Pikula v. Dept. of Social Services , 321 Conn. 259 ( 2016 )


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    MARIAN PIKULA v. DEPARTMENT OF
    SOCIAL SERVICES
    (SC 19533)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and
    Robinson, Js.
    Argued January 25—officially released May 10, 2015
    J. Colin Heffernan, with whom, on the brief, was
    John C. Heffernan, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Patrick B. Kwanashie, assistant attorney general,
    with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney
    general, for the appellee (defendant).
    Opinion
    EVELEIGH, J. The plaintiff, Marian Pikula, appeals
    from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her
    appeal from the decision of an administrative hearing
    officer for the defendant, the Department of Social Ser-
    vices (department),1 denying her application for bene-
    fits under the state administered Medicaid program
    (Medicaid)2 because her assets, in the form of a testa-
    mentary trust, exceeded prescribed Medicaid limits. We
    conclude that the trial court should not have dismissed
    the appeal on the ground that the hearing officer cor-
    rectly determined that the trust was an asset available
    to the plaintiff. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
    of the trial court.
    The following undisputed facts, as found by the trial
    court, are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘In 1989, John Pikula,
    the plaintiff’s father, executed a will containing a testa-
    mentary trust for his two daughters: Dorothy McKee
    and the plaintiff. When John Pikula died in 1991, the
    trust became effective and the Probate Court appointed
    a trustee.’’
    The testamentary language creating the trust pro-
    vided as follows: ‘‘A. Until [the plaintiff] shall die, the
    [t]rustee shall pay to or spend on behalf of [the plaintiff]
    as much of the net income derived from this trust fund
    as the [t]rustee may deem advisable to provide properly
    for [her] maintenance and support and may incorporate
    any income not so distributed into the principal of the
    fund at the option of the [t]rustee.
    ‘‘B. I hereby authorize and empower the [t]rustee in
    his sole and absolute discretion at any time and from
    time to time to disburse from the principal for any of
    the trust estates created under this [will], even to the
    point of completely exhausting the same, such amount
    as he may deem advisable to provide adequately and
    properly for the support and maintenance of the current
    income beneficiaries thereof, any expenses incurred
    by reason of illness and disability. In determining the
    amount of principal to be so disbursed, the [t]rustee
    shall take into consideration any other income or prop-
    erty which such income beneficiary may have from
    any other source, and the [t]rustee’s discretion shall be
    conclusive as to the advisability of any such disburse-
    ment and the same shall not be questioned by anyone.
    For all sums so distributed, the [t]rustee shall have
    full acquittance.’’
    In March, 2012, the plaintiff entered a long-term care
    facility. At that time, she applied for financial and medi-
    cal assistance under Medicaid. At the time she applied
    for Medicaid benefits, the trust value was approxi-
    mately $169,745.91. In May, 2013, the department denied
    the plaintiff’s application for Medicaid benefits on the
    ground that her assets, including the trust, exceeded
    the relevant asset limits.
    The plaintiff then requested a hearing to contest the
    department’s decision. The hearing occurred in Octo-
    ber, 2013. Thereafter, on December 20, 2013, the hearing
    officer issued a decision upholding the department’s
    denial of the plaintiff’s Medicaid benefits because the
    trust was an asset that was available to her and, there-
    fore, her assets exceeded the regulatory limits.
    The plaintiff subsequently requested reconsideration
    of the decision pursuant to General Statutes § 4-181a
    (a) (1) (A). Her motion was denied. Pursuant to General
    Statutes §§ 17b-61 and 4-183, the plaintiff appealed from
    the hearing officer’s decision to the Superior Court.
    In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that,
    under the terms of the department’s policy manual and
    applicable case law, the trust assets are not available
    to the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that,
    under the terms of the trust, the assets of the trust are
    not available to her because she is not entitled to receive
    trust principal and the trustee has sole and absolute
    discretion regarding trust expenditures and his deci-
    sions cannot be challenged by anyone.3 The trial court
    rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal,
    concluding that the hearing officer properly determined
    that the trust in this case was an available asset and that,
    therefore, the plaintiff’s assets disqualified her from
    Medicaid eligibility.
    The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment
    of dismissal to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, we
    transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General
    Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
    On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the
    trial court improperly upheld the hearing officer’s con-
    clusion that the trust was an asset available to the
    plaintiff as defined by relevant Medicaid regulations.
    Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the testator
    intended to create a discretionary, supplemental needs
    trust, the assets of which should not be considered
    available for Medicaid purposes. The department, how-
    ever, contends that the testamentary language indicates
    that the testator intended the trust to provide for the
    plaintiff’s general support, in which case it would con-
    stitute an asset available to the plaintiff. We agree with
    the plaintiff that the testator intended to create a discre-
    tionary, supplemental needs trust and, therefore, we
    further agree that the trust corpus and income may not
    be considered to be available to the plaintiff for the
    purpose of determining eligibility for Medicaid benefits.
    We begin by setting forth our applicable standard of
    review. Resolution of this issue requires us to determine
    whether the hearing officer properly construed the
    terms of the trust instrument. ‘‘The construction of a
    will presents a question of law . . . . Canaan National
    Bank v. Peters, 
    217 Conn. 330
    , 335, 
    586 A.2d 562
    (1991).
    As we previously have stated . . . [c]onclusions of law
    reached by the administrative agency must stand if the
    court determines that they resulted from a correct appli-
    cation of the law to the facts found and could reasonably
    and logically follow from such facts. . . . Board of
    Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Oppor-
    tunities, 
    266 Conn. 492
    , 504, [
    832 A.2d 660
    ] (2003).’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran v. Dept. of
    Social Services, 
    271 Conn. 679
    , 698, 
    859 A.2d 533
    (2004).
    Given the nature of the plaintiff’s claim, namely, that
    the trial court improperly upheld the hearing officer’s
    determination that the trust in the present case was a
    general needs trust for the purpose of eligibility for
    Medicaid benefits, ‘‘[o]ur analysis begins with an over-
    view of the [M]edicaid program. The program, which
    was established in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Secu-
    rity Act and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. ([M]ed-
    icaid act), is a joint federal-state venture providing
    financial assistance to persons whose income and
    resources are inadequate to meet the costs of, among
    other things, medically necessary nursing facility care.
    . . . The federal government shares the costs of [M]ed-
    icaid with those states that elect to participate in the
    program, and, in return, the states are required to com-
    ply with requirements imposed by the [M]edicaid act
    and by the [S]ecretary of the Department of Health and
    Human Services. . . . Specifically, participating states
    are required to develop a plan, approved by the [S]ecre-
    tary of [H]ealth and [H]uman [S]ervices, containing rea-
    sonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for
    and the extent of medical assistance to be provided.
    . . .
    ‘‘Connecticut has elected to participate in the [M]ed-
    icaid program and has assigned to the department the
    task of administering the program. . . . Pursuant to
    General Statutes §§ 17b-262 and 17b-10, the department
    has developed Connecticut’s state [M]edicaid plan and
    has promulgated regulations that govern its administra-
    tion. . . .
    ‘‘The [M]edicaid act requires that a state’s [M]edicaid
    plan make medical assistance available to qualified indi-
    viduals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (10). The term medical
    assistance means payment of part or all of the cost of
    . . . care and services . . . [including] nursing facility
    services . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (a); see Catanzano
    v. Wing, 
    103 F.3d 223
    , 229 (2d Cir. 1996). Participating
    states are required to provide coverage to certain
    groups and are given the option to extend coverage to
    various other groups. The line between mandatory and
    optional coverage primarily is drawn in 42 U.S.C.
    § 1396a (a) (10) (A): mandatory coverage is specified
    in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (10) (A) (i); and optional cover-
    age is set forth in subsection (a) (10) (A) (ii). In [M]edic-
    aid parlance, individuals who qualify for [M]edicaid
    benefits pursuant to those subsections are referred to
    as the categorically needy because, in general, they are
    eligible for financial assistance under Titles IV-A (Aid
    to Families with Dependent Children) or XVI (Supple-
    mental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Dis-
    abled) of the Social Security Act.
    ‘‘Under the [M]edicaid act, states have an additional
    option of providing medical assistance to the medically
    needy—persons who . . . lack the ability to pay for
    their medical expenses but do not qualify as categori-
    cally needy solely because their income exceeds the
    income eligibility requirements of the applicable cate-
    gorical assistance program. . . . The medically needy
    become eligible for [M]edicaid, if the state elects to
    cover them, by incurring medical expenses in an
    amount sufficient to reduce their incomes below the
    income eligibility level set by the state in its [M]edicaid
    plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17) (in determining
    eligibility, state must take costs . . . incurred for medi-
    cal care into account); see also 42 C.F.R. § 435.301.
    Only when they spend down the amount by which their
    income exceeds that level, are [medically needy per-
    sons] in roughly the same position as [categorically
    needy] persons . . . [because then] any further expen-
    ditures for medical expenses . . . would have to come
    from funds required for basic necessities. Atkins v.
    Rivera, [
    477 U.S. 154
    , 158, 
    106 S. Ct. 2456
    , 
    91 L. Ed. 2d
    131 (1986)]. Connecticut has chosen to cover the
    medically needy. . . .
    ‘‘The [M]edicaid act, furthermore, requires participat-
    ing states to set reasonable standards for assessing an
    individual’s income and resources in determining eligi-
    bility for, and the extent of, medical assistance under
    the program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17) . . . . The
    resources standard set forth in Connecticut’s state
    [M]edicaid plan for categorically needy and medically
    needy individuals is $1600. General Statutes §§ 17b-264
    and 17b-80 (c); [Dept. of Social Services, Uniform Policy
    Manual] § 4005.10 . . . . Consequently, a person who
    has available resources; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (17)
    (B); in excess of $1600 is not eligible to receive benefits
    under the Connecticut [M]edicaid program even though
    the person’s medical expenses cause his or her income
    to fall below the income eligibility standard. . . .
    Ahern v. Thomas, 
    248 Conn. 708
    , 713–16, 
    733 A.2d 756
    (1999).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Palomba-Bourke v. Commissioner of Social
    Services, 
    312 Conn. 196
    , 203–206, 
    92 A.3d 932
    (2014).
    This court has stated that, ‘‘[u]nder applicable federal
    law, only assets actually available to a medical assis-
    tance recipient may be considered by the state in
    determining eligibility for public assistance programs
    such as [Medicaid]. . . . A state may not, in administer-
    ing the eligibility requirements of its public assistance
    program . . . presume the availability of assets not
    actually available . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
    omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services, 
    179 Conn. 83
    , 94, 
    425 A.2d 553
    (1979). This principal ‘‘has
    served primarily to prevent the [s]tates from conjuring
    fictional sources of income and resources by imputing
    financial support from persons who have no obligation
    to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that
    attributes nonexistent resources to recipients.’’ Heckler
    v. Turner, 
    470 U.S. 184
    , 200, 
    105 S. Ct. 1138
    , 
    84 L. Ed. 2d
    138 (1985).
    To resolve the issue on appeal, we must determine
    whether the assets in the testamentary trust were avail-
    able to the plaintiff. ‘‘For the purposes of determining
    eligibility for the Medicaid program, an available asset
    is one that is actually available to the applicant or one
    that the applicant has the legal right, authority or power
    to obtain or to have applied for the applicant’s general
    or medical support. If the terms of a trust provide for
    the support of an applicant, the refusal of a trustee to
    make a distribution from the trust does not render the
    trust an unavailable asset.’’ General Statutes (Supp.
    2016) § 17b-261 (c).4 For Medicaid purposes, general
    support trusts are considered available because a bene-
    ficiary can compel distribution of the trust income. See
    General Statutes § 52-321. In other words, the benefi-
    ciary has a ‘‘legal right . . . to obtain’’ the funds. See
    General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 17b-261 (c). Conversely,
    supplemental needs trusts, in which a trustee retains
    unfettered discretion to withhold the income, are not
    considered available to the beneficiary. Connecticut
    Bank & Trust Co. v. Hurlbutt, 
    157 Conn. 315
    , 327, 
    254 A.2d 460
    (1968) (spendthrift trust not open to alienation
    or assignment by anyone until income paid over to
    beneficiary); Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Beach, 
    119 Conn. 131
    , 141, 
    174 A. 308
    (1934) (beneficiary may not
    alienate or assign interest of spendthrift trust).
    ‘‘It is well settled that in the construction of a testa-
    mentary trust, the expressed intent of the testator must
    control. This intent is to be determined from reading the
    instrument as a whole in the light of the circumstances
    surrounding the testator when the instrument was exe-
    cuted, including the condition of his estate, his relations
    to his family and beneficiaries and their situation and
    condition. Gimbel v. Bernard F. & Alva B. Gimbel
    Foundation, Inc., 
    166 Conn. 21
    , 26, 
    347 A.2d 81
    (1974).
    Therefore, in determining whether the assets of a testa-
    mentary trust are available to a beneficiary, this court
    considers whether the testator intended to create a
    supplemental needs trust or a general support trust.
    See Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social 
    Services, supra
    ,
    
    179 Conn. 91
    –92.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Corcoran v. Dept. of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    271 Conn. 700
    .
    ‘‘A trust which creates a fund for the benefit of
    another, secures it against the beneficiary’s own
    improvidence, and places it beyond the reach of his
    creditors is a spendthrift trust. Carter v. Brownell, 
    95 Conn. 216
    , 223, 
    111 A. 182
    [1920]. Section 52-321 . . .
    provides that trust fund income is not subject to the
    claims of creditors of the beneficiary if the trustee is
    granted the power to accumulate or withhold trust
    income or if the income has been expressly given for the
    support of the beneficiary or his family. See Cromwell v.
    Converse, 
    108 Conn. 412
    , 424–25, 
    143 A. 416
    [1928]
    . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner of
    Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    179 Conn. 88
    ; see also
    Restatement (Third), Trusts § 58 (2003) (‘‘[i]f the terms
    of a trust provide that a beneficial interest shall not be
    transferable by the beneficiary or subject to claims of
    the beneficiary’s creditors, the restraint on voluntary
    and involuntary alienation of the interest is valid’’).
    Accordingly, to resolve the issue on appeal, we must
    determine whether John Pikula intended to create a
    supplemental needs trust or a general support trust. In
    making this determination, we agree with both parties
    and the trial court that prior case law from this court
    provides the appropriate framework within which to
    examine this issue. Specifically, Zeoli v. Commissioner
    of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    179 Conn. 83
    , and Corcoran
    v. Dept. of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    271 Conn. 679
    , guide
    our analysis of this issue.
    First, in Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    179 Conn. 84
    –88, this court concluded that the
    testator intended to create a supplemental needs trust
    for the plaintiffs, his two disabled daughters.5 In doing
    so, this court recognized that ‘‘[t]o determine the discre-
    tionary powers provided, it is necessary to ascertain
    the dispositive intention as expressed by the language
    of the entire will in the light of the circumstances sur-
    rounding the testator when the instrument was exe-
    cuted, including the condition of his estate, his relations
    to his family and beneficiaries and their situation and
    condition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 89; see
    also Rosa v. Palmer, 
    177 Conn. 10
    , 13, 
    411 A.2d 12
    (1978); Gimbel v. Bernard F. & Alva B. Gimbel
    Foundation, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    166 Conn. 26
    ; Colonial Bank &
    Trust Co. v. Stevens, 
    164 Conn. 31
    , 37, 
    316 A.2d 768
    (1972); Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyman, 
    148 Conn. 273
    , 279, 
    170 A.2d 130
    (1961). On the basis of
    these principles, this court concluded that ‘‘the testa-
    tor’s intent was to provide the trustee with sufficient
    flexibility to use the funds under the trust solely for
    supplemental support. Both the surrounding circum-
    stances and the language of the will militate in favor
    of this interpretation. The trust established by [the testa-
    tor’s] will clearly recognizes the obvious incapacity of
    his daughters to care for themselves. As the amount
    held under trust, approximately one-half of his entire
    estate, indicates, the [testator] was a person of modest
    means. Presumably, the funds under the trust would
    not provide for general support of his daughters in an
    institution for much more than a few months. Moreover,
    at the time of the will’s execution and at the time of
    the testator’s death, the daughters were not receiving
    medical assistance payments and the testator could not
    know if and how soon such benefits would become
    available.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner
    of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 90.
    This court further explained that ‘‘[t]he trust grants
    the trustee in express terms the power both to discrimi-
    nate totally against either of the beneficiaries by with-
    holding all income and to disregard funds that might
    be available to either of the beneficiaries. On the other
    hand, in precatory language, the trust provides that the
    trustee apply ‘the net income or principal of the trust
    for the maintenance, support, education, health and
    general welfare of those of my daughters who my
    [t]rustee believes would benefit most from a share of
    the income of this trust after considering the income
    of the beneficiaries from other sources.’
    ‘‘In granting the trustee the ability to discriminate
    against either of the beneficiaries as well as to consider
    other sources of funds available to the beneficiaries,
    the testator reveals an intent to provide for only the
    supplementary support of his daughters. The combina-
    tion of express and precatory terms in the will attempts
    to grant the trustee flexibility to provide the support
    that would benefit either of the beneficiaries the most,
    that is, imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish
    only supplementary support. If the testator had desired
    to create a trust for general support, it would have been
    simple to do so and no discriminatory provision would
    have been necessary or desirable.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
    
    Id., 90–91. On
    the basis of the terms of the trust, this
    court concluded that the testator had intended to create
    a supplemental needs trust and that those assets were
    not available to the daughters for the purpose of
    determining their eligibility for Medicaid benefits. 
    Id., 97. In
    2004, this court again confronted whether a trust
    was available for the purpose of Medicaid eligibility in
    Corcoran v. Dept. of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    271 Conn. 679
    . In Corcoran, this court acknowledged that the tes-
    tamentary language reflective of the testator’s intent in
    Corcoran was markedly different than that used in
    Zeoli. 
    Id., 701. Specifically,
    this court explained that
    ‘‘[i]n Zeoli, the trust instrument was replete with refer-
    ences to the ‘absolute and uncontrolled discretion’
    afforded the [trustee] in [his] decision-making process.
    . . . In addition to the overt references to the unfet-
    tered discretion of the [trustee], the court in Zeoli
    deemed the provision authorizing the trustee to discrim-
    inate among the beneficiaries when making distribu-
    tions highly probative of the vast level of discretion the
    testator intended to confer on the trustee.’’ (Citation
    omitted.) 
    Id. This court
    then compared the testamentary
    language in Corcoran, explaining that ‘‘the testator
    granted the trustees ‘sole discretion’ to make distribu-
    tions and provided them with factors to consider when
    making ‘discretionary distributions . . . .’ This lan-
    guage is not as strong as that used in Zeoli and suggests
    that the testator in the present case intended to confer
    a lesser amount of discretion.’’ (Footnote omitted.)
    
    Id., 701–702. This
    court further reasoned as follows: ‘‘The principal
    distinction between Zeoli and [Corcoran], however, is
    the manner in which the respective testators expressed
    their intentions regarding the use of the trust funds. In
    Zeoli, after establishing the trust, the testator provided
    in his will that it [was his] fond hope that [his] trustee
    pay or apply the net income or principal of the trust
    for the maintenance, support, education, health and
    general welfare of [the beneficiaries] . . . . [In Zeoli,
    the] court interpreted this to mean that [t]he combina-
    tion of express and precatory terms in the will attempts
    to grant the trustee flexibility to provide the support
    that would benefit either of the [daughters] the most,
    that is, imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish
    only supplementary support.’’ (Citation omitted;
    emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 702. This
    court, however, found the testamentary
    language in Corcoran to be distinguishable from that
    in Zeoli. 
    Id. In Corcoran,
    the testator created the trust
    with the following language: ‘‘If [the plaintiff] is then
    living, the trust established for her shall be retained by
    my trustees to hold, manage, invest and reinvest said
    share as a [t]rust [f]und, paying to or expending for the
    benefit of [the plaintiff] so much of the net income and
    principal of said [t]rust as the [t]rustees, in their sole
    discretion, shall deem proper for her health, support in
    reasonable comfort, best interests and welfare . . . .’’
    (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 703. This
    court relied on the fact that the trustees
    did not have absolute discretion, instead their sole dis-
    cretion was ‘‘limited by the ascertainable standard of
    the plaintiff’s ‘health, support in reasonable comfort,
    best interests and welfare . . . .’ ’’ 
    Id. On the
    basis of
    these distinctions, this court concluded that the testa-
    mentary trust in Corcoran did not display the testamen-
    tary intent to provide only for the plaintiff’s
    supplemental needs and, therefore, was a general needs
    trust available to the plaintiff. 
    Id. These cases
    provide a framework for considering the
    language of the trust in the present case. Specifically, in
    Zeoli and Corcoran, this court identified and examined
    several factors that are useful in determining whether a
    particular testamentary trust is intended to be a general
    needs trust or a supplemental needs trust—namely, the
    amount and nature of the trustee’s discretion with
    regards to trust income and principal, any limitations
    or guiding principles within which the trustee must
    operate, and the factual circumstances regarding the
    establishment of the trust, including the amount of
    the trust.
    With these factors in mind, we examine the language
    of the testamentary trust in the present case. The rele-
    vant portions of the testamentary trust in the present
    case provides as follows: ‘‘I give, devise and bequeath
    all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real,
    personal and mixed, of whatever nature and whereso-
    ever situated, including all property that I may acquire
    or become entitled to after the execution of this will
    to [the trustee] in trust, nevertheless . . . for the bene-
    fit of . . . [the plaintiff] . . . and [McKee] . . . . Said
    [t]rustee shall hold, manage and control all of the afore-
    said property as a trust estate with all of the rights and
    powers subject to limitations herein enumerated for
    the following uses and purposes:
    ‘‘A. Until [the plaintiff] shall die, the [t]rustee shall
    pay to or spend on behalf of [the plaintiff] as much
    of the net income derived from this trust fund as the
    [t]rustee may deem advisable to provide properly for
    [her] maintenance and support and may incorporate
    any income not so distributed into the principal of the
    fund at the option of the [t]rustee.
    ‘‘B. I hereby authorize and empower the [t]rustee in
    his sole and absolute discretion at any time and from
    time to time to disburse from the principal for any of
    the trust estates created under this [will], even to the
    point of completely exhausting the same, such amount
    as he may deem advisable to provide adequately and
    properly for the support and maintenance of the current
    income beneficiaries thereof, any expenses incurred
    by reason of illness and disability. In determining the
    amount of principal to be so disbursed, the [t]rustee
    shall take into consideration any other income or prop-
    erty which such income beneficiary may have from
    any other source, and the [t]rustee’s discretion shall be
    conclusive as to the advisability of any such disburse-
    ment and the same shall not be questioned by anyone.
    For all sums so distributed, the [t]rustee shall have
    full acquittance.’’
    First, the language set forth previously in this opinion
    indicates that the trustee in the present case need only
    use as much income from the trust ‘‘as the [t]rustee
    may deem advisable’’ to the plaintiff. The testamentary
    language further provides that any unused income may
    be returned to the trust principal. Although the language
    in the present case indicates that the trustee may use
    the net income for the maintenance and support of the
    plaintiff, the fact that the trustee is only required to use
    as much income as he ‘‘may deem advisable’’ to provide
    for such maintenance, indicates that the testator
    intended for the trustee to have complete discretion in
    determining what, if any, of the income was to be used
    for the plaintiff’s maintenance. Furthermore, the fact
    that the trust provides that any unused income may be
    returned to the principal of the trust indicates that the
    testator did not intend to provide for the general needs
    of the plaintiff. The trust was only valued at approxi-
    mately $169,745, therefore, it is unlikely that the income
    of the trust would have been significant enough to pro-
    vide for the plaintiff’s maintenance at the time the testa-
    tor executed his will in 1989 or when the trust was
    established in 1991.
    Furthermore, the testamentary language in the pre-
    sent case provides that the trustee has ‘‘sole and abso-
    lute discretion’’ to make disbursements from the
    principal of the trust. The trust further provides that
    the trustee’s discretion ‘‘shall be conclusive as to the
    advisability of any such disbursement and the same
    shall not be questioned by anyone.’’ Furthermore, the
    trust provides a release from liability for the trustee
    regarding any distributions of principal. On the basis
    of the foregoing, it is clear that no person can compel
    the trustee to disburse any principal to the plaintiff. We
    conclude that the language regarding the discretion of
    the trustee in the present case is analogous to the lan-
    guage providing absolute and sole discretion to the
    trustee in Zeoli.
    Next, we examine whether the trust in the present
    case contains any limitations or guiding principles
    within which the trustee must operate. In the present
    case, the trust mentions ‘‘support’’ and ‘‘maintenance’’
    in both the section providing for expenditure of the
    income and the section addressing disbursement of
    principal. Nevertheless, in each of these sections the
    ‘‘support’’ and ‘‘maintenance’’ language is followed or
    preceded by language allowing the trustee broad discre-
    tion to do so only if he deems it advisable. Unlike the
    language of the trust in Corcoran, nothing in the present
    trust mentions a standard by which the trustee shall
    make the expenditures or distribution. In Corcoran,
    this court relied on language that the trustees shall
    ‘‘hold, manage, invest and reinvest said share as a [t]rust
    [f]und, paying to or expending for the benefit of [the
    plaintiff] so much of the net income and principal of
    said [t]rust as the [t]rustees, in their sole discretion,
    shall deem proper for her health, support in reasonable
    comfort, best interests and welfare . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran
    v. Dept. of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    271 Conn. 703
    . This
    court reasoned that the language of the trust in Corco-
    ran acted as a limitation on the discretion of the trustees
    because it provided a standard within which the trust-
    ees must operate in making expenditures. 
    Id. On the
    other hand, the language of the trust in Zeoli,
    provided that ‘‘[w]ithout in any way limiting the abso-
    lute discretion of my [t]rustee, it is my fond hope that
    my trustee pay or apply the net income or principal of
    the trust for the maintenance, support, education,
    health and general welfare of those of my daughters
    who my [t]rustee believes would benefit most from a
    share of the income of this trust after considering the
    income of the beneficiaries from other sources.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Zeoli v. Commissioner
    of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    179 Conn. 87
    n.2. This court
    concluded in Zeoli that ‘‘[t]he combination of express
    and precatory terms in the will attempts to grant the
    trustee flexibility to provide the support that would
    benefit either of the beneficiaries the most, that is,
    imposing on the trustee the legal duty to furnish only
    supplementary support.’’ 
    Id., 91. We
    conclude that the
    language in the present case is more similar to that
    language in Zeoli and provides that the trustee is
    required to provide only supplemental support.
    We next consider the factual circumstances regarding
    the establishment of the trust, including the amount of
    the trust. In Zeoli, this court considered the fact that
    the testator’s estate was a modest $9500 in 1975. 
    Id., 85. This
    court reasoned that, because the beneficiary
    had a mental impairment that required institutionaliza-
    tion, the modest trust assets would be exhausted
    quickly if it was treated as a general needs trust. 
    Id., 90. This
    court reasoned that these factual circumstances
    weighed in favor of understanding that the testator did
    not intend for the trust to be a general support trust.
    
    Id. In Corcoran,
    however, this court concluded that the
    testator intended to create a general support trust with
    a significantly larger estate—approximately $854,307.
    Corcoran v. Dept. of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    271 Conn. 682
    .
    In the present case, the testator had a relatively small
    estate. Indeed, the trust assets in the present case con-
    sisted mainly of the plaintiff’s primary residence, the
    testator’s home. In March, 2012, after the home was
    sold, the trust assets totaled $169,745.91. Much like the
    situation in Zeoli, the assets of the present trust would
    be quickly exhausted if they were applied to the
    expenses related to the plaintiff’s impairment for which
    she has sought residential placement. Accordingly, we
    conclude that the factual circumstances surrounding
    the establishment of the trust in the present case further
    bolster our conclusion that it is a supplemental
    needs trust.
    On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the
    trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal
    from the decision of the hearing officer determining
    that the trust in the present case is a general support
    trust and that, therefore, the assets are available to
    the plaintiff. Instead, we conclude that the trust in the
    present case is a supplemental needs trust and that,
    therefore, the assets are not available to the plaintiff
    for the purpose of determining eligibility for Medic-
    aid benefits.
    The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
    to the trial court with direction to render judgment
    sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    1
    We note that the Commissioner of Social Services acts on behalf of the
    department. For the sake of simplicity, references in this opinion to the
    department include the Commissioner of Social Services.
    2
    ‘‘Medicaid is a federal program that provides health care funding for
    needy persons through cost-sharing with states electing to participate in
    the program.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Corcoran v. Dept. of
    Social Services, 
    271 Conn. 679
    , 683 n.4, 
    859 A.2d 533
    (2004).
    3
    In her complaint, the plaintiff also alleged that the hearing officer was
    barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from determining that the trust
    was a ‘‘general support trust’’ or that the assets were ‘‘available’’ to the
    plaintiff because the Probate Court had previously decided that the trust
    was a supplemental needs trust and that the plaintiff could not force the
    trustee to make any distributions. The trial court determined that the doc-
    trine of collateral estoppel did not bar the hearing officer from determining
    that the trust was a general needs trust for the purpose of determining the
    plaintiff’s eligibility for Medicaid benefits. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts
    that the trial court improperly determined that the hearing officer was not
    collaterally estopped from determining that the trust was a general needs
    trust. Because we conclude that the trial court improperly upheld the hearing
    officer’s conclusion that the trust was a general needs trust and available
    to the plaintiff, we need not reach the issue of collateral estoppel.
    4
    We note that § 17b-261 has been amended by our legislature since the
    events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts 2015, No. 15-69,
    § 17. These amendments are not, however, relevant to the present appeal.
    For the sake of simplicity, all references to § 17b-261 in this opinion are to
    the version appearing in the 2016 supplement to the General Statutes.
    5
    The language of the trust in Zeoli provided as follows: ‘‘All of the rest,
    residue and remainder of my property and estate, real, person or mixed, of
    whatsoever the same may consist and wheresoever the same may be situated,
    all of which is hereinafter referred to as my residuary estate, shall be disposed
    of as follows:
    ‘‘(a) I give, devise and bequeath one-half . . . of my residuary estate unto
    my son . . . to be his absolutely and forever;
    ‘‘(b) I give, devise and bequeath one-half . . . of my residuary estate to
    my [t]rustee hereinafter named in trust [nevertheless], to hold in a single
    trust for and until the death of the survivor of my daughters, to invest and
    reinvest the principal of such trust and to dispose of the net income and
    principal thereof as follows:
    ‘‘To pay or apply so much of the net income or the principal of such trust
    to or among either one or both of my daughters as shall be living from time
    to time during the term of such trust, and in such proportions and amounts
    as my [t]rustee shall determine in his absolute and uncontrolled discretion.
    Such amounts of net income or principal may be paid or applied without
    regard to equality of distribution and regardless of whether any one of my
    daughters may be totally deprived of any benefit hereunder. My [t]rustee,
    in exercising his absolute and uncontrolled discretion, shall not be required
    to consider the amount of income from other sources of any beneficiary or
    the amount of any beneficiary’s independent property or the extent to which
    any beneficiary may be entitled to support by a parent or any other person.
    The judgment of my [t]rustee as to the allocation of the net income or
    principal of this trust among the beneficiaries shall be final and conclusive
    upon all interested persons and upon making such payments or application
    my [t]rustee shall be fully released and discharged from all further liability
    or accountability therefor. My trustee shall not be required to distribute any
    net income of such trust currently and may, in his absolute and uncontrolled
    discretion, accumulate any part or all of the net income of such trust,
    which such accumulated net income shall be available for distribution to
    the beneficiaries as aforesaid.
    ‘‘Without in any way limiting the absolute discretion of my [t]rustee, it is
    my fond hope that my trustee pay or apply the net income or principal of
    the trust for the maintenance, support, education, health and general welfare
    of those of my daughters who my [t]rustee believes would benefit most
    from a share of the income of this trust after considering the income of the
    beneficiaries from other sources.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zeoli
    v. Commissioner of Social 
    Services, supra
    , 
    179 Conn. 86
    –87 n.2.