United States v. Barret ( 2022 )


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  • 21-1743
    United States v. Barret
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
    filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
    document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
    electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
    must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 22nd day of December, two thousand twenty-two.
    PRESENT:          Susan L. Carney,
    Steven J. Menashi,
    Beth Robinson,
    Circuit Judges.
    ____________________________________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.                                                  No. 21-1743-cr
    CHRISTOPHER BARRET, DBA DERRICK BROWN,
    AKA SEAN BROWN, AKA MOUTHY, AKA THE
    GENERAL, AKA CHRIS, AKA SOLO,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    KAREEM FORREST, AKA DOOLEY, AKA
    KAREEM FOREST, RYAN ANDERSON,
    AKA DRE, JOSEPH DONALDSON, AKA
    SCRATCHY, CHARLES JONES, AKA SPEEDY,
    AKA SHAWN BROWN, AKA CHARLES JONES,
    KEVIN LEE, AKA BALA BOY, LATOYA
    MANNING, LEEMAX NEUNIE, AGENT OF
    JUKES, VINCENT QUINONES, KUAME WILSON,
    AKA KWAUME WILSON, KERRY GUNTER, AKA
    GUNS, ANDRE WILSON, AKA MARIO, LEON
    SCARLETT, AKA AGONY, AKA PIGGY, OMAR
    MITCHELL, AKA SOX,
    Defendants.
    ____________________________________________
    For Defendant-Appellant:                BRENDAN WHITE, White & White, New
    York, NY.
    For Appellee:                           GILLIAN KASSNER (Susan Corkery, on the
    brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for
    Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the
    Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
    Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of New York (Matsumoto, J.).
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    Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
    DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Defendant-Appellant Christopher Barret appeals the judgment of the U.S.
    District Court for the Eastern District of New York granting his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    motion in part, vacating two of his convictions, and conducting a limited
    resentencing as to a third conviction. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    facts and procedural history of this case.
    On appeal, Barret argues principally that the district court erred because it
    did not conduct a de novo resentencing. He argues that United States v. Quintieri,
    
    306 F.3d 1217
     (2d Cir. 2002), and United States v. Rigas, 
    583 F.3d 108
     (2d Cir. 2009),
    require a district court to conduct a de novo resentencing whenever any single
    conviction of two or more convictions is vacated, as is the case here. But our recent
    decision in United States v. Peña forecloses that argument. See No. 20-4192, 
    2022 WL 17587854
     (2d Cir. Dec. 13, 2022). In that case, we held that “Section 2255’s plain
    text, which vests district courts with discretion to select the appropriate relief from
    a menu of options, precludes us from applying the default rule in Rigas to all cases
    that arise in the § 2255 context.” Id. at *3. Accordingly, Barret was not entitled to
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    de novo resentencing on the ground that his § 2255 motion resulted in vacatur of at
    least one conviction.
    In Peña, we said that a district court may abuse its discretion in denying de
    novo resentencing when “resentencing would not be strictly ministerial.” Id. at *7.
    In this case, however, Barret has not advanced the alternative argument that the
    district court abused its discretion under § 2255. He therefore abandoned that
    argument. See United States v. Joyner, 
    313 F.3d 40
    , 44 (2d Cir. 2002) (“It is well
    established that an argument not raised on appeal is deemed abandoned and
    lost.”) (quoting United States v. Babwah, 
    972 F.2d 30
    , 34-35 (2d Cir. 1992)).
    Separately, Barret argues on appeal that his § 924(c) conviction must be
    vacated in light of United States v. Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. 2319
     (2019). Section 924(c)
    prohibits the use of a firearm in relation to any “crime of violence or drug
    trafficking crime.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c)(1)(A). Barret’s indictment based the § 924(c)
    charge on “carry[ing] one or more firearms during and in relation to one or more
    drug trafficking crimes.” App’x 63. Thus, his § 924(c) conviction was not based on
    carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Davis invalidated a clause
    defining a “crime of violence.” Davis, 
    139 S. Ct. at 2336
    . Because Barret’s § 924(c)
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    conviction did not depend on the clause at issue in Davis, that case provides him
    no basis for relief.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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