v. ICAO , 2021 COA 27 ( 2021 )


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  •      The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
    constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
    the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
    Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
    should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
    SUMMARY
    March 4, 2021
    2021COA27
    No. 20CA0732, Fisher v. ICAO — Labor and Industry —
    Workers’ Compensation — Benefits — Physical Impairment
    Ratings
    Subsections (3)(a)(I) and (3.7) of section 8-42-101, C.R.S.
    2020, state that, in workers’ compensation cases, physical
    impairment ratings “shall be based on” the revised third edition of
    the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of
    Permanent Impairment. In this opinion, a division of the court of
    appeals considers the question whether the phrase “shall be based
    on” the revised third edition of the Guides means that a doctor is
    barred from using an evaluative process to determine an
    impairment rating that is not described in the Guides. The division
    answers the question “no.”
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                        2021COA27
    Court of Appeals No. 20CA0732
    Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado
    WC No. 5-068-151
    Kerry Fisher,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and State of Colorado
    Department of Corrections,
    Respondents.
    ORDER AFFIRMED
    Division I
    Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE BERNARD
    Rothenberg* and Taubman*, JJ., concur
    Announced March 4, 2021
    Hassler Law Firm, LLC, Stephen M. Johnston, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner
    No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
    Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, D. Clay Thornton, Senior Assistant Attorney
    General, Denver, Colorado, for Respondent State of Colorado Department of
    Corrections
    *Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
    VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2020.
    ¶1    The American Medical Association publishes Guides to the
    Evaluation of Permanent Impairment that have been used over the
    years by doctors in workers’ compensation systems to evaluate and
    to describe patient impairments in terms of percentages of total
    disability. Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and a Consequential
    Model of Loss, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 783, 798 n.42 (1990). The Guides are
    focused on “specifying methods of measurement and the
    assignment of a single percentage for a given impairment.”
    Id. There are different
    editions of the Guides — the most recent edition
    is the sixth, see AMA, AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
    Impairment, Sixth Edition: Hardcover, https://perma.cc/6JZ6-6T7U
    — and there are “significant differences among” them, “not only in
    emphasis of certain areas, but also as a reflection of the latest
    consensus in medical science within its subject matter.” Litchfield’s
    Case, 
    15 N.E.3d 252
    , 254 n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014).
    ¶2    The revised third edition of the Guides is mentioned in section
    8-42-101, C.R.S. 2020, of Colorado’s workers’ compensation
    statutes, specifically in subsections (3)(a)(I) and (3.7). These
    subsections address one aspect of how a doctor should evaluate a
    work-related injury of a joint to determine the extent of the joint’s
    1
    impairment, which, in turn, is used to determine the level of
    compensation that the worker will receive.
    ¶3    As is pertinent to our analysis, subsection 101(3)(a)(I) states
    that “impairment rating guidelines . . . shall be based on the revised
    third edition of the [Guides] in effect as of July 1, 1991, and medical
    treatment guidelines and utilization standards.” Subsection
    101(3.7) is similar: “On or after July 1, 1991, all physical
    impairment ratings used under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall be
    based on the revised third edition of the [Guides], in effect as of July
    1, 1991.”
    ¶4    In this appeal, we must address a question of statutory
    interpretation: Does the phrase “shall be based on the revised third
    edition” of the Guides mean that a doctor is barred from using an
    evaluative process to determine an impairment rating that is not
    described in the Guides’ revised third edition? For reasons that we
    set out below, we answer this question “no.”
    ¶5    This statutory interpretation question is raised by claimant,
    Kerry Fisher, who seeks review of a final order of a panel of the
    Industrial Claim Appeals Office. The order upheld the decision of
    an administrative law judge, who assigned him a scheduled
    2
    impairment rating of thirteen percent for his injured left knee. We
    affirm.
    I. Background
    ¶6    The facts of this case are undisputed. Claimant worked as a
    correctional officer for the Colorado Department of Corrections. In
    December 2017, he suffered an injury to his left knee while walking
    up some stairs. The department admitted that claimant injured his
    knee while he was on duty.
    ¶7    Claimant’s authorized treating physician decided that he was
    at maximum medical improvement as of early January 2019. The
    physician also decided that the injury to his knee was permanent.
    Using a method known as “normalization,” which we will describe
    shortly, the physician calculated that the net impairment was
    thirteen percent of the lower leg. The department filed a final
    admission of liability based on the maximum medical improvement
    date and the impairment rating.
    ¶8    Claimant thought that his impairment rating should have
    been higher. He challenged the physician’s methodology of
    “normalizing” the impairment to his left knee because it had not
    been based on the Guides’ third edition.
    3
    ¶9     When describing this methodology, the physician explained in
    a deposition that “normalization” is a process in which doctors
    compare the range of motion of a patient’s uninjured joint — in this
    case, claimant’s right knee — with the range of motion of the
    patient’s injured joint — in this case, claimant’s left knee. The
    range of motion in the uninjured joint is considered to be the
    baseline. Once the range of motion in both joints is determined, the
    doctor then subtracts any impairment to the range of motion of the
    uninjured joint from the impairment to the injured joint to reach
    the final impairment figure.
    ¶ 10   The practice of normalization is summarized in a Desk Aid
    published by the Department of Labor and Employment, Division of
    Workers’ Compensation. Dep’t of Lab. & Emp., Div. of Workers’
    Comp., Desk Aid #11, Impairment Rating Tips (July 2020),
    https://perma.cc/G9KX-Q2ZH. As is pertinent to our analysis, in
    addition to describing the normalization process, the Desk Aid’s
    discussion of “Rating of Extremities Using Contralateral Joint/
    ‘Normalization’” makes several other points.
     Using the uninjured joint for comparison purposes may be
    “a better representation of the patient’s pre-injury state
    4
    than . . . [the] population norms” described in the revised
    third edition of the Guides.
    Id.  The revised
    third edition of the Guides “has little
    commentary on” normalization, while the fifth edition and
    the Division of Labor “consider it reasonable to compare
    both extremities [ — i.e., normalization — ] when there are
    specific conditions which would make the opposite,
    non-injured extremity serve as a better individual baseline.”
    Id.  An evaluating
    doctor should not use normalization if the
    opposite joint “has a known previous injury because that
    joint may not reflect the ‘normal’ [range of motion] for
    that individual.”
    Id. ¶ 11
      The revised third edition of the Guides — the edition
    mentioned in subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7) — does not
    address normalization. But, as we mentioned above, the fifth
    edition discusses it, and, according to the physician, the
    normalization process, as outlined in the Desk Aid, has been taught
    to doctors in workers’ compensation accreditation courses for at
    least the last decade.
    5
    ¶ 12   In claimant’s case, normalization reduced his range of motion
    impairment by nine percentage points because he had pre-existing
    degenerative arthritis in his knees.
    ¶ 13   When considering this case, the administrative law judge
    noted that panels of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office had already
    rejected numerous challenges to normalization and to the Desk Aid,
    as had a division of this court in Kurtz v. Industrial Claim Appeals
    Office, (Colo. App. No. 11CA2561, Oct. 18, 2012)(not published
    pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)). The judge then rejected claimant’s
    challenge to the validity of the Desk Aid, concluding that
    normalization was a legitimate process and that its use did not
    violate any mandate in subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7). The
    judge therefore awarded claimant benefits based on the physician’s
    determination that the claimant’s left knee was thirteen percent
    impaired. The reviewing panel affirmed the judge’s order.
    II. General Legal Principles
    ¶ 14   We uphold a judge’s factual findings in a workers’
    compensation case if they are supported by substantial evidence in
    the record. § 8-43-308, C.R.S. 2020; Kieckhafer v. Indus. Claim
    Appeals Off., 
    2012 COA 124
    , ¶ 12. “However, we review de novo
    6
    questions of law and of the application of law to undisputed facts.”
    Winter v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    2013 COA 126
    , ¶ 7.
    Consequently, if a panel’s decision misconstrues or misapplies the
    law, it does not bind us. Paint Connection Plus v. Indus. Claim
    Appeals Off., 
    240 P.3d 429
    , 431 (Colo. App. 2010). Because the
    underlying facts are undisputed in this case, we review the panel’s
    application of the law to the facts de novo.
    ¶ 15   We also review the panel’s interpretation of the statutes at
    issue in this case de novo. Lobato v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    105 P.3d 220
    , 223 (Colo. 2005). When interpreting a statute, we must
    determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Davison v.
    Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    84 P.3d 1023
    , 1029 (Colo. 2004). If the
    statutory language is clear, we interpret the statute according to its
    plain and ordinary meaning. Specialty Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 
    231 P.3d 393
    , 397 (Colo. 2010).
    III. Analysis
    ¶ 16   Claimant contends, as he did at the previous stages of his
    case, that (1) subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7) state that
    impairment ratings “shall be based” on the revised third edition of
    the Guides; therefore (2) doctors cannot employ the process of
    7
    normalization because it is not mentioned in the revised third
    edition; (3) even though normalization is discussed in the Desk Aid,
    doctors nonetheless cannot use the process because the Desk Aid
    “is not law”; and, as a result, (4) the Division of Workers’
    Compensation “has overstepped its authority and changed the
    calculation of extremity ratings inconsistently with the law.” We
    disagree for the following three reasons, and we therefore conclude
    that the panel did not err when it affirmed the judge’s order.
    ¶ 17   First, the plain language of subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and
    101(3.7) did not bar the physician from employing the process of
    normalization. To remind the reader, both subsections provide that
    impairment ratings “shall be based on” the revised third edition of
    the Guides. § 8-42-101 (emphasis added).
    ¶ 18   The use of the word “based” is critical to interpreting
    subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7). As a verb, it means “to find a
    foundation or basis for: to find a base for” and “to make, form, or
    serve as a base for.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
    https://perma.cc/5SP2-LPZ5. Among the many definitions of the
    noun “base,” the most relevant to this case are: “a main ingredient”;
    “a first or bottom layer of something on which other elements are
    8
    added”; “the fundamental part of something”; and “the starting
    point or line for an action or undertaking.”
    Id. ¶ 19
      So, when the legislature stated that impairment ratings shall
    be “based on” the revised third edition of the Guides, it meant that
    the revised third edition is the starting point, not the exclusive
    fount, of impairment rating methodology. By employing “based on,”
    instead of using a more limiting word such as “only,” the legislature
    made clear that doctors should have some leeway and discretion
    when determining a patient’s final impairment rating. When viewed
    from this perspective, we can see that the legislature intended the
    revised third edition to be the foundation upon which a doctor can
    begin to develop an impairment rating.
    ¶ 20   The Kansas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in
    Johnson v. U.S. Food Service, 
    478 P.3d 776
    , 779 (Kan. 2021).
    Johnson involved Kansas’s version of subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and
    101(3.7), which reads that “[t]he extent of permanent partial general
    disability shall be . . . based on [the Guides].”
    Id. (quoting 2013 Kan.
    Sess. Laws 539). The court reasoned that “[u]sing the phrase
    ‘based on’ typically signifies a guideline rather than a mandate.”
    Id. at 780.
    In other words, “[t]he use of the phrase ‘based on’ indicates
    9
    the [l]egislature intended the [Guides] to serve as a standard
    starting point . . . .” Id.; cf. Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. ___,
    ___, 
    138 S. Ct. 1765
    , 1775 (2018)(A court “imposes a sentence that
    is ‘based on’ a [federal Sentencing] Guidelines range [in a criminal
    case] if the range was a basis for the court’s exercise of discretion in
    imposing a sentence.”).
    ¶ 21   Second, in addition to referring to the revised third edition of
    the Guides, subsection 101(3)(a)(I) states that “impairment rating
    guidelines . . . shall [also] be based on . . . medical treatment
    guidelines and utilization standards.” According to the physician,
    normalization has been taught to doctors for at least ten years —
    which suggests that normalization is a utilization standard — and it
    is discussed in the Desk Aid — which indicates that normalization
    is found in medical treatment guidelines. The Desk Aid therefore
    supplies guidance for doctors who are determining permanent
    impairment ratings.
    ¶ 22   But, claimant asserts, by promulgating the Desk Aid, the
    Division of Workers’ Compensation adopted a “law[] that [was]
    contrary to” subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7). See Suetrack
    USA v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    902 P.2d 854
    , 855 (Colo. App.
    10
    1995)(“Any regulation that is contrary to or inconsistent with the
    regulatory authorizing statute is void.”).
    ¶ 23   The Division might have set up such a conflict (1) if it had
    required doctors to follow the normalization process, as described in
    the Desk Aid; or (2) if it had issued a rule under the rule-making
    process of the Administrative Procedure Act, see § 24-4-103(1),
    C.R.S. 2020, that incorporated the contents of the Desk Aid, and
    this rule “establishe[d] a norm that commands a particular result in
    all applicable proceedings,” Hammond v. Pub. Emps.’ Retirement
    Ass’n, 
    219 P.3d 426
    , 428 (Colo. App. 2009).
    ¶ 24   But it did not set up such a conflict. Rather, using the same
    reasoning that supports our conclusion that the phrase “based on”
    does not restrict doctors to using the revised third edition of the
    Guides, we further conclude that the phrase “based on” does not
    require doctors to use “medical treatment guidelines and utilization
    standards” such as the Desk Aid instead of the revised third
    edition. See § 8-42-101(3)(a)(I).
    ¶ 25   The Desk Aid was not issued pursuant to the rule-making
    process, and there is no indication that the Division intended it to
    serve as a rule that would mandate a particular result in all cases.
    11
    Rather, the Desk Aid simply “establishes guidelines that do not
    bind the agency to a particular result.” 
    Hammond, 219 P.3d at 428
    .
    For example, when discussing normalization, the Desk Aid states
    that “the Division consider[s] it reasonable to compare both
    extremities when there are specific conditions which would make the
    opposite, non-injured extremity serve as a better individual
    baseline.” (Emphasis added.) In this way, the Desk Aid serves as
    an “interpretive rule” as described by section 24-4-103(1), which is
    not subject to the formal rule-making process, including notice and
    an opportunity for comments, and which is “not meant to be
    binding . . . .” See 
    Hammond, 219 P.3d at 428
    . Indeed, the panel
    concluded that the Desk Aid was an interpretive rule, and we agree.
    ¶ 26   Third, it has long been the law that the two inquiries into
    whether, in the course of conducting a division-sponsored
    independent medical examination, a doctor properly applied the
    Guides, and whether the subsequent rating was overcome by clear
    and convincing evidence, “are questions of fact.” Wackenhut Corp.
    v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    17 P.3d 202
    , 204 (Colo. App. 2000);
    see also McLane W. Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    996 P.2d 263
    ,
    265 (Colo. App. 1999)(“Whether the . . . physician has properly
    12
    applied the . . . Guides in ascertaining the impairment rating and
    whether that rating has been overcome by clear and convincing
    evidence are questions of fact to be determined by” the judge.).
    And, because the appropriate application of the Guides is a
    question of fact, a panel will not set aside a judge’s decision if it is
    supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 
    Wackenhut, 17 P.3d at 204
    ; see also Leewaye v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    178 P.3d 1254
    , 1256 (Colo. App. 2007)(“We are bound by the [judge’s]
    factual determinations . . . if they are supported by substantial
    evidence in the record.”).
    ¶ 27   Yet, in the twenty years since Wackenhut and McLane were
    issued, the legislature has not amended subsection 101(3)(a)(I) or
    subsection 101(3.7) to change this law by limiting doctors’
    discretion or by requiring them to comply strictly with the revised
    third edition of the Guides. Indeed, despite amendments to one or
    both of these subsections in 2004 and 2009, the statutory
    statement that impairment ratings are to be “based on” the revised
    third edition remains unchanged. Because the legislature is
    presumed to be aware of judicial statutory interpretations, “where,
    as here, there is no express intent to repeal or abrogate existing law
    13
    . . . we presume that the legislature ‘accepted and ratified [our]
    prior judicial construction’ of the statute.” Sullivan v. People, 
    2020 CO 58
    , ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Swain, 
    959 P.2d 426
    , 430-31 (Colo.
    1998)).
    ¶ 28   To summarize, the Desk Aid states that the determination of
    whether normalization is necessary rests squarely with the
    examining doctor, who “may” follow normalization procedures
    “when deemed appropriate.” In our view, the Desk Aid does not
    reject the revised third edition of the Guides; rather, it expands on
    the factors upon which doctors may, in their discretion, base
    impairment ratings. And, as we have pointed out above, the
    legislature gave doctors that discretion by using the phrase “based
    on” in subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7). Given the legislature’s
    acceptance of this medical discretion, and its long-term acceptance
    of Wackenhut and McLane, we conclude that the panel’s
    interpretation of subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7) is consistent
    with the legislature’s intent. We therefore will not set it aside. See
    Zerba v. Dillon Cos., 
    2012 COA 78
    , ¶ 37 (“The [p]anel’s
    interpretation [of the Workers’ Compensation Act] will . . . be set
    aside only ‘if it is inconsistent with the clear language of the statute
    14
    or with the legislative intent.’” (quoting Support, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
    Appeals Off., 
    968 P.2d 174
    , 175 (Colo. App. 1998))).
    ¶ 29   Claimant’s two remaining contentions do not persuade us to
    reach a different conclusion.
    ¶ 30   Initially, claimant asserts, without citing any legal authority,
    that, by recommending normalization, “the Desk Aid specifically
    discriminates against individuals based on age and body habitus
    [physical build],” ostensibly because older workers are more prone
    to arthritis and cannot “remember every injury that they have
    suffer[ed] to the nonindustrial injured limb.” But he does not
    articulate how the panel’s interpretation of subsections 101(3)(a)(I)
    and 101(3.7) discriminates against him and other similarly situated
    workers. And he does not offer any examples illustrating how the
    physician, the Division, the judge, or the panel treated him
    differently or how his individual circumstances produced an
    unequal application of subsections 101(3)(a)(I) and 101(3.7). We
    decline to address this contention because he has not developed it.
    See Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    2017 COA 71
    , ¶ 41
    (declining to address “underdeveloped arguments” (quoting
    Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 
    183 P.3d 582
    , 604 (Colo. App.
    15
    2007))); Meza v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 
    2013 COA 71
    , ¶ 38
    (same).
    ¶ 31   Finally, claimant theorizes that the physician wrongly thought
    that he was required to follow the normalization procedure
    described in the Desk Aid even though its use is discretionary. But
    he does not develop this assertion either. Rather, he simply raises
    it, without offering legal authority or citations to the record to
    support it. We therefore will not address it. See Mauldin v. Lowery,
    
    127 Colo. 234
    , 236, 
    255 P.2d 976
    , 977 (1953)(“It is the task of
    counsel to inform us, as required by our rules, both as to the
    specific errors relied on and the grounds and supporting facts and
    authorities therefor.”); see also Sanchez, ¶ 62 (“‘Given the dearth of
    legal grounds offered,’ we decline to address claimant’s remaining
    arguments.” (quoting Meza, ¶ 38)).
    ¶ 32   The order is affirmed.
    JUDGE ROTHENBERG and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.
    16