Furniture Brands Int'l, Inc. v. United States , 2012 CIT 20 ( 2012 )

Slip Op. 12- 20
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
FURNITURE BRANDS INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES and UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, Before: Gregory W. Carman, Judge
Timothy C. Stanceu, Judge
Defendants, Leo M. Gordon, Judge
and Court No. 07-00026
AMERICAN FURNITURE
MANUFACTURERS COMMITTEE FOR
LEGAL TRADE and VAUGHAN-BASSETT
FURNITURE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
OPINION AND ORDER
[Denying plaintiff’s motion for an injunction pending appeal to prevent distribution of withheld
funds]
Dated: February 17, 2012
David W. DeBruin and Matthew E. Price, Jenner & Block LLP, of Washington, DC, for
plaintiff.
Jessica R. Toplin, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for defendant United States. With her on the brief
were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, Franklin E. White,
Jr., Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was Andrew G. Jones, Office of Assistant Chief
Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of New York, NY.
Court No. 07-00026 Page 2
Patrick V. Gallagher, Jr., Attorney Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
International Trade Commission, of Washington, DC, for defendant U.S. International Trade
Commission. With him were James M. Lyons, General Counsel, and Neal J. Reynolds, Assistant
General Counsel.
Joseph W. Dorn, Jeffrey M. Telep, and Taryn K. Williams, King & Spalding LLP, of
Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenors.
Stanceu, Judge: This litigation concerns administrative decisions by two agencies, the
U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC” or the “Commission”) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (“Customs”), that denied plaintiff Furniture Brands International, Inc.
(“Furniture Brands”) distributions of funds available under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000 (“CDSOA”), Pub. L. No. 106-387, §§ 1001-03, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72-75,
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000),1 repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-171,
§ 7601(a), 120 Stat. 4, 154 (Feb. 8, 2006; effective Oct. 1, 2007). The ITC did not include
Furniture Brands on a list of parties potentially eligible for “affected domestic producer”
(“ADP”) status under the CDSOA, which status could have qualified Furniture Brands for
distributions of antidumping duties collected under an antidumping duty order on imports of
wooden bedroom furniture from the People’s Republic of China (“China”). Second
Supplemental Compl. ¶ 31 (deemed filed Oct. 8, 2008), ECF No. 46; Notice of Amended Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value & Antidumping Duty Order: Wooden Bedroom
Furniture From the People’s Republic of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 329 (Jan. 4, 2005) (“Antidumping
Duty Order”). Based on the ITC’s decision, Customs declined to provide Furniture Brands
annual CDSOA distributions for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008.
1
Citations are to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (“CDSOA”), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675c (2000). All other citations to the United States Code are to the 2006 edition.
Court No. 07-00026 Page 3
Plaintiff brought this action in 2007, raising constitutional (First Amendment and Fifth
Amendment equal protection) challenges to the agency actions and the CDSOA. Compl.
(Jan. 23, 2007), ECF No. 4. Plaintiff was opposed in this action by defendant-intervenors
American Furniture Manufacturers Committee for Legal Trade, a coalition of domestic wooden
bedroom furniture producers that were eligible to receive CDSOA distributions, and Vaughan-
Bassett Furniture Company, Inc., a domestic wooden bedroom furniture producer eligible to
receive CDSOA distributions. Mot. for Joinder & Intervention 2-3 (Mar. 16, 2006), ECF No. 11.
In Furniture Brands International, Inc. v. United States, 35 CIT __, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1301(2011), the court entered judgment dismissing plaintiff’s action, concluding, first, that plaintiff’s
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, second, that plaintiff’s
attempt to amend the complaint to add additional claims would be futile.
Plaintiff now moves for an injunction pending appeal under USCIT Rule 62(c),
attempting to prevent distribution of “any funds pursuant to the [CDSOA] that are currently
being withheld by Customs for Furniture Brands” until the conclusion of “all appeals, petitions
for certiorari, and remands.” Pl.’s Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal 1-2 (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF
No. 117 (“Pl.’s Mot.”); Pl.’s Mem. of Points & Authorities in Supp. of its Mot. for Inj. Pending
Appeal (Jan. 18, 2012), ECF No. 117 (“Pl.’s Mem.”). The court denies plaintiff’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on imports of wooden bedroom
furniture from China. Antidumping Duty Order. During proceedings before the ITC to
determine whether such imports were causing or threatening to cause material injury to the
domestic industry, Furniture Brands responded to the ITC’s questionnaires, opposing the
Court No. 07-00026 Page 4
issuance of an antidumping duty order. Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d
at 1304. Furniture Brands did not appear as a potential ADP with respect to the antidumping
duty order on the list published by Customs for fiscal years 2006, 2007, or 2008. Distribution of
Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset to Affected Domestic Producers, 71 Fed. Reg. 31,336,
31,375-76 (June 1, 2006); Distribution of Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset to Affected
Domestic Producers, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,622-23 (May 29, 2007); Distribution of Continued
Dumping & Subsidy Offset to Affected Domestic Producers, 73 Fed. Reg. 31,196, 31,236-37
(May 30, 2008).
In this litigation, plaintiff challenged the ITC’s decision not to include Furniture Brands
on the list of parties potentially eligible for ADP status and the failure by Customs to distribute
CDSOA funds to Furniture Brands, arguing that these actions violated freedom of expression
guarantees of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the equal protection guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment, and the CDSOA. Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d
at 1306-07. Plaintiff also requested an order dismissing its own action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and moved for leave to amend the complaint to add claims that the ITC and Customs
had violated the Administrative Procedure Act in denying Furniture Brands CDSOA
distributions. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-04. As relief, plaintiff sought an order that the
ITC include Furniture Brands on the list of potential ADPs and that Customs distribute to
Furniture Brands the withheld funds. Second Supplemental Compl. Prayer for Relief.
On October 20, 2011, the court dismissed plaintiff’s action upon motions to dismiss filed
by defendant and defendant-intervenors. Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d
at 1316. The court concluded, first, that this action was within its subject matter jurisdiction
Court No. 07-00026 Page 5
under section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (“Customs Courts Act”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1581(i)(4), as a “civil action commenced against the United States that arises out of a law of
the United States . . . ‘providing for . . . administration . . . with respect to’ antidumping and
countervailing duties.” Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. The court
then concluded that plaintiff’s constitutional claims were foreclosed by precedent of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Court of Appeals”), which, in rejecting analogous
First and Fifth Amendment claims, held that “the CDSOA is valid under the First and Fifth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 (citing SKF USA, Inc.
v. United States, 556 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“SKF”)). Finally, the court denied plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend the complaint because the two claims Furniture Brands sought to add
would have been futile, as neither claim “makes out a plausible claim for relief under the set of
facts alleged in the proposed Third Amended Complaint . . . .” Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d
at 1316.
On November 4, 2011, Furniture Brands appealed the court’s judgment dismissing this
action. Notice of Appeal (Nov. 4, 2011), ECF No. 114. On January 5, 2012, the court conferred
with the parties to this case, as well as other parties to other cases involving the CDSOA, during
which conference Customs informed the court that it did not intend to delay processing of
CDSOA distributions past a date to which it had agreed previously, January 31, 2012. Pl.’s
Mem. 5; Def. U.S. Customs & Border Protection’s Resp. to the Ct.’s Feb. 14, 2011 Request
(Feb. 28, 2011), ECF No. 75. According to subsequent e-mail communications between counsel
for plaintiff and Customs, no distributions will be made until March 9, 2012. Pl.’s Mem.
attachment B. Plaintiff filed the instant motion on January 18, 2012. Pl.’s Mot. On
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February 10, 2012, defendant Customs and defendant-intervenors filed their responses in
opposition. Defs. United States’ & U.S. Customs & Border Protection’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for
an Inj. Pending Appeal (Feb. 10, 2012), ECF No. 122; Def.-Intervenors’ Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for
an Inj. Pending Appeal (Feb. 10, 2012), ECF No. 123. Defendant ITC did not respond.
II. DISCUSSION
Furniture Brands seeks to enjoin Customs and the ITC from making any CDSOA
distributions “that are currently being withheld by Customs for Furniture Brands” and that would
“remain in place for the pendency of this litigation, including all appeals, petitions for certiorari,
and remands.” Pl.’s Mem. 2.2 The court concludes that USCIT Rule 62(c) governs the issue
presented by plaintiff’s motion, in providing that “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an
interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court
may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction . . . .” USCIT R. 62(c). Although the
court’s judgment in Furniture Brands International did not grant, dissolve, or deny an injunction
expressly, the judgment implicitly denied plaintiff’s request for affirmative injunctive relief in
the form of an order under which the ITC would add Furniture Brands to the list of potential
2
Furniture Brands International, Inc. seeks
[An] injunction enjoining the Defendants, the United States, United States Customs
and Border Protection (‘Customs’), and United States International Trade
Commission (‘USITC’), together with their agents, officers, delegates, and
employees, from disbursing, ordering the disbursement of, or causing the
disbursement of any funds pursuant to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset
Act of 2000 (‘CDSOA’), that are currently being withheld by Customs for Furniture
Brands. Furniture Brands further requests that such injunction remain in place for
the pendency of this litigation, including all appeals, petitions for certiorari, and
remands.
Pl.’s Mem. of Points & Authorities in Supp. of its Mot. for Inj. Pending Appeal 1-2 (Jan. 18,
2012), ECF No. 117 (internal citation omitted).
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recipients of CDSOA distributions and Customs would distribute to Furniture Brands the
CDSOA funds plaintiff claims it is owed. Second Supplemental Compl. Prayer for Relief.
Our first consideration is the standard to be applied to plaintiff’s motion. With respect to
the standard governing a stay pending appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009 instructed that a
court is to consider:
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed
on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.
Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761 (2009) (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776
(1987)). The Court instructed that “[t]he first two factors of the traditional standard are the most
critical,” id., and that “[it] is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be better than
negligible,” id. (internal quotations omitted).
What plaintiff requests is not a stay, which would merely “operat[e] upon the judicial
proceeding itself,” but instead is an injunction that is “directed at someone, and governs that
party’s conduct.” See Nken, 129 S. Ct. at 1757-58. We conclude that to obtain the injunction it
seeks, plaintiff must satisfy a test at least as stringent as the test prescribed in Nken. We find
instructive as guidance several statements of the Supreme Court, made in the context of the
Supreme Court’s exercise of its powers under the All-Writs Act, that injunctions pending appeal
demand a “significantly higher justification” than do stays, Ohio Citizens For Responsible
Energy, Inc. v. NRC, 479 U.S. 1312, 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers), at least where, as
here, the injunction is “against the enforcement of a presumptively valid Act of Congress,”
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 507 U.S. 1301, 1301 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., in
chambers). See Respect Maine PAC v. McKee, 131 S. Ct. 445 (2010) (Mem.) (noting that the
Court No. 07-00026 Page 8
standard for injunctive relief pending appeal is more demanding than the standard for a stay of a
judgment).
The court determines that plaintiff’s motion does not satisfy even the test stated in Nken.
Although the court presumes the irreparably injury factor to be satisfied, plaintiff has not shown
that it is likely to succeed on appeal. Moreover, plaintiff is unable to show that our granting the
injunction will not prejudice defendant-intervenors, whose receipt of the withheld funds would
be further delayed through the progress of plaintiff’s appeal. And it is not readily apparent that
the public interest, which is served by the orderly and proper administration of the CDSOA,
would be advanced by the injunction being sought.
A. Plaintiff Has Not Shown a Likelihood of Succeeding on the Merits of Its Appeal
For likelihood of success on appeal, plaintiff relies on three arguments that we considered
and rejected in Furniture Brands International. Plaintiff does not cite an intervening change in
the governing law, nor does it present a new argument for why we now should conclude that
Furniture Brands International was incorrectly decided.
Plaintiff’s first argument is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
action. According to plaintiff, an injunction pending appeal is appropriate because there is a
“substantial and novel question concerning whether this Court properly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.” Pl.’s Mem. 12. Section 201 of the Customs Courts Act grants this
Court jurisdiction “of any civil action commenced against the United States . . . that arises out of
any law of the United States providing for . . . administration and enforcement with respect to,”
inter alia, “tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons
other than the raising of revenue . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2), (4). Plaintiff argues that its case
Court No. 07-00026 Page 9
does not arise out of the CDSOA as a whole but rather from particular subsections of the
CDSOA defining the petition support requirement, 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1), (d)(1), & (d)(3).
Pl.’s Mem. 12-15. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites Orleans International, Inc. v.
United States, 334 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which it views as holding that “the relevant ‘law’
out of which a civil action arises, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4), is the particular
subsection giving rise to the civil action.” Pl.’s Mem. 12. Plaintiff maintains that these
subsections “do not involve the administration of duties; they merely establish a scheme to
distribute money to a class of beneficiaries selected by Congress.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff perceives
in the meaning of the word “law,” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), a “substantial question as to
whether this action falls outside this Court’s carefully delimited jurisdiction.” Id. at 14.
In Furniture Brands International, we rejected the argument that plaintiff’s case, for
purposes of subject matter jurisdiction, arises out of the CDSOA subsections defining the
petition support requirement. 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 n.9. We reasoned that the
“petition support requirement provision is integral in structure and purpose with the other
provisions of the CDSOA, the provisions of which collectively constitute a ‘law’ within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).” Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 n.9. Concluding that the
CDSOA is a law providing for administration of antidumping and countervailing duties within
the meaning of § 1581(i)(2) and (4), we held that plaintiff’s claims were within the court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1307-1310.
Plaintiff again relies on Orleans International for its argument that there is a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Pl.’s Mem. 12. In that case, the Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment of this Court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an action that arose
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from import duties assessed pursuant to the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, which
funded a “program of promotion and research” in support of the beef industry through fees
assessed both on domestic purchases and on import transactions of cattle, beef, and beef
products. Orleans Int’l, 334 F.3d at 1377. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because the
Beef Promotion and Research Act imposed a duty on imports for reasons other than the raising
of revenue, an action arising from import duties assessed under the statute “fits squarely within
the language of [28 U.S.C.] § 1581(i)(2),” even though the statute expressly granted to the
district courts jurisdiction over certain types of actions arising thereunder. Id. at 1379. The
Court of Appeals stated that it found “no requirement in the law that a statute (as opposed to a
specific cause of action) must be entirely involved with international trade for the Court of
International Trade to have jurisdiction over any action brought under that statute.” Id. In
crafting its argument on jurisdiction, plaintiff reads too much into this statement. Orleans
International did not hold that the term “law,” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), always must be
construed to refer to an individual provision within a statute. In this case, such a construction is
unsound because the various provisions of the CDSOA operate together to create a program for
“the depositing, maintaining, allocating, and distributing of antidumping and countervailing
duties.” Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. Plaintiff’s claims and
the remedy sought, the distribution to plaintiff of the withheld funds, arise from that program.
Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 & 1308 n.9. As we concluded in Furniture Brands
International, the CDSOA is a statute providing for administration of antidumping duties within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) and (i)(4), and, therefore, jurisdiction was properly
exercised over this case.
Court No. 07-00026 Page 11
Plaintiff argues, second, that “the facts in its case are materially different than the facts in
SKF, requiring a different result.” Pl.’s Mem. 15. Plaintiff asserts as factual differences that,
unlike the plaintiffs in SKF, “Furniture Brands is not foreign owned and does not own any
Chinese exporters of wooden bedroom furniture” and that it “opposed the imposition of duties
because . . . it believed that trade barriers . . . ultimately would do more harm than good to
domestic industry.” Id. at 16-17. Furniture Brands views these facts as material, on the premise
that the Court of Appeals “expressly recognized” the SKF plaintiffs as a “‘domestic industry
participant . . . owned by a foreign company charged with dumping . . . . ’” Id. at 15 (quoting
SKF, 556 F.3d at 1358) (emphasis omitted). According to Furniture Brands, it was only in that
factual context that the Court of Appeals “viewed the indication of opposition in response to the
ITC’s questionnaire as action taken by an ‘opposing party’ rather than as an expression of
viewpoint.” Id. Furniture Brands argues that SKF was thus limited to circumstances in which
the opposition can be construed as action, which it alleges not to be the case here. Id.We rejected plaintiff’s argument in Furniture Brands International, concluding that
“[t]he Court of Appeals considered it permissible under the First Amendment for Congress to
decline to reward domestic parties who did not support a petition” and that “[t]he Court of
Appeals did not condition that conclusion on a circumstance in which the party declining to
support the petition is foreign-owned.” 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1313. As we pointed
out, the language in SKF to which plaintiff directed our attention refers only to the likelihood
that a domestic producer opposing a petition does so because of ownership by a respondent in an
antidumping proceeding. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1313. In reaching its holding in SKF, the
Court No. 07-00026 Page 12
Court of Appeals did not attach controlling significance to the reason why a domestic producer
opposes a petition.
Plaintiff argues, third, that it has met its burden of showing likelihood of success on
appeal because “the intervening Supreme Court decision in Sorrell presents a substantial
question concerning whether SKF must be revisited altogether.” Pl.’s Mem. 15 (citing Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011)). According to Furniture Brands, Sorrell held that a law
imposing a “‘content-based burden on protected expression’” must be subjected to “‘heightened
judicial scrutiny,’” and that “‘[c]ommercial speech is no exception.’” Id. at 19 (quoting Sorrell,
131 S. Ct. at 2664). Furniture Brands argues that the Court of Appeals in SKF incorrectly
“applied intermediate scrutiny because it regarded the CDSOA as akin to a regulation of
commercial speech.” Id. Alternatively, plaintiff construes Sorrell to compel a narrow reading of
SKF under which the court should distinguish between “mere commercial speech and speech on
matters of public concern like Furniture Brands,’ which is entitled to greater protection and
stricter judicial scrutiny.” Id.In Furniture Brands International, we rejected the argument that Sorrell implicitly
overturned SKF. 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1314-15. We also rejected the argument that
Sorrell requires a narrow reading of SKF under which the court may conclude that plaintiff’s
constitutional claims are not foreclosed by the SKF precedent. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d
at 1315. We reject those same arguments again, for the reasons we stated in Furniture Brands
International. In brief summary, the Vermont statute struck down in Sorrell authorized civil
penalties against certain persons selling or using a type of information (“prescriber-identifying
information”) that the statute sought to suppress, while the CDSOA does not have as a stated or
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implied purpose the intentional suppression of expression. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1314-16.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sorrell concluded that the Vermont statute could not survive
First Amendment scrutiny under the same standard that the Court of Appeals applied to the
CDSOA in SKF. Id. at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. Sorrell is not properly construed to reach a
holding requiring us to subject the CDSOA to a different standard than that applied by the Court
of Appeals.
Recognizing that the court already has rejected its arguments grounded in SKF and
Sorrell, plaintiff argues that it need not make a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the
merits and that it “can meet its burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits merely by
raising questions that are ‘serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful.’” Pl.’s Mem. 11 (quoting
SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 28 CIT 170, 176, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 (2004)). Plaintiff
argues that it has met this burden because its arguments “resulted in a 27-page opinion by this
Court addressing several matters of first impression.” Id. at 11; id. at 7 (arguing that plaintiff
had “raised ‘serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful questions, as shown by this Court’s 27-
page opinion . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Pl.’s Mot. 3 (same).
The court rejects the argument plaintiff puts forth as to why it has satisfied the likelihood
of success factor, for two reasons. First, the page length of the opinion from which an appeal is
pending is insufficient to show that the underlying issues were serious, substantial, difficult, or
doubtful. Second, plaintiff’s permissive view of the likelihood of success factor does not square
with the Supreme Court’s statements in Nken that an applicant must have “made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits” and that “[it] is not enough that the chance of
success on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” 129 S. Ct. at 1761. Plaintiff cites various
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judicial decisions in support of its view, but these cases are inapplicable because they refer to the
likelihood of success factor in other contexts, such as applied to preliminary injunctions, rather
than as applied to post-judgment relief pending appeal. See id. (stating in dicta that the test for
granting a preliminary injunction differs from the test for granting post-judgment relief).
According to an appellate court that has considered this question, the burden is greater when a
party seeks post-judgment relief than when a party seeks a preliminary injunction because the
court already has considered the merits. Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users, Inc.
v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[A] movant seeking a stay pending review
on the merits of a district court’s judgment will have greater difficulty in demonstrating a
likelihood of success on the merits. In essence, a party seeking a stay must ordinarily
demonstrate to a reviewing court that there is a likelihood of reversal.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that plaintiff has not shown that upon
appeal it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims.
B. Plaintiff Has Shown a Probability That It Would Be Irreparably Injured Absent an Injunction
Furniture Brands argues that denial of an injunction pending appeal would cause it
irreparable harm in three ways. First, plaintiff states that, because its claims involve First
Amendment rights, any unlawful loss of those rights should be presumed to be irreparable injury.
Pl.’s Mem. 8. Second, plaintiff argues that the court’s denying injunctive relief would lead to
distribution of the CDSOA funds reserved for Furniture Brands, which would leave Furniture
Brands without “an adequate remedy in the event that it prevails on its appeal and on remand.”
Id. at 9. Plaintiff argues that the regulation pertaining to recovery of overpayment of CDSOA
funds, 19 C.F.R. § 159.64(b)(3) (2011), would not allow Customs to recover the entirety of the
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amounts that might be found owing to Furniture Brands, should Furniture Brands succeed on
appeal, because of the “real possibility of bankruptcies among some of the affected domestic
producers . . . .” Pl.’s Mem. 9. Plaintiff also argues that “[e]ven those companies that are not on
the verge of bankruptcy may have difficulty promptly repaying CDSOA funds” because “one
cannot assume that the companies receiving the funds will leave them untouched until Furniture
Brands’ action is resolved.” Id. at 10.
The court is willing to presume, based on the circumstances plaintiff identifies, that a
distribution of CDSOA funds to furniture producers currently designated as ADPs is likely to
prevent Furniture Brands from receiving the funds to which it claims entitlement. The
distribution would render uncertain the prospects of plaintiff’s ever receiving those funds in the
entirety. Even though irreparable harm may not be a certainty, the court presumes, for purposes
of ruling on plaintiff’s motion, the irreparable harm requirement to be satisfied by plaintiff’s
motion for an injunction pending appeal.
C. Plaintiff Has Not Shown that Issuance of an Injunction Would Not Substantially Injure the
Other Parties Interested in the Proceeding
Plaintiff argues that “the balance of hardships also weighs strongly in favor of Furniture
Brands” because Customs’ continued withholding of CDSOA distributions would not injure
Customs and the ITC and that any harm caused to defendant-intervenors by additional delay in
receiving the CDSOA distribution would be insubstantial, as evidenced by the fact that
“[d]efendant-intervenors have never filed any action to compel the distribution of funds . . . .”
Pl.’s Mem. 20. Plaintiff also argues that continued delay would cause defendant-intervenors no
harm if Furniture Brands succeeds on its claims and is ultimately determined to be eligible for
CDSOA distributions. Id.
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The court disagrees that defendant-intervenors would not be substantially injured by the
court’s granting the requested injunction. As plaintiff admits, these funds have been withheld for
more than five years. Id. The court is not in a position to presume that further delay, even if
only during appellate review, would cause nothing more than insubstantial harm to defendant-
intervenors. The court views as unduly speculative plaintiff’s argument that the court should
presume a lack of harm to defendant-intervenors based on the lack of attempts to force
distributions prior to the conclusion of this litigation. Regarding plaintiff’s remaining argument,
that no parties would be injured by our granting the injunction if Furniture Brands were
determined to be eligible for these funds, that outcome is unlikely for the reasons we have
discussed. See Furniture Brands Int’l, 35 CIT at __, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1316.
D. Plaintiff Has Not Shown that the Public Interest Lies in the Court’s Granting an Injunction
Plaintiff argues that enjoining CDSOA distributions pending appeal would serve the
public interest by “avoiding the needless complication and expense that would result from
recouping funds that are prematurely distributed” and by “ensuring that the government comply
with constitutional dictates.” Pl.’s Mem. 21-22. Plaintiff also argues that an injunction would be
consistent with the CDSOA’s purpose, which plaintiff describes as providing “a competitive
remedy to domestic producers adversely affected by dumping.” Id. at 22. According to
Furniture Brands, the injunction would further the purpose of the CDSOA because if funds were
distributed it would place “Furniture Brands at a competitive disadvantage and compound the
conditions of unfair trade that have harmed Furniture Brands as much as any other domestic
producer.” Id.
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We are not persuaded that the injunction plaintiff desires would serve the public interest.
To the contrary, the public at large is best served by a lawful and orderly resolution of the issue
posed by the continuing withholding of the funds. Continued delay in the distribution of the
funds to those who are entitled to them by law is inimical to the public interest.
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For purposes of ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, as filed on
January 18, 2012, ECF No. 117 (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), the court presumes that plaintiff has
satisfied the irreparable harm factor. That factor, standing alone, is insufficient to justify the
injunction plaintiff seeks, particularly where, as here, there has been no showing of likelihood of
success on the merits of plaintiff’s claims during the appellate process. Plaintiff has not satisfied
the remaining two factors relevant to a determination on Plaintiff’s Motion.
Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion, the accompanying memorandum of law, and all
papers and proceedings herein, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion be, and hereby is, DENIED.
Timothy C. Stanceu ______
Timothy C. Stanceu
Judge
Dated: February 17, 2012
New York, New York