State v. Davis ( 2014 )


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    STATE v. DAVIS—SECOND CONCURRENCE
    McDONALD, J., concurring. I agree with the majority
    that the implied waiver rule set forth in State v. Kitch-
    ens, 
    299 Conn. 447
    , 482–83, 
    10 A.3d 942
    (2011), should
    not extend to the facts of the present case, where the
    trial court failed to provide the defendant, Raquann
    Tyrone Davis, with a written copy of the jury charge
    and simply stated that the charge would be ‘‘in essence’’
    the one provided on the Judicial Branch website. None-
    theless, I write separately to acknowledge the concerns
    that Justice Palmer has renewed regarding the under-
    pinnings of the per se, irrefutable presumption set forth
    in Kitchens and the question of whether an implied
    waiver would arise even if defense counsel expressly
    disavowed any knowledge of legitimate claims that
    counsel could advance. I also note that recent decisions
    questioning whether the implied waiver rule in Kitchens
    applies to claims of plain error; see State v. Sanchez,
    
    308 Conn. 64
    , 74–75 n.5, 
    60 A.3d 271
    (2013); State v.
    Webster, 
    308 Conn. 43
    , 64, 
    60 A.3d 259
    (2013) (Rogers,
    C. J., concurring); State v. Darryl W., 
    303 Conn. 353
    ,
    371–72 n.17, 
    33 A.3d 239
    (2012); lend some support to
    Justice Palmer’s contention that the rule in Kitchens
    is, in effect, a rule of forfeiture, not waiver.1 Irrespective
    of the merits of such concerns, I note that the defendant
    has not asked us to consider modifying or overruling
    Kitchens in the present case. Not having previously
    weighed in on the merits of the question presented in
    Kitchens, I believe I am obliged to apply that precedent.
    Therefore, I reserve judgment on whether, faced with
    such a request, we should reconsider that precedent.
    I respectfully concur.
    1
    Relying on federal case law, which deems claims forfeited under certain
    circumstances, the Appellate Court has noted: ‘‘[The] Plain Error Rule may
    only be invoked in instances of forfeited-but-reversible error, United States
    v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 731–33, [
    113 S. Ct. 1770
    ], 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 508
    (1993),
    and cannot be used for the purpose of revoking an otherwise valid waiver.
    This is so because if there has been a valid waiver, there is no error for us
    to correct. See [id., 732–33]. . . . The distinction between a forfeiture of a
    right (to which the Plain Error Rule may be applied) and a waiver of that
    right (to which the Plain Error Rule cannot be applied) is that [w]hereas
    forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is
    the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. [Id., 733]
    . . . . United States v. Lakich, 
    23 F.3d 1203
    , 1207 (7th Cir. 1994).’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 
    52 Conn. App. 802
    , 809–10, 
    729 A.2d 778
    (1999).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: SC18864 Concurrence

Filed Date: 4/22/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016