In re Stanley v. District Attorney for the 18th Judicial District , 395 P.3d 1198 ( 2017 )

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA33
Court of Appeals No. 16CA0588
Arapahoe County District Court No. 15CV30140
Honorable Elizabeth A. Weishaupl, Judge
In the Matter of Douglas Roy Stanley,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
District Attorney for the 18th Judicial District, State of Colorado,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB
Rothenberg* and Casebolt*, JJ., concur
Announced March 9, 2017
Forrest W. Lewis, P.C., Forrest W. Lewis, Golden, Colorado, for Petitioner-
Appellant
George H. Brauchler, District Attorney, Richard H. Orman, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Centennial, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2016.
¶1 Petitioner, Douglas Roy Stanley, is a sex offender convicted in
California of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor. He appeals
the district court’s denial of his petition to discontinue sex offender
registration in Colorado based on California’s decision to terminate
his registration requirement in that state. We affirm the district
court’s order.
I. Background
¶2 In 2001, Stanley pleaded no contest and was subsequently
convicted and sentenced in California of a sexual offense under
California Penal Code section 261.5(d) (West 2016), “Unlawful
sexual intercourse with [a] person under 18.” Stanley, then twenty-
nine years old, had sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old girl.
¶3 Stanley successfully completed his California probation, and
his conviction was eventually reduced to a misdemeanor.1
¶4 In November 2014, the California Department of Justice (DOJ)
notified Stanley in a letter that his statutory requirement to register
in California as a sex offender under California Penal Code section
1The record is unclear as to Stanley’s original California sentence
and the original level of his conviction (i.e., felony or misdemeanor).
However, this information does not affect the outcome of this
appeal.
1
290 (West 2016) had been terminated. The California DOJ did not
give a reason for the termination of the registration requirement.
¶5 In January 2015, Stanley filed a pro se petition in the
Arapahoe County District Court to discontinue sex offender
registration in Colorado for a non-Colorado conviction under section
16-22-113, C.R.S. 2016.2 The petition filed by Stanley was a form
document that tracked the language of section 16-22-113 by listing
the various circumstances under which an offender can petition to
discontinue registration. See JDF 473, Petition to Discontinue Sex
Offender Registration Non-Colorado Conviction or Juvenile
Adjudication or Disposition (revised Oct. 2013),
https://perma.cc/Y5PA-T7UC. On the form, offenders are required
to state that none of the statutory prohibitions regarding ineligibility
as set forth in section 16-22-113(3) apply to them, and check the
2 The record is unclear as to whether Stanley has ever registered in
Colorado or if his petition was preemptive. However, we use the
term “discontinue registration” to refer to Stanley’s action in the
district court because that is how he titled his petition and how the
relevant statute, section 16-22-113, C.R.S. 2016, is worded. § 16-
22-113(1) (An offender may file a “petition . . . for an order to
discontinue the requirement for such registration or internet
posting, or both.”).
2
box next to their circumstances of conviction that would allow them
to petition for removal from the registry. Id.
¶6 In his petition, Stanley checked the following as his conviction
circumstances:
The offense for which I was required to register
was a class 4, 5, or 6 felony or was a class 1
misdemeanor of unlawful sexual contact or
third degree sexual assault and it has been 10
years since my final release from the
jurisdiction of the Court or discharge from the
Department of Corrections. I have not been
subsequently convicted or adjudicated for any
offense involving unlawful sexual behavior[.]
Stanley failed to check the box that affirmed “[t]he statutory
prohibitions regarding ineligibility to file this Petition as set forth at
§ 16-22-113(3), C.R.S. do not apply to me.”
¶7 On the same date the petition was filed, a Colorado attorney
representing Stanley filed a supplement to the petition. The
supplement stated that, although Stanley currently resided in
California, he had family in Arapahoe and Jefferson Counties in
Colorado, and he wanted to travel to and stay in Colorado for
potentially prolonged periods of time, recognizing that travel would
result in him being considered a temporary resident of Colorado for
purposes of sex offender registration. The supplement also set forth
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additional facts regarding Stanley’s rehabilitation and attached
supporting documentation that he was no longer required to
register as a sex offender in the State of California (the California
DOJ letter). The supplement also conceded that Stanley’s offense, if
committed in Colorado, would be a violation of section 18-3-402,
C.R.S. 2016, sexual assault, or section 18-3-404(1.5), C.R.S. 2016,
unlawful sexual contact.3 The supplement to the petition did not
correct Stanley’s failure to affirm that none of the prohibitions in
section 16-22-113(3) applied to his situation.
¶8 In a written order, the district court reviewed the plain
language of the relevant sex offender registration statutes and
denied Stanley’s petition, concluding that, as a matter of law, he
3 It is important to note that Stanley’s California conviction was not
for unlawful “sexual contact” with a minor, but for unlawful “sexual
intercourse” with a minor. This is an important distinction
because, in California, “sexual intercourse” under California Penal
Code section 261.5 (West 2016) is defined as any penetration,
however slight, of the vagina by the penis. Cal. Penal Code § 263
(West 2016); Cal. Crim. Jury Instr. 10.40.2 (2016). In Colorado,
penetration results in a sexual assault conviction as opposed to
unlawful sexual contact. § 18-3-401(4), (6), C.R.S. 2016 (definition
of sexual contact versus sexual penetration); compare § 18-3-402,
C.R.S. 2016, with § 18-3-404, C.R.S 2016. Moreover, Stanley does
not argue on appeal that the district court improperly found that
the comparable Colorado crime was section 18-3-402. Therefore,
for purposes of our analysis, Stanley’s conduct, if committed in
Colorado, would have violated section 18-3-402.
4
was ineligible for relief under section 16-22-113(3) because his
crime, if committed in Colorado, would have been a violation of
section 18-3-402 and consequently required lifetime sex offender
registration.
¶9 Stanley now appeals, arguing that the district court erred as a
matter of law in its interpretation of section 16-22-113(3).
II. Standard of Review
¶ 10 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo. E.g., Curtiss v. People, 2014 COA 107, ¶ 6. “As with any
statute, our primary task is to give effect to the General Assembly’s
intent by first examining the statute’s plain language.” Id. We
must read and consider the statute as a whole in order to give
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id.
However, a statutory interpretation leading to an illogical or absurd
result will not be followed. Id.
III. Applicable Statutes
¶ 11 To address Stanley’s argument on appeal, we must analyze the
statutes in California and Colorado regarding his conviction and the
relevant portions of the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act
(CSORA), sections 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2016.
5
A. Stanley’s Conduct
¶ 12 Stanley was convicted in California under penal code section
261.5(d), which provides: “Any person 21 years of age or older who
engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who
is under 16 years of age is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a
felony . . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(d).
¶ 13 In his petition for discontinuation of registration, Stanley
conceded that, if committed in Colorado, his offense would have
been a violation of section 18-3-402(1), specifically subsection (1)(e),
which provides as follows:
(1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual
intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim
commits sexual assault if:
....
(e) At the time of the commission of the act, the
victim is at least fifteen years of age but less
than seventeen years of age and the actor is at
least ten years older than the victim and is not
the spouse of the victim . . . .
The offense described in subsection (1)(e) is a class 1 misdemeanor
and is an extraordinary risk crime subject to the modified
sentencing range in section 18-1.3-501(3), C.R.S. 2016. § 18-3-
402(3). The General Assembly has found that a violation of section
6
18-3-402(1)(e) “present[s] an extraordinary risk of harm to society.”
§ 18-1.3-501(3).
B. CSORA
¶ 14 The purpose of sex offender registration is not to inflict
additional punishment on a person convicted of a sexual offense,
but rather to aid law enforcement officials in investigating future
sex crimes and to protect the public safety. Curtiss, ¶ 8 (citing
People v. Brooks, 2012 COA 52, ¶ 9).
¶ 15 As of 1998, several classes of persons have been statutorily
required to register as sex offenders pursuant to the provisions of
section 16-22-108, C.R.S. 2016. § 16-22-103(1), C.R.S. 2016.
Under section 16-22-103(2)(a), persons convicted after July 1,
1994, of “unlawful sexual behavior” are required to register as sex
offenders. The definition of “unlawful sexual behavior” for purposes
of registration includes sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-
402. § 16-22-102(9)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2016.
¶ 16 A sex offender with a non-Colorado conviction is required to
register in the State of Colorado pursuant to section 16-22-108 if,
as a result of the conviction, [the offender] is,
was, has been, or would be required to register
if he or she resided in the state or jurisdiction
7
of conviction, or . . . such person would be
required to register if convicted in Colorado . . .
so long as such person is a temporary or
permanent resident of Colorado.
§ 16-22-103(3). A “temporary resident” means a person who is a
resident of another state but is in Colorado temporarily because the
person is, as relevant to Stanley’s situation, “[p]resent in Colorado
for more than fourteen consecutive business days or for an
aggregate period of more than thirty days in a calendar year for any
purpose, including but not limited to vacation, travel, or
retirement.” § 16-22-102(8)(c).
¶ 17 CSORA also sets forth procedures and requirements for
discontinuing an offender’s duty to register in Colorado. Under
certain circumstances, an offender with a non-Colorado conviction
is expressly allowed to petition a Colorado court for an order to
discontinue the requirement for registration in Colorado. § 16-22-
113(1.5). The procedure for an out-of-state offender to petition a
Colorado court for discontinuation of registration is as follows:
If the conviction that requires a person to
register pursuant to the provisions of section
16-22-103 was not obtained from a Colorado
court, the person seeking to discontinue
registration or internet posting or both may file
a civil case with the district court of the
8
judicial district in which the person resides
and seek a civil order to discontinue the
requirement to register or internet posting or
both under the circumstances specified in
subsection (1) of this section.
§ 16-22-113(1.5). Subsection (1) provides specific details as to
persons eligible for relief under section 16-22-113 “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in subsection (3)” of the statute. § 16-22-113(1)
(emphasis added).
¶ 18 Pertinent to Stanley’s petition, subsection (3)(b)(I) specifically
excludes those persons who were convicted as adults of sexual
assault in violation of section 18-3-402. § 16-22-113(3)(b)(I).
Instead, those offenders are “subject for the remainder of their
natural lives to the registration requirements specified in this article
or to the comparable requirements of any other jurisdictions in
which they may reside.” § 16-22-113(3).
IV. Analysis
A. CSORA Precludes Stanley’s Requested Relief
as a Matter of Law
¶ 19 We conclude, as did the district court, that the plain language
of CSORA precludes Stanley, as a matter of law, from discontinuing
sex offender registration in Colorado as a temporary resident.
9
¶ 20 We start with the basic premise that Stanley, as a potential
temporary resident of Colorado, is required to register in Colorado
as a sex offender because of his California conviction. Section 16-
22-103(3) requires Stanley to register in Colorado because he was
and had been subject to California sex offender registration. In
addition, Stanley must register in Colorado because he was
convicted in California of an offense that would require registration
in Colorado — namely, sexual assault in violation of section
18-3-402(1)(e). §§ 16-22-102(9)(a)(I), 16-22-103(2)(a), (3); cf.
Curtiss, ¶ 10.
¶ 21 However, as previously mentioned, CSORA provides sex
offenders living or staying in Colorado with a non-Colorado
conviction a potential avenue for discontinuing Colorado sex
offender registration by following the procedures in section 16-22-
113(1). § 16-22-113(1.5). But, subsection (1) is explicitly limited by
the restrictions in subsection (3). § 16-22-113(1).
¶ 22 Turning to subsection (3), adult offenders who were convicted
of sexual assault under section 18-3-402 are expressly excluded
from discontinuing sex offender registration and are required to
register in Colorado for the remainder of their natural lives. § 16-
10
22-113(3)(b)(I). Therefore, read in context with 16-22-103(3), we
interpret section 16-22-113(3) to mandate that persons convicted
outside of Colorado of offenses comparable to those proscribed in
section 18-3-402 are expressly precluded from seeking relief from
Colorado sex offender registration requirements and are subject to
lifetime registration as long as they remain temporary or permanent
residents of Colorado.
¶ 23 Thus, because Stanley was convicted of a California offense
that is comparable to sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-
402(1)(e), he is precluded, as a matter of law, from discontinuing his
requirement to register under section 16-22-108 as a sex offender
in Colorado if he resides here as a temporary resident as defined
under section 16-22-102(8).
B. Language in Section 16-22-113(3) Does Not Provide an
Exception for Non-Colorado Offenders No Longer Required to
Register in Their State of Conviction
¶ 24 Stanley asserts on appeal that the language of section 16-22-
113(3) allows for discontinuation of registration when the offender
was convicted outside of Colorado and the state of conviction no
longer requires registration in that state. Specifically, he relies on
the disjunctive language in section 16-22-113(3), that offenders
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convicted of certain sex-based offenses are subject to lifetime
registration “or to the comparable requirements of any other
jurisdictions in which they may reside,” to argue that he should not
be required to register in Colorado when the state where he resides,
California, no longer requires him to register as a sex offender. We
are not persuaded and reject Stanley’s argument for the following
four reasons.
¶ 25 First, Stanley’s argument ignores the plain language preceding
the “other jurisdictions” phrase — namely, that the persons listed in
that subsection are expressly ineligible for relief under section 16-
22-113. In interpreting statutes, we must construe the language so
as to give effect to every word, and we cannot adopt a construction
that renders any term superfluous or meaningless. People v. Vigil,
2013 COA 102, ¶ 13. Adopting Stanley’s interpretation of section
16-22-113(3) would render the language that certain persons are
ineligible for relief from registration superfluous. In our view, the
phrase is not meant to provide an exception to the statutory
declaration that the persons listed in subsection (1.5) are ineligible
for relief.
12
¶ 26 Second, to interpret subsection (3) as Stanley suggests would
result in different registration requirements for persons who are
convicted of sexual assault in Colorado and those who are convicted
of comparable offenses in another state. A division of this court
noted in Curtiss that if a person with an out-of-state conviction for
an offense comparable to sex assault on a child in Colorado would
be eligible to discontinue registration but a person convicted in
Colorado of the same offense would not be eligible to discontinue
registration, such an interpretation “would produce an illogical and
absurd result as a matter of law.” Curtiss, ¶ 20. We see no
meaningful difference between the conviction for sexual assault
here and the conviction for sexual assault on a child in Curtiss,
especially considering the young age of Stanley’s victim (fifteen).
Accordingly, we apply the division’s analysis in Curtiss, with which
we agree, to this case. Id.
¶ 27 We reject Stanley’s argument that Curtiss is distinguishable
from his situation because Curtiss was a permanent resident of
Colorado when he filed his petition to discontinue sex offender
registration. It is a distinction without a difference that Stanley
would be a temporary resident of Colorado. Under section 16-22-
13
103(3), Stanley is required to register in Colorado if he is a
temporary or permanent resident of Colorado, meaning that the
statute does not differentiate based on residency status, and the
requirement to register is for both temporary and permanent
residents.
¶ 28 Third, Stanley’s interpretation of the pertinent statutes is
inconsistent with the central statutory intent of CSORA to assist
law enforcement officials and protect the public safety, Curtiss, ¶¶
8, 20, because such a reading would necessarily mean that persons
convicted in another state of sexual assault on a minor, and who
are now residing in Colorado, would not be registered with law
enforcement officials or be known to the public. This is especially
so considering that sexual assault as defined under section 18-3-
402(1)(e) is deemed by the General Assembly to present an
extraordinary risk of harm to the public. § 18-1.3-501(3).
¶ 29 Fourth, Stanley’s interpretation takes the “other jurisdictions”
phrase out of context. The provisions of section 16-22-113 assume
that the offender was convicted in Colorado; subsection (1.5) allows
certain persons convicted out-of-state to also petition the courts for
discontinuation of registration. Thus, in the context of a Colorado
14
offender, the phrase “or to the comparable requirements of any
other jurisdictions in which they may reside” means that certain
persons convicted in Colorado are not eligible for relief from
Colorado registration requirements and are subject to lifetime
registration in Colorado or to the comparable registration
requirements in any other state in which they reside. Applied to the
situation here, if Stanley had been convicted under section 18-3-
402 in Colorado he would be subject to lifetime registration in
Colorado without the ability to petition for relief, and if he moved to
another jurisdiction, he would be subject to the comparable
registration laws of that jurisdiction. In other words, the “other
jurisdictions” phrase does not allow non-Colorado offenders who
reside in Colorado to discontinue registration here simply because
the laws or administrative agencies in their original or primary
states of residence no longer require them to register in those
states.
¶ 30 More importantly, in our view, the “other jurisdictions” phrase
does not reflect an intent by the General Assembly to allow
registration laws or administrative decisions in other states to take
precedence over Colorado registration requirements for persons
15
temporarily or permanently residing in Colorado. Indeed, section
16-22-103(3) provides that non-Colorado offenders are subject to
registration if they were or had been subject to registration
requirements in the state of conviction. We cannot conclude, as
Stanley’s interpretation necessitates, that the “other jurisdictions”
phrase in 16-22-113(3) elevates California’s decision regarding sex
offender registration over Colorado’s registration laws.
V. Conclusion
¶ 31 The district court’s order denying Stanley’s petition is affirmed.
JUDGE ROTHENBERG and JUDGE CASEBOLT concur.
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