,
    
    171 U.S. 210
    , 216 (1898).         A "process of manufacture" advances an
    article in condition or value such that the article is more than it
    was in its original state.          See, e.g., United States v. Oxford
    Int'l Corp., 62 CCPA 102, 106, 
    517 F.2d 1374
    , 1377-78 (1975); Unit-
    ed States v. Flex Track Equip. Ltd., 59 CCPA 97, 101, 
    458 F.2d 148
    ,
    151-52 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 19 CCPA 69, 71,
    T.D. 44897 (1931).      It is well-established, though, that certain
    processes are not manufacturing.           See, e.g., Lackawanna Steel Co.
    v. United States, 10 Ct.Cust.Appls. 93, 94-95, T.D. 38359 (1920)
    (crushing rock such that it was "rendered into the imported sizes
    solely   to    facilitate   and   economize    in   transportation"   not   a
    manufacturing process); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United
    States, 
    71 Cust.Ct. 63
    , 66, C.D. 4474, 
    364 F.Supp. 1394
    , 1397
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                        Page 3
    (1973) ("mere cleansing of an article, or 'getting it by itself',
    [] not a manufacturing process"). Morever, "[e]very application of
    labor is not a manufacturing process[,] and it has long been held
    that an operation which is necessary to get an article of commerce
    by itself is not such a process."     George Beurhaus Co. v. United
    States, 
    32 Cust.Ct. 269
    , 271, C.D. 1612 (1954), citing United
    States v. Sheldon & Co., 2 Ct.Cust.Appls. 485, T.D. 32245 (1912);
    Cone & Co. v. United States, 14 Ct.Cust.Appls. 133, T.D. 41672
    (1926); United States v. U.S. Rubber Co., 31 CCPA 174, C.A.D. 269
    (1944); V.W. Davis v. United States, 
    10 Cust.Ct. 189
    , C.D. 751
    (1943); J.E. Bernard & Co. v. United States, 
    30 Cust.Ct. 122
    , C.D.
    1509 (1953).   In Beurhaus, for example, pumpkin seed kernels were
    held to have been imported unmanufactured where their foreign
    processing consisted of removing the kernels from whole seeds and
    drying them out:
    . . . Defendant claims that the imported merchandise has
    been partially manufactured because shelling or peeling
    the seeds was one of the steps necessary to the develop-
    ment of the finished article.      It might likewise be
    claimed that removing the seeds from the pumpkin and
    taking the pumpkin from the vine were such steps. All of
    those operations were, of course, necessary to the pro-
    duction of the finished article, but they were primarily
    required for the purpose of obtaining the seed kernels
    free from the pods.
    32 Cust.Ct. at 271.     Similarly,   in United States v. Salomon, 1
    Ct.Cust.Appls. 246, 249, T.D. 31277 (1911), the court held that
    cotton waste, which had been treated and bleached, was not "advanc-
    ed in value by a[] . . . manufacturing process".
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                        Page 4
    II
    In the light of this law long settled, come the parties
    to this action with a Stipulation of Material Facts in Lieu of
    Trial, which the court has reviewed and approved as having "be[en]
    submitted for decision in lieu of trial on" its contents.1   They
    include the following:
    4. Plaintiff . . . is the surety on the customs
    bonds for the entries subject to this action.
    5. The importer of record on the subject entries
    during the relevant time period[] was either Newmet
    Corporation or Newmet Steel Corporation (collectively
    referred to as "Newmet"). . . .
    6. Newmet was engaged in the business of selling in
    the United States[] finished or semi-finished stainless
    and electrical steel products which were purchased from
    foreign steel mills on a scrap conversion basis, meaning
    that Newmet supplied scrap to the foreign steel mills and
    paid them for converting the scrap into the imported
    stainless steel sheets, plates and strips.
    7. Newmet obtained orders for the imported semi-
    finished or finished stainless steel sheets, plates or
    strips from steel fabricators in the United States, which
    such fabricators would further process by straightening,
    slitting and cutting to size for further sale to manufac-
    turers of a variety of stainless steel products.
    *   *    *
    9. The imported merchandise consists of stainless
    steel sheets, plates and strips and are articles of metal
    other than precious metal.
    1
    The court's jurisdiction over this consolidated action is
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1581
    (a), 2631(a).
    In addition to their stipulation, the plaintiff has filed a
    motion for summary judgment, and the defendant has countered with
    a motion for judgment upon the stipulation.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                      Page 5
    10. The merchandise covered by the subject entries
    . . . [was] processed abroad by foreign steel mills from
    stainless steel scrap that had been exported from the
    United States.
    11. The exported scrap (hereinafter also referred
    to, for purposes of this stipulation, as "prepared
    scrap")[] was the raw material from which the imported
    products were manufactured . . . by the foreign steel
    mills.
    12. The subject imported stainless steel sheets,
    plates and strips were imported into the United States
    for further processing into various stainless steel
    products.
    13. The subject entries were liquidated with duty
    assessed on the full value of the imported merchandise.
    *   *   *
    15. The "scrap" as it enters the . . . yard (here-
    inafter also referred to as "incoming scrap") was not
    solely of U.S. origin but consisted of scrap of U.S. and
    foreign origin that were commingled.
    *   *   *
    17. The Customs Service issued 2 rulings in connec-
    tion with this matter: HQ 555096, July 7, 1989 and HQ
    555557, April 15, 1991, which are attached to this
    stipulation.
    *   *   *
    19. The scrap yards dealt with two types of scrap:
    "obsolete" and "industrial" . . ..
    20. "Obsolete" scrap, also known as "old solids,"
    consist of metal machinery that is no longer usable.
    21. "Industrial" scrap is comprised of two types:
    (i) "turnings," and (ii) "new solids". "Turnings" are
    small pieces of metal, approximately 1 inch in size or
    smaller and less than 1/8 inch thick, that result from
    milling bars of stainless steel into the correct size,
    such as in the manufacture of screwdrivers or screws.
    About 10 percent of the incoming scrap consisted of
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                       Page 6
    turnings.   "New solids" are the discarded trimmings
    resulting from the process of manufacturing articles and
    components from stainless steel sheets and bars.
    *   *   *
    23. The scrap yards generally perform three
    categories of operations on the incoming scrap: (i)
    testing and segregating; (ii) sizing; and (iii) packag-
    ing.
    24. Testing and segregating consisted of identify-
    ing the alloy metal content of the incoming scrap and
    segregating it into containers based on its chemical
    composition. All incoming scrap was tested with a magnet
    after being unloaded from rail cars onto a conveyer belt
    with hydraulic or rail cranes. . . . The incoming scrap
    was then spark tested by placing the scrap against a
    grinding wheel to produce a spark.     The color of the
    spark identified the metal. Where those tests did not
    definitively identify the chemical composition, further
    testing was performed by placing acid on the scrap or on
    grindings resulting from drilling a hole in the metal.
    . . .
    These tests would be sufficient to identify about 90
    percent of the incoming scrap. For the remaining 10 per-
    cent . . ., the scrap yards had laboratories equipped
    with x-ray spectrometers and atomic absorption analyzers
    to test tiny pieces of scrap called grindings obtained
    from drilling a hole in the scrap. . . .
    Large and irregularly-shaped incoming scrap was
    compacted or crushed before being tested, which allowed
    for a composite piece . . . for testing. Incoming scrap
    was sometimes decontaminated or upgraded.      Decontam-
    ination was the process of cleaning and cutting out sec-
    tions of non-alloy material from the scrap metal and was
    performed by cutting with an automatic torch or an
    abrasive saw. Upgrading was the separating out of non-
    stainless steel material from mixed shipments of stain-
    less and non-stainless steel scrap received by the . . .
    yards. . . .
    After the . . . alloy content was identified the
    scrap was sorted into containers corresponding to its
    grade. There were hundreds of grades . . ..
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                       Page 7
    25. Sizing was the operation of cutting scrap to a
    size that would fit in the steel mill's furnaces and
    depended upon the shape and size of each individual piece
    of scrap. Sizing includes cutting, crushing, ripping,
    shearing or shredding. . .. Cutting refers to the cutting
    of scrap into smaller pieces using an automatic torch.
    Ripping, which was rarely needed, is the term used to
    separate stainless steel from non-stainless material.
    Shearing is the cutting of long strips of scrap into
    smaller pieces using alligator or heavy shears. Shred-
    ding is the cutting of scrap in a shredder into small
    thin pieces and was occasionally performed on special
    kinds of incoming scrap. Larger pieces of scrap were put
    through a crusher to break up big pieces of castings
    which could not be cut by other methods and could also be
    subject to another method of cutting, such as shearing
    and/or cutting, depending upon . . . size.     . . .
    26. Packaging was the weighing and accumulating of
    truck loads or railcar loads of a specific grade of
    solids or a sufficient amount of briquettes or bales of
    turnings to comprise a railcar load or truck load, to
    fill a customer order. Briquetting is the forcing, by
    using a briquetting machine, of turnings and small solids
    into blocks no larger than 3 ft. by 5 ft. by 2 ft. for
    ease of transport and utilization in the customer's fur-
    nace. Baling is performed by compressing very thin scrap
    into small square sized packs for the convenience of
    handling, transporting and furnace size.
    *   *   *
    29. The truck loads and railcar loads of prepared
    scrap were then exported to foreign steel mills in order
    to be processed into stainless steel sheets, plates, and
    strips.
    The parties further agree in paragraph 14 of this stipulation that
    the crux of their controversy is whether or not the merchandise was
    "manufactured in the United States or subjected to a process of
    manufacture in the United States" within the meaning of TSUS item
    806.30, supra, and that "[a]ll other conditions of [that] item
    . . . are met."
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                         Page 8
    A
    The imports underlying this action, as described in their
    entry papers and also in the foregoing stipulation, were stainless
    steel sheets, plates, and strips produced overseas. And those pro-
    ducts were "manufactured" there within any definition of that term.
    That is, plaintiff's exported pieces of metal underwent transforma-
    tion, resulting in new and different articles, having distinctive
    names, characters or uses of the kind contemplated by Anheuser-
    Busch, 
    supra,
     and other cases.        Nothing which occurred in the
    United States prior thereto, as stipulated above by the parties,
    amounted to such manufacture.
    The plaintiff does not argue otherwise, but it does
    contend that the afore-described preparation of the scrap for
    shipment for that foreign transformation was itself manufacture --
    in this country.     Its briefs characterize the incoming metal as
    "junk"2, perhaps in the hope that this court could and therefore
    would divine transformation into scrap.    The court cannot do so on
    the evidence adduced, although at least some sources of that metal
    surely could satisfy someone's definition of junk3.    But that def-
    inition would not necessarily differ materially from that for
    scrap4.   Whichever definition, the substance of interest which en-
    2
    Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
    Judgment [hereinafter "Plaintiff's Memorandum"], pp. 1, 2, 7, 12,
    15; Plaintiff's Memorandum in Reply, pp. 2, 7, 15, 19.
    3
    See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
    the English Language Unabridged, pp. 1226-27 (1981).
    4
    Compare, e.g., 
    id.
     with id. at 2039.
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                         Page 9
    tered the Newmet yard(s) remained that substance upon exit for
    export, including some originally from other lands.    In short, the
    court is unable to conclude that Newmet's preparation of the
    articles of metal for export was "manufacture[] in the United
    States" in satisfaction of the statutory standard to support, if
    not save, dissipating U.S. industry.
    This action thus comes down to consideration of whether
    that preparation subjected those articles to a "process of manu-
    facture in the United States". On this issue, the plaintiff argues
    that,
    in enacting item 806.30, TSUS, Congress did not intend
    the phrases "manufactured in the United States" and
    "subject to a process of manufacture in the United
    States" to mean the same. A contrary conclusion would
    render the words of the statute superfluous, a result the
    courts seek to avoid.5
    This court concurs.   And the plaintiff also points out
    that
    "Congress used the expression 'subjected to a process of
    manufacture' as synonymous with processing." . . .
    "Processing generally connotes an advancement of the
    material or article, as distinguished from manufacturing
    which is broader in scope," said the Customs Service in
    Headquarters Ruling 055038 dated June 16, 1978. Thus,
    less has to be done to "process" an article than to
    "manufacture" one.6
    5
    Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 11, citing Carey & Skinner,
    Inc. v. United States, 42 CCPA 86, C.A.D. 576 (1954).
    6
    Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 11-12, erroneously attribut-
    ing in toto the first quoted sentence to A.F. Burstrom v. United
    States, 44 CCPA 27, [31,] C.A.D. 631 (1956).
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                                  Page 10
    Cited by counsel for the last proposition is Firestone Tire &
    Rubber Co. v. United States, supra, which does indeed support it.
    In that case, metal top and bottom domes for liquid containers were
    manufactured in the United States and then sent to Canada for
    coating with rubber before return to this country.             The court held
    that application to be "further processing" under TSUS item 806.30,
    overruling the contrary view of Customs, which had resulted in
    imposition of duties on the full appraised value of the returned,
    rubberized, metal domes.      That view of the government was that,
    to come within the purview of item 806.30, TSUS, some
    process of manufacture comparable to machining, grinding,
    drilling, tapping, threading, punching, or forming must
    be performed on the metal itself. Defendant urges that
    these enumerated operations were the types of "further
    processing" contemplated by Congress in item 806.30, and
    that the rubber coating operation performed by Uniroyal
    in Canada was not comparable to any of the above enumer-
    ated operations.
    71 Cust.Ct. at 66, 
    364 F.Supp. at 1397
    .             The court concluded that
    Congress had not intended this "highly restrictive interpretation"
    and   that   the   process   at   bar   was   a     "manufacturing   operation
    performed by Uniroyal in [Canada]".           
    Id.
    The result of that operation in that case, however, was
    a genuine change or advancement in the character of the merchan-
    dise.   This the plaintiff does not show herein.            Whatever the pro-
    cessing of its goods, as stipulated above, the unaltered facts are
    that scraps of stainless steel entered the Newmet yard(s) and that
    Consolidated
    Court No. 92-04-00252                                      Page 11
    scraps of stainless steel exited those premises.   Ergo, the plain-
    tiff is not entitled to the benefit of item 806.30, TSUS, supra.
    III
    In view of the foregoing, plaintiff's motion for summary
    judgment must be denied; judgment for the defendant, dismissing
    this action, will enter accordingly.
    Decided:   New York, New York
    August 8, 2003
    Judge
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Consol. 92-04-00252

Citation Numbers: 2003 CIT 100, 27 Ct. Int'l Trade 1173

Judges: Aquilino

Filed Date: 8/8/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023