Pendleton v. Newsome ( 2015 )

PRESENT: Lemons, C.J., Goodwyn, Millette and Kelsey, JJ., and
Russell and Koontz, S.JJ.
LAURA MARY-BETH PENDLETON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 141116 SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
June 4, 2015
MARCUS J. NEWSOME, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Gregory L. Rupe, Judge
This appeal arises out of an action to recover damages for
defamation in which the circuit court sustained a demurrer and
dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The dispositive
question is whether the complaint sets forth facts that, if
taken as true, are sufficient to support a cause of action for
defamation. We therefore focus on the allegations contained in
the complaint. 1
FACTS ALLEGED
On January 2, 2012, Amarria Denise Johnson was a seven-
year-old first grade student at Hopkins Elementary School in
Chesterfield County. Amarria died at the school that day as a
result of a severe allergic reaction to a peanut provided to her
by a classmate.
1
The complaint is 34 pages long and with its attached
exhibits occupies 81 pages of the joint appendix to the record.
Consequently, we will, to some extent, paraphrase and condense
its content in the interests of brevity.
Amarria's mother, Laura Mary-Beth Pendleton (the plaintiff)
brought this action in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
against six defendants: Marcus J. Newsome, who was
Superintendent of the Chesterfield County Public Schools (CCPS),
Shawn Smith, who was Assistant Director of Community Relations
for CCPS, Jody Enoch, who was a Public Health Nurse Supervisor
for the Chesterfield County Health Department (CCHD), Tim
Bullis, Director of Community Relations for CCPS, Ed Witthoefft,
who was Assistant Superintendent of CCPS, and Patricia M.
Carpenter, who was Chair of the Chesterfield County School Board
(collectively, the defendants).
The plaintiff was a licensed practical nurse. She had
informed the school staff earlier in the school year that
Amarria was severely allergic to certain food products,
including peanuts. The plaintiff had also, the prior year,
filled out a confidential school "Standard Health/Emergency
Plan" signed by Amarria's pediatrician. The plan directed that
Amarria receive Benadryl and an auto-injection of Epinephrine if
she should ingest or have skin contact with certain allergens,
including nuts. As required by school regulations, the
plaintiff also brought to the school an "EpiPen Jr." for the
injection of Epinephrine for the school's use in such an
emergency. The school's clinic assistant, however, told the
plaintiff to retain it for use at home. The plaintiff
2
understood that the school maintained allergy medications for
emergency use. 2
On January 2, 2012, Amarria reported "bumps" and
"scratching" in her neck shortly after ingesting the peanut but
was not given either Benadryl or Epinephrine. She died soon
thereafter.
The tragic death of the child received prompt and
widespread publicity in news reports published by local,
national, and international media. These reports contained many
statements and comments made by the defendants.
The gravamen of the plaintiff's claim is that those
statements were maliciously designed to divert public
indignation from the failures of CCPS and CCHD personnel to
exercise proper care for the child by falsely implying and
insinuating that the plaintiff had failed to inform the school
authorities of the child's serious allergy, failed to furnish a
doctor-approved emergency medical plan, and failed to furnish
the school clinic with the required medications for use in such
an emergency. The plaintiff contends that the defendants'
statements were designed to convey the innuendo that she bore
2
The school's clinic assistant, specifically referring to
the EpiPen Jr., told the plaintiff "we have everything we need
here; you can take this one home in case you need it. [Amarria]
will be fine," or words to that effect. The assistant then
handed the EpiPen Jr. back to the plaintiff.
3
responsibility for the death of her child. The complaint
asserts:
In the days following Amarria's death, when
Ms. Pendleton was seeking answers to, and
grieving from, the loss of her daughter, the
Defendants undertook a public-relations smear
campaign to deflect away from school and
health officials, and onto Ms. Pendleton,
responsibility for Amarria's death. The
Defendants falsely implied, inferred, and/or
insinuated, through direct statements,
omissions of relevant facts, and use of
innuendo, that Amarria's death was caused by
Ms. Pendleton's alleged inactions --
specifically, failing to provide necessary
information and medications to Amarria's
school. In truth, as noted above, Ms.
Pendleton had completed necessary paperwork
and had provided Amarria's EpiPen Jr. to the
Hopkins clinic assistant. Defendants' false
statements -- made by inference, implication,
and/or insinuation -- caused Ms. Pendleton to
be pilloried by the public. Ms. Pendleton did
attempt to explain her actual actions to the
public. Her single voice, however, was not
heard above the chorus of false statements
spread by the Defendants, whose falsities were
bolstered by the Defendants' employment
positions, and were repeated over and over in
the media. Persuaded by the Defendants'
characterization of events, countless
individuals, including the parents of other
Chesterfield County Public Schools ("CCPS")
students, concluded and declared that Ms.
Pendleton was a bad mother -- the most hurtful
and disparaging of labels.
4
STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS 3
In a public letter dated January 4, 2012 which was posted
to CCPS's website on January 5, 2012, defendant Newsome stated:
Student and staff safety is a top priority. . . .
Earlier this week, a first-grade student at
Hopkins Elementary School died. Chesterfield
County Public Schools is deeply saddened by the
loss of this child and has reached out to her
family . . . . Key . . . is a parent's
responsibility to provide the school with
accurate, timely information; a health emergency
plan . . . and the medicine necessary to execute
the plan. . . . If any one of these items is
missing, the doctor's orders cannot be carried
out. The school . . . relies on parents to follow
through.
In two emails dated January 4, 2012 responding to producers of
major news organizations, Defendant Smith reiterated the CCPS
statements, including "[e]xecution of the plan is dependent on
the parent's ability to inform the school of needs and to
provide the appropriate resources" and privacy protection
"hampers our efforts to correct misinformation."
In a news article dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Grieving
mom: School knew about peanut allergy," Smith was quoted as
stating:
Parents/guardians of a student with a severe
allergy are key to the process of keeping their
3
These statements are set forth as expressed in the
complaint, including the emphasis given to the words the
plaintiff contends are designed to convey a defamatory
insinuation.
5
child safe at school. They are at the center of
developing a plan that works for their child.
Execution of the plan is dependent on the
parent's ability to inform the school of needs
and to provide the appropriate resources. When
any or all of the resources are not provided, the
public health nurse makes contact(s) with the
family in an effort to obtain the necessary
medication.
In an article dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Death of
Allergic Student Raises Questions about School's
Responsibility," Smith was quoted as stating:
For any medication, the school would
have to be in possession of [it] to
provide it . . . . At the beginning of
the school year, we sent information to
parents outlining the different
responsibilities for the family and the
child . . . . First and foremost, it does
begin at home. Working with their
doctor, the family would outline a health
care plan . . . .
In two articles dated January 5, 2012 entitled "Pupil, 7,
who 'loved school' dies after suffering allergic reaction to
peanuts during recess break" and "Family: Child dies in school
from peanut allergic reaction," Smith was further quoted as
stating "[a]t the beginning of the school year, we sent home a
packet to the family, the understanding that there are certain
students that have severe allergies."
An article dated January 6, 2012 entitled "Allergy kills
Virginia girl at school," states that Smith gave a written
statement stating "[w]hen any or all of the resources are not
6
provided, the public health nurse makes contact with the family
in an effort to obtain the necessary medication."
In two articles dated January 5, 2012 defendant Enoch was
quoted as stating "[p]arents need to provide all necessary
medication their child needs to the school. That is the
responsibility of the parent."
In official email responses dated January 5, 2012 to
concerned parents, defendant Witthoefft stated certain laws "can
hamper our efforts to correct misinformation that is provided to
and reported by local media outlets." He further stated:
Key to the plan is a parent's ability to
provide the school with accurate, timely
information; a health plan . . . and access
to the medical resources necessary . . . .
When the resources are not available,
execution of the plan cannot be continued.
Our school division welcomes medication . . .
[EpiPens] are not prohibited . . . . Again,
execution of the plan is dependent on the
parent's ability to inform the school of
needs and to provide the appropriate
resources. When any or all of the resources
are not provided, the public health nurse
makes contact(s) with the family in an effort
to obtain the necessary medication . . . .
[I]f one piece of the puzzle is missing, the
doctor's orders cannot be carried out.
In an email response dated January 7, 2012 to a concerned
parent, defendant Carpenter used the words "misinformation,"
"rumors," and "inaccurate information." She said she
appreciated the "opportunity to provide [her] with as many
facts" as she could "at this time" and stated:
7
Key to the school division's plan to manage
severe allergies is a parent's
responsibility to provide the school with
accurate, timely information; a health
emergency plan . . . and the medicine
necessary . . . If any one of these items is
missing, the doctor's orders cannot be
carried out. If a student's health
emergency plan calls for . . . medicine and
it is not provided . . . the public health
nurse contacts the family to obtain the
necessary medication. The school division
relies on our parents to follow through and
provide whatever is prescribed by the doctor
in that plan . . . . these trained
professionals have the best interests of our
students in mind but can only be effective
if a parent provides information, doctor-
prescribed health plans and the medicines
necessary to carry out those plans.
Unfortunately, this does not always occur."
I hope . . . you will join us in our
efforts to educate parents about their
important role in providing us with
information about allergies and the
resources necessary to manage them.
Finally, in an article dated January 11, 2012 entitled
"Fatal allergic reaction is a wake-up call," defendant Bullis
was quoted as describing Amarria's death as a "wake-up call" for
parents and stating that the plan requires parents to "provide
accurate and timely information about their child's allergy, to
provide a health action plan . . . and to provide access to the
resources and medications . . . . If any of those are missing,
including medications, we can't execute the plan."
8
ANALYSIS
We review a circuit court's ruling on a demurrer de novo.
Webb v. Virginian-Pilot Media Companies, LLC, 287 Va. 84, 88,
752 S.E.2d 808, 811 (2014). The purpose of a demurrer is to
determine whether the complaint states a cause of action upon
which the requested relief may be granted. Welding, Inc. v.
Bland County Service Auth., 261 Va. 218, 226, 541 S.E.2d 909,
913 (2001). A demurrer admits the truth of all properly pleaded
material facts and all facts which are impliedly alleged, as
well as facts that may be fairly and justly inferred. Cox Cable
Hampton Roads, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 242 Va. 394, 397, 410
S.E.2d 652, 653 (1991). In deciding whether to sustain a
demurrer, the sole question before the trial court is whether
the facts pleaded, implied, and fairly and justly inferred are
legally sufficient to state a cause of action against a
defendant. Id.; see also, e.g., Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 719,
726-27, 708 S.E.2d 882, 887, 892 (2011); Tronfeld v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 713, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006).
A common law complaint for libel or slander
historically included three elements: the
inducement, an explanation of the facts
demonstrating that the allegedly defamatory
statement is actionable; the colloquium, an
explanation of how the allegedly defamatory
statement refers to the plaintiff, if he is not
explicitly named; and the innuendo, an
9
explanation of the allegedly defamatory meaning
of the statement, if it is not apparent on its
face.
Webb, 287 Va. at 88, 752 S.E.2d at 811 (citations omitted).
In determining whether the words and statements
complained of in the instant case are
reasonably capable of the meaning ascribed to
them by innuendo, every fair inference that may
be drawn from the pleadings must be resolved in
the plaintiff's favor. However, the meaning of
the alleged defamatory language can not, by
innuendo, be extended beyond its ordinary and
common acceptation. The province of the
innuendo is to show how the words used are
defamatory, and how they relate to the
plaintiff, but it can not introduce new matter,
nor extend the meaning of the words used, or
make that certain which is in fact uncertain.
Id. at 89-90, 752 S.E.2d at 811 (quoting Carwile v. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 8, 82 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1954)).
In Webb, we reiterated that Virginia law recognizes a claim
for defamation by inference, implication or insinuation, id. at
89 n.7, 752 S.E.2d at 811 n.7, but we made it clear that
ensuring that defamation actions proceed only upon statements
which may actually defame a plaintiff "is an essential
gatekeeping function of the court." Id. at 90, 752 S.E.2d at
911.
We need not expound upon the fact that a statement falsely
implying that a mother was responsible for her child's death
10
would be defamatory. 4 The issue before this Court is whether
such an implication is present. Because Virginia law makes room
for a defamation action based on a statement expressing a
defamatory meaning "not apparent on its face," evidence is
admissible to show the circumstances surrounding the making and
publication of the statement which would reasonably cause the
statement to convey a defamatory meaning to its recipients.
Allegations that such circumstances attended the making of the
statement, with an explanation of the circumstances and the
defamatory meaning allegedly conveyed, will suffice to survive
demurrer if the court, in the exercise of its gatekeeping
function, deems the alleged meaning to be defamatory. Whether
the circumstances were reasonably sufficient to convey the
alleged defamatory meaning, and whether the plaintiff was
actually defamed thereby, remain issues to be resolved by the
fact-finder at trial.
In the present case, published news reports, attached as
exhibits to the complaint, indicate that in the days immediately
following the child's death, the case had been widely
publicized. News accounts had identified the plaintiff by name
4
For a thorough discussion of the elements of defamation in
Virginia, including the role of innuendo when the allegedly
defamatory meaning of a statement is not apparent on its face,
see Schaecher v. Bouffault, ___ Va. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___(2015)
(this day decided).
11
as the mother at the center of the case. In this context, it is
clear that any defamatory implication proceeding from the
defendants' statements was aimed directly at her and at no other
person.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer upon first
consideration. Later, the defendants moved for reconsideration
based on our recent decision in Webb. The court then reversed
its former ruling and sustained the demurrer. The court's
reliance on Webb was misplaced. That case, also a claim for
defamation by innuendo, was based on statements by a defendant
that raised no implication that the plaintiff had acted
wrongfully, and showed that it was just as likely that other
persons were responsible for the allegedly improper conduct of
which the plaintiff complained. Id. at 90-91, 752 S.E.2d at
812. In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiff was the
sole and unmistakable target of any innuendo she may be able to
prove to have resulted from the defendants' statements.
The context in which the statements were published includes
the circumstances that the identity of the plaintiff was
publicly known, that news media had heard her side of the story
and had asked CCPS officials to comment on it, and had received
responses from certain defendants to the effect that their
efforts to "correct misinformation" were hampered by privacy
laws. In that context, a fair and just inference would be drawn
12
that the plaintiff's version was "misinformation" but that the
defendants, in laudable obedience to privacy laws, were unable
to express the true version.
The defendants argue that their statements were true and
the truth is a defense to a defamation claim. The defendants'
statements here, however, may be true if taken out of context,
but in the context of the alleged publicity attending the case
when the statements were published, it cannot be said at the
demurrer stage that they were not capable of conveying the
defamatory innuendo that the plaintiff bore responsibility for
her child's death.
The defendants also argue that their statements were
protected by the First Amendment. Again, that position may be
sound if the statements were read out of context, but a
defamatory innuendo is no more protected by the First Amendment
than is defamatory speech expressed by any other means. See
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (libelous speech is not protected by the
First Amendment).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1092-93 (4th
Cir. 1993), a diversity case applying Virginia law, stated:
[B]ecause the Constitution provides a sanctuary
for truth, a libel-by-implication plaintiff
must make an especially rigorous showing where
13
the expressed facts are literally true. The
language must not only be reasonably read to
impart the false innuendo, but it must also
affirmatively suggest that the author also
intends or endorses the inference.
(Citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520
(D.C. Cir. 1990).) 5 Our decisions in defamation cases do not
include a requirement that "a libel-by-implication plaintiff
must make an especially rigorous showing where the expressed
facts are literally true." The plaintiff's burden is proof by a
preponderance of the evidence. Food Lion, Inc. v. Melton, 250
Va. 144, 150, 458 S.E.2d 580, 584 (1995). Nor have we held that
the defendant's words must, by themselves, suggest that the
author intends or endorses the allegedly defamatory inference.
Such a holding would immunize one who intentionally defames
another by a careful choice of words to ensure that they state
no falsehoods if read out of context but convey a defamatory
innuendo in the circumstances in which they were uttered.
Motive, intent, scheme, plan or design are issues of fact that
5
In Chapin, the court considered a libel claim in which the
defendants were members of the press, the plaintiffs were public
figures, and the subject matter touched on matters of public
concern (controversy regarding involvement of American troops in
the Persian Gulf War). In these circumstances, the court held,
"the constitutional protection of the press reaches its apogee."
Id. at 1092. Here, by contrast, the plaintiff was not a public
figure, the defendants were employed by government agencies but
were not officials generally known, the publicity attending the
subject matter lasted only a few days, and the freedom of the
press is in no way impacted.
14
may be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct
evidence. See Banovitch v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 216, 83
S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954) ("The specific intent may, like any other
fact, be shown by circumstances.").
Because defamatory speech falls outside the protection of
the First Amendment, a First Amendment analysis is inapposite in
a case in which a plaintiff must allege and ultimately prove
that the defendant intended his words to express a defamatory
innuendo, that the words actually did so, and that the plaintiff
was actually defamed thereby.
Assuming, as we must, the truth of all the facts properly
pleaded by the plaintiff, and giving her the benefit of all
facts implied and fairly and justly inferred from them, we
conclude that in the context set forth in the complaint, the
words ascribed to the defendants, given their plain meaning, are
reasonably capable of conveying the defamatory innuendo of which
the plaintiff complains.
The plaintiff also assigns error to the circuit court's
denial of her motion to amend the complaint. The proposed
amendment included all matters originally pleaded, but added
numerous email communications by the defendants tending to
demonstrate their motivation and intent. Our holding here
renders that assignment of error moot. On retrial, those
15
matters may be admissible, subject to the Virginia Rules of
Evidence.
At trial, the plaintiff will bear the burden of proving, by
a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the defendants made
the statements alleged in the complaint, (2) that the
statements, even if facially true, were designed and intended by
the defendants to imply that the plaintiff was responsible for
the death of her child, (3) that in the light of the
circumstances prevailing at the time they were made, the
statements conveyed that defamatory implication to those who
heard or read them, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered harm as
a result.
CONCLUSION
Because the circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer,
we will reverse the judgment and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
16