Bova v. Commissioner of Correction ( 2016 )


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    MARK BOVA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
    (AC 36915)
    Lavine, Mullins and Schaller, Js.
    Argued October 8, 2015—officially released January 12, 2016
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Tolland, Kwak, J.)
    Peter Tsimbidaros, for the appellant (petitioner).
    Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state’s
    attorney, Michael Proto, assistant state’s attorney, and
    Steven M. Lesko, deputy assistant state’s attorney, for
    the appellee (respondent).
    Opinion
    SCHALLER, J. The petitioner, Mark Bova, appeals
    after the second habeas court granted his petition for
    certification to appeal from the court’s judgment deny-
    ing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus. On appeal, he claims that the second habeas
    court improperly concluded that he had not been denied
    effective assistance of counsel when his first habeas
    counsel failed to adequately pursue claims pertaining
    to the failure of this trial and appellate counsel, John
    R. Williams, (1) to request a new trial based on or to
    raise on appeal the trial court’s inconsistent application
    of the dual intent requirement in the law of conspiracy;
    (2) to investigate and then produce an adequate basis
    to impeach a witness regarding her bias and motive; and
    (3) to object adequately to instances of prosecutorial
    impropriety during closing argument. We affirm the
    judgment of the second habeas court.
    The petitioner was convicted after a jury trial of mur-
    der in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) and
    conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General
    Statutes §§ 53a-54a (a) and 53a-48 (a). The trial court,
    Gormley, J., sentenced him to concurrent prison terms
    of sixty years on the murder count and twenty years
    on the conspiracy count. On direct appeal in State v.
    Bova, 
    240 Conn. 210
    , 213–15, 
    690 A.2d 1370
     (1997),
    our Supreme Court concluded that the jury reasonably
    could have found the following facts.
    On January 29, 1992, the petitioner reported his wife,
    Susan Bova, missing. 
    Id.,
     213–14. The West Haven Police
    Department discovered her body shortly thereafter and
    commenced an investigation of her death. 
    Id., 214
    . In
    the course of the investigation, the petitioner revealed
    that he had been engaged in an extramarital affair with
    Diane Donofrio since 1985. 
    Id., 215
    . In May, 1993, the
    petitioner terminated his relationship with Donofrio.
    
    Id., 216
    . Two months later, Donofrio reported that the
    petitioner had killed the victim on January 28, 1992.
    
    Id., 216
    . The petitioner was arrested and charged with
    murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
    Donofrio testified at the petitioner’s criminal trial
    that the petitioner told her he intended to kill the victim,
    then called her on Tuesday, January 28, 1992, while he
    was in the process of doing so, asking for her assistance.
    
    Id., 216
    . Donofrio went to the petitioner’s house. 
    Id.
    She found him strangling the victim with a cord. 
    Id.
    Because the victim still had a pulse, Donofrio and the
    petitioner took turns smothering her with a pillow until
    they could no longer detect any heartbeat. 
    Id.
    As previously stated, the petitioner was convicted of
    murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Donofrio
    pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and
    making a false statement to the police; she was sen-
    tenced, by the same trial judge, Gormley, J., as the
    petitioner, to ten years imprisonment, execution sus-
    pended after four years, and three years of probation for
    the conspiracy charge, and received an unconditional
    discharge on the false statement charge. On direct
    appeal our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
    the trial court.1 
    Id., 213
    . On March 9, 1999, the petitioner
    filed his first habeas petition, citing grounds different
    from those in the present appeal,2 and was represented
    by a different attorney (first habeas counsel) from Wil-
    liams or from his present attorney.3 The habeas court
    dismissed the petition, and this court affirmed the judg-
    ment of dismissal. Bova v. Commissioner of Correction,
    
    95 Conn. App. 129
    , 130–31, 
    894 A.2d 1067
    , cert. denied,
    
    278 Conn. 920
    , 
    901 A.2d 43
     (2006).
    The petitioner filed a second habeas petition, which
    he amended on April 9, 2013. Following a trial (second
    habeas trial) at which the petitioner testified and sub-
    mitted documentary evidence, the habeas court, Kwak,
    J. (second habeas court), first granted the motion for
    summary judgment filed by the respondent, the Com-
    missioner of Correction, on three of the four counts,
    then denied the petition regarding the remaining count
    by written memorandum of decision on March 14, 2014.
    The second habeas court subsequently granted the peti-
    tioner’s petition for certification to appeal.4 The present
    appeal followed.
    The standard of review pertaining to claims of ineffec-
    tive assistance of counsel is well settled. ‘‘The habeas
    court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual
    findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless
    they are clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts consti-
    tute a recital of external events and the credibility of
    their narrators. . . . Accordingly, [t]he habeas judge,
    as the trier of facts, is the sole arbiter of the credibility
    of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testi-
    mony. . . . The application of the habeas court’s fac-
    tual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however,
    presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is
    subject to plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Anderson v. Commissioner
    of Correction, 
    313 Conn. 360
    , 375, 
    98 A.3d 23
     (2014),
    cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Semple,           U.S. ,
    
    135 S. Ct. 1453
    , 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 403
     (2015).
    ‘‘[I]t is well established that [a] criminal defendant
    is constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective
    assistance of counsel at all critical stages of criminal
    proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.
    ‘‘[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel consists
    of two components: a performance prong and a preju-
    dice prong. To satisfy the performance prong . . . the
    petitioner must demonstrate that his attorney’s repre-
    sentation was not reasonably competent or within the
    range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordi-
    nary training and skill in the criminal law. . . . To sat-
    isfy the prejudice prong, [the petitioner] must
    demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,
    but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
    the proceeding would have been different. . . . A rea-
    sonable probability is a probability sufficient to under-
    mine confidence in the outcome.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Lapointe v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, 
    316 Conn. 225
    , 264–65, 
    112 A.3d 1
     (2015). ‘‘Because both prongs of [Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
     (1984)] must be demonstrated for the petitioner
    to prevail, failure to prove either prong is fatal to an
    ineffective assistance claim.’’ Jefferson v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    144 Conn. App. 767
    , 773, 
    73 A.3d 840
    , cert. denied, 
    310 Conn. 929
    , 
    78 A.3d 856
     (2013).
    When raising a subsequent habeas petition, ‘‘the peti-
    tioner must establish that both prior habeas counsel
    and trial counsel were ineffective.’’ Alterisi v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    145 Conn. App. 218
    , 227, 
    77 A.3d 748
    , cert. denied, 
    310 Conn. 933
    , 
    78 A.3d 859
     (2013).
    I
    The petitioner claims that his first habeas counsel
    failed to pursue claims pertaining to the failure of Wil-
    liams either to request a new trial or to appeal on the
    basis of the trial court’s inconsistent application of the
    dual intent requirement in the law of conspiracy, which
    requires an agreement between coconspirators. The
    petitioner claims that this inconsistency is evident in
    argument on two successive days of the petitioner’s
    criminal trial, and in Donofrio’s sentencing transcript.
    The petitioner asserts that media coverage of the trial
    motivated the trial court to change course. He asserts
    that the trial court concluded there was no evidence
    of a conspiracy on November 28, 1994, then, despite
    this finding and after reading and hearing the media
    speculation, denied his motion for a judgment of acquit-
    tal on November 29, 1994, and then again found, when
    sentencing Donofrio, that there was no evidence of a
    conspiracy. The respondent replies, first, that collateral
    estoppel bars this argument because the sufficiency of
    the evidence for conspiracy was raised on direct appeal,
    and second, that the petitioner failed to provide evi-
    dence at the second habeas trial that his first habeas
    counsel was ineffective.
    The following additional facts are relevant to our
    resolution of the petitioner’s first claim. During the
    criminal trial on November 28, 1994, Williams moved
    for a judgment of acquittal on the second count, conspir-
    acy to commit murder, on the ground that there was
    no evidence of a meeting of the minds between Donofrio
    and the petitioner. In considering the motion, the trial
    court reviewed the evidence, principally Donofrio’s tes-
    timony on direct examination, and indicated it did not
    see evidence of an agreement, a necessary element of
    the crime. The state then focused the court’s attention
    on Donofrio’s testimony that she suffocated the victim
    after the petitioner handed her the pillow; the court
    queried whether Donofrio’s testimony or the testimony
    of Wayne Carver, the medical examiner, indicated that
    the victim was alive when Donofrio placed the pillow
    over her face. Judge Gormley concluded by telling the
    state: ‘‘I’ll give you until tomorrow morning to deal with
    this, but I can tell you I’ve gone over this transcript
    with a fine tooth comb looking for exactly what you’ve
    said I should be looking for before I remove the issue
    from the jury and I don’t find any evidence, and I recog-
    nize I’m not looking for proof beyond a reasonable—I
    don’t see any evidence, express or implied, explicit or
    implicit, as of my reading of this, to evidence that this
    kind of agreement was entertained by Ms. Donofrio and
    without her there cannot be a conspiracy . . . .’’
    At trial the following day, November 29, 1994, the
    state again argued that there was sufficient evidence
    that Donofrio had entered into an agreement with the
    petitioner to murder the victim for the court to submit
    the conspiracy count to the jury. In support of its argu-
    ment, the state filed a brief and presented the court
    with various sections of the transcript of Donofrio’s
    cross-examination by Williams, which the court indi-
    cated it had not seen. One exchange in the transcript,
    between Williams and Donofrio, provided as follows:
    ‘‘Q. [I]t’s your claim that Mark Bova was on the other
    end of the line and he told you that he was right in the
    middle of committing the murder. Is that right?
    ‘‘A. Yes.
    ‘‘Q. And it’s your claim that he told you he wanted
    you to come right over and help him do it. Is that right?
    ‘‘A. Yes.
    ‘‘Q. And you said sure, I’ll be right there. Is that right?
    ‘‘A. I don’t know exactly what I said.
    ‘‘Q. Or something to that effect.’’
    ‘‘A. Yes.’’
    Another exchange, again between Williams and
    Donofrio, provided:
    ‘‘Q. Oh. Okay. All right. You’re just claiming that your
    role was to use the pillow, is that right?
    ‘‘A. Yes.’’
    Following a discussion of the law of conspiracy to
    commit murder, the court commented: ‘‘I’m going to
    read this because you’ve pointed out some new areas
    or some areas where there may be sufficient evidence
    to allow this to go to the jury . . . .’’ Still later, the
    court noted that ‘‘I have both listened to myself being
    quoted by others on the radio and what I’m supposed
    to have said in newspaper accounts of this thing. They,
    they, as often is the case, they come off somewhat
    differently than what the court is actually dealing with.’’
    The trial court reiterated that it would read the tran-
    script it had just been given and continue to consider
    the issue, after it let Williams present his argument.
    Thereafter, the trial court denied the petitioner’s
    motion for a judgment of acquittal. In doing so, it
    reviewed Carver’s testimony, concluding that his testi-
    mony allowed for the possibility that the victim was
    alive when Donofrio arrived at the house, and it
    reviewed Donofrio’s testimony, finding several
    instances that indicated a conspiracy, drawing special
    attention to her testimony that the petitioner asked
    for help when he was ‘‘in the process’’ of murdering
    the victim.
    In a separate proceeding, Donofrio pleaded guilty
    to conspiracy to commit murder and making a false
    statement to the police. State v. Bova, 
    supra,
     
    240 Conn. 217
     n.3. At her sentencing, Judge Gormley considered
    a statement from the victim’s family, a statement by
    Donofrio’s brother, and several letters. The trial court
    noted Donofrio’s cooperation in the prosecution of the
    petitioner, and made its own observations regarding
    her demeanor and her veracity while testifying. In the
    course of its extensive remarks, it commented: ‘‘Again,
    in the court’s mind, there is no way I could conclude
    one way or the other whether or not there was still life
    in Mrs. Bova at [the time when Donofrio arrived at the
    house]. More than likely there was not.’’ It also noted
    that in pleading guilty, ‘‘she has also chosen not to force
    the state to prove a conspiracy case which would at
    least have been, in the court’s mind, difficult, not impos-
    sible but difficult.’’ She was sentenced to ten years
    imprisonment, execution suspended after four years,
    and three years of probation for the conspiracy charge,
    and received an unconditional discharge on the false
    statement charge.
    At the second habeas trial, the petitioner testified
    regarding the media attention generated by the case,
    specifically media speculation that the court was about
    to grant the motion for acquittal based on the judge’s
    statements on November 28, 1994. The petitioner also
    submitted a newspaper article published on the morn-
    ing of November 29, 1994. The article asserts that the
    trial court was leaning toward granting the motion for
    a judgment of acquittal. The article quotes several attor-
    neys who opine on the effect of an acquittal on the
    conspiracy charge.5 The second habeas court found that
    the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proving
    ineffective assistance of counsel according to both
    Strickland prongs.
    The petitioner has failed to prove that he was preju-
    diced by Williams’ failure to raise the issue of any dis-
    crepancy among the trial court’s statements regarding
    the existence of a conspiracy; therefore we decline to
    reach the first Strickland prong or the collateral estop-
    pel argument.6 See Jefferson v. Commissioner of Cor-
    rection, 
    supra,
     
    144 Conn. App. 773
    . Our review of the
    record demonstrates that the trial court commented on
    the evidence in a thorough and thoughtful manner prior
    to ruling; it did not make inconsistent rulings. The evi-
    dence and argument presented on November 29, 1994,
    rather than the media speculation, provided the basis
    for the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for
    a judgment of acquittal. The trial court’s leniency in
    sentencing Donofrio was supported by a host of factors,
    and the trial court specifically stated that a conspiracy
    case against Donofrio would not have been impossible
    for the state to win. Nothing presented at the second
    habeas trial rebuts this. The second habeas court prop-
    erly found that the petitioner was not prejudiced by first
    habeas counsel’s failure to raise the issue of Williams’
    failure to argue that the trial court applied inconsistent
    standards either in a motion for a new trial or in the
    direct appeal.
    II
    The petitioner claims that the second habeas court
    erred in finding that the petitioner’s first habeas counsel
    did not fail to pursue adequately claims pertaining to
    Williams’ failures to investigate and then produce an
    adequate basis to impeach Donofrio. He asserts that
    Williams should have pursued the theory that Donofrio
    had been stalking the petitioner and his fiance´e, Lisa
    Sheldon, prior to and during the trial, and that this
    would show Donofrio’s bias and motive. The respon-
    dent argues that this issue, again, is barred by collateral
    estoppel,7 or, alternatively, that the petitioner failed to
    demonstrate that his first habeas counsel and Williams
    were ineffective.
    The following additional facts are relevant to our
    resolution of this claim. On direct examination during
    the criminal trial, Donofrio testified that within one and
    one-half years of the murder, the petitioner was with
    another woman, Lisa Sheldon, and that after learning
    this, Donofrio contacted the police. Donofrio testified
    that she had not told the full truth in statements to
    the police and in her testimony at the probable cause
    hearing on September 30, 1993. She initially left out her
    own involvement in the crime completely, but steadily
    divulged further information regarding her role as the
    investigation progressed. She eventually divulged, a
    month before trial, that she felt for the victim’s pulse
    and smothered her with a pillow. She testified that she
    was charged with conspiracy to commit murder and
    aiding and abetting murder.
    On cross-examination during the criminal trial, Wil-
    liams elicited further testimony from Donofrio regard-
    ing specific instances when she had lied to the police
    and had lied in court at a pretrial hearing regarding her
    own role in the murder and other details about her
    relationship with the petitioner. She testified that she
    had written the victim a letter describing her affair with
    the petitioner in order to upset the victim and destroy
    the victim’s marriage to the petitioner. Most import-
    antly, she testified that she hated the petitioner and
    wanted to destroy him.
    While cross-examining Donofrio at the criminal trial
    on November 15, 1994, Williams also asked why she
    had been near the petitioner’s residence the previous
    morning. The state objected on relevancy grounds, the
    court excused the jury, and Williams continued to ques-
    tion Donofrio outside the presence of the jury. Donofrio
    denied being near the petitioner’s residence on the
    morning of November 14, 1994, and denied being near
    Sheldon’s residence over the Memorial Day holiday of
    1994. The trial court did not allow Williams to continue
    the line of questioning.
    At the second habeas trial, the petitioner testified
    that he had seen Donofrio behind Sheldon’s house over
    the Memorial Day weekend in 1994, that Sheldon had
    seen Donofrio driving next to her during the trial, and
    that Donofrio had moved from Derby to Naugatuck to
    be closer to the petitioner. He also testified that Wil-
    liams could have interviewed Sheldon or hired a private
    investigator to uncover more information regarding
    Donofrio’s alleged stalking behavior. The second
    habeas court found that the petitioner had failed to
    meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of
    counsel according to both Strickland prongs.
    We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner
    failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Wil-
    liams’ failure to pursue the stalking theory further and
    do not reach the respondent’s other arguments. See
    Jefferson v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    supra,
     
    144 Conn. App. 773
    . We are unable to conclude what evi-
    dence of stalking behavior the petitioner could have
    elicited due to the petitioner’s failure to call Sheldon,
    Donofrio, trial counsel, or first habeas counsel at the
    second habeas trial. Moreover, our review of the record
    reveals that Williams had elicited numerous examples
    of Donofrio’s inconsistent statements and of her ani-
    mosity toward the victim and the petitioner. There was
    significant support for the second habeas court’s deter-
    mination that the petitioner failed to prove there was
    a reasonable possibility that had his first habeas counsel
    raised Williams’ failure to pursue the stalking theory,
    the result of the proceeding would have been different.
    III
    The petitioner next claims that his first habeas coun-
    sel failed to pursue adequately claims pertaining to Wil-
    liams’ failures to object adequately to instances of
    prosecutorial impropriety during closing argument. He
    claimed that because Williams did not object to state-
    ments made by the prosecutor until after the luncheon
    recess, the trial court denied Williams’ objection ‘‘as
    untimely thereby allowing the comments to fester.’’ The
    respondent replies that this claim is also controlled by
    the Supreme Court’s determination that the comments
    were not improper.8 In the alternative, the respondent
    asserts that neither the first habeas counsel nor Wil-
    liams was ineffective.
    The following additional facts are relevant to our
    consideration of this issue. At the petitioner’s criminal
    trial, the prosecutor argued at the conclusion of her
    closing argument: ‘‘This is the husband of the week,
    father of the year, best man, best friend of the decade.
    This is the person with the motive, the opportunity and
    the method. This is the man who has greed and has
    lust. And, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this is a
    crime about greed and about lust on both their parts.
    But for you, twelve men and women firm and true, with
    a great responsibility, this is a case about justice. Thank
    you.’’ The court excused the jury for lunch. Following
    the luncheon recess, Williams argued that the language
    used by the prosecutor and the manner in which she
    delivered the closing (gesturing at the petitioner) were
    unacceptable and that the court should instruct the jury
    to disregard those portions of the closing argument. In
    response, the prosecutor claimed that Williams’ failure
    to object immediately demonstrated that those remarks
    were not improper. The court ruled: ‘‘It would not be
    the court’s intention to either comment on or strike the
    language within the argument.’’
    At the second habeas trial, the petitioner testified that
    during the luncheon recess, following the prosecutor’s
    comments, he asked Williams whether the prosecutor
    was permitted to point her finger at him and make
    statements such as ‘‘father of the year’’ and ‘‘husband
    of the decade’’ about him. The petitioner further testi-
    fied that, following this conversation, Williams objected
    to the prosecutor’s comments, but the trial court
    refused to comment to the jury.
    Again, we agree that the petitioner has failed to prove
    prejudice pursuant to Strickland. See Lapointe v. Com-
    missioner of Correction, 
    supra,
     
    316 Conn. 264
    –65. We
    need not reach the respondent’s other arguments. See
    Jefferson v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    supra,
     
    144 Conn. App. 773
    . Pursuant to State v. Stevenson, 
    269 Conn. 563
    , 576, 
    849 A.2d 626
     (2004), when analyzing a
    claim of prosecutorial impropriety, ‘‘the fact that
    defense counsel did not object to one or more incidents
    of [impropriety] must be considered in determining
    whether and to what extent the [impropriety] contrib-
    uted to depriving the defendant of a fair trial . . . .’’
    See also State v. Williams, 
    204 Conn. 523
    , 540, 
    529 A.2d 653
     (1987) (factors for determining prosecutorial
    impropriety). The petitioner cites to State v. Ceballos,
    
    266 Conn. 364
    , 
    832 A.2d 14
     (2003): ‘‘We emphasize the
    responsibility of defense counsel, at the very least, to
    object to perceived prosecutorial improprieties as they
    occur at trial . . . . Accordingly, we emphasize that
    counsel’s failure to object at trial, while not by itself
    fatal to a defendant’s claim, frequently will indicate on
    appellate review the magnitude of the constitutional
    error . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered.) Id.,
    414. This statement by our Supreme Court is clearly
    distinguishable; here, Williams did object at trial; he
    merely did so following the luncheon recess. The trial
    court did not rule that the objection was too late or that,
    because Williams had not objected earlier, it discounted
    the merits of the objection. It ruled that it would not
    comment on or strike the language and did not further
    elucidate its reasoning. Our Supreme Court upheld this
    decision on direct appeal, with reference to State v.
    Williams, supra, 
    204 Conn. 523
    , among other cases,
    and without any mention of Williams’ failure to object
    before the luncheon recess. State v. Bova, 
    supra,
     
    240 Conn. 244
    –45. Our only task, then, is to determine
    whether the petitioner was prejudiced because Williams
    objected after lunch rather than before lunch. We see
    no evidence in the trial transcript or the second habeas
    trial transcript suggesting that the court would have
    ruled differently prior to lunch. We find that the peti-
    tioner has failed to meet his burden of showing he was
    prejudiced by the first habeas counsel’s failure to raise
    the issue of Williams’ failure to object the moment the
    prosecutor finished her closing argument.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The petitioner claimed on direct appeal that the trial court ‘‘improperly:
    (1) restricted his cross-examination of several witnesses in violation of his
    right to confront his accusers as guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the
    United States constitution; (2) denied his motion to suppress incriminating
    evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant issued in
    violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution; (3)
    precluded him from introducing certain evidence in violation of his right
    to present a defense as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments
    to the United States constitution; (4) overruled his objections to certain
    allegedly inflammatory comments by the state during its closing argument,
    thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (5) concluded that the evidence
    was sufficient to support the verdict of guilty of the crime of conspiracy to
    commit murder.’’ State v. Bova, 
    supra,
     
    240 Conn. 213
    .
    2
    In the first habeas case, the petitioner claimed that Williams failed to
    object when the jury asked a question regarding the meaning of a ‘‘nonsurety
    bond’’ during Donofrio’s testimony. Bova v. Commissioner, 
    95 Conn. App. 129
    , 131–133, 
    894 A.2d 1067
    , cert. denied, 
    278 Conn. 920
    , 
    901 A.2d 43
     (2006).
    The petitioner claimed that this demonstrated the jury was impermissibly
    deliberating prematurely, and that Williams was ineffective in failing to
    request an evidentiary hearing into the premature deliberations. 
    Id.,
     135–36.
    3
    The petitioner alleged in the amended petition in the present action that
    his attorneys for his first habeas action were Cynthia Barlow and George
    Cameron, but the petitioner stated at the habeas trial that they were Adele
    Patterson, Cynthia Barlow, and others.
    4
    While the petition for certification to appeal lists the habeas court’s
    granting of the motion for summary judgment as a ground, the petitioner’s
    arguments on appeal all concern the count alleging ineffective assistance
    of first habeas counsel, which was the remaining count following the habeas
    court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment.
    5
    The petitioner claims that the attorneys quoted in the article expressed
    the opinion that acquitting as to one count would imply that the entire case,
    including the remaining charge of murder, was weak. While this accurately
    represents the opinions of some of the attorneys quoted, the article also
    contained opinions to the contrary: one attorney stated that acquitting as
    to one count ‘‘could cut both ways—either casting doubt on the prosecution’s
    entire case or implying that even though [the trial judge] felt there wasn’t
    enough evidence of conspiracy, there was enough evidence that Bova com-
    mitted the murder’’; another stated that ‘‘the effect would be minimal.’’
    6
    While we do not reach the issue of collateral estoppel, in Diaz v. Commis-
    sioner of Correction, 
    125 Conn. App. 57
    , 66, 
    6 A.3d 213
     (2010), cert. denied,
    
    299 Conn. 926
    , 
    11 A.3d 150
     (2011), this court held that in order for a claim
    on direct appeal to have preclusive effect on a habeas action, the claims
    must be identical. ‘‘Although the habeas court was correct that the deficiency
    of counsel claim bears a striking similarity to the claim of impropriety by
    the court raised on direct appeal, this is a separate claim, thus requiring
    separate legal analysis.’’ 
    Id.
     Unlike in Diaz, in the present case, collateral
    estoppel was not the basis for the habeas court’s decision on the issues
    appealed by the petitioner, although it was the basis for the court’s grant
    of summary judgment on other counts of the petition.
    7
    See footnote 6 of this opinion. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court held
    that ‘‘the [petitioner] had already elicited numerous admissions by Donofrio
    that clearly established her intense and abiding hostility toward him.’’ State
    v. Bova, 
    supra,
     
    240 Conn. 226
    .
    8
    See footnote 6 of this opinion. On direct appeal, our Supreme Court
    held: ‘‘In this case, the state’s remarks regarding the defendant’s lust and
    greed were fully supported by the evidence; indeed, the jury reasonably
    could have concluded that such lust and greed provided the defendant with
    sufficient motive to kill the victim. Although it may be argued that the state’s
    ironic characterization of the defendant as a good husband and father was
    unnecessarily caustic, it cannot be said that the comments were without
    support in the record. The challenged remarks were relatively isolated and
    brief, they did not reflect a pattern of misconduct, and they did not implicate
    the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’’ State v. Bova, 
    supra,
     
    240 Conn. 244
    –45.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC36915

Filed Date: 1/12/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/5/2016