Former Employees of Benee's, Inc. v. United States Secretary of Labor , 29 Ct. Int'l Trade 1256 ( 2005 )


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  •                            SLIP OP. 05-135
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    ___________________________________
    :
    FORMER EMPLOYEES OF BENEE’S, INC.  :
    :
    Plaintiffs,         :
    : Before: Richard K. Eaton,
    : Judge
    :
    : Court No. 05-00378
    v.                       :
    :
    :
    UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF LABOR, :
    :
    Defendant.          :
    ___________________________________:
    [Defendant’s motion to dismiss denied]
    Dated: October 14, 2005
    Dennis Parent, pro se, for plaintiffs.
    Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice; David M. Cohen,
    Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice (Jefferson Hughes) for defendant.
    MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    Eaton, Judge:   This Trade Adjustment Assistance (“TAA”) case
    is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss of defendant United
    States Secretary of Labor.    The basis for defendant’s motion is
    its contention that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
    because plaintiffs failed to seek judicial review of the negative
    determination regarding TAA benefits within the sixty-day period
    prescribed by statute.    See Notice of Determination Regarding
    Court No. 05-00378                                            Page 2
    Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and NAFTA
    Transitional Adjustment Assistance, 
    69 Fed. Reg. 57092
     (Sept. 23,
    2004), Admin. R. Doc. 24.   The court has jurisdiction pursuant to
    
    19 U.S.C. § 2395
    (c).   For the reasons set forth below,
    defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Where the court’s jurisdiction is challenged, “[t]he party
    seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of
    proving the requisite jurisdictional facts.”   Former Employees of
    Sonoco Prods. Co. v. United States Sec’y of Labor, 27 CIT ___,
    ___, 
    273 F. Supp. 2d 1336
    , 1338 (2003) (citing McNutt v. Gen.
    Motors Acceptance Corp., 
    298 U.S. 178
    , 179 (1936)).   At the same
    time, in the context of a motion to dismiss, “the Court assumes
    ‘all well-pled factual allegations are true,’ construing ‘all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.’” United States
    v. Islip, 
    22 CIT 852
    , 854, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d 1047
    , 1051 (1998)
    (quoting Gould, Inc. v. United States, 
    935 F.2d 1271
    , 1274 (Fed.
    Cir. 1991)).
    DISCUSSION
    The facts, as set out in defendant’s papers, are as follows:
    On September 13, 2004, the Department of Labor
    (“Labor”) issued a negative determination for former
    employees of Benee’s Inc. regarding eligibility to
    apply for Trade Adjustment Assistant (“TAA”). This
    Court No. 05-00378                                            Page 3
    denial was published in the Federal Register on
    September 23, 2004.
    On March 24, 2005, Labor received from Mr. Dennis
    Parent, a former employee of Benee’s, a facsimile copy
    of a letter signed by Mr. Parent dated October 13,
    2004. The letter requested that Labor reconsider its
    negative determination as to the petition on behalf of
    former Benee’s employees.
    In a letter dated April 1, 2005, Labor declined Mr.
    Parent’s request because it had “not receive[d] any
    correspondence from [Mr. Parent] previously and there
    [was] no evidence of [his] filing the request for
    reconsideration prior to March 24, 2005,” and stated
    that its previous denial notice was now final because
    the filing period for administrative reconsideration
    had expired.
    Def.’s Mem. in Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 1–2
    (internal citations omitted).
    Mr. Parent then appealed to this Court.   See Letter from
    Dennis Parent to U.S. Court of International Trade of 5/19/05.
    In that letter, deemed a complaint by the Court Clerk,1 Mr.
    Parent asserts that, in fact, he had requested reconsideration of
    Labor’s negative determination within 30 days of the notice of
    denial’s publication in the Federal Register: “I wish to appeal
    the decision of the Department of Labor that I did not meet the
    date deadline of 30 days after posting with [the] Federal
    Register.” 
    Id.
       Mr. Parent asserts that he emailed his request
    for reconsideration on October 6, 2004.   In addition, the record
    1
    See Letter from U.S. Court of International Trade to
    Dennis Parent of 6/10/05.
    Court No. 05-00378                                            Page 4
    contains a copy of a letter dated October 13, 2004, in which Mr.
    Parent requests reconsideration.   See Letter from Dennis Parent
    to U.S. Department of Labor of 10/13/04, Admin. R. Doc. 27.    As
    explained in defendant’s papers,
    Mr. Parent stated that he had attached a copy of all
    his correspondence, which included (1) a facsimile
    cover page from his March 24, 2005, transmission; (2)
    an unsigned letter dated October 6, 2004; and (3) an
    unsigned letter dated November 17, 2004. 
    Id.
     The
    unsigned letter dated November 17, 2004, with the
    exception of two minor changes in paragraph 7, is
    identical to the signed letter dated October 13, 2004,
    previously submitted by Mr. Parent to Labor on March
    24, 2005, as evidence of an attempt to communicate with
    Labor after publication of Labor’s adverse
    determination.
    Def.’s Mem. at 2–3.
    The basis for defendant’s motion to dismiss is that the
    court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Parent failed
    to appeal to this court within the sixty days prescribed by
    statute2 following Labor’s final determination, which was
    published on September 23, 2004, and failed to extend “the date
    2
    Title 
    19 U.S.C. § 2395
    (a) states in relevant part:
    Any worker . . . aggrieved by a final
    determination of the Secretary of Labor under
    section 2273 of this title . . . may, within
    sixty days after notice of such
    determination, commence a civil action in the
    United States Court of International Trade
    for review of such determination.
    Court No. 05-00378                                           Page 5
    for appeal by timely3 requesting administrative reconsideration.”
    Id. at 7.    Defendant’s motion is therefore based on a question of
    fact, i.e., whether plaintiff timely sought administrative
    review.   Although Mr. Parent, proceeding pro se, did not reply to
    defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court must nonetheless make
    its decision based on the complaint.
    In the context of a motion to dismiss, “the Court assumes
    ‘all well-pled factual allegations to be true,’ construing ‘all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.’”    Islip, 22 CIT
    at 854, 
    18 F. Supp. 2d at 1051
     (quoting Gould, 
    935 F.2d at 1274
    );
    Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 
    234 F.3d 1374
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir.
    2000).    Thus, the court must assume that Mr. Parent’s assertions,
    in his complaint, with respect to timely filing of his
    application for reconsideration are true.    Defendant’s
    contentions to the contrary do not overcome this assumption.   If
    an examination of the facts should reveal that no timely request
    was made, then Labor may make a new motion.    In the context of a
    3
    Requests for administrative reconsideration of Labor
    determinations are governed by 
    29 C.F.R. § 90.18
    , which states in
    relevant part:
    Any worker . . . aggrieved by a determination
    . . . may file an application for
    reconsideration of the determination . . . .
    All applications must be in writing and must
    be filed no later than thirty (30) days after
    the notice of the determination has been
    published in the Federal Register.
    Court No. 05-00378                                               Page 6
    motion to dismiss, however, establishment of the facts must wait
    for another day.     That being the case, defendant’s motion fails.
    Therefore, it is hereby
    ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied, and it
    is further
    ORDERED that the defendant file an answer to plaintiff’s
    complaint no later than November 21, 2005.
    /s/Richard K. Eaton
    Richard K. Eaton
    Dated:    October 14, 2005
    New York, New York