People in Interest of G.B , 433 P.3d 138 ( 2018 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
May 31, 2018
2018COA77
No. 15CA1239, People in Interest of G.B. — Juvenile Court —
Delinquency
In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, a division of the court
of appeals holds that the trial court committed structural error by
excluding from two days of trial all spectators under age eighteen.
The closure did not satisfy the four requirements laid out in Waller
v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984).
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA77
Court of Appeals No. 15CA1239
Weld County District Court No. 14JD159
Honorable Thomas J. Quammen, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of G.B.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE WEBB
Richman and Fox, JJ., concur
Announced May 31, 2018
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Ryann S. Hardman,
Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, a jury convicted G.B.,
age sixteen, of offenses that would, if committed by an adult,
constitute felony sexual assault against the victim, age fifteen. The
trial court adjudicated G.B. delinquent and sentenced him to the
custody of the Division of Youth Corrections.
¶2 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that
he knew the victim was “incapable of appraising the nature of [her]
conduct.” He also contends, among other things, that the trial
court violated his right to a public trial by excluding, over objection,
all spectators during his cross-examination of the sexual assault
nurse examiner (SANE), and by excluding all spectators under age
eighteen from a significant portion of the trial. The Attorney
General concedes that G.B. preserved the sufficiency and the
under-eighteen courtroom closure issues.
¶3 We conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Resolving a
novel question in Colorado, we further conclude that because the
trial court committed structural error by excluding all spectators
under age eighteen from a significant portion of the trial, the
judgment must be reversed. The case is remanded for a new trial.
1
Because we cannot predict whether, or if so how, G.B.’s other
issues may arise on retrial, we decline to address them.
I. The Prosecution Presented Sufficient Evidence for a Reasonable
Jury to Conclude that G.B. Knew the Victim Was “Incapable of
Appraising the Nature of [Her] Conduct”
¶4 We begin with this contention because if G.B. is entitled to
reversal of his adjudication “due to insufficient evidence, the
guarantees against double jeopardy in the United States and
Colorado Constitutions may preclude retrial.” People v. Marciano,
2014 COA 92M-2, ¶ 42.
A. Background
¶5 According to the prosecution’s evidence, the victim decided to
sneak out of her parents’ Greeley home. At a friend’s house, she
contacted G.B., who was a fellow student at her high school, using
Facebook. G.B., two other students at the high school, the older
brother of one of them, and the victim drove to a party in Evans.
They all drank beer and smoked marijuana.
¶6 The victim testified that when they left the party, she was
having trouble walking. G.B. and one of the boys helped her to a
car. They drove to meet Ignacio Guzman, an adult, and returned to
the party in his four-door truck. She and G.B. stayed in the truck,
2
continuing to drink and smoke marijuana. According to the victim,
G.B. forced her to have vaginal intercourse in the truck. The jury
acquitted G.B. of this charge.
¶7 G.B., the victim, the other three boys, and Guzman left the
party together. They continued to drink and smoke marijuana.
Eventually, they went to Guzman’s house in Johnstown. Testimony
concerning what happened after that was conflicting.
¶8 The victim testified that on arriving at Guzman’s house, she
had trouble walking. She went into the bathroom, then rejoined the
others in the living room. The group continued drinking and
smoking marijuana. She was dizzy and having trouble standing up.
¶9 According to the victim, two of the boys were “helping move
myself” to the bathroom. Although she was “conscious,” she felt
that she could not do anything for herself. All the boys and
Guzman joined her in the bathroom. She testified that Guzman
forced her to perform oral sex on each of the boys. Then while
someone held her hands and ankles, each of the boys and Guzman
had vaginal intercourse with her. She told them to stop.
¶ 10 The victim testified further that the boys and Guzman left the
bathroom and then returned one by one, each of them again having
3
vaginal intercourse with her. When G.B. was in the bathroom with
her, she told him “no” and that she was in pain. Eventually, she
cleaned up her blood from the bathroom floor, returned to the living
room, and fell asleep.
¶ 11 One of the boys testified that Guzman told the victim to go to
the bathroom, but she walked there by herself. She was “high and
drunk.”
¶ 12 Guzman testified that when the group arrived at his house,
the victim was flirting, dancing, rubbing on the boys, and appeared
to be affected by drugs. He said that in the bathroom, she acted
like she wanted to have sex, no one forced her to give G.B. oral sex,
and she rejected his attempt to have anal sex. Then she suggested
that she have sex with them one at a time.
B. Law
¶ 13 An appellate court reviews the record de novo to determine if it
includes sufficient evidence to support the convictions. People v.
Douglas, 2015 COA 155, ¶ 8. In doing so, “we determine whether
the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, is both ‘substantial and sufficient’ to support the
4
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Dempsey
v. People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005)).
¶ 14 G.B. was charged under section 18-3-402(1)(b), C.R.S. 2017,
which provides that a person commits sexual assault if he
“knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a
victim” and “knows that the victim is incapable of appraising the
nature of the victim’s conduct.” The statute does not define
“incapable of appraising the nature of the victim’s conduct.” But
the supreme court has said that it “addresses the situation in which
a victim is cognitively unable to appreciate her conduct; in other
words, it involves a victim who simply cannot understand what she
is doing.” Platt v. People, 201 P.3d 545, 548 (Colo. 2009).
C. Analysis
¶ 15 G.B. argues that unlike many other cases involving section
18-3-402(1)(b), here the victim “was not mentally retarded, did not
have an extremely simplistic understanding of sexual intercourse,
was not asleep, and was not passed out or blacked out.” G.B.
continues that “[a]lthough [the victim] may have been intoxicated to
some degree,” she testified that she “knew what was going on.”
5
¶ 16 This argument, however, ignores other evidence supporting
the adjudication. For example, the victim testified, “I felt as if I
couldn’t do anything for myself.” She explained, “I could feel myself
moving . . . but it was hard for me to lift, like, my arm or to be able
to walk on my own.” She also testified that she did not remember
certain things about that night until she started having nightmares
and flashbacks months later. And several witnesses testified about
the victim’s alcohol and drug use during the evening.
¶ 17 Our role is not to sit as a thirteenth juror and reweigh the
evidence heard by the jury. People v. Bertrand, 2014 COA 142, ¶ 15
(“It was within the sole province of the jury to determine the weight
of the evidence and to resolve any conflicts and inconsistencies in
witness testimony.”). Instead, viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that it is sufficient to
support a conclusion by a reasonable jury that G.B. knew the
victim was incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct.
II. The Trial Court Violated G.B.’s Right to a Public Trial
¶ 18 G.B. next contends the trial court violated his right to a public
trial by excluding all spectators from his cross-examination of the
SANE and all spectators under age eighteen from a significant
6
portion of the trial. He asserts that because this error is structural,
we must reverse the adjudication and remand for a new trial. We
conclude that exclusion of all spectators under age eighteen from a
significant portion of the trial was a structural error that requires
reversal. Based on this conclusion, we need not address the cross-
examination issue.
A. Relevant Facts
¶ 19 During the prosecution’s case, just before the paramedics who
treated the victim testified, the court asked counsel, “What are they
going to talk about?” The court explained to counsel “there[ are]
children in here, and I will excuse them when it starts getting down
to the nitty-gritty stuff.” Then the following discussion occurred:
THE COURT: Do you know who these children
are back here?
PROSECUTOR: They’re with [G.B.], I believe.
THE COURT: I’m going to ask them to leave. I
don’t think it’s good for children to be listening
to this.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I understand the Court’s
position. I’ll just pose an objection on [G.B.’s]
right to a speedy and public trial.
THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. I have to
also counter — I also have to balance that with
topics that I just don’t think are in the best
7
interest of a child to hear. So I respect that.
But I’m going to . . . ask the children — do you
know what their ages are?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don’t, Judge. I’m not
actually sure who they are.
THE COURT: Okay. Well . . . I’m going to ask
that the children be excused when we have
testimony about sexual things. I know that
there is an objection on the basis of a public
trial, but I’ve got to balance that. Having a
little child hear this type of stuff, I just . . .
think it’s harmful for a child to hear this, so
I’m going to have them leave . . . .
¶ 20 The next day, the parties discussed closing the courtroom to
the general public during the presentation of photographs of the
victim’s genitalia. Although G.B. did not object to this narrow
closure, he reiterated his prior objection to closing the courtroom
and said “our objection stands there. We would still like the
courtroom to be open and public.” After that, the trial court said:
And I also, in this particular case, am
excluding children from the gallery. I don’t do
that because the Court is concerned about
whether they are going to be talking or — that
is not the Court’s concern. The Court’s
concern is that it is not in the best interests of
a young child to be hearing this type of
evidence. And I just don’t think that it’s good
for a child to hear this. Their parents may
disagree, but I disagree with them if they
disagree with me on that. So . . . I have
8
directed the courtroom bailiff from —
excluding children from the courtroom for that
purpose.
The courtroom deputy asked the trial court, “Is there an age limit
that you want me . . . .” The court responded, “No. If they are
children under 18, then they should — probably should not be
here.”
¶ 21 The record does not indicate whether the courtroom was ever
reopened to spectators under age eighteen. The closure occurred
on the seventh day of the trial. Further evidence was presented
over the next two days. Counsel made closing arguments on day
nine.
B. Standard of Review
¶ 22 “A trial court’s decision to close the courtroom presents a
mixed question of law and fact.” People v. Hassen, 2015 CO 49,
¶ 5. We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by the
record, but review its ultimate legal conclusion de novo. Id.
C. Law
¶ 23 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee a
criminal defendant the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amends.
VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. Violation of this right is a
9
structural error requiring reversal without any showing of
prejudice. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999);
Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984). Still, this right is not
absolute; it may give way “to other rights or interests, such as the
defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in
inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Waller, 467 U.S. at
45; Anderson v. People, 176 Colo. 224, 226, 490 P.2d 47, 48 (1971).
¶ 24 To close a courtroom without violating a defendant’s public
trial right, four requirements must be met. First, “the party seeking
to close the [proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is
likely to be prejudiced.” Hassen, ¶ 9 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at
48). Second, “the closure must be no broader than necessary to
protect that interest.” Id. (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). Third,
“the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding.” Id. (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). And fourth, the
trial court “must make findings adequate to support the closure.”
Id. (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).
10
D. Analysis
1. The First Waller Requirement — Overriding Interest
¶ 25 The trial court closed the courtroom to spectators under age
eighteen because it was “not in the best interests of a young child to
be hearing this type of evidence.” G.B. argues that under Waller,
this reason did not constitute an “overriding interest.”
¶ 26 G.B. relies on Thompson v. People, 156 Colo. 416, 426-27, 399
P.2d 776, 781-82 (1965), where our supreme court said:
[W]hatever may have been the view in an
earlier and more formally modest age, we think
that the franker and more realistic attitude of
the present day toward matters of sex
precludes a determination that all members of
the public, the mature and experienced as well
as the immature and impressionable, may
reasonably be excluded from the trial of a
sexual offense upon the ground of public
morals.
Although Thompson referred to the “immature and
impressionable,” the closure there involved all of the general public
— not just children. Id. So, while we must follow the decisions of
our supreme court, Thompson does not resolve the issue before us.
¶ 27 And unlike in Thompson, courts in other jurisdictions have
recognized “[i]t is everywhere conceded that minors deserve special
11
consideration and may be excluded from the courtroom in trials of a
salacious nature.” State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn.
1966); see also Marshall v. State, 258 N.E.2d 628, 630 (Ind. 1970)
(“In the trial for a sex offense . . . many courts have held that,
because of the nature of the offense and the type of evidence which
will be elicited, youthful spectators may be excluded.”); 6 Wayne R.
LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.1(b), Westlaw (4th ed.
database updated Dec. 2017) (“Earlier cases took the view that in
the trial of sex offenses the general public, or at least youthful
spectators, could be excluded from the courtroom to protect public
morals.”).
¶ 28 In disputing whether an overriding interest is at stake, the
Attorney General urges us to follow the standard mentioned in
People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371, 379 (Colo. App. 2007), that where
“the courtroom is only partially closed to the public” — as here —
“there need only be a ‘“substantial” interest, rather than a
“compelling” one.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d
542, 546 (10th Cir. 1991)). According to the Attorney General,
12
excluding children from the courtroom based on age-inappropriate
evidence constitutes at least a substantial interest.1
¶ 29 G.B. responds that excluding such spectators does not
constitute even a substantial interest. He points out that children
under age eighteen may consent to sexual conduct under section
18-3-402(1)(e).
¶ 30 Be that as it may, no Colorado court has embraced the
substantial interest standard for partial closures. See Whitman,
205 P.3d at 379 (explaining that the reason for the closure “satisfies
either the overriding or substantial interest standards”). The
Supreme Court has not addressed this question and other
jurisdictions are divided. Compare Galloway, 937 F.2d at 546 (“[A]
different standard applies where the courtroom is only partially
closed to the public . . . .”), with People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524,
529 (N.Y. 2001) (“We believe that there is no need to adopt such an
articulation of the Waller standard since Waller already
1 In arguing that a substantial interest exists, the Attorney General
relies on section 19-1-106(2), C.R.S. 2017, and section 19-2-110,
C.R.S. 2017, both of which allow the closing of a juvenile trial if it is
in the best interests of the juvenile or the community. But here the
trial court’s findings focused on the interests of “child attendees” at
trial, not the best interests of G.B. or the community.
13
contemplates a balancing of competing interests in closure
decisions.”).
¶ 31 On this record, we need not decide whether the substantial
interest standard applies. See Developmental Pathways v. Ritter,
178 P.3d 524, 535 (Colo. 2008) (“[T]he principle of judicial restraint
requires us to ‘avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of
the necessity of deciding them.’” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988))). Regardless
of whether excluding children is a compelling interest, only a
substantial interest, or something less, the trial court’s closure did
not satisfy the second and third Waller requirements.2 See United
States v. Simmons, 797 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2015) (Courts “that
have distinguished between partial closures and total closures
modify the Waller test so that the ‘overriding interest’ requirement is
replaced by requiring a showing of a ‘substantial reason’ for a
partial closure, but the other three factors remain the same.”)
(emphasis added); see also Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 216
(2010) (per curiam) (“[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the trial
2 The Attorney General does not dispute that even under the
substantial interest standard, the remaining three Waller
requirements must still be met.
14
court had an overriding interest in closing [the courtroom], it was
still incumbent upon it to consider all reasonable alternatives to
closure. It did not, and that is all this Court needs to decide.”).
2. The Second Waller Requirement — No Broader Than Necessary
¶ 32 G.B. argues that closing the courtroom to all spectators under
age eighteen was broader than necessary. We agree.
¶ 33 Under Waller, a courtroom closure may not be any broader
than necessary to protect the overriding interest. In other words,
the closure must strike “‘a careful balance of interests’ that results
in the exclusion of only those persons” necessary to protect the
overriding interest. State v. Hood, 320 P.3d 522, 526 (N.M. Ct. App.
2014) (quoting State v. Turrietta, 308 P.3d 964, 972 (N.M. 2013)).
¶ 34 Under this requirement, some courts addressing courtroom
closures excluding all children have warned that such an “approach
may be carried too far.” Marshall, 258 N.E.2d at 630. Reynolds v.
State, 126 So. 2d 497 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961), is illustrative.
¶ 35 There, the court held that because excluding from the
courtroom all children under age eighteen went beyond excluding
merely “children of tender age,” the closure violated the defendant’s
right to public trial. Id. at 498. The court explained:
15
[W]e do not think that the exclusion of
“children of tender age” can be deemed to
include persons of the ages excluded from the
trial by the court below, that is, “children of
eighteen years or less.” Persons of eighteen
years of age can hardly be deemed children of
“tender age.” Males of that age are subject to
military service. In some states persons of
that age can vote. In this State a female of
eighteen years of age may marry without her
parent’s consent.
Id.; see also McConnaughey v. United States, 804 A.2d 334, 342
n.10 (D.C. 2002) (“A barring of all children, rather than a select few,
might present a closer constitutional question . . . .”).
¶ 36 In contrast, where a trial court imposes a narrow closure
related to only young children, the public trial right is not violated.
See Covington v. Lord, 275 F. Supp. 2d 352, 358 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (A
trial court’s exclusion of one “young boy from a murder trial did not
infringe any of the core values that the public trial right protects.”),
aff’d, 111 F. App’x 647 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Davis v. Walsh, No.
CV 08-4659(PKC), 2015 WL 1809048, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2015)
(“Only the [four-year-old] child was excluded, so the closure was no
broader than necessary.”).
¶ 37 Recall that here the courtroom closure was based on the trial
court’s desire to prevent “a young child [from] hearing this type of
16
evidence.” Yet, the closure went well beyond “a young child” and
excluded all spectators under age eighteen. Such a broad closure
was especially problematic given the ages of G.B., the victim, and
many trial witnesses, all of whom were under age eighteen.
¶ 38 The trial court’s closure could have prevented peers of G.B.
and the victim from attending the trial, undermining two goals
served by the public trial right: to encourage witnesses to come
forward and to discourage perjury. Hassen, ¶ 15; see Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 (1979) (“Openness in court
proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown
witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, [and] cause all
trial participants to perform their duties more conscientiously
. . . .”). In contrast, young children would not have had a similar
interest in the proceeding. See Sobin v. United States, 606 A.2d
1029, 1033-34 (D.C. 1992) (Excluding “two children of tender years
. . . in no way undermined the public policy goals identified above
which are advanced by the requirement that criminal proceedings
be open.”).
¶ 39 For these reasons, we conclude that closing the courtroom to
all spectators under age eighteen — for the remainder of the trial —
17
was broader than necessary to achieve the trial court’s legitimate
interest in protecting young children from exposure to
age-inappropriate evidence. This conclusion brings us to whether
the trial court considered any reasonable alternatives.
3. The Third Waller Requirement — Reasonable Alternatives
¶ 40 G.B. argues that the trial court failed to consider reasonable
alternatives when it closed the courtroom to all spectators under
age eighteen. Again, we agree.
¶ 41 Under Waller, the trial court was required to consider
reasonable alternatives to the closure “even when they are not
offered by the parties.” Presley, 558 U.S. at 214; see
Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 2 N.E.3d 145, 151 (Mass. 2014)
(“Before ordering any closure of a court room, whether full or
partial, a judge ‘must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the
proceeding . . . .’” (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48)). This is so
because “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable
measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.”
Presley, 558 U.S. at 215.
¶ 42 The Attorney General responds that the court must have
considered reasonable alternatives because it only ordered a partial
18
closure of the courtroom rather than a total closure (other than as
to cross-examination of the SANE), and only during part rather
than all of the trial. This response misses the mark in two ways.
¶ 43 First, the record does not show that the trial court considered
any alternatives to the exclusion of all spectators under age
eighteen. See People v. Richards, 795 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Colo. App.
1989) (“In this case, there is no indication in the record that the
court adequately considered all of these factors. Of particular
importance is the fact that the trial court failed to consider the
other reasonable and less drastic alternatives available . . . .”).
¶ 44 Second, even if “instituting a partial closure might, in some
cases, satisfy a court’s obligation to consider reasonable
alternatives, it might not satisfy that obligation in other situations.”
State v. Tucker, 290 P.3d 1248, 1258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
Specifically, “if the partial closure under consideration is not
sufficiently limited to comply with Waller’s second requirement, the
court must consider other alternatives.” Id. And as we have
concluded above, the closure was not narrowly tailored.
¶ 45 For example, G.B. asserts that “[i]f the court was concerned
about young children hearing the evidence, [it] could have
19
considered excluding only children under [age] twelve or thirteen.”
After all, “[c]hildren today are more ‘streetwise’ and knowledgeable
than children were even a few decades ago.” Belcher v. Charleston
Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837 n.12 (W. Va. 1992) (citation
omitted). The court could have considered an exception for
spectators who were identified as G.B.’s relatives, regardless of their
ages. See People v. Richardson, 744 N.Y.S.2d 407, 407 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (“The trial court’s exclusion of defendant’s children, ages
eight and nine, from the courtroom violated defendant’s right to a
public trial . . . .”). And it could have exempted from the exclusion
persons under age eighteen who were students in the high school
that G.B. and the victim attended, a community that had a
particular “interest in seeing that offenders are brought to account.”
United States v. Cojab, 996 F.2d 1404, 1407 (2d Cir. 1993); see also
In re J.R.L., 738 S.E.2d 144, 148 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing
“the community’s need for a full and public trial”).
¶ 46 Because the trial court did not expressly consider any of these
less drastic alternatives, the court failed to meet the third Waller
requirement.
20
¶ 47 In the end, based on the second and third Waller
requirements, we conclude that the trial court erred in closing the
courtroom to all spectators under age eighteen. In saying this
much, we take care to explain what we do not mean to say. Trial
courts have a legitimate concern in protecting young children from
exposure to salacious evidence that is potentially disturbing to
them. But balancing that concern against the public trial right
based on a bright-line test of excluding all spectators under age
eighteen will rarely survive constitutional scrutiny.
4. Remedy
¶ 48 The Attorney General asserts that even if the trial court failed
to satisfy one or more of the Waller requirements, “to the extent that
it is not clear how long the children were excluded for, this Court
may remand for any perceived deficiency in the record rather than
reversing under structural error.” We decline to remand.
¶ 49 Only one Colorado case has remanded for findings on this
issue. People v. Thomas, 832 P.2d 990, 993 (Colo. App. 1991). In
Thomas, whether closure even occurred was unclear, and if it did,
the closure may have been so “momentary and fleeting” as to be de
minimis. Id.
21
¶ 50 Unlike in Thomas, here the record is clear that the closure was
neither momentary nor fleeting. The trial court told the parties that
it was excluding spectators under age eighteen two days before
closing arguments. See Hassen, ¶ 16 (“Given that the testimony of
the two undercover officers totaled roughly twenty-seven pages in
the trial transcript, we cannot conclude that the multiple closures
were ‘extremely short.’”).
¶ 51 Nor was G.B. required to prove that specific spectators under
age eighteen attempted to enter the courtroom after the trial court’s
order, but were excluded. See Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321, 331
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“When determining whether a defendant
has proved that his trial was closed to the public, the focus is not
on whether the defendant can show that someone was actually
excluded. Rather, a reviewing court must look to the totality of the
evidence and determine whether the trial court fulfilled its
obligation ‘to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public
attendance at criminal trials.’” (quoting Presley, 558 U.S. at 215)).
¶ 52 As well, remand would waste judicial resources. By any fair
account, the closure was not narrowly tailored. The trial court
could not now find otherwise. Nor did the trial court even consider
22
any alternatives. So, whatever alternatives the court might
belatedly recognize on remand would not shore up its earlier
decision. See Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 327, 338 n.2 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2011) (“Although an appellate court may, in some
circumstances, remand a cause . . . to supplement the record with
specific findings in compliance with Waller, such a remand is not
necessary in this case.”).
III. Conclusion
¶ 53 The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new
trial.
JUDGE RICHMAN and JUDGE FOX concur.
23