Huang v. Lynch , 628 F. App'x 57 ( 2016 )


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  •      14-4206
    Huang v. Lynch
    BIA
    Hom, IJ
    A087 737 207
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
    PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    2   the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    3   Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    4   13th day of January, two thousand sixteen.
    5
    6   PRESENT:
    7            DENNIS JACOBS,
    8            GUIDO CALABRESI,
    9            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                 Circuit Judges.
    11   _____________________________________
    12
    13   YING YING HUANG,
    14            Petitioner,
    15
    16                    v.                                             14-4206
    17                                                                   NAC
    18   LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    19   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20            Respondent.
    21   _____________________________________
    22
    23   FOR PETITIONER:                     Theodore N. Cox, New York, New
    24                                       York.
    25
    26   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
    27                                       Assistant Attorney General; Shelley
    28                                       R. Goad, Assistant Director; Julia
    29                                       J. Tyler, Trial Attorney, Office of
    30                                       Immigration Litigation, United
    31                                       States Department of Justice,
    32                                       Washington, D.C.
    1        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
    4    DENIED.
    5        Petitioner Ying Ying Huang, a native and citizen of
    6    People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 17, 2014,
    7    decision of the BIA affirming an October 16, 2012, decision of
    8    an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Huang’s application for
    9    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
    10   Against Torture (“CAT”).      In re Ying Ying Huang, No. A087 737
    11   207 (B.I.A. Oct. 17, 2014), aff’g No. A087 737 207 (Immig. Ct.
    12   N.Y. City Oct. 16, 2012).     We assume the parties’ familiarity
    13   with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
    14       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
    15   the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.”
    16   Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    448 F.3d 524
    , 528 (2d Cir.
    17   2006).    The    applicable    standards   of   review   are   well
    18   established.    
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
    19   
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Dedji v. Mukasey, 
    525 F.3d 20
       187, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
    2
    1         Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination
    2    that Huang failed to establish a well-founded fear of harm at
    3    the hand of smugglers in China.        Absent past persecution, an
    4    applicant may establish eligibility for asylum by demonstrating
    5    a   well-founded    fear    of     future   persecution,     8 C.F.R.
    6    § 1208.13(b)(2), which must be both subjectively credible and
    7    objectively reasonable, Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 8
        169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).     To demonstrate a well-founded fear,
    9    an applicant must show either a reasonable possibility that she
    10   would be singled out for persecution or that the country of
    11   removal has a pattern or practice of persecuting similarly
    12   situated individuals.      
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(2)(iii).
    13        As   the   agency   concluded,    Huang’s   fear   of   harm   was
    14   speculative given that she and her family have not been
    15   contacted, much less threatened, by smugglers since they paid
    16   the fee for Huang’s entry to the United States.         See Jian Xing
    17   Huang v. INS, 
    421 F.3d 125
    , 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence
    18   of solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear
    19   is speculative at best.”).       Huang’s failure to demonstrate that
    20   her fear of harm was objectively reasonable is dispositive of
    21   asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three
    3
    1    claims are based on the same factual predicate.      See Paul v.
    2    Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).      Accordingly,
    3    we do not reach the agency’s alternative bases for denial of
    4    asylum and withholding of removal.    See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429
    
    5 U.S. 24
    , 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are
    6    not required to make findings on issues the decision of which
    7    is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
    8         Furthermore, the IJ did not abuse his discretion in
    9    declining to admit Huang’s late-filed evidence because she was
    10   given more than one year to file it and the evidence pre-dated
    11   the filing deadline.     Huang argues that the IJ should have
    12   extended the August 2012 deadline because she did not present
    13   her new basis for asylum (fear of smugglers) until July 2012.
    14   This argument is disingenuous.      She did not argue this point
    15   to the IJ.   And, regardless of when she amended her application
    16   to present this new claim, she knew of the bases for it as early
    17   as July 2010 and thus had more than two years to gather and timely
    18   submit background evidence.
    19        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    20   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
    21   that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
    4
    1   and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
    2   is DISMISSED as moot.   Any pending request for oral argument
    3   in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
    4   Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
    5   34.1(b).
    6                               FOR THE COURT:
    7                               Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    5