Conlin v. United States Sec'y of Agric. , 32 Ct. Int'l Trade 467 ( 2008 )

Slip Op. 08-54
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
:
CONLIN GREENHOUSES, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
: Before: Richard K. Eaton, Judge
UNITED STATES :
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, : Court No. 06-00441
:
Defendant. :
:
:
OPINION
[Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record denied,
defendant’s motion to dismiss granted and case dismissed.]
Dated: May 20, 2008
Steven D. Schwinn, for plaintiff.
Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne
E. Davidson, Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director,
Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States
Department of Justice (Marla T. Conneely); Office of the General
Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture (Jeffrey Kahn),
of counsel, for defendant.
Eaton, Judge: Plaintiff1 seeks judicial review of the United
States Department of Agriculture’s (“Agriculture,” or the
“Department”) denial of its application for cash benefits under
the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers (“TAA”) program. 19
1
It does not appear that plaintiff “Conlin Greenhouses”
is incorporated. Thus, for purposes of this opinion, it is
assumed that John and Susan Conlin are the plaintiffs and are
referred to as “the Conlins” or the plaintiff.
Court No. 06-00441 Page 2
U.S.C. § 2401e (2002); Pl.’s R. 56.1 Mot. J. Agency R. (“Pl.’s
Mot.”). Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to
USCIT Rules 12(b)(1) and 56.1, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, for the court to enter
judgment in its favor. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”); see
also Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp.”). For the following
reasons, the court grants the Department’s motion to dismiss and
denies plaintiff’s motion for judgment upon the agency record.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because it seeks to invoke the court’s jurisdiction,
plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. Former Employees of Siemens Info.
Commc’n Networks, Inc. v. Herman, 24 CIT 1201, 1202, 120 F. Supp.
2d 1107, 1108 (2000) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Reynolds v. Army and Air Force
Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
DISCUSSION
According to the record, John and Susan Conlin grew
snapdragons at the Conlin Greenhouses in Indianapolis, Indiana,
until the business ceased operations in December of 2003. See
Application for TAA, Conlin Greenhouses, Johnnie, Susan Conlin,
dated April 26, 2006, Admin. R. (“AR”) 3; Pl.’s Mot. 13; Letter
Court No. 06-00441 Page 3
dated December 8, 2006 from James E. Barbour to Susan Conlin,
Compl. Att. 2 at 1. Thereafter, they sought to receive benefits
under the TAA program, as compensation for their losses.
Petitioning for TAA benefits is a two-step process. In the first
step, a group of producers, or their authorized representative,
files with the United States Secretary of Agriculture (the
“Secretary”) a “petition for a certification of eligibility to
apply for adjustment assistance.” 19 U.S.C. § 2401a(a). If the
Secretary certifies the group petition, individual producers
covered by the group certification may then apply for TAA
benefits. 19 U.S.C. § 2401e(a)(1); 7 C.F.R. § 1580.301 (2003).
In this case, in November 2005, a petition for certification
was filed on behalf of the Indiana Flower Growers Association.
Pl.’s Mot. 5. In February 2006, the group certification was
approved. Pl.’s Mot. 5. Thereafter, the Conlins applied for TAA
benefits. Pl.’s Mot. 5. On October 3, 2006, the Conlins learned
that they had been denied TAA benefits when they received a
letter, dated September 7, 2006, from the Department. Pl.’s Mot.
6; Letter dated Sept. 7, 2006, from Robert H. Curtis, Dir.,
Import Policies and Program Div., Int’l Trade Policy, Foreign
Agric. Serv., United States Dep’t of Agric. to Conlin
Greenhouses, AR 14 at 1 (the “Denial Letter”). The letter stated
“the Foreign Agriculture Service has disapproved your 2006
Indiana Fresh Cut Snapdragons marketing year application for a
Court No. 06-00441 Page 4
cash benefit under the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Farmers
program (TAA).” Denial Letter, AR 14 at 1. In addition, the
letter advised the Conlins of their right to judicial review of
the determination in this Court, noting that “[a]ppeals to the
Court must be filed within 60 days from the date of this letter.”
Denial Letter, AR 14 at 2.2 Thus, on October 3, 2006, the
Conlins had both notice of the Department’s final determination
and the sixty-day time limit for filing suit.
On December 10, 2006, Susan Conlin initiated this suit by
sending a letter addressed to the Clerk of the Court, via
certified mail. Letter dated December 8, 2006 from Susan Conlin
to Office of the Clerk, USCIT (“Compl.”). The Clerk of the Court
deemed the letter to be a summons and complaint, filed on the
postmarked date. See USCIT Rule 5(e); Letter dated December 18,
2006 from Office of the Clerk, USCIT, Donald C. Kaliebe, Case
Management Supervisor, to Susan Conlin, at 1. Thus, suit was
commenced sixty-eight days after receiving notice of the
Department’s final determination. Plaintiff does not dispute
that it brought its suit more than sixty days after receiving
notice. See generally Pl.’s Resp. Plaintiff does argue,
however, that because the defendant failed to raise the
2
Although the letter indicates that the sixty-day
statute of limitations begins to run “from the date of this
letter,” the statute only states that suit must be brought
“within sixty days after notice of” a final determination. 19
U.S.C. § 2395(a).
Court No. 06-00441 Page 5
limitations period in its answer, it has waived any affirmative
defense predicated upon the statute of limitations. Pl.’s Resp.
1.
Under well-established law, a statute of limitations defense
is an affirmative defense, and is waived if it is not pleaded in
the answer. USCIT R. 8(d); Parkdale Int’l Ltd. v. United States,
31 CIT __, __, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1348-1349 n. 6 (2007). It
is equally well-settled, however, that a time limitation that is
a condition of the court’s jurisdiction cannot be waived and thus
can be raised at any time. United States v. Hitachi America
Ltd., 172 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“if [a statute of
limitations] is ‘jurisdictional’ in nature, it cannot be waived
by the parties under any circumstances. . . .”); USCIT Rule
12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). Accordingly, the
question of the court’s jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s
claim turns on whether the sixty-day limitations period imposed
by 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) is jurisdictional in nature.
This question must be answered in the affirmative, and
requires plaintiff’s claim to be dismissed. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has held that the sixty-day filing
Court No. 06-00441 Page 6
deadline contained in 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a)3 is a “jurisdictional
requirement.” Kelley v. Secretary, United States Dep’t of Labor,
812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Kelley”).4 Kelley further
characterized the conditions imposed by 19 U.S.C. § 2395(a) as
“the terms upon which the United States has consented to be
sued,” and stated that a petitioner’s failure to observe the
sixty-day filing deadline would leave “the court [without]
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. (citation and
quotations omitted).
It is noteworthy that the plaintiff in Kelley was held to
have received constructive notice pursuant to the regulations
governing workers seeking trade adjustment assistance from the
Department of Labor, i.e., notice by publication in the Federal
Register. By way of contrast, the Conlins had actual notice of
3
“[A]n agricultural commodity producer (as defined in
[19 U.S.C.] § 2401(2) of this title) aggrieved by a determination
of the Secretary of Agriculture under [19 U.S.C.] § 2401b of this
title. . . may within sixty days after notice of such
determination, commence a civil action in the United States Court
of International Trade for review of such determination.” 19
U.S.C. § 2395(a).
4
Agricultural commodity producers became entitled to
receive trade adjustment assistance and to seek judicial review
of any final determination in this Court effective August 6,
2002, subsequent to the Kelley decision. See Trade Act of 2002,
§ 141, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933, 953 (2002). There is
no indication that the addition of “agricultural commodity
producer[s]” to those who may seek review under 19 U.S.C.
§ 2395(a) changes the basic holding in Kelley.
Court No. 06-00441 Page 7
denial of benefits when they received the Denial Letter on
October 3, 2006. See Denial Letter. In other words, in this
case there is no question, as there was in Kelley, regarding the
notice necessary to start the running of the sixty-day
limitations period.
Consequently, the court finds that the sixty-day statutory
period for challenging Agriculture’s final determination cannot
be waived, and the Department may properly assert the statute of
limitations by way of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Former
Employees of Rocky Mountain Region Office of Terra Res., Inc. v.
United States, 13 CIT 427, 713 F. Supp. 1433 (1989) (no
jurisdiction over suit brought by pro se petitioners sixty-one
days after receiving notice); see also Washko v. Donovan, 4 CIT
271, No. 82-9-01333 (December 28, 1982) (not reported in the
Federal Supplement); Brunelle v. Donovan, 3 CIT 76, No. 81-10-
01453 (March 23, 1982) (not reported in the Federal Supplement).
Because plaintiff failed to begin its case in the time required
by statute, the court has no jurisdiction to hear its claims.
Court No. 06-00441 Page 8
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court grants defendant’s motion
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denies
plaintiff’s motion for judgment upon the agency record. Judgment
shall be entered accordingly.
/s/ Richard K. Eaton
Richard K. Eaton
Dated: May 20, 2008
New York, New York