Clearon Corp. v. United States ( 2010 )


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  •                            Slip Op. 10-86
    UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
    ________________________________
    :
    CLEARON CORPORATION and         :
    OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL             :
    CORPORATION,                    :
    :
    Plaintiffs,      : Before: Richard K. Eaton, Judge
    v.                    :
    : Court No. 08-00364
    UNITED STATES,                  :
    :
    Defendant,       :
    and                   :
    :
    ARCH CHEMICALS, INC. and HEBEI :
    JIHENG CHEMICAL CO., LTD.,      :
    :
    Defendant–Intervenors.:
    :
    ________________________________:
    OPINION AND ORDER
    [Defendant’s motion to dismiss denied.]
    Dated: August 9, 2010
    Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Daniel J. Plaine, J.
    Christopher Wood, and Andrea F. Farr) for plaintiffs.
    Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Jeanne E. Davidson,
    Director, Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial
    Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of
    Justice (David D’Alessandris); Office of the Chief Counsel for
    Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce
    (Brian Soiset), for defendant.
    Eaton, Judge: This case is before the court on a motion to
    dismiss, pursuant to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1), of defendant the United
    States, acting on behalf of the United States Department of
    Court No. 08-00364                                            Page 2
    Commerce (“Commerce”).   Defendant’s motion seeks the dismissal of
    Count 3 of plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety, and the
    dismissal of Counts 1 and 2 as they pertain to Hebei Jiheng
    Chemical Corporation (“Jiheng”).   Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss in Part
    as Moot (“Def.’s Mot.”) 1.   If Commerce’s motion is granted,
    Jiheng will be dismissed from the case.
    By their complaint, Clearon Corporation and Occidental
    Chemical Corporation (collectively, “plaintiffs” or “Clearon”)
    contest certain aspects of Commerce’s final results in the second
    administrative review of the antidumping duty order on
    chlorinated isocyanurates covering the period June 1, 2006
    through May 31, 2007.    Compl. ¶ 3; see also Chlorinated
    Isocyanurates from the People’s Republic of China, 
    73 Fed. Reg. 62,249
     (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 20, 2008) (amended final results
    of antidumping duty administrative review)(the “Final Results”).
    Plaintiffs are domestic producers of chlorinated isocyanurates
    seeking to increase Jiheng’s dumping margins found in the Final
    Results.   See Compl. ¶ 5.
    The basis for defendant’s motion is that the portions of the
    complaint involving Jiheng’s merchandise have been rendered moot
    because the merchandise was liquidated by operation of law in
    accordance with 
    19 U.S.C. § 1504
    (d) (2006), commonly referred to
    as the deemed liquidation provision.   Def.’s Mot. 1.   According
    to defendant, plaintiffs’ failure to serve their injunction on
    Court No. 08-00364                                            Page 3
    named government officials at Commerce and United States Customs
    and Border Protection (“Customs” or “CBP”) rendered the
    injunction order incapable of preventing a deemed liquidation.
    Def.’s Mot. 3.   For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s
    motion to dismiss is denied.
    BACKGROUND
    On June 24, 2005, following an investigation, Commerce
    published an antidumping duty order on chlorinated isocyanurates.
    Chlorinated Isocyanurates from the People’s Republic of China, 
    70 Fed. Reg. 36,561
     (Dep’t of Commerce June 24, 2005) (notice of
    antidumping duty order)(the “Order”).     On July 26, 2007, at the
    request of certain foreign producers, exporters, and domestic
    producer Clearon, Commerce commenced the second periodic review
    of the Order pursuant to 
    19 U.S.C. § 1675
    (a)(1) and 
    19 CFR § 351.213
    (b).    Initiation of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
    Administrative Reviews and Request for Revocation in Part, 
    72 Fed. Reg. 41,057
     (Dep’t of Commerce July 25, 2007).    On September
    10, 2008, Commerce published the final results of the review,
    later amended on October 20, 2008.   Chlorinated Isocyanurates
    from the People's Republic of China, 
    73 Fed. Reg. 52,645
     (Dep’t
    of Commerce Sept. 10, 2008); Final Results, 73 Fed. Reg. at
    62,249.   Importantly, as a result of this publication, the
    suspension of liquidation that had previously been in effect as a
    Court No. 08-00364                                          Page 4
    result of the review was lifted.   See, e.g., Int’l Trading Co. v.
    United States, 
    281 F.3d 1268
    , 1272 (2002) (“Int’l Trading”)
    (holding that “[t]he statutory scheme governing suspension of
    liquidation supports the . . . conclusion that suspension of
    liquidation [is] removed when the final results of the
    administrative review [are] published in the Federal Register”).
    Following publication of the Final Results, Clearon
    commenced this lawsuit to contest the results of the review.    On
    November 12, 2008, Clearon, with defendant’s consent, sought an
    injunction against liquidation, and on November 13, 2008, the
    court granted the injunction.   Def.’s Mot. 2; Clearon Corp. v.
    United States, Court No. 08-00364, at 1-2 (Nov. 13, 2008)
    (injunction order) (the “Injunction”).   Among other things, the
    Injunction provided that it would enjoin liquidation of
    plaintiffs’ merchandise that remained:
    unliquidated as of 5:00 p.m. on the fifth
    business day after the day on which a copy of
    this preliminary injunction is personally
    served by Plaintiffs’ counsel by hand on the
    following individuals or their delegates:
    Attn: Ann Sebastian, APO Director,
    U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 1870
    International Trade Administration, Import
    Administration,
    14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
    Washington, DC 20230; and
    Hon. W. Ralph Basham, Commissioner of Customs,
    Attn: Alfonso Robles, Esq., Chief Counsel,
    U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection,
    Room 4.4-B,
    1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.,
    Court No. 08-00364                                  Page 5
    Washington, DC 20229
    Injunction at 1-2 (emphasis added).     While the Injunction was
    served on defendant’s counsel, it was never served on either of
    the named officials.   Def.’s Mot. 3.
    The case then proceeded in the usual fashion until December
    14, 2009 when defendant filed its motion to dismiss, claiming
    that all of Jiheng’s merchandise subject to the second
    administrative review had been deemed liquidated pursuant to 
    19 U.S.C. § 1504
    (d), and as a result, the court had no jurisdiction
    to hear unfair trade duty claims related to the Company’s
    merchandise.   Def.’s Mot. 4.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “The party seeking to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction has
    the burden of establishing such jurisdiction.”     Autoalliance
    Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 
    29 CIT 1082
    , 1088, 
    398 F. Supp. 2d 1326
    , 1332 (2005) (citations omitted).    A case becomes moot when
    it has “lost its character as a present, live controversy of the
    kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opinions on
    abstract propositions of law.”     Hall v. Beals, 
    396 U.S. 45
    , 48
    (1969) (citations omitted).     This requirement of an actual
    controversy exists at all stages of an action.     Steffel v.
    Thompson, 
    415 U.S. 452
    , 461 n.10 (1974).
    Court No. 08-00364                                              Page 6
    DISCUSSION
    I.      Contentions of the Parties
    Defendant’s primary argument is that because plaintiffs
    failed to serve the Injunction on Ms. Sebastian at Commerce and
    Mr. Basham at Customs, the document did not effect a suspension
    of liquidation that would prevent a deemed liquidation.       Def.’s
    Mot. 3.    Defendant further insists that, by operation of law,
    deemed liquidation of Jiheng’s merchandise occurred on April 20,
    2009.    Def.’s Mot. 3.   According to defendant, this deemed
    liquidation mooted Clearon’s case as to Jiheng’s merchandise,
    thus denying the court subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the
    substantive claims with respect to that merchandise.     Def.’s Mot.
    4.   Thus, defendant argues that:
    The clear terms of the injunction state
    that the injunction will take effect “on the
    fifth business day after the day on which a
    copy of this preliminary injunction is
    personally served by Plaintiffs’ counsel by
    hand” on Commerce. The injunction was not
    served, personally or otherwise, upon Commerce
    and CBP [Customs]. Thus, nothing enjoined the
    lifting of the suspension of liquidation
    during the nearly 14 months since publication
    of the Amended Final Results . . . .
    In this case, the removal of suspension
    of liquidation, as well as notice to CBP of
    that removal, occurred when the Amended Final
    Results were published in the Federal Register
    on October 20, 2008. Thus, the entries at
    issue in this case became liquidated by
    operation of law on April 20, 2009.
    Def.’s Mot. 6-7 (citations omitted).
    Court No. 08-00364                                          Page 7
    Clearon, on the other hand, insists that the motion should
    be denied, primarily because:
    [T]he absence of any prejudice to Defendant or
    any other party from the alleged service
    defect places this case squarely within the
    ambit of the harmless error rule. . . . Under
    these circumstances, the Court should give
    effect to the clear intent and agreement of
    the parties and the order of this Court that
    the entries subject to the appeal would be
    enjoined and deny Defendant’s motion to
    partially dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims as moot.
    Memo. of Clearon Corp. and Occidental Chem. Corp. in Opp. to
    Def.’s Part. Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Resp.”) 2.
    II.   Suspension of Liquidation and Injunction
    Suspensions of liquidation and court-ordered injunctions are
    important tools used in the statutory scheme providing for the
    application of the proper duties under our unfair trade regime.1
    1
    The United States uses a “retrospective” assessment
    system where the importer makes a cash deposit of the estimated
    dumping duties when the subject merchandise enters the United
    States, but the actual duty is not necessarily determined until
    after entry, and is not paid until the entries are liquidated by
    Customs. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.212
    (a) (2009); 
    19 C.F.R. §§ 141.101
    ,
    103. If no request for a review is made, Commerce instructs
    Customs to liquidate the entries at the estimated antidumping
    duties at the time of entry (the “entered rate”). 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.212
    (c)(i). If a timely request for review is made,
    Commerce publishes the notice of initiation of the review in the
    Federal Register and commences the review, during which time
    liquidation is suspended. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.212
    (c)(2); 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.221
    (b); see also American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 
    10 CIT 535
    , 539, 
    642 F. Supp. 1187
    , 1191 (1986) (“Because 
    19 U.S.C. § 1675
    (a)(2) expressly calls for the retrospective application of
    antidumping review determinations . . . suspension of liquidation
    during the pendency of a periodic antidumping review is
    Court No. 08-00364                                            Page 8
    The suspension of liquidation is terminated, however, when final
    results of an investigation are published in the Federal Register
    so that Customs may liquidate the merchandise at the final rate.
    Int’l Trading, 
    281 F.3d at 1272
    ; see also 19 U.S.C. §
    1673e(a)(providing that an antidumping duty order should set
    forth the antidumping duty rate).    Often, however, a party will
    request a periodic review to test the applicability of the rate
    to entered merchandise.     See 
    19 U.S.C. § 1675
    (a)(2)(c) (providing
    that the final results of an administrative review should set
    forth the determination of antidumping duty rates that “shall be
    the basis for the assessment of countervailing or antidumping
    duties” on the subject entries).    Liquidation is suspended during
    the review so the liquidation will take place in accordance with
    a review’s result.   See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(2).
    When the results of a review are challenged in this Court, a
    party will typically seek to further halt liquidation by
    requesting an injunction.    19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2) (“The United
    States Court of International Trade may enjoin the liquidation of
    some or all entries of merchandise covered by a determination of
    the . . . administering authority . . . upon a request by an
    interested party for such relief and a proper showing that the
    unquestionably ‘required by statute[].’”). Following the review,
    Commerce publishes the final results of the review, and the
    entries are liquidated in accordance with those final results,
    unless there is an appeal to this Court. 
    19 C.F.R. § 351.221
    (b).
    Court No. 08-00364                                           Page 9
    requested relief should be granted under the circumstances.”).
    The purpose of the injunction is to prevent liquidation and to
    preserve merchandise for liquidation at the rate finally
    determined following judicial review.
    Were an injunction not entered, Customs would be free to
    actually liquidate the merchandise pursuant to 
    19 U.S.C. § 1500
    (c)-(d), which provides that the “Customs Service shall . .
    . fix the final amount of duty to be paid on such merchandise . .
    . [and] liquidate the entry . . . of such merchandise . . . .”
    III. Deemed Liquidation
    If no injunction is entered and Customs does not act,
    however, another provision comes into play.   By statute, entries
    of merchandise not liquidated by Customs within six months of the
    removal of suspension of liquidation are deemed liquidated at the
    entered rate:
    Any entry (other than an entry with respect to
    which liquidation has been extended under
    subsection (b) [relating to an extension of
    the six month period by the Secretary of
    Commerce] of this section) not liquidated by
    the Customs Service within 6 months after
    receiving such notice shall be treated as
    having been liquidated at the rate of duty,
    value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted
    by the importer of record . . . .
    
    19 U.S.C. § 1504
    (d).
    Thus, for a deemed liquidation to take place, three
    conditions must be met: “(1) the suspension of liquidation that
    Court No. 08-00364                                           Page 10
    was in place must have been removed; (2) Customs must have
    received notice of the removal of the suspension; and (3) Customs
    must not liquidate the entry at issue within six months of
    receiving such notice.”    Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States,
    
    283 F.3d 1364
    , 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Fujitsu”).    Because they
    take place by operation of law, Customs plays no role in
    effectuating deemed liquidations.
    IV.   Mootness
    The “mootness doctrine” results from the case or controversy
    requirement found in Article III of the United States
    Constitution.    See 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller &
    Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533 (3d ed.
    2008).   In the context of an unfair trade case, courts have
    generally found that once entries have been liquidated, there is
    no case or controversy with respect to the duty rate to be
    applied to them.   As a result, liquidation moots a court
    challenge to the duty rate imposed in an administrative review.
    “Once liquidation occurs, it permanently deprives a party of the
    opportunity to contest Commerce’s results for the administrative
    review by rendering the party’s cause of action moot.”      SKF USA
    Inc. v. United States, 
    28 CIT 170
    , 173, 
    316 F. Supp. 2d 1322
    ,
    1327 (2004) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 
    710 F.2d 806
    , 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Zenith”)); see also Fujitsu, 283
    Court No. 08-00364                                           Page 11
    F.3d at 1376.   This applies to entries deemed liquidated by
    operation of 
    19 U.S.C. § 1504
    (d).     Ames True Temper v. United
    States, 34 CIT __, __, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, Slip Op. 10-33 at 6
    (Mar. 30, 2010) (citation omitted).
    V.   Special Provision of CIT Injunctions
    Consent injunctions in the Court of International Trade
    generally contain two special provisions not normally found in
    other injunction orders.   In ordinary practice, it is the duty of
    the lawyer for the party being enjoined to inform those who might
    violate the injunction of its existence, e.g., officers of a
    corporation.    See, e.g., USCIT Rule 65(d)(2) (stating that an
    injunction binds various categories of individuals working for or
    with the parties “who receive actual notice of it by personal
    service or otherwise”); Anthony Marano Co. v. MS-Grand
    Bridgeview, Inc., No. 08 C 4244, 
    2009 WL 1904403
    , at *3 (N.D.
    Ill. July 1, 2009) (providing that the enjoined party, whose
    employees violated a preliminary injunction, cannot claim that
    the “notice of the injunction ‘was not fully transmitted’ to all
    of [its employees]” when its counsel has been notified of the
    injunction).
    Starting sometime after Zenith,2 however, it became common
    2
    This case, which is generally the initial point of
    reference for cases dealing with injunctions in the context of
    unfair trade laws, held that liquidation of entries of
    Court No. 08-00364                                            Page 12
    in this Court for a consent injunction to contain language
    requiring the party that obtained the injunction to serve it on
    officers of the United States government.   The agreed upon reason
    for this service was to give actual notice sufficient to prevent
    Commerce and Customs from taking any inadvertent action to
    actually liquidate the subject merchandise while the injunction
    was in force.   Pls.’ Resp. 5.   At oral argument, defendant’s
    counsel explained that because these agencies are large, the
    correct person must be served to ensure proper compliance with an
    injunction.   Tr. of Civ. Cause for Or. Arg. at 6:1-7.
    The other special provision often found in consent
    injunctions in this Court is the five-day grace period.      In
    accordance with this provision, a consent injunction does not
    become effective until “the fifth business day after the day on
    which a copy of [the] preliminary injunction is personally served
    by Plaintiffs’ counsel by hand” on the specified individuals at
    Commerce and Customs.   See, e.g., Injunction at 1.   This
    provision has recently been the subject of litigation.       See Agro
    merchandise subject to administrative review renders court
    challenges moot, and therefore, a domestic manufacturer
    challenging the result of the review would suffer irreparable
    harm if liquidation were not enjoined. Zenith, 
    710 F.2d at 810
    .
    Hence, the court established a “per se right to a preliminary
    injunction enjoining liquidation of unliquidated entries pending
    final judicial review of administrative review determinations.”
    NMB Sing. Ltd. v. United States, 
    24 CIT 1239
    , 1242 n.4, 
    120 F. Supp. 2d 1135
    , 1138 n.4 (2000) (citing Zenith).
    Court No. 08-00364                                               Page 13
    Dutch Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 
    589 F.3d 1187
    , 1189 (Fed.
    Cir. 2009) (“Agro Dutch”).
    VI.   Agro Dutch
    In Agro Dutch, this Court granted a consent injunction that
    included the five-day grace period.      Thus, in accordance with its
    terms, the injunction would not take effect until five days after
    it was served on the specified individuals at Commerce and
    Customs.   
    589 F.3d at 1189
    .      The Federal Circuit noted that the
    purpose of the grace period was “to ensure against subjecting
    Customs officials to contempt sanctions for an inadvertent
    liquidation.”      
    Id. at 1193
    .   The Agro Dutch injunction was served
    on the named officials.      
    Id. at 1189
    .   Customs, however,
    liquidated the entries during the five-day grace period.         
    Id.
    Because Commerce acted to liquidate during the grace period,
    nothing in the terms of the injunction prevented the liquidation
    from taking place.     Nonetheless, both this Court and the Federal
    Circuit found that the “original understanding and intent of the
    court and the parties” that the entries be preserved for
    liquidation at the final rate overrode the lesser intention that
    there should be a safe harbor period.       
    Id. at 1192, 1194
    .    The
    Federal Circuit emphasized the importance of “effecting the
    intent of the parties and the court to prevent a premature
    liquidation while judicial review is ongoing.”       
    Id. at 1193-94
    .
    Court No. 08-00364                                           Page 14
    In reaching its decision, the Agro Dutch court stressed the
    equitable power of a Court of International Trade judge and the
    importance of complying with the parties’ original intent:
    The trial court’s discretion is not limited to
    the correction of clerical or typographical
    errors but encompasses the correction of errors
    needed to comport the order with the original
    understandings and intent of the court and the
    parties.
    . . . [I]t was the purpose of the
    injunction and the understanding and intent of
    all the parties to suspend liquidation pending
    a decision on the merits of [plaintiff’s]
    challenge. . . .
    . . . .
    While finality is an important goal, the
    interest in finality must give way in the face
    of a more compelling interest in this case:
    namely, effecting the intent of the parties and
    the court to prevent a premature liquidation
    while judicial review is ongoing. . . . No valid
    interest in finality is served by foreclosing
    judicial review in a case such as this one,
    where the parties and trial court agreed that
    finality was not warranted, and where an
    injunction was entered for the very purpose of
    preventing the antidumping duty from becoming
    final.
    
    Id. at 1192-94
    .
    VII. The Injunction Was In Effect at the Time of Deemed
    Liquidation
    Here, the Injunction was entered by this Court on November
    13, 2008, and Customs claims that deemed liquidation took place
    on April 20, 2009.   Def.’s Mot. 2-3.   As in Agro Dutch, the
    Court No. 08-00364                                           Page 15
    parties agreed to a special term in the Injunction, i.e., the
    requirement that Clearon serve Commerce and Customs.   As noted,
    the purpose of this service was to reduce the chance of these
    entities’ taking action to liquidate the subject merchandise.      It
    is important to keep in mind, however, that the notice resulting
    from service on the named officials was designed to prevent
    either Commerce or Customs from taking any action that would
    result in an actual liquidation.   No party claims, nor could it,
    that this service would put either agency on notice with respect
    to any action it might take to effectuate a deemed liquidation.
    This is because, as has been seen, a deemed liquidation is the
    result of the operation of law upon the satisfaction of several
    conditions.   Fujitsu, 
    283 F.3d at 1376
    .   Under the circumstances
    of the case, neither Commerce nor Customs was empowered to act in
    any way in furtherance of a deemed liquidation.   An examination
    of the preconditions for a deemed liquidation will serve to
    illustrate why this is the case.
    The first condition is that the “suspension required by
    statute or court order is removed.”   
    19 U.S.C. § 1504
    (d).   As
    noted, this lifting of the suspension of liquidation took place
    when Commerce published the Final Results.    See Int’l Trading,
    
    281 F.3d at 1272
    .    In other words, the only action that Commerce
    is authorized to take leading up to a deemed liquidation took
    place here, and always takes place, prior to a party’s seeking an
    Court No. 08-00364                                            Page 16
    injunction against liquidation in this Court.    Thus, the service
    of the Injunction on Commerce, as provided for in the document,
    had no meaning under these circumstances, because Commerce was
    powerless to take further action that would result in a deemed
    liquidation.   Likewise, Customs could take no act nor make any
    finding to further a deemed liquidation because it had no power
    to do so.   Thus, with respect to a deemed liquidation, the
    service requirement at issue here merely demands a meaningless
    act.
    With this in mind, the court finds that the holding in Agro
    Dutch directs the outcome of this case.    Indeed, as compelling as
    the case was in Agro Dutch for reforming the injunction order to
    eliminate the five-day grace period, here, the case for
    dispensing with the service requirement is even more compelling.
    In Agro Dutch, the five-day provision was designed to address
    precisely the set of facts that actually came to pass—that is,
    the liquidation of merchandise during the grace period.    
    589 F.3d at 1189
    .    As has been noted, the provision at issue in Agro Dutch
    specifically placed no bar on actual liquidation during the five-
    day period.    
    Id.
       In other words, the parties agreed, and the
    court ordered, that a liquidation during this period would remain
    undisturbed.   Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit found that it was
    the primary “intent of the parties and the court to prevent a
    premature liquidation while judicial review is ongoing” and
    Court No. 08-00364                                              Page 17
    therefore, authorized the court to use its equitable powers to
    eliminate the grace period provision.     
    Id. at 1193-94
    .
    Here, the service provisions were designed to provide
    notice sufficient to stop the served agencies from inadvertently
    taking steps to liquidate the entries of subject merchandise
    while the injunction was in effect.    Pls.’ Resp. 5.   It is
    important to keep in mind, however, that an actual liquidation,
    not a deemed liquidation, was the object of the provision.       As
    has been seen, in this case, neither served official could take
    lawful action to effectuate a deemed liquidation.    Thus, the
    service provision served no purpose with respect to preventing a
    deemed liquidation.
    Thus, as in Agro Dutch, the primary intention of the
    parties was to stop, during the pendency of the lawsuit, a
    liquidation, deemed or otherwise.    As such, the court is required
    to give meaning to the parties’ primary intention that no
    liquidation should take place, and use its equitable powers to
    eliminate the notice provision.     See Agro Dutch, 
    589 F.3d at 1192
    (providing that “[t]he trial court’s discretion is not limited to
    the correction of clerical or typographical errors but
    encompasses the correction of errors needed to comport the order
    with the original understandings and intent of the court and the
    parties”).
    Court No. 08-00364                                                Page 18
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant’s
    motion to dismiss.   Further, the court amends the Injunction to
    eliminate the service requirement and thus, finds that the
    Injunction served to suspend the liquidation of Jiheng’s
    merchandise by action of law pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(2).
    As a result, Counts 1 and 2 of Clearon’s complaint as they
    pertain to Jiheng’s merchandise and Count 3 in its entirety are
    not moot.
    /s/ Richard K. Eaton
    Richard K. Eaton
    Dated:   August 9, 2010
    New York, New York
    Errata
    Clearon Corp. v. United States, Court No. 08-00364, Slip Op. 10-
    86 (Aug. 9, 2010)
    Page 2, line 19:               Insert “its contention” between
    “is” and “that”.
    Page 4, line 15:               Replace “plaintiffs’” with
    “Jiheng’s”.
    Page 6, lines 5-6:             Remove “effect a suspension of
    liquidation that would prevent” and
    replace with “enjoin”.
    Page 7, line 15:               Add an “s” to the end of
    “Suspension” and “Injunction”.
    Page 7, footnote 1, line 14:   Replace “American” with “Am.”.
    Page 11, line 5:               Add an “s” to the end of
    “Provision”; replace “of” with
    “in”.
    Page 17, line 6:               Capitalize the first letter of
    “injunction”.
    Page 18, line 5:               Replace “suspend” with “prevent”.