75, People in Interest of D.L.C ( 2019 )


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  •      The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
    constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
    the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
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    Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
    should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
    SUMMARY
    August 29, 2019
    2019COA135
    No. 2018CA0575 People in Interest of D.L.C. — Juvenile Court
    — Delinquency — Sentencing — Restitution
    In this appeal of a juvenile’s restitution obligation resulting
    from his adjudication, a division of the court of appeals considers
    whether a juvenile court may suspend accrual of postjudgment
    interest on restitution for a juvenile while he is committed to the
    Division of Youth Services under the juvenile restitution statute.
    The division concludes it cannot and affirms the district court’s
    order denying D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.
    COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2019COA135
    Court of Appeals No. 18CA0575
    El Paso County District Court No. 16JD742
    Honorable G. David Miller, Judge
    The People of the State of Colorado,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    In the Interest of D.L.C.,
    Juvenile-Appellant.
    ORDER AFFIRMED
    Division I
    Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE
    Taubman and Grove, JJ., concur
    Announced August 29, 2019
    Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney
    General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
    Amy D. Trenary, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
    Juvenile-Appellant
    ¶1      Under the juvenile restitution statute, may a juvenile court
    suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on restitution for a
    juvenile while he is committed to the Division of Youth Services
    (DYS)? We answer “no” and affirm the district court’s order denying
    D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.
    I.    Factual Background and Procedural History
    ¶2      D.L.C. pleaded guilty to aggravated motor vehicle theft. He
    also agreed to pay restitution. The juvenile court magistrate
    sentenced D.L.C. to probation and granted the People’s restitution
    request, ordering D.L.C. to pay $59,417.07 1 in restitution.
    ¶3      Later, the magistrate revoked D.L.C.’s probation after he
    pleaded guilty to committing other offenses in a different case
    (17JD487) and committed D.L.C. to DYS. 2 The magistrate ordered
    D.L.C. to pay restitution in this case and also made it a condition of
    his parole in case 17JD487 after his commitment to DYS.
    ¶4      D.L.C. filed a motion asking the magistrate to suspend
    postjudgment interest on restitution in this case and case 17JD487
    while he is committed to DYS. After the magistrate denied the
    1   This amount was later amended to $56,349.07.
    2   D.L.C. also appeals from case 17JD487 in 18CA0574.
    1
    motion, D.L.C. asked the district court to review the magistrate’s
    order. The district court upheld the magistrate’s order, finding that
    it didn’t have authority to suspend postjudgment interest under the
    statutory scheme or case law.
    II.     Postjudgment Restitution Interest Can’t Be Suspended for a
    Juvenile Under the Adult Restitution Statute
    ¶5         D.L.C. contends that the district court erred in refusing to
    suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on his restitution
    obligation while he is committed to DYS because section
    19-2-918(2), C.R.S. 2018, authorizes such suspension “to ensure
    that restitution is ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner.” We
    disagree.
    A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    ¶6         We generally review a trial court’s restitution order for an
    abuse of discretion. See People v. Henry, 
    2018 COA 48M
    , ¶ 12; cf.
    People v. Barbre, 
    2018 COA 123
    , ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion
    when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
    or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Henry, ¶ 12. We
    review de novo statutory interpretation questions. See Cowen v.
    2
    People, 
    2018 CO 96
    , ¶ 11; Dubois v. People, 
    211 P.3d 41
    , 43 (Colo.
    2009).
    ¶7    Our primary purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain
    and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Cowen, ¶ 12. We
    look first to the statute’s language, giving words and phrases their
    plain and ordinary meanings. Doubleday v. People, 
    2016 CO 3
    ,
    ¶ 19. We read statutory words and phrases in context and construe
    them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id.;
    Marquez v. People, 
    2013 CO 58
    , ¶ 8 (“It is widely accepted that
    where the legislature has not expressly defined a statutory term or
    otherwise limited its meaning, that term must be given its ordinary
    meaning.”). If the statute is unambiguous, we needn’t conduct any
    further statutory analysis. Doubleday, ¶ 20.
    ¶8    When the court finds that a juvenile who is adjudicated a
    delinquent has damaged a victim’s real or personal property, has
    lost a victim’s personal property, or causes a victim personal injury,
    the court “shall enter a sentencing order requiring the juvenile to
    make restitution as required by [the adult criminal restitution
    statutes].” § 19-2-918(1); People in Interest of A.V., 
    2018 COA 138M
    , ¶ 22.
    3
    ¶9     The adult criminal restitution statutes require offenders to pay
    “full restitution” to victims harmed by their misconduct.
    § 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018.; A.V., ¶ 23. “Restitution” means in
    relevant part “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim and includes
    but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use
    of money, anticipated future expenses . . . and other losses or
    injuries proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can
    be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”
    § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2018. Postjudgment interest accrues “for
    as long as the victim has not been paid in full” and must be added
    to all restitution orders to “encourage expeditious payment of the
    restitution order.” Roberts v. People, 
    130 P.3d 1005
    , 1009 (Colo.
    2006).
    B.    Analysis
    ¶ 10   D.L.C. argues that the district court has authority to suspend
    postjudgment interest based on the following statutory language:
    “Restitution shall be ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner, as
    determined by the court and in accordance with [the adult criminal
    restitution statutes].” § 19-2-918(2) (emphasis added). He also
    argues that the statute’s “reasonable manner” language is
    4
    ambiguous, so we should broadly interpret the statute to consider a
    juvenile’s unique circumstances, postjudgment interest’s purposes,
    and the juvenile justice system’s overall restorative and
    rehabilitative aims. According to D.L.C., considering these factors,
    it’s unreasonable to accrue postjudgment interest while he is
    committed to DYS and can’t pay restitution.
    ¶ 11   Another division of this court recently addressed section
    19-2-918(2)’s “reasonable manner” language, concluding that it
    didn’t allow a district court to modify a restitution order based on a
    juvenile’s ability to pay or any hardship that the juvenile might
    experience. A.V., ¶ 41. The division based its conclusion on the
    General Assembly’s removal of language from section 19-2-918
    requiring that restitution be ordered “in a reasonable amount” and
    precluded if payment “would cause serious hardship or injustice to
    the juvenile.” 
    Id. at ¶¶
    40-41. The division concluded that these
    deletions reflected the General Assembly’s intent to remove ability
    to pay and hardship from a juvenile court’s consideration when
    ordering restitution. It also concluded that it was “bound by the
    statute’s plain language, which mandates that the juvenile court
    order full restitution for the victims’ losses.” 
    Id. at ¶
    41.
    5
    ¶ 12   We are likewise bound by the plain language of section
    18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2018: “Any order for restitution entered
    pursuant to this section is a final civil judgment in favor of the state
    and any victim. Notwithstanding any other civil or criminal statute
    or rule, any such judgment remains in force until the restitution is
    paid in full.” And nested within “[a]ny order for restitution made
    pursuant to this section is also an order that . . . [t]he defendant
    owes simple interest from the date of the entry of the order at the
    rate of eight percent per annum.” § 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I). The adult
    criminal restitution statute’s plain language is unambiguous, and it
    compels the accrual of simple interest from the date the restitution
    order is entered. Again, we are “bound by the statute’s plain
    language.” A.V., ¶ 41.
    ¶ 13   D.L.C. also argues that the language “in accordance with [the
    adult criminal restitution statutes]” in section 19-2-918(2) likewise
    gave the juvenile court discretion to suspend postjudgment interest
    because adult restitution contains requirements that are
    inapplicable to juveniles, so the adult criminal restitution statutes
    can’t be strictly applied to juveniles. See, e.g., § 16-18.5-106,
    C.R.S. 2018 (adult defendants required to pay restitution from
    6
    Department of Corrections bank accounts based on ability to pay
    while incarcerated). We disagree. It’s true that some adult criminal
    restitution statutes impose requirements inapplicable to juveniles,
    but section 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I)’s plain language applies equally to
    juveniles and suspending postjudgment interest wouldn’t be “in
    accordance with” this plain language.
    III.   Due Process
    ¶ 14   D.L.C. contends that the statute’s postjudgment interest
    provision is unconstitutional as applied to him because it’s
    fundamentally unfair and violates constitutional due process
    requirements.
    ¶ 15   D.L.C. failed to preserve his constitutional claims with the
    district court on review of the magistrate’s order. D.L.C. argued to
    the district court that
    to the extent that this [motion] is construed as
    a constitutional as-applied challenge to the
    [statute] . . . [D.L.C.] has proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the statute is
    unconstitutional as applied to him pursuant to
    the federal and Colorado constitutions. U.S.
    Const. amend. V, VIII, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,
    sec. 3, 20, 25.
    7
    This general conclusory statement isn’t sufficient to preserve the
    specific argument he now makes on appeal. See also Martinez v.
    People, 
    2015 CO 16
    , ¶ 14 (“A general objection will not suffice.
    Parties must make objections that are specific enough to draw the
    trial court’s attention to the asserted error.”) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 16   We may address an unpreserved constitutional claim for plain
    error. See Reyna-Abarca v. People, 
    2017 CO 15
    , ¶ 47. And
    reviewing for plain error, we conclude that no case law or other
    authority existed that should’ve caused the district court to, on its
    own motion, find the statute unconstitutional as applied because it
    denied D.L.C. due process. See People in Interest of L.C., 
    2017 COA 82
    , ¶ 20. So any possible error wouldn’t have been obvious and
    thus not plain. See People v. Miller, 
    113 P.3d 743
    , 750 (Colo. 2005)
    (for plain error to apply, error must have been “obvious”).
    IV.   Conclusion
    ¶ 17   The district court’s order is affirmed.
    JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.
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