State v. Devon D. , 321 Conn. 656 ( 2016 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DEVON D.*
    (SC 19379)
    Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,
    Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
    Argued January 22—officially released June 14, 2016
    Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s
    attorney, and Anne Mahoney, senior assistant state’s
    attorney, for the appellant (state).
    James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender,
    for the appellee (defendant).
    Opinion
    ZARELLA, J. After a jury trial, the defendant, Devon
    D., was convicted of four counts of sexual assault in
    the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
    70 (a) (2), three counts of risk of injury to a child in
    violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (1), and four
    counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-
    21 (a) (2). The charges were brought in three separate
    informations and involved allegations made by three of
    the defendant’s biological children—C1, C2 and C3.1
    From the judgments of conviction, the defendant
    appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that
    the trial court had abused its discretion in two ways—
    by permitting the three cases against the defendant to
    be tried jointly and by permitting C1 to testify with a
    dog at her feet for comfort and support. In the present
    appeal, the state contends that the Appellate Court
    incorrectly concluded that the trial court had abused
    its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to sever
    the three cases and in allowing a dog to be present with
    C1 during her testimony. We agree with the state.
    The jury reasonably could have found the following
    relevant facts and procedural history. The defendant
    and his former girlfriend, GF, have several children
    together, including a girl, C1, and two boys, C2 and
    C3. After the defendant and GF separated in 2005, the
    children visited the defendant at his residence or at his
    mother’s home. In October, 2009, seven year old C1
    told GF that the defendant had put his ‘‘wee-wee’’ on
    her stomach and had touched her ‘‘private part’’ with
    his fingers. Erin Byrne, a clinical child interview special-
    ist for the Children’s Advocacy Center at Saint Francis
    Hospital and Medical Center, interviewed C1 in Novem-
    ber, 2009, and in March, 2010. In the first interview, C1
    ‘‘spoke about being in a bedroom [in her grandmother’s
    house] with her father and that he had poured some
    lotion on her body, as well as poured the white stuff
    from his wee-wee on her body, and had contact with
    her genitals with his fingers.’’ C1 also disclosed that
    the defendant had inserted his finger into her vagina
    while bathing her and using a rag, causing her to bleed.
    He also forced C1 and her siblings to watch a porno-
    graphic movie.
    In the second interview, C1 told Byrne that the defen-
    dant had penetrated her ‘‘private part’’ with his penis,
    had attempted to penetrate her ‘‘butt’’ with his penis
    and had ejaculated on her several times. She also told
    Byrne that the defendant had forced her to perform
    fellatio on him, causing her to vomit. Additionally, C1
    told Byrne that the defendant had told her that she
    might die from eating meat and that the reason he ‘‘does
    the nasty stuff’’ is to get the ‘‘meat’’ she had eaten ‘‘out’’
    of her body. C1 told Byrne that the defendant had put
    vinegar, or a substance that stung, on her vagina and
    in her ear, and that he had tried to put his penis in her
    ear, causing it to bleed. C1 stated that these incidents
    occurred in her grandmother’s home on different days,
    and that the defendant had his clothes off or his pants
    pulled down each time. The defendant warned C1 not
    to say anything about these incidents.
    Nine year old C2 also came forward with allegations
    against the defendant in November, 2009. In an inter-
    view with Stacy Karpowitz, a child forensic interview
    specialist with the Children’s Advocacy Center, C2
    stated that, on several occasions, the defendant had
    inserted a rag covered finger into his ‘‘butt hole’’ while
    C2 was bathing. C2 also stated that the defendant had
    rubbed C2’s penis and made it go ‘‘up and down.’’ In
    doing so, the defendant sometimes used a rag and some-
    times used his hand. Finally, C2 stated that the defen-
    dant had made him watch a pornographic movie with
    his siblings and had warned him not to say anything.
    Also, in November, 2009, Lisa Murphy-Cipolla, a clini-
    cal child interview supervisor with the Children’s Advo-
    cacy Center, interviewed ten year old C3. C3 stated that
    the defendant had inserted his finger into C3’s ‘‘butt’’
    on more than one occasion, and that he had been using
    a rag, but the rag ‘‘slipped.’’ The defendant also had
    squeezed C3’s penis and had pulled back the foreskin
    on C3’s penis on multiple occasions. C3 further stated
    that the defendant sometimes made him shower with
    C2, but he did not see the defendant do anything to C2.
    C3, however, had seen the defendant insert his finger
    into C1’s ‘‘butt’’ on at least one occasion. Finally, C3
    told Murphy-Cipolla that the defendant had made him
    watch a pornographic movie with his siblings and had
    warned him not to tell GF that the defendant was bath-
    ing him.
    On the basis of these allegations, the defendant was
    arrested and charged with four counts of sexual assault
    in the first degree in violation of § 53a-70 (a) (2), three
    counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-
    21 (a) (1), and four counts of risk of injury to a child
    in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). During a trial before a
    jury, the video-recorded interviews with C1, C2 and C3
    were admitted into evidence as full exhibits, and all
    three recordings were played for the jury.
    In its final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed:
    ‘‘In a criminal case in which the defendant is charged
    with a crime exhibiting abhorrent and compulsive sex-
    ual criminal behavior, evidence of the defendant’s com-
    mission of another offense or offenses is admissible
    and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
    to which it is relevant. So for these three cases, you
    may use [C2’s] and [C3’s] testimony in this fashion in
    [C1’s] case. In [C2’s] case, you may use [C1’s] and [C3’s]
    testimony for this specific purpose. In [C3’s] case, [C1’s]
    and [C2’s] testimony.
    ‘‘However, evidence of another offense on its own is
    not sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of the crime
    or crimes charged in the informations. Bear in mind as
    you consider this evidence that, at all times, the state
    has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the defendant committed each of the elements of
    the offense or offenses charged in each information. I
    remind you that the defendant is not on trial for any
    act, conduct, or offense not charged in the informations.
    With regard to propensity evidence, like other evidence,
    you decide to give it the weight you find reasonable.’’
    Defense counsel did not object or take exception to
    the trial court’s instructions to the jury.
    After the jury returned verdicts of guilty as to all
    counts, the trial court rendered judgments in accor-
    dance with the verdicts. The defendant then appealed
    to the Appellate Court, which reversed the judgments
    of conviction and remanded the cases for new trials.
    State v. Devon D., 
    150 Conn. App. 514
    , 550, 
    90 A.3d 383
    (2014). We granted the state’s petition for certification
    to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court.2
    Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The first question in this certified appeal is whether
    the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial
    court had abused its discretion in denying the defen-
    dant’s motion to sever the three cases against him. The
    state contends that the cases properly were joined for
    trial because the evidence in each case would have
    been admitted as prior misconduct in the other cases.
    We agree with the state.
    The following procedural history and facts are rele-
    vant to our resolution of this claim. On March 29, 2011,
    the defendant filed a motion to sever the cases against
    him. During argument before the trial court, defense
    counsel claimed that the main concern was that the jury
    would aggregate the evidence against the defendant, so
    that, even if the evidence on any single charge would
    not persuade the jury of his guilt, ‘‘the sum total of all
    the charges . . . may persuade the jury that he’s guilty
    of all of them.’’ Counsel further argued that, because
    the case concerning C1 was more brutal and shocking
    than the cases concerning C2 and C3, the jurors might
    find the evidence in the first case so offensive that they
    would not be able to deliberate objectively with respect
    to the remaining two cases. Finally, defense counsel
    argued that the cases should be tried separately because
    they were complex, involving multiple charges, chil-
    dren, witnesses, interviewers and police officers, and
    because curative instructions would not be sufficient
    to overcome the potential prejudice of trying the
    cases jointly.
    The state responded that the trial would not be
    lengthy or overly complex because it involved easily
    separable fact patterns. The state emphasized that many
    of the witnesses would be called in all three cases and
    that, under State v. DeJesus, 
    288 Conn. 418
    , 470–74, 
    953 A.2d 45
    (2008), it expected that evidence in the three
    cases would be cross admissible. Finally, the state noted
    that each case was ‘‘shocking on its own, so one of
    them is not more shocking than the other.’’ Defense
    counsel refuted the state’s contention that the evidence
    in each case would be admissible as prior misconduct
    in the other cases, pointing to the fact that the victims
    were different ages, that two victims were male and one
    was female, and that the allegations involved different
    types of penetration.
    After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial court
    acknowledged that the allegations in all three cases
    were brutal and shocking and recognized the potential
    effect on the jurors. The trial court also noted the diffi-
    culties involved in satisfying the Boscarino test, which
    requires a showing that the cases are discrete and easily
    distinguishable, versus the DeJesus test, which requires
    a showing that the cases are similar. After considering
    these and other factors, including the effect of the trial
    on the child victims, the applicable case law, the court’s
    ability to permit jurors to take notes and to provide
    cautionary instructions, and judicial economy, the court
    denied the motion for severance. The court noted in
    particular that the cases involved ‘‘discrete and easily
    distinguishable factual features,’’ that the trial would
    not be lengthy or complex, and that, because the allega-
    tions in all three cases were equally brutal and shocking,
    ‘‘[t]he jurors are going to be shocked to some extent
    in all three of these [cases].’’3
    The standards for reviewing a trial court’s ruling on
    a motion pertaining to joinder are discussed at length
    in our decisions in State v. LaFleur, 
    307 Conn. 115
    , 159,
    
    51 A.3d 1048
    (2012), and State v. Payne, 
    303 Conn. 538
    ,
    544–50, 
    34 A.3d 370
    (2012). In those cases, we rejected
    the notion of a blanket presumption in favor of joinder4
    and clarified that, when charges are brought in separate
    informations, and the state seeks to join those informa-
    tions for trial, ‘‘the state bears the burden of proving
    that the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced
    by joinder pursuant to Practice Book § 41-19. The state
    may satisfy this burden by proving, by a preponderance
    of the evidence, either that the evidence in the cases
    is cross admissible or that the defendant will not be
    unfairly prejudiced pursuant to the factors set forth in
    State v. Boscarino, 
    204 Conn. 714
    , 722–24, 
    529 A.2d 1260
    (1987).5 State v. 
    Payne, supra
    , [549–50].’’ (Footnote
    added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    
    LaFleur, supra
    , 157. Although the state bears the burden
    of proof in the trial court, ‘‘[i]t is the defendant’s burden
    on appeal to show that joinder was improper by proving
    substantial prejudice that could not be cured by the
    trial court’s instructions to the jury . . . .’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 158. As
    we emphasized
    in LaFleur, ‘‘our appellate standard of review remains
    intact. Accordingly, [i]n deciding whether to [join infor-
    mations] for trial, the trial court enjoys broad discretion,
    which, in the absence of manifest abuse, an appellate
    court may not disturb.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) 
    Id. We start
    our analysis by determining whether the
    evidence in the cases concerning C1, C2 and C3 was
    cross admissible, such that evidence in each case would
    have been admissible as prior misconduct in the other
    cases. In DeJesus, we set forth the following standards
    for determining when evidence of prior sexual miscon-
    duct is admissible: ‘‘[E]vidence of uncharged sexual
    misconduct properly may be admitted in sex crime
    cases to establish that the defendant had a tendency
    or a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive
    criminal sexual behavior if: (1) the trial court finds that
    such evidence is relevant to the charged crime in that
    it is not too remote in time, is similar to the offense
    charged and is committed upon persons similar to the
    prosecuting witness; and (2) the trial court concludes
    that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its
    prejudicial effect. In assessing the relevancy of such
    evidence, and in balancing its probative value against
    its prejudicial effect, the trial court should be guided
    by this court’s prior precedent construing the scope
    and contours of the liberal standard pursuant to which
    evidence of uncharged misconduct previously was
    admitted under the common scheme or plan exception.
    Lastly, prior to admitting evidence of uncharged sexual
    misconduct under the propensity exception . . . the
    trial court must provide the jury with an appropriate
    cautionary instruction . . . .’’ State v. 
    DeJesus, supra
    ,
    
    288 Conn. 476
    –77; see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-5 (b)
    (effective January 1, 2012), in 73 Conn. L.J., No. 1, p.
    211PB (July 5, 2011) (codifying propensity exception
    described in DeJesus).
    Recognizing the difficulties of balancing the proba-
    tive value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect,
    we have held that ‘‘the trial court’s decision will be
    reversed only whe[n] abuse of [its] discretion is mani-
    fest or whe[n] an injustice appears to have been done.
    . . . On review by this court, therefore, every reason-
    able presumption should be given in favor of the trial
    court’s ruling. . . . State v. Merriam, 
    264 Conn. 617
    ,
    659–61, 
    835 A.2d 895
    (2003).’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Romero, 
    269 Conn. 481
    , 497, 
    849 A.2d 760
    (2004).
    Applying these standards in the present case, we con-
    clude that the trial court properly exercised its discre-
    tion in permitting the cases to be tried together because
    the evidence in all three cases was cross admissible.6
    Turning first to the question of relevancy, it is undis-
    puted that the incidents alleged by C1, C2 and C3 were
    proximate in time because all of the alleged misconduct
    occurred between January 1, 2006, and August 31, 2009.
    See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 
    283 Conn. 618
    , 632–33, 
    930 A.2d 628
    (2007) (upholding admission of uncharged mis-
    conduct that occurred approximately six and ten years
    before charged offenses). Second, it cannot reasonably
    be claimed that C1, C2 and C3 are not sufficiently similar
    witnesses. All three victims are prepubescent children
    of similar age who are the defendant’s biological chil-
    dren. We are not convinced by the defendant’s sugges-
    tion that the victims cannot be deemed similar wit-
    nesses simply because they do not share the same gen-
    der. This singular difference does not outweigh their
    shared attributes. See State v. 
    Romero, supra
    , 
    269 Conn. 501
    (although victims were different genders, both were
    prepubescent children who were of similar age when
    abuse began and were under defendant’s care when
    it occurred).
    Finally, the defendant’s conduct with respect to each
    victim was sufficiently similar to demonstrate that he
    had a propensity toward aberrant sexual behavior. See,
    e.g., State v. 
    DeJesus, supra
    , 
    288 Conn. 474
    –75. Because
    of the familial relationship, the defendant had access
    to and time alone with each victim. All of the sexual
    abuse occurred during the defendant’s unsupervised
    visitation with the victims, either at his residence or
    his mother’s residence. The defendant forced all of the
    victims to watch a pornographic movie. Although none
    of the victims needed help bathing, the defendant used
    the cover of bathing in each case as a means of touching
    them inappropriately. In each case, the defendant used
    a rag to maintain the pretense of washing, but, in each
    case, the purported washing resulted in digital anal or
    vaginal penetration. Not only did all three cases involve
    allegations that the defendant had used the rag to cam-
    ouflage the inappropriate digital penetration, but all
    three victims also alleged that the defendant touched
    them inappropriately when he was not using the rag.
    Lastly, the defendant warned each victim not to tell
    anyone about his conduct. Given the extensive similari-
    ties between the conduct in the three cases, and in view
    of the liberal standard of admissibility governing the
    use of prior misconduct evidence in sexual assault
    cases, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused
    its discretion in denying the motion for severance.
    We disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusions
    that ‘‘the only conduct arguably common to all three
    victims was the defendant’s insertion of his finger into
    their ‘butts’ while they bathed’’ and that C1’s allegations
    ‘‘reflect[ed] significant qualitative differences from the
    facts alleged in the cases involving C2 and C3 . . . .’’
    State v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 529
    . Specifi-
    cally, the Appellate Court focused on the following dif-
    ferences: (1) C1 alleged that the defendant was partially
    or fully undressed and that some of the abuse occurred
    in the bedroom, whereas C2 and C3 alleged that he
    remained clothed and that all of the abuse occurred in
    the bathroom; (2) C1 alleged penile penetration and
    fellatio, in addition to digital penetration; and (3) the
    ‘‘alleged conduct toward C1 [unlike the conduct toward
    C2 and C3] in no way could have been mistaken for an
    aggressive bathing practice.’’ 
    Id., 528. With
    respect to the similarity of the charged and
    uncharged misconduct, this court has repeatedly recog-
    nized that it ‘‘need not be so unusual and distinctive as
    to be like a signature . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted) State v. Gupta, 
    297 Conn. 211
    , 228–29, 
    998 A.2d 1085
    (2010). Rather, the question is whether the
    evidence is sufficiently similar to demonstrate a propen-
    sity ‘‘to engage in the type of aberrant and compulsive
    criminal sexual behavior with which he . . . [was]
    charged.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 224. As
    we discussed previously in this opinion, the defen-
    dant engaged in multiple types of similar conduct with
    all three victims. The fact that the defendant was
    unclothed during his abuse of C1 and engaged in addi-
    tional types of sexual misconduct with her does not
    outweigh these numerous similarities or erode the pro-
    bative value of that evidence.
    In addition, the fact that the defendant engaged in
    additional types of sexual misconduct with C1 does not
    render his conduct with her so much more severe and
    shocking than his conduct with C2 and C3 that sever-
    ance is required. As the trial court noted, the allegations
    in all three cases were shocking, and the defendant’s
    inappropriate touching and digital penetration of all
    three victims can only be characterized as severe. The
    fact that the defendant engaged in additional types of
    sexual misconduct with C1 does not render the defen-
    dant’s conduct toward C2 and C3 any less severe. Even
    if the conduct toward C1 was significantly more egre-
    gious than his conduct toward C2 and C3, however, this
    court previously has upheld the admission of uncharged
    sexual misconduct when it differed in degree from the
    charged conduct. See, e.g., State v. 
    Jacobson, supra
    ,
    
    283 Conn. 637
    –38; State v. McKenzie-Adams, 
    281 Conn. 486
    , 530–33, 
    915 A.2d 822
    , cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 888
    ,
    
    128 S. Ct. 248
    , 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 148
    (2007).
    In Jacobson, the defendant hockey coach, Scott
    Jacobson, developed close relationships with two boys,
    M and B. State v. 
    Jacobson, supra
    , 
    283 Conn. 622
    –23.
    He met with them frequently, gave them gifts, became
    friends with their mothers, invited them to sleep at his
    home and slept in the same bed with them. 
    Id. M alleged
    that, during a sleepover, he awoke to find Jacobson
    performing oral sex on him. 
    Id., 623. B
    alleged that,
    during a sleepover, he awoke to find Jacobson touching
    his penis with his hands and his mouth. 
    Id., 624. B
    also
    alleged that, on subsequent occasions, Jacobson forced
    B to touch his penis and attempted to have B sodomize
    him. 
    Id., 625. During
    trial, the court permitted K, the
    mother of a boy who had been involved in a close
    relationship with Jacobson, to testify as evidence of a
    common scheme or plan. 
    Id., 628–30. On
    appeal, this
    court rejected Jacobson’s claim that K’s allegations
    were not sufficiently similar to the allegations by M and
    B. See 
    id., 637. We
    concluded that, ‘‘although [Jacobson]
    never sexually assaulted K’s son, K’s description of
    [Jacobson’s] relationship with and actions toward her
    son—in particular, sleeping in the same bed with him
    at [Jacobson’s] home—was sufficient to permit an infer-
    ence that [Jacobson] was grooming K’s son for the same
    kind of sexual abuse that [Jacobson] later inflicted on
    M and B.’’ 
    Id. In McKenzie-Adams,
    the defendant high school
    teacher, Van Clifton McKenzie-Adams, was charged
    with multiple counts of sexual assault in connection
    with his relationships with two female students, N.R.
    and P.L. See State v. 
    McKenzie-Adams, supra
    , 
    281 Conn. 490
    –91. The relationship with both victims began with
    intimate conversations in the school library, proceeded
    to embraces in the school hallway and ultimately
    resulted in sexual relations. See 
    id., 491–95. The
    state
    also introduced the testimony of a third student, R.S.,
    who testified that she and P.L. had had a conversation
    of a sexual nature with McKenzie-Adams in the school
    library and that he had embraced her in a sexual manner
    in the school hallways on several occasions. 
    Id., 528. We
    concluded that the trial court properly exercised
    its discretion in admitting the testimony of R.S. as evi-
    dence of a common scheme or plan because McKenzie-
    Adams’ sexual misconduct with R.S. was similar to his
    sexual misconduct during the initial stages of his rela-
    tionships with both N.R. and P.L. See 
    id., 530–31. In
    the present case, the sexual misconduct in each
    case was much closer in degree of severity than in
    Jacobson and McKenzie-Adams. If anything, the basis
    for the cross admissibility of the evidence in the present
    case is stronger than in Jacobson or McKenzie-Adams
    given the extensive similarities between the victims and
    their allegations. Moreover, our holdings in State v.
    
    Gupta, supra
    , 
    297 Conn. 229
    , and State v. Ellis, 
    270 Conn. 337
    , 358, 
    852 A.2d 676
    (2004), are consistent with
    our conclusion that the evidence was cross admissible.
    In both of those cases, the charged and uncharged mis-
    conduct did not share the significant similarities that
    are present here. In Ellis, two of the victims, Julia S.
    and Kristin C., played softball for the defendant coach,
    Robert Ellis, and alleged that he had touched their
    breasts inappropriately. State v. 
    Ellis, supra
    , 344–46.
    The third victim, Sarah S., did not play softball on Ellis’
    team but was connected to him through her sister and
    her father. 
    Id., 346. Ellis’
    conduct toward her started
    with explicit telephone conversations and then became
    physical. See 
    id., 347–48. Ellis’
    behavior progressed
    from touching Sarah S. inappropriately, to exposing
    himself to her and attempting to force her to touch him
    with her hands and mouth, to digital penetration of her
    vagina and attempted penile penetration. 
    Id., 347–49. This
    court emphasized that ‘‘there were few similari-
    ties’’ between Ellis’ abuse of Sarah S. and the other two
    victims. 
    Id., 358. Similarly,
    in Gupta, we specifically recognized that
    there were few similarities between the victims and the
    conduct alleged. In that case, the defendant physician,
    Sushil Gupta, touched two patients’ breasts inappropri-
    ately during a medical examination. State v. 
    Gupta, supra
    , 
    297 Conn. 215
    –17. With the third victim, who
    had been employed by Gupta’s medical group for four
    years, Gupta engaged in far more overtly sexual behav-
    ior. See 
    id., 217–19. In
    Gupta, as in Ellis, we emphasized
    the lack of similarity between the charged and the
    uncharged misconduct, emphasizing that ‘‘the only con-
    duct common to all three victims’’ was that Gupta had
    felt the victims’ breasts with his fingertips and grabbed
    them. 
    Id., 226. In
    both cases, the uncharged misconduct
    had limited relevance because it shared virtually no
    similarities with the charged misconduct. That is not
    the case here.
    Finally, we strongly disagree that, if the cases had
    been tried separately, the defendant in the present case
    could have raised a plausible claim that he was merely
    bathing C2 and C3. Cf. 
    id., 222–33 (Gupta
    arguably could
    assert that improper touching of two victims’ breasts
    was part of legitimate medical exam whereas his
    improper sexual comments and more overtly sexual
    acts toward third victim clearly did not constitute legiti-
    mate medical procedure). Notably, the defendant never
    claimed that joinder impaired his ability to assert such
    a theory with respect to C2 and C3, only that it made
    it likely that the jury would aggregate the evidence.
    Therefore, the state did not have an opportunity to
    make a proffer as to why such a claim would not be
    plausible. Accordingly, in view of the evidence pre-
    sented by the state, it is clear that the facts simply
    would not support this assertion. C2, who was nine
    years old at the time of the abuse, testified that he had
    been bathing himself since he was five years old, that
    nothing had happened to make him especially dirty
    before the defendant bathed him, that the defendant
    never said anything to indicate that he was showing
    C2 how to clean himself appropriately, and that the
    defendant penetrated his anus in such a manner as to
    cause pain. C2 also testified that, on more than one
    occasion, the defendant touched C2’s penis without the
    rag and made it go ‘‘up and down.’’ C3, who was ten
    years old at the time of the abuse, offered similar testi-
    mony as to all of these circumstances, including that
    the defendant squeezed C3’s penis and manipulated
    the foreskin of his penis on several occasions and for
    sufficient duration to cause pain. Given these allega-
    tions, the defendant could not make a credible claim
    that he was merely vigorously bathing C2 and C3.
    Having determined that the misconduct evidence was
    relevant to prove that the defendant had a propensity
    to engage in aberrant sexual behavior, we turn to
    whether the prejudicial value of the evidence out-
    weighed its probative value. The defendant claims that
    the trial court did not address whether the prejudicial
    value of the evidence outweighed its probative value.
    He also claims that the trial court’s instructions ‘‘exacer-
    bated’’ the prejudicial effect of the misconduct evidence
    because ‘‘[t]he jury was told that [it was] to consider
    such evidence only to show that the defendant has a
    propensity to commit sex offenses.’’ We disagree with
    both claims.
    ‘‘We previously have held that the process of balanc-
    ing probative value and prejudicial effect is critical to
    the determination of whether other crime[s] evidence
    is admissible. . . . At the same time, however, we . . .
    do not . . . requir[e] a trial court to use some talis-
    manic phraseology in order to satisfy this balancing
    process. Rather . . . in order for this test to be satis-
    fied, a reviewing court must be able to infer from the
    entire record that the trial court considered the prejudi-
    cial effect of the evidence against its probative nature
    before making a ruling.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    James G., 
    268 Conn. 382
    , 395, 
    844 A.2d 810
    (2004). In
    conducting this balancing test, the question before the
    trial court ‘‘is not whether [the evidence] is damaging
    to the defendant but whether [the evidence] will
    improperly arouse the emotions of the jur[ors].’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 
    275 Conn. 205
    , 218, 
    881 A.2d 160
    (2005).
    In the present case, we are satisfied that the trial
    court weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence
    against its probative value before ruling on the motion
    to sever. The court acknowledged the shocking nature
    of the allegations and recognized their potential effect
    on the jurors. The court also considered the interests
    of judicial economy, the effect of the trial on the child
    victims, the applicable case law and the ability to use
    cautionary instructions to mitigate any prejudice stem-
    ming from the shocking nature of the evidence. Only
    after balancing these numerous factors did the trial
    court deny the motion for severance.
    We also reject the defendant’s claim that the trial
    court’s cautionary instructions ‘‘exacerbated’’ any prej-
    udice to the defendant by informing the jurors that they
    could consider the uncharged misconduct evidence
    ‘‘only’’ to show that the defendant had a propensity
    to engage in such conduct. We do not agree that the
    defendant has properly characterized the trial court’s
    instruction,7 and, even if we did, there is no merit to
    this claim because DeJesus stands for the proposition
    that uncharged misconduct evidence in sexual assault
    cases ‘‘may be admitted in sex crime cases to establish
    that the defendant had a tendency or a propensity to
    engage in aberrant and compulsive criminal sexual
    behavior’’; State v. 
    DeJesus, supra
    , 
    288 Conn. 476
    ; and
    requires a cautionary instruction to that effect. 
    Id., 477. In
    sum, we conclude that the trial court properly
    exercised its discretion in permitting the three cases
    against the defendant to be tried jointly. The defendant
    cannot demonstrate that he was substantially preju-
    diced by the denial of his motion for severance because
    the evidence in all three cases would have been cross
    admissible to show that the defendant had a tendency
    or a propensity to engage in aberrant and compulsive
    sexual misconduct.
    II
    The second issue in this certified appeal is whether
    the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial
    court had abused its discretion in permitting a dog to
    sit near C1 during her testimony to provide comfort
    and support. The state challenges the Appellate Court’s
    conclusion, arguing that the trial court properly exer-
    cised its discretion by balancing its determination that
    the dog’s presence likely would help C1 to provide
    complete and reliable testimony against the possibility
    of prejudice to the defendant. We agree with the state.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our resolution of this claim. On July 5, 2011,
    the state filed a motion to permit a dog ‘‘to sit in close
    proximity to [C1] during [C1’s] testimony, provided that
    such dog and the dog’s handler shall not obscure [C1]
    from the view of the defendant or the jury . . . .’’ The
    state filed the motion after C1, who was eight years old
    at the time of trial, ‘‘had indicated to the victim witness
    advocate that she was concerned about people looking
    at her in the courtroom . . . .’’ Recognizing that the
    state’s motion presented an issue of first impression in
    Connecticut, the court determined that it would con-
    duct a full evidentiary hearing in accordance with State
    v. Jarzbek, 
    204 Conn. 683
    , 704, 
    529 A.2d 1245
    (1987),
    cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 1061
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 1017
    , 
    98 L. Ed. 2d
    982 (1988), and would ‘‘apply the more exacting
    standard of clear and convincing [evidence] . . . .’’ The
    court emphasized that its ‘‘reading of the case law indi-
    cate[d] that [the hearing] might not be necessary, but
    it appears to be the more prudent course of action
    . . . .’’ The state did not object to the hearing but noted
    that it did not believe a hearing was necessary.
    During the hearing, David Meyers, a licensed clinical
    social worker, testified that approximately 40 percent
    of his practice during the previous ten years had
    involved the treatment of child trauma victims, includ-
    ing victims of sexual assault. He testified that the dog
    that would sit near C1 during her testimony, Summer,
    had been trained to be a service dog and occasionally
    provided support to children in his practice who experi-
    enced anxiety. At the time of trial, Summer had not yet
    been certified as a service dog8 because she had only
    just reached the testing age of two. Meyers testified
    that he and Summer met C1 two hours before the hear-
    ing began. C1 initially refused to touch Summer but
    ‘‘became more and more comfortable as she began to
    pet her. She even touched her teeth and . . . sat with
    her on the floor and . . . appeared to be more con-
    nected and less fearful.’’ Meyers explained that, in his
    practice, Summer ‘‘decreases people’s level of anxiety,
    and she increases people’s ability to engage and share
    difficult life situations.’’ Meyers testified that he saw a
    similar response with C1 and that Summer’s presence
    increased C1’s ability to engage, to answer questions
    and to talk. After spending one hour with Summer, C1
    was ‘‘more visibly relaxed, she was able to talk to [the
    prosecutor], she was able to talk to me about anecdotes
    about Summer and [was] visibly comfortable.’’ Accord-
    ing to Meyers, C1 said that having Summer near her
    would ‘‘help her feel more comfortable.’’ When defense
    counsel asked Meyers whether he had any way of know-
    ing ‘‘whether . . . [C1 would] be able to be more truth-
    ful, more reliable, have better memory of events that
    are a couple of years old with the presence of a dog
    or without a dog,’’ Meyers responded that, in his experi-
    ence, ‘‘when kids are anxious, they’re less likely to
    be able to talk about those things, memories and life
    experiences. [C1] appeared less anxious during our
    time, so I’m not sure if that’s a clear answer to your
    question, but it would be my opinion, as a dog handler
    child therapist, that she appeared more comfortable.’’
    In response to questioning from the court, Meyers
    explained that Summer would be able to lay still for
    five or six hours.
    Defense counsel objected to the dog’s presence,
    arguing that General Statutes § 54-86g (b),9 which enu-
    merates the procedures that a court may employ when
    a child testifies in a sexual assault case, does not con-
    template the use of dogs. In response to questioning
    from the trial court, defense counsel clarified that he
    was not making a confrontation clause claim.10 Rather,
    he claimed that the defendant’s due process rights
    would be prejudiced because Summer’s presence would
    improperly influence the jury by making it appear that
    C1 is someone with whom the jury should sympathize.
    Counsel suggested alternative procedures, such as hav-
    ing C1 testify outside the presence of the jury on closed
    circuit television or letting her hold a teddy bear or
    letting a trusted adult sit by her during her testimony.
    He also requested a curative instruction in the event
    that the court permitted Summer to be present. The
    state emphasized that it had considered counsel’s sug-
    gestion to permit GF to sit with C1 but opted not to do
    so because the theory of the defense was that GF had
    coached her children to make false allegations against
    the defendant and because the procedure would defeat
    any sequestration order. The state also emphasized that
    the court possessed the inherent discretionary author-
    ity, ‘‘separate and apart from [§ 54-86g],’’ to permit C1
    to testify with Summer nearby. Although the state also
    had prepared a motion to permit C1 to testify outside
    of the courtroom, it indicated that it would not pursue
    that more drastic measure unless it became necessary.
    Following the hearing, the court recognized the need
    to ‘‘balance the [defendant’s] due process rights . . .
    against the need to provide an atmosphere in which all
    witnesses can testify and provide the truth reliably, fully
    and completely,’’ and emphasized that the defendant
    was ‘‘entitled to the jury’s direct observation of all wit-
    nesses.’’ The court opined that permitting Summer to
    be present would prevent ‘‘the need for the more drastic
    and onerous’’ procedure of video recording C1’s tes-
    timony.
    After taking these considerations into account and
    applying a standard of clear and convincing evidence,
    the court concluded that it ‘‘should allow all reasonable
    tools to make the courtroom a place of comfort and
    reliability for any witness, but especially a child witness,
    who, it is alleged, has faced child sexual abuse.’’ The
    court concluded that permitting Summer to be present
    was within its discretion, that C1’s testimony would be
    assisted, but not directed, by Summer’s presence, and
    that the defendant’s rights would not be prejudiced by
    Summer’s presence with proper curative instructions
    and safeguards. The court directed that Summer would
    be ‘‘put in place [on the witness stand] . . . in such a
    way that the dog will not be viewed by the jury in any
    way, shape or form,’’11 and solicited suggestions from
    counsel with respect to additional safeguards and cura-
    tive instructions. Subsequently, counsel stipulated that
    the instructions would indicate that ‘‘[t]he witness is
    anxious about testifying in front of a group of people.
    The dog is not present due to any concern the witness
    has with the defendant’s presence. The . . . dog met
    the witness [the day before] in preparation for court
    trial.’’ The jury heard these instructions when the trial
    commenced, just before C1 testified, and as part of the
    court’s final charge. Each time the court offered these
    instructions, it also admonished the jurors to disregard
    the presence of the dog, to draw no inference for or
    against any witness using a dog, that sympathy should
    play no part in its considerations or ultimate delibera-
    tion, and to ‘‘[t]hink of the dog like an interpreter, an
    aid to get the witness’ testimony across to you more
    clearly.’’
    On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant
    claimed that the trial court’s ruling constituted an abuse
    of discretion and violated his confrontation and due
    process rights. See State v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 150 Conn.
    App. 516, 538 and n.9. The Appellate Court concluded
    that, although the trial court had the inherent discretion-
    ary authority, apart from § 54-86g, to permit Summer
    to sit near C1 while she testified, ‘‘the court abused its
    discretion in granting the state’s motion to [use this
    procedure] . . . because there was no finding [or] . . .
    a showing . . . that this special procedure was
    needed.’’12 
    Id., 549. Although
    the Appellate Court held
    that a showing of need was required, it did not discuss
    what constitutes a showing of need. The defendant
    argues, on appeal to this court, that, under State v.
    
    Jarzbek, supra
    , 
    204 Conn. 704
    , the state was required
    to prove a compelling need for Summer’s presence. The
    state argues, to the contrary, that the procedures in
    Jarzbek do not apply under these circumstances and
    that ‘‘the question on appeal is whether the trial court
    abused its discretion in balancing the likelihood that
    the accommodation—in this case, the . . . dog—
    would help [C1] testify truthfully and completely by
    reducing . . . her stress or trauma against the poten-
    tial for prejudice to the defendant.’’ We agree with the
    state. After considering the record and relevant author-
    ity, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised
    its discretion in granting the state’s motion for spe-
    cial procedures.
    Whether a trial court may permit a dog to sit near a
    witness during testimony in a criminal trial to provide
    comfort and support presents a question of first impres-
    sion for this court. With respect to statutory authority
    for such a procedure, we agree with the Appellate
    Court’s analysis and conclusion that § 54-86g (b) does
    not specifically authorize the use of a dog. See State v.
    Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 541
    –42. As the Appel-
    late Court noted, although § 54-86g enumerates various
    special procedures that the court may use when a child
    testifies in a case involving sexual assault or abuse, it
    does not list the use of a dog among the authorized
    procedures. 
    Id., 542. We
    further agree with the Appellate Court’s conclu-
    sion that, although § 54-86g does not authorize such a
    procedure, the trial court has inherent discretionary
    authority, separate and apart from the statute, to order
    special procedures or accommodations to assist a wit-
    ness in testifying. See 
    id., 543. As
    the Appellate Court
    recognized, it is well established that ‘‘[t]he function of
    the court in a criminal trial is to conduct a fair and
    impartial proceeding. . . . A trial judge in a criminal
    case may take all steps reasonably necessary for the
    orderly progress of the trial. . . . When the rights of
    those other than the parties are implicated, [t]he trial
    judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the
    rights of the accused and the interests of the public in
    the administration of criminal justice. . . . Moreover,
    [t]he [ability] of a witness [to testify reliably] is a matter
    peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court and
    its ruling will be disturbed only in a clear case of abuse
    or of some error in law.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id., quoting State
    v. Torres, 
    60 Conn. App. 562
    , 569–70, 
    761 A.2d 766
    (2000), cert. denied, 
    255 Conn. 925
    , 
    767 A.2d 100
    (2001). The trial court may, for exam-
    ple, exercise its discretion to permit a child to bring a
    special doll or comfort object from home. See State v.
    Aponte, 
    249 Conn. 735
    , 744–45, 
    738 A.2d 117
    (1999); see
    also State v. 
    Torres, supra
    , 569 (court did not abuse its
    discretion in permitting witness’ fiance´ to sit beside her
    while she testified); State v. McPhee, 
    58 Conn. App. 501
    ,
    506–508, 
    755 A.2d 893
    (court did not abuse its discretion
    in permitting witness to hold stuffed animal while testi-
    fying), cert. denied, 
    254 Conn. 920
    , 
    759 A.2d 1026
    (2000).
    We therefore agree with the Appellate Court’s conclu-
    sion that the trial court possessed the broad discretion-
    ary authority to order special procedures to ensure that
    C1 was able to testify reliably.
    We disagree, however, with the Appellate Court’s
    conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in
    permitting C1 to testify with Summer at her feet. State
    v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 550
    . Specifically,
    we disagree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that
    the trial court was required to make an express finding
    that ‘‘there was a need for this special procedure to
    be implemented for C1, and that use of such special
    procedure would not deny the defendant a fair trial.’’
    (Emphasis in original.) 
    Id. We conclude
    that the pivotal
    question is not whether the special procedure is neces-
    sary but whether it will aid the witness in testifying
    truthfully and reliably.13 We further conclude that the
    record in the present case demonstrates that the trial
    court expressly found that Summer would help C1 to
    testify more reliably and completely and that Summer’s
    presence would not violate the defendant’s right to a
    fair trial. Finally, the record indicates that the trial court
    took extensive measures to ensure that the jurors never
    saw Summer. On the basis of the record, we conclude
    that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.
    We start our analysis by clarifying the applicable stan-
    dard of review. Although we apply an abuse of discre-
    tion standard to review the trial court’s decision to
    permit Summer to sit near C1 during her testimony, we
    engage in plenary review with respect to the standard
    and procedures that the trial court used in making this
    determination. See, e.g., In re Tayler F., 
    296 Conn. 524
    ,
    537, 
    995 A.2d 611
    (2010). With respect to those stan-
    dards and procedures, the defendant argues that the
    trial court was required to find, by clear and convincing
    evidence, that the state had shown a compelling need
    for the use of Summer. See State v. 
    Jarzbek, supra
    , 
    204 Conn. 707
    . The state contends that the compelling need
    test set forth in Jarzbek is not applicable because the
    defendant’s right of confrontation is not at issue. We
    agree with the state and conclude that the appropriate
    standard is whether the trial court has balanced the
    extent that the special accommodation will aid the relia-
    bility of the witness’ testimony against any possible
    prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
    Because this court has not considered the appro-
    priate standards and procedures that apply in this pre-
    cise context, we turn to other jurisdictions for guidance.
    In the five cases in which courts have considered chal-
    lenges to a trial court’s decision to permit a dog to sit
    with a testifying witness to provide comfort and sup-
    port, all have concluded that the trial court may exercise
    its discretion to permit such an accommodation. See
    People v. Chenault, 
    227 Cal. App. 4th 1503
    , 1517, 
    175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
    (2014), review denied, California
    Supreme Court, Docket No. S220741 (Cal. October 15,
    2014); People v. Spence, 
    212 Cal. App. 4th 478
    , 517,
    
    151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374
    (2012), review denied, California
    Supreme Court, Docket No. S208415 (Cal. April 10,
    2013); People v. Tohom, 
    109 A.D. 3d
    253, 266–67,
    
    969 N.Y.S.2d 123
    (2013), appeal denied, 
    22 N.Y.3d 1203
    ,
    
    9 N.E.3d 918
    , 
    986 N.Y.S.2d 423
    (2014); State v. Jacobs,
    Docket No. 27545, 
    2015 WL 6180908
    , *6 (Ohio App.
    October 21, 2015), appeal denied, 
    145 Ohio St. 3d 1406
    ,
    
    46 N.E.2d 701
    (2016); State v. Dye, 
    178 Wash. 2d 541
    ,
    553–55, 
    309 P.3d 1192
    (2013). As the court noted in
    Jacobs, ‘‘[t]hese cases reveal three principles that guide
    us . . . . First, trial courts are in the best position to
    determine how to control trial proceedings, especially
    the mode of interrogating witnesses. Second, in light
    of the trial courts’ position and their discretion, it is
    not erroneous for them to approve a variety of special
    allowances for child victims of sexual abuse. And, third,
    these special allowances may include using a . . . dog
    during the child victim’s testimony under certain cir-
    cumstances.’’ State v. 
    Jacobs, supra
    , *6.
    In each of these cases, the appellate court upheld
    the trial court’s exercise of discretion when it was clear
    from the record that the dog’s presence ‘‘would likely
    assist or enable [the witnesses] to testify completely
    and truthfully without undue harassment or embar-
    rassment’’; People v. 
    Chenault, supra
    , 
    227 Cal. App. 4th 1520
    ; would make the witness feel ‘‘ ‘more comfort-
    able’ ’’; State v. 
    Jacobs, supra
    , 
    2015 WL 6180908
    , *6;
    would alleviate the witness’ anxiety and help her to
    more easily discuss the conduct at issue; People v.
    
    Tohom, supra
    , 
    109 A.D. 3d
    267; or would serve to
    facilitate the testimony of a witness who was signifi-
    cantly anxious about testifying and who had develop-
    mental disabilities. State v. 
    Dye, supra
    , 
    178 Wash. 2d 554
    , 557.
    In Chenault, the California Court of Appeal held that
    ‘‘[i]nstead of requiring a case-specific finding that an
    individual witness needs the presence of a . . . dog
    . . . in exercising its discretion . . . a trial court
    should consider the particular facts of the case and the
    circumstances of each individual witness and determine
    whether the presence of a . . . dog would assist or
    enable that witness to testify without undue harassment
    or embarrassment and provide complete and truthful
    testimony. . . . If the trial court finds that the presence
    of a . . . dog would likely assist or enable the individ-
    ual witness to give complete and truthful testimony and
    the record supports that finding, the court generally
    will act within its discretion . . . by granting a request
    for the presence of the . . . dog when that witness
    testifies.’’ (Footnote omitted.) People v. 
    Chenault, supra
    , 
    227 Cal. App. 4th 1517
    . After reviewing the record
    in Chenault, the California Court of Appeal held that
    the trial court properly exercised its discretion, noting
    that it ‘‘made implicit findings that the presence of [the
    dog] . . . would assist or enable [the child victims] to
    testify completely and truthfully without undue harass-
    ment or embarrassment.’’ 
    Id., 1520; see
    also People v.
    
    Tohom, supra
    , 
    109 A.D. 3d
    256–58, 267 (upholding
    decision to allow dog to accompany child witness dur-
    ing her testimony when social worker testified that dog
    would decrease witness’ anxiety, allow her to communi-
    cate better, and better express herself). We find the
    reasoning in Chenault and Tohom persuasive because
    it focuses the trial court’s attention on the central ques-
    tion of whether a special accommodation will serve to
    aid a witness in testifying reliably and completely. Such
    testimony, in turn, helps to ensure a fair and impar-
    tial trial.
    We also agree with the state that the compelling need
    standard set in Jarzbek does not apply in the present
    case because the defendant’s right of confrontation is
    not at issue. In State v. 
    Jarzbek, supra
    , 
    204 Conn. 684
    ,
    this court considered whether a child victim in a case
    involving alleged sexual abuse could testify through the
    use of a video recording made outside the defendant’s
    physical presence. Because this procedure necessarily
    infringed on the defendant’s constitutional right of con-
    frontation, this court concluded that ‘‘a trial court must
    determine, at an evidentiary hearing, whether the state
    has demonstrated a compelling need for excluding the
    defendant from the witness room during the [video
    recording] of a [child] victim’s testimony.’’ 
    Id., 704. This
    court also held that the state ‘‘bears the burden of prov-
    ing such compelling need by clear and convincing evi-
    dence.’’ 
    Id., 705. The
    rigorous procedures set forth in Jarzbek are not
    appropriate in the present case because the defendant’s
    right of confrontation is not at issue. See, e.g., State v.
    
    McPhee, supra
    , 
    58 Conn. App. 507
    –508 (declining to
    extend Jarzbek standard to case in which defendant
    claimed special accommodations to witness aroused
    jurors’ sympathies). Defense counsel informed the trial
    court that the defendant was not claiming that Sum-
    mer’s presence violated his right of confrontation, and
    the defendant makes no claim on appeal that Summer
    interfered with counsel’s ability to cross-examine C1
    or impeded his view or the jury’s view of C1. In fact,
    as the trial court noted, permitting Summer to sit near
    C1 during her testimony was intended to obviate the
    need for the more drastic measure of securing C1’s
    testimony by video recording.
    We conclude that the trial court may exercise its
    discretion to permit a dog to provide comfort and sup-
    port to a testifying witness. Before doing so, the court
    must balance the extent to which the accommodation
    will help the witness to testify reliably and completely
    against any possible prejudice to the defendant’s right to
    a fair trial. The trial court should consider the particular
    facts and circumstances for the request to have a dog
    accompany the particular witness, the extent to which
    the dog’s presence will permit the witness to testify
    truthfully, completely and reliably, and the extent to
    which the dog’s presence will obviate the need for more
    drastic measures to secure the witness’ testimony. The
    trial court should balance these factors against the
    potential prejudice to the defendant and the availability
    of measures to mitigate any prejudice, such as limiting
    instructions and procedures to limit the jury’s view of
    the dog.
    Applying these standards in the present case, we con-
    clude that the trial court properly exercised its discre-
    tion in permitting Summer to sit near C1 during her
    testimony. The court heard testimony that C1 was anx-
    ious about testifying, that children who are anxious are
    less likely to be able to talk about their experiences, and
    that Summer made C1 feel more comfortable. Meyers
    testified that Summer helped C1 to be less anxious and
    more verbal, to engage, to answer questions, and to
    talk. On the basis of this evidence, the court found that
    C1’s testimony would be ‘‘supported and assisted in an
    appropriate manner by [Summer’s] presence . . . .’’
    The court recognized its duty to ‘‘balance the [defen-
    dant’s] due process rights . . . against the need to pro-
    vide an atmosphere in which all witnesses can testify
    and provide the truth reliably, fully and completely.’’
    In doing so, the court considered a number of factors,
    including that the defendant was ‘‘entitled to the jury’s
    direct observation of all witnesses,’’ that a dog would
    not be able to coach C1’s testimony, and that permitting
    Summer to sit near C1 during her testimony would
    obviate the need for capturing C1’s testimony through
    a video recording. After considering these factors, the
    court concluded that the defendant’s rights would not
    be prejudiced by Summer’s presence. Moreover, the
    jurors never saw Summer because the court excused
    the jury prior to C1’s testimony so that Summer would
    be on the witness stand, out of view, before the jury
    returned. This procedure eliminated the possibility that
    the jurors might be swayed by the presence of ‘‘[a] cute
    little kid with her cute dog,’’ as the defendant feared.14
    After examining the record in the present case, we
    conclude that the trial court properly exercised its dis-
    cretion in permitting Summer to sit near C1 during her
    testimony. We therefore reverse the judgment of the
    Appellate Court.
    The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and
    the case is remanded to that court with direction to
    render judgment affirming the judgments of the trial
    court.
    In this opinion the other justices concurred.
    * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
    victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
    to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through
    whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes
    § 54-86e.
    1
    To be consistent with the Appellate Court’s decision in the present case,
    we refer to the victims as C1, C2 and C3, and refer to the defendant’s former
    girlfriend as GF. See State v. Devon D., 
    150 Conn. App. 514
    , 516, 
    90 A.3d 383
    (2014).
    2
    We granted the state’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to the
    following two questions: First, ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court properly conclude
    that the trial court erred by joinder of the three sexual assault cases against
    the defendant?’’ State v. Devon D., 
    314 Conn. 909
    , 
    100 A.3d 402
    (2014).
    Second, ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court properly determine that the trial court’s
    decision to allow an eight year old victim to testify accompanied by a comfort
    canine constituted an abuse of discretion?’’ 
    Id. 3 Although
    the trial court did not rule specifically on whether the evidence
    would have been cross admissible, it instructed the jury that the evidence
    in each case was admissible in the other cases to prove the defendant’s
    propensity to commit crimes of an abhorrent and compulsive sexual nature.
    We conclude that the Appellate Court properly reviewed the issue of whether
    the evidence was cross admissible to show propensity because ‘‘both parties
    address[ed] this claim in light of the propensity standard for the admission
    of misconduct evidence in cases concerning crimes of a sexual nature that
    was adopted in State v. 
    DeJesus, supra
    , 
    288 Conn. 470
    –74’’; State v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 522
    n.5; and because the test for admitting misconduct
    evidence to show a common scheme or plan also applies to admitting
    misconduct evidence to show a propensity to commit crimes of an abhorrent
    and compulsive sexual nature. See State v. 
    DeJesus, supra
    , 476–77.
    4
    When the trial in the present case took place, there was a presumption
    in favor of joinder. Although the presumption no longer applies; see State
    v. 
    Payne, supra
    , 
    303 Conn. 548
    , 549; the trial court’s reliance on the presump-
    tion is not dispositive because the question before us on appeal remains
    the same. That question is whether the defendant has satisfied his burden
    of ‘‘showing that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice,
    and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the
    court’s instructions.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. 
    LaFleur, supra
    , 
    307 Conn. 159
    .
    5
    In Boscarino, we identified the factors that a trial court should consider
    in determining whether separate trials might be necessary to ‘‘avoid undue
    prejudice resulting from consolidation of multiple charges for trial. These
    factors include: (1) whether the charges involve discrete, easily distinguish-
    able factual scenarios; (2) whether the crimes were of a violent nature or
    concerned brutal or shocking conduct on the defendant’s part; and (3) the
    duration and complexity of the trial. . . . If any or all of these factors
    are present, a reviewing court must decide whether the trial court’s jury
    instructions cured any prejudice that might have occurred.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. 
    LaFleur, supra
    , 
    307 Conn. 156
    .
    6
    Because we conclude that the evidence was cross admissible, we need
    not consider whether the trial court properly applied the Boscarino factors.
    State v. 
    LaFleur, supra
    , 
    307 Conn. 155
    (‘‘[w]here evidence is cross admissible
    . . . our inquiry ends’’); State v. Pollitt, 
    205 Conn. 61
    , 68, 
    530 A.2d 155
    (1987)
    (when evidence is cross admissible, ‘‘the defendant would not ordinarily be
    substantially prejudiced by joinder of the offenses for a single trial’’).
    7
    The defendant does not raise a formal challenge to the trial court’s
    instructions and does not cite to any specific language in the charge. In
    addition, defense counsel did not object or take exception to the trial court’s
    instructions to the jury at trial.
    8
    As the Appellate Court noted in its decision, there is a difference between
    service dogs, comfort dogs, therapy dogs, companion dogs and facility dogs,
    and these and additional terms are often used interchangeably. See State
    v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 538
    n.10. Hereinafter, we use the term
    ‘‘dog’’ or refer to Summer by name.
    9
    General Statutes § 54-86g (b) provides: ‘‘In any criminal prosecution of
    an offense involving assault, sexual assault or abuse of a child twelve years
    of age or younger, the court may, upon motion of the attorney for any party,
    order that the following procedures be used when the testimony of the child
    is taken: (1) Persons shall be prohibited from entering and leaving the
    courtroom during the child’s testimony; (2) an adult who is known to the
    child and with whom the child feels comfortable shall be permitted to sit
    in close proximity to the child during the child’s testimony, provided such
    person shall not obscure the child from the view of the defendant or the
    trier of fact; (3) the use of anatomically correct dolls by the child shall be
    permitted; and (4) the attorneys for the defendant and for the state shall
    question the child while seated at a table positioned in front of the child,
    shall remain seated while posing objections and shall ask questions and
    pose objections in a manner which is not intimidating to the child.’’
    10
    We agree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that the defendant
    waived any right to assert that Summer’s presence violated his constitutional
    right of confrontation. See State v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 538
    n.9.
    11
    The record indicates that Summer was, in fact, put into place on the
    stand, out of view, before the jurors entered the courtroom for C1’s testi-
    mony. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jurors ever saw
    Summer, and the defendant does not claim that the jurors ever viewed
    the dog.
    12
    The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant had waived his claim
    that the trial court’s ruling violated his constitutional right of confrontation;
    State v. Devon 
    D., supra
    , 
    150 Conn. App. 538
    n.9; see footnote 10 of this
    opinion; and noted that, because the cases were being remanded for new
    trials, there was no need to consider whether any possible prejudice to the
    defendant had been cured by the trial court’s instructions. State v. Devon
    
    D., supra
    , 550 n.13. Those questions are not before us in this certified appeal,
    which is limited to whether the Appellate Court properly determined that
    the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting Summer to sit near
    C1 while she testified. To the extent that the defendant has referred to these
    issues in his brief, both claims are unavailing. Not only do we agree with the
    Appellate Court’s conclusion that the defendant waived any confrontation
    clause claim, but there is nothing in the record to suggest that Summer’s
    presence interfered with the ability of defense counsel to view or cross-
    examine C1, or interfered with the jury’s view of C1. Similarly, although the
    defendant makes the blanket statement that he was harmed by Summer’s
    presence because it ‘‘implied that C1 had been traumatized . . . made her
    more sympathetic . . . [and] implied she [was] telling the truth,’’ he refers
    to nothing in the record to substantiate this statement.
    13
    Because truthful and reliable testimony is an essential component of a
    fair trial, a finding that an accommodation will help a witness to testify
    more reliably also constitutes a finding that the accommodation is necessary.
    14
    The jury was instructed that ‘‘[t]he witness [C1] is anxious about testi-
    fying in front of a group of people. The dog is not present due to any concern
    the witness has with the defendant’s presence.’’ The court also informed
    the jurors that C1 had only just met Summer, and that they were to disregard
    Summer’s presence and to ‘‘[t]hink of the dog like an interpreter, an aid to
    get the witness’ testimony across to you more clearly.’’ To the extent that
    the defendant now claims that the trial court’s instructions actually exacer-
    bated any prejudice to the defendant, we note that defense counsel specifi-
    cally requested the foregoing instructions.