Gerald Lynn Bostock v. Clayton County ( 2018 )


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  •          Case: 17-13801   Date Filed: 05/10/2018   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13801
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-01460-ODE
    GERALD LYNN BOSTOCK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CLAYTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
    Defendant,
    CLAYTON COUNTY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (May 10, 2018)
    Case: 17-13801        Date Filed: 05/10/2018      Page: 2 of 3
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gerald Lynn Bostock appeals the district court’s dismissal of his
    employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
    U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), against Clayton County, Georgia, for failure to state a
    claim. On appeal, Bostock argues that the County discriminated against him based
    on sexual orientation and gender stereotyping. After a careful review of the record
    and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
    “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
    [Fed. R. Civ. P. ] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the
    complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
    Hill v. White, 
    321 F.3d 1334
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Issues not
    briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874
    (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
    Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the
    basis of their sex. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). This circuit has previously held that
    “[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.” Blum v. Gulf Oil
    Corp., 
    597 F.2d 936
    , 938 (5th Cir. 1979)1 (per curiam) (emphasis added). And we
    1
    See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that
    all decisions of the “old Fifth” Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September
    30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
    2
    Case: 17-13801      Date Filed: 05/10/2018     Page: 3 of 3
    recently confirmed that Blum remains binding precedent in this circuit. See Evans
    v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 
    850 F.3d 1248
    , 1256 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 557
     (2017). In Evans, we specifically rejected the argument that Supreme Court
    precedent in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
    523 U.S. 75
    , 79 (1998), and
    Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
    490 U.S. 228
    , 250–51 (1989), supported a cause of
    action for sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.
    As an initial matter, Bostock has abandoned any challenge to the district
    court’s dismissal of his gender stereotyping claim under Glenn 2 because he does
    not specifically appeal the dismissal of this claim. See Timson, 
    518 F.3d at 874
    .
    Moreover, the district court did not err in dismissing Bostock’s complaint for
    sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII because our holding in Evans
    forecloses Bostock’s claim. And under our prior panel precedent rule, we cannot
    overrule a prior panel’s holding, regardless of whether we think it was wrong,
    unless an intervening Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit en banc decision is
    issued. United States v. Kaley, 
    579 F.3d 1246
    , 1255–56 (11th Cir. 2009); United
    States v. Steele, 
    147 F.3d 1316
    , 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    In analyzing an equal protection claim, rather than a Title VII claim, we held that
    discrimination based on gender nonconformity was sex discrimination. Glenn v. Brumby, 
    663 F.3d 1312
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2011).
    3