75, People in Interest of D.L.C , 2019 COA 135 ( 2019 )

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY
August 29, 2019
2019COA135
No. 2018CA0575 People in Interest of D.L.C. — Juvenile Court
— Delinquency — Sentencing — Restitution
In this appeal of a juvenile’s restitution obligation resulting
from his adjudication, a division of the court of appeals considers
whether a juvenile court may suspend accrual of postjudgment
interest on restitution for a juvenile while he is committed to the
Division of Youth Services under the juvenile restitution statute.
The division concludes it cannot and affirms the district court’s
order denying D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA135
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0575
El Paso County District Court No. 16JD742
Honorable G. David Miller, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Petitioner-Appellee,
In the Interest of D.L.C.,
Juvenile-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE
Taubman and Grove, JJ., concur
Announced August 29, 2019
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee
Amy D. Trenary, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 Under the juvenile restitution statute, may a juvenile court
suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on restitution for a
juvenile while he is committed to the Division of Youth Services
(DYS)? We answer “no” and affirm the district court’s order denying
D.L.C.’s motion to suspend postjudgment interest.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
¶2 D.L.C. pleaded guilty to aggravated motor vehicle theft. He
also agreed to pay restitution. The juvenile court magistrate
sentenced D.L.C. to probation and granted the People’s restitution
request, ordering D.L.C. to pay $59,417.07 1 in restitution.
¶3 Later, the magistrate revoked D.L.C.’s probation after he
pleaded guilty to committing other offenses in a different case
(17JD487) and committed D.L.C. to DYS. 2 The magistrate ordered
D.L.C. to pay restitution in this case and also made it a condition of
his parole in case 17JD487 after his commitment to DYS.
¶4 D.L.C. filed a motion asking the magistrate to suspend
postjudgment interest on restitution in this case and case 17JD487
while he is committed to DYS. After the magistrate denied the
1 This amount was later amended to $56,349.07.
2 D.L.C. also appeals from case 17JD487 in 18CA0574.
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motion, D.L.C. asked the district court to review the magistrate’s
order. The district court upheld the magistrate’s order, finding that
it didn’t have authority to suspend postjudgment interest under the
statutory scheme or case law.
II. Postjudgment Restitution Interest Can’t Be Suspended for a
Juvenile Under the Adult Restitution Statute
¶5 D.L.C. contends that the district court erred in refusing to
suspend accrual of postjudgment interest on his restitution
obligation while he is committed to DYS because section
19-2-918(2), C.R.S. 2018, authorizes such suspension “to ensure
that restitution is ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner.” We
disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶6 We generally review a trial court’s restitution order for an
abuse of discretion. See People v. Henry, 2018 COA 48M, ¶ 12; cf.
People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123, ¶ 21. A court abuses its discretion
when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,
or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Henry, ¶ 12. We
review de novo statutory interpretation questions. See Cowen v.
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People, 2018 CO 96, ¶ 11; Dubois v. People, 211 P.3d 41, 43 (Colo.
2009).
¶7 Our primary purpose when construing a statute is to ascertain
and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Cowen, ¶ 12. We
look first to the statute’s language, giving words and phrases their
plain and ordinary meanings. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3,
¶ 19. We read statutory words and phrases in context and construe
them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. Id.;
Marquez v. People, 2013 CO 58, ¶ 8 (“It is widely accepted that
where the legislature has not expressly defined a statutory term or
otherwise limited its meaning, that term must be given its ordinary
meaning.”). If the statute is unambiguous, we needn’t conduct any
further statutory analysis. Doubleday, ¶ 20.
¶8 When the court finds that a juvenile who is adjudicated a
delinquent has damaged a victim’s real or personal property, has
lost a victim’s personal property, or causes a victim personal injury,
the court “shall enter a sentencing order requiring the juvenile to
make restitution as required by [the adult criminal restitution
statutes].” § 19-2-918(1); People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA
138M, ¶ 22.
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¶9 The adult criminal restitution statutes require offenders to pay
“full restitution” to victims harmed by their misconduct.
§ 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2018.; A.V., ¶ 23. “Restitution” means in
relevant part “any pecuniary loss suffered by a victim and includes
but is not limited to all out-of-pocket expenses, interest, loss of use
of money, anticipated future expenses . . . and other losses or
injuries proximately caused by an offender’s conduct and that can
be reasonably calculated and recompensed in money.”
§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. 2018. Postjudgment interest accrues “for
as long as the victim has not been paid in full” and must be added
to all restitution orders to “encourage expeditious payment of the
restitution order.” Roberts v. People, 130 P.3d 1005, 1009 (Colo.
2006).
B. Analysis
¶ 10 D.L.C. argues that the district court has authority to suspend
postjudgment interest based on the following statutory language:
“Restitution shall be ordered to be paid in a reasonable manner, as
determined by the court and in accordance with [the adult criminal
restitution statutes].” § 19-2-918(2) (emphasis added). He also
argues that the statute’s “reasonable manner” language is
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ambiguous, so we should broadly interpret the statute to consider a
juvenile’s unique circumstances, postjudgment interest’s purposes,
and the juvenile justice system’s overall restorative and
rehabilitative aims. According to D.L.C., considering these factors,
it’s unreasonable to accrue postjudgment interest while he is
committed to DYS and can’t pay restitution.
¶ 11 Another division of this court recently addressed section
19-2-918(2)’s “reasonable manner” language, concluding that it
didn’t allow a district court to modify a restitution order based on a
juvenile’s ability to pay or any hardship that the juvenile might
experience. A.V., ¶ 41. The division based its conclusion on the
General Assembly’s removal of language from section 19-2-918
requiring that restitution be ordered “in a reasonable amount” and
precluded if payment “would cause serious hardship or injustice to
the juvenile.” Id. at ¶¶ 40-41. The division concluded that these
deletions reflected the General Assembly’s intent to remove ability
to pay and hardship from a juvenile court’s consideration when
ordering restitution. It also concluded that it was “bound by the
statute’s plain language, which mandates that the juvenile court
order full restitution for the victims’ losses.” Id. at ¶ 41.
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¶ 12 We are likewise bound by the plain language of section
18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2018: “Any order for restitution entered
pursuant to this section is a final civil judgment in favor of the state
and any victim. Notwithstanding any other civil or criminal statute
or rule, any such judgment remains in force until the restitution is
paid in full.” And nested within “[a]ny order for restitution made
pursuant to this section is also an order that . . . [t]he defendant
owes simple interest from the date of the entry of the order at the
rate of eight percent per annum.” § 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I). The adult
criminal restitution statute’s plain language is unambiguous, and it
compels the accrual of simple interest from the date the restitution
order is entered. Again, we are “bound by the statute’s plain
language.” A.V., ¶ 41.
¶ 13 D.L.C. also argues that the language “in accordance with [the
adult criminal restitution statutes]” in section 19-2-918(2) likewise
gave the juvenile court discretion to suspend postjudgment interest
because adult restitution contains requirements that are
inapplicable to juveniles, so the adult criminal restitution statutes
can’t be strictly applied to juveniles. See, e.g., § 16-18.5-106,
C.R.S. 2018 (adult defendants required to pay restitution from
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Department of Corrections bank accounts based on ability to pay
while incarcerated). We disagree. It’s true that some adult criminal
restitution statutes impose requirements inapplicable to juveniles,
but section 18-1.3-603(4)(b)(I)’s plain language applies equally to
juveniles and suspending postjudgment interest wouldn’t be “in
accordance with” this plain language.
III. Due Process
¶ 14 D.L.C. contends that the statute’s postjudgment interest
provision is unconstitutional as applied to him because it’s
fundamentally unfair and violates constitutional due process
requirements.
¶ 15 D.L.C. failed to preserve his constitutional claims with the
district court on review of the magistrate’s order. D.L.C. argued to
the district court that
to the extent that this [motion] is construed as
a constitutional as-applied challenge to the
[statute] . . . [D.L.C.] has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him pursuant to
the federal and Colorado constitutions. U.S.
Const. amend. V, VIII, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,
sec. 3, 20, 25.
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This general conclusory statement isn’t sufficient to preserve the
specific argument he now makes on appeal. See also Martinez v.
People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“A general objection will not suffice.
Parties must make objections that are specific enough to draw the
trial court’s attention to the asserted error.”) (citation omitted).
¶ 16 We may address an unpreserved constitutional claim for plain
error. See Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO 15, ¶ 47. And
reviewing for plain error, we conclude that no case law or other
authority existed that should’ve caused the district court to, on its
own motion, find the statute unconstitutional as applied because it
denied D.L.C. due process. See People in Interest of L.C., 2017 COA
82, ¶ 20. So any possible error wouldn’t have been obvious and
thus not plain. See People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)
(for plain error to apply, error must have been “obvious”).
IV. Conclusion
¶ 17 The district court’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE GROVE concur.
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