Berkshire-Litchfield Environmental Council, Inc. v. Esty ( 2016 )


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    APPENDIX
    BERKSHIRE-LITCHFIELD ENVIRONMENTAL
    COUNCIL, INC. v. DANIEL ESTY ET AL.*
    Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford
    File No. LND CV-13-6041645-S
    Memorandum filed July 9, 2014
    Proceedings
    Memorandum of decision on defendants’ motion to
    dismiss. Motion granted.
    Nicholas J. Harding and Mary E. Mintel, for the
    plaintiff.
    Kimberly P. Massicotte and Sharon M. Seligman,
    assistant attorneys general, for the defendants.
    Opinion
    BERGER, J.
    I
    On April 25, 2013, the plaintiff, Berkshire-Litchfield
    Environmental Council, Inc.,1 commenced this suit
    against the defendants; Daniel Esty, the Commissioner
    of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protec-
    tion (commissioner); the Department of Energy and
    Environmental Protection (department); Susan Whalen,
    the Deputy Commissioner of the Department; and
    George C. Jepsen, the Attorney General; pursuant to
    General Statutes § 22a-16 of the Connecticut Environ-
    mental Protection Act (CEPA).2 In the plaintiff’s
    amended complaint filed on June 28, 2013, the plaintiff
    alleges that BNE Energy, Inc. (BNE), entered the state
    of Connecticut’s Canaan Mountain Wilderness Natural
    Area Preserve3 (the forest) on or about May 17, 2010,
    and clear-cut more than 332 trees on approximately 2.5
    acres. On November 13, 2012, the commissioner entered
    into a consent order with BNE concerning remediation
    plans for the forest.4 The plaintiff seeks a declaratory
    judgment rendering the consent order void because it
    alleges that the commissioner had no general statutory
    authority, including that set forth in General Statutes
    § 22a-6 (a) (3),5 to enter into the consent order. In the
    alternative, the plaintiff seeks a declaratory ruling that
    the consent order must be revised to comply with Gen-
    eral Statutes § 52-560a,6 which it alleges would require
    referral of the matter to the attorney general and resto-
    ration of the forest by BNE.
    On December 26, 2013, the defendants moved to dis-
    miss and to strike the action on grounds that the court
    lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff
    has no standing to bring the suit, or that if it does
    have standing, the suit should be stricken because the
    plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action against the
    defendants under CEPA. The defendants argue that the
    plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit under CEPA
    because (1) CEPA does not provide for suits against
    parties that did not cause or participate in causing envi-
    ronmental damage; (2) CEPA cannot be used to force
    a third party to take some action, in this case, to require
    that the commissioner or the attorney general file suit
    against BNE; and (3) CEPA cannot be used to void a
    lawful consent order.
    On February 13, 2014, the plaintiff filed a memoran-
    dum in opposition to the defendants’ motion, arguing
    that the commissioner misunderstands its allegations.
    The plaintiff denies that it is requesting that the commis-
    sioner obtain injunctive relief to have BNE restore the
    state forest; rather, it argues that the commissioner only
    had the authority under § 52-560a to refer the matter
    to the attorney general. The plaintiff further asserts that
    the commissioner did not have the authority to enter
    into the consent order either pursuant to §§ 22a-6 or
    52-560a, and that, by entering into the order, he has
    prevented the plaintiff from pursuing an action against
    BNE for violation of CEPA. The plaintiff also argues
    that the commissioner, by entering into the order, has
    prevented the restoration of the state forest, thereby
    negatively impacting wildlife.
    The defendants filed a memorandum in reply on
    March 13, 2014. They argue that no statute requires
    referral of the matter to the attorney general, the defen-
    dants’ actions have not been illegal or impermissible,
    and the commissioner has broad authority to enter into
    a consent order. They also assert that the plaintiff lacks
    standing because it has failed to allege a substantive
    violation of environmental law or direct impairment
    or destruction of natural resources. This court heard
    argument on April 15, 2014.
    II
    ‘‘A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on
    the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.
    . . . When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional ques-
    tion raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must con-
    sider the allegations of the complaint in their most
    favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take
    the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including
    those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
    construing them in a manner most favorable to the
    pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss . . . admits all
    facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing
    record and must be decided upon that alone.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti,
    
    310 Conn. 616
    , 626, 
    79 A.3d 60
    (2013).
    ‘‘If a party is found to lack standing, the court is
    without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
    cause. . . . A determination regarding a trial court’s
    subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. . . .
    ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of
    the court to adjudicate the type of controversy pre-
    sented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks dis-
    cretion to consider the merits of a case over which it
    is without jurisdiction . . . . The objection of want of
    jurisdiction may be made at any time . . . [a]nd the
    court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should
    do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its atten-
    tion. . . . The requirement of subject matter jurisdic-
    tion cannot be waived by any party and can be raised
    at any stage in the proceedings. . . .
    ‘‘Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep
    aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substan-
    tive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to
    ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits
    brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that
    judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
    are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and
    vigorously represented. . . . These two objectives are
    ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant
    makes a colorable claim of direct injury he has suffered
    or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative
    capacity. Such a personal stake in the outcome of the
    controversy . . . provides the requisite assurance of
    concrete adverseness and diligent advocacy. . . . The
    requirement of directness between the injuries claimed
    by the plaintiff and the conduct of the defendant also
    is expressed, in our standing jurisprudence, by the focus
    on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to assert
    the claim at issue. . . .
    ‘‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement
    exist, classical and statutory. . . . Classical
    aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party
    must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest
    in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a
    general interest that all members of the community
    share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the
    agency’s decision has specially and injuriously affected
    that specific personal or legal interest. . . .
    Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the pos-
    sibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected inter-
    est. . . .
    ‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not
    by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case.
    In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, par-
    ticular legislation grants standing to those who claim
    injury to an interest protected by that legislation. . . .
    ‘‘Traditionally, citizens seeking to protect the envi-
    ronment were required to show specific, personal
    aggrievement to attain standing to bring a legal action.
    . . . [CEPA] . . . however, waives the aggrievement
    requirement in two circumstances. First, any private
    party, including a municipality, without first having to
    establish aggrievement, may seek injunctive relief in
    court for the protection of the public trust in the air,
    water and other natural resources of the state from
    unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction
    . . . . General Statutes § 22a-16. Second, any person
    or other entity, without first having to establish
    aggrievement, may intervene in any administrative pro-
    ceeding challenging conduct which has, or which is
    reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably
    polluting, impairing or destroying the public trust in
    the air, water or other natural resources of the state.
    General Statutes § 22a-19 (a). . . .
    ‘‘Under § 22a-16, standing . . . is conferred only to
    protect the natural resources of the state from pollution
    or destruction. . . . Accordingly, all that is required to
    invoke the jurisdiction of the Superior Court under
    § 22a-16 is a colorable claim, by any person [or entity]
    against any person [or entity], of conduct resulting in
    harm to one or more of the natural resources of this
    state. . . . Although it is true, of course, that the plain-
    tiff need not prove [his or her] case at this stage of the
    proceedings . . . the plaintiff nevertheless must artic-
    ulate a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution,
    impairment or destruction of the environment. . . . A
    complaint does not sufficiently allege standing [how-
    ever] by merely reciting the provisions of § 22a-16
    . . . . Rather, it must set forth facts to support an infer-
    ence that unreasonable pollution, impairment or
    destruction of a natural resource will probably result
    from the challenged activities unless remedial measures
    are taken.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental
    Protection, 
    291 Conn. 789
    , 802–804, 
    970 A.2d 640
    (2009).
    III
    The defendants maintain that the plaintiff is improp-
    erly attempting to use CEPA to sue them instead of
    suing BNE for the destruction of the forest. The plaintiff
    posits, however, that it would be unsuccessful in suing
    BNE for violations of CEPA because of the preclusive
    effect of the consent order. See Carothers v. Capoz-
    ziello, 
    215 Conn. 82
    , 95–96, 
    574 A.2d 1268
    (1990) (‘‘[a
    consent order], just like a stipulated judgment or con-
    sent decree, will be given preclusive effect to the same
    extent as a judgment or decree rendered after answer
    and contest’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). The
    plaintiff’s ability to sue BNE is, however, irrelevant to
    the issue of whether the plaintiff has standing. Specifi-
    cally, the issue is whether the plaintiff’s complaint
    ‘‘set[s] forth facts to support an inference that unreason-
    able pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural
    resource will probably result’’; (internal quotation
    marks omitted) Burton v. Commissioner of Environ-
    mental 
    Protection, supra
    , 
    291 Conn. 804
    ; from the
    defendants’ conduct of entering into the consent order
    and failing to seek damages from BNE under § 52-560a.
    A
    In count one in the plaintiff’s amended complaint, it
    alleges the following:
    ‘‘14. The red bad and the hoary bat are both species
    of Special Concern in Connecticut and both roost in
    dense forests . . . like those found in the Canaan
    Mountain Wilderness Natural Area Preserve.’’
    ‘‘15. Neotropical migratory birds rely on large forest
    tracts . . . for breeding, including those on Canaan
    Mountain.
    ‘‘16. There are approximately 200 species of Neotropi-
    cal migratory birds; those that frequent the Canaan
    Mountain Wilderness Natural Area Preserve include:
    songbirds . . . and raptors . . . .
    ‘‘17. In February 2011, a golden eagle was found near
    the Connecticut-New York border and it is now believed
    there may be at least one hundred more that spend the
    winter in northwestern Connecticut, residing on, or in
    nearby or complimenting areas to, Canaan Mountain.
    ***
    ‘‘30. Though required by General Statutes § 52-560a,
    neither the Commissioner, nor the Deputy Commis-
    sioner, nor DEEP (collectively, the ‘DEEP Defendants’)
    has required BNE to restore the Clear-cut Area to the
    condition as it existed prior to BNE’s decimation of the
    State Forest, or, in the alternative, has sought the costs
    of restoration, including reasonable management costs.
    Nor did the DEEP Defendants consider the willfulness
    of the violation, the extent of damage done to the natu-
    ral resources, or the appraised value of the trees or
    shrubs cut in accordance with the statute.
    ‘‘31. The DEEP Defendants did not seek any damages
    for the destruction of the natural resources or the
    appraised value of the trees or shrubs cut.
    ***
    ‘‘33. After confirming that BNE had clear cut the trees
    in the State Forest . . . the DEEP defendants should
    have referred the matter to the Attorney General for
    enforcement, as provided for in General Statutes
    § 52-560a.
    ‘‘34. Instead of referring the matter to the Attorney
    General, the Deputy Commissioner entered into the
    consent order.
    ‘‘35. The consent order erroneously claimed that the
    Commissioner had the authority to act under . . .
    § 52-560a.
    ***
    ‘‘37. Nothing in General Statutes §§ 22a-6 or 52-560a
    gives the DEEP Defendants authority to settle cases
    involving the destruction of the State Forest without
    the participation of the Attorney General or the Supe-
    rior Court.
    ‘‘38. Because of the lack of jurisdiction of the DEEP
    Defendants, as described above, the Deputy Commis-
    sioner did not have authority to sign the Consent Order,
    and the Consent Order is null and void.
    ‘‘39. As a result of DEEP’s failure to act in accordance
    with Connecticut law, which ensures the restoration of
    this valuable section of the State Forest that was ille-
    gally destroyed, the State has now lost a unique habitat
    that DEEP and the Attorney General are mandated by
    Connecticut law to protect.
    ***
    ‘‘46. As [General Statutes § 26-303 et seq.; 16 U.S.C.
    § 6101; 16 U.S.C. § 668] make clear, Connecticut values
    endangered and threatened species and essential habi-
    tats, and the United States has taken steps to protect
    Neotropical migratory birds and golden eagles, all of
    which have ties to the area on, or in nearby or compli-
    menting areas to, Canaan Mountain, which the DEEP
    Defendants have failed and continue to fail to ade-
    quately protect and restore.
    ‘‘47. The illegal actions of the DEEP Defendants have
    prevented the State Forest from being restored in accor-
    dance with General Statutes § 52-560a, and therefore
    the DEEP Defendants have unreasonably impaired or
    destroyed, and continue to unreasonably impair and
    destroy, the natural resources of the State of Connecti-
    cut and the public trust therein.’’
    In count two, the plaintiff incorporates these para-
    graphs and further alleges: ‘‘47. The actions of the DEEP
    Defendants, both their incomplete investigation of
    BNE’s actions and their refusal to follow the state policy
    outlined in § 52-560a that requires BNE to restore the
    State Forest to its natural state, unreasonably impaired
    or destroyed, and continue to unreasonably impair and
    destroy, the natural resources of the State of Connecti-
    cut and the public trust therein.’’
    These allegations are insufficient to infer unreason-
    able harm to the environment caused by the defendants.
    ‘‘A complaint does not sufficiently allege standing . . .
    by merely reciting the provisions of § 22a-16 . . . .
    Rather, it must set forth facts to support an inference
    that unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction
    of a natural resource will probably result from the chal-
    lenged activities unless remedial measures are taken.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Domin-
    ion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 
    300 Conn. 542
    , 556–57,
    
    23 A.3d 1176
    (2011). The amended complaint clearly
    alleges that BNE clear-cut the forest and that the defen-
    dants did not take that action or permit it. The defen-
    dants’ entering into the consent order and their failure
    to seek damages—or to refer the matter to have the
    attorney general seek damages—from BNE under § 52-
    560a did not cause the harm in this case. More import-
    antly, the plaintiff does not allege any specific facts
    from which the court could infer how or why the con-
    sent order is causing any destruction7 and is causing
    harm now to the threatened or endangered species; it
    simply concludes that the failure to seek restoration
    is the cause of the alleged harm. See Fort Trumbull
    Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 
    286 Conn. 264
    , 273, 
    943 A.2d 420
    (2008) (‘‘[o]ur case law establishes that, to set
    forth a colorable claim under § 22a-16, the party seeking
    relief must provide an indication as to how or why [the
    challenged conduct] is likely to cause unreasonable
    harm to the environment’’ [emphasis altered; internal
    quotation marks omitted]); Fort Trumbull Conser-
    vancy, LLC v. New London, 
    265 Conn. 423
    , 433, 
    829 A.2d 801
    (2003) (‘‘In the present case, the allegations
    of the complaint do not give rise to an inference of
    unreasonable harm to the environment because it is
    not evident how the defendants’ failure to follow certain
    procedural requirements in adopting the development
    plan or to consider alternatives to the demolition of
    buildings in the Fort Trumbull area is likely to cause
    such harm. Nor is it apparent what the nature of any
    such harm might be.’’).
    Construing the plaintiff’s claim of an invalid consent
    order as a cause of action for unreasonable pollution
    under § 22a-16 would effectively strip the commissioner
    of the authority to enter into consent orders. See Con-
    necticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque, 
    267 Conn. 116
    , 139, 
    836 A.2d 414
    (2003). ‘‘It is not our func-
    tion to take such a step; that determination rests with
    the legislature.’’ 
    Id. Nevertheless, the
    plaintiff argues
    that the commissioner had no authority to issue the
    consent order8 and that the only enforcement action
    allowed is that under § 52-560a.9
    Section 52-560a (c) authorizes the owner of open
    space land, the holder of a conservation easement, or
    the attorney general to bring a suit in the Superior
    Court. Specifically, the statute provides that ‘‘the Attor-
    ney General may bring an action . . . .’’10 (Emphasis
    added.) ‘‘[T]he use of the term may . . . ordinarily does
    not connote a command. Rather, the word generally
    imports permissive conduct and the conferral of discre-
    tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v.
    County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 
    310 Conn. 38
    , 47–48, 
    74 A.3d 1212
    (2013). The plaintiff’s
    assertion that the commissioner could only refer the
    matter to the attorney general under § 52-560a is an
    unduly rigid and unworkable construction of the statute
    and cannot be what the legislature intended. See Niz-
    zardo v. State Traffic Commission, 
    259 Conn. 131
    , 157,
    
    788 A.2d 1158
    (2002) (‘‘[i]f two constructions of a statute
    are possible, we will adopt the one that makes the
    statute effective and workable’’ [internal quotation
    marks omitted]). Thus, the court cannot construe the
    statute to require anyone to bring a cause of action or
    to mandate that the commissioner refer the matter to
    the attorney general for enforcement.
    The plaintiff also argues that by entering into the
    consent order rather than referring the matter to the
    attorney general to have the land restored, the commis-
    sioner has both ‘‘usurped the authority of the [a]ttorney
    [g]eneral’’ and has prevented the enforcement of, and
    failed to enforce, the Connecticut Endangered Species
    Act, General Statutes § 26-303 et seq.;11 the Neotropical
    Migratory Bird Conservation Act; 16 U.S.C. § 6101;12
    and the 1940 Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16
    U.S.C. § 668;13 and to protect endangered or threatened
    species, including neotropical migratory birds and
    golden eagles, or essential habitats. Nothing in these
    statutes can be construed as preventing the commis-
    sioner from entering into a consent order.14
    The commissioner entered into an order pursuant to
    his statutory power under § 22a-6 (a) (3). Section 22a-
    6, in relevant part, provides: ‘‘(a) The commissioner
    may . . . (3) initiate and receive complaints as to any
    actual or suspected violation of any statute, regulation,
    permit or order administered, adopted or issued by
    him. The commissioner shall have the power to hold
    hearings, administer oaths, take testimony and sub-
    poena witnesses and evidence, enter orders and insti-
    tute legal proceedings including, but not limited to,
    suits for injunctions, for the enforcement of any statute,
    regulation, order or permit administered, adopted or
    issued by him . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Our courts
    have long been aware that the consent order is used
    by the commissioner to define parameters and obliga-
    tions of operation as well as obligations and penalties
    for environmental violations. See, e.g., Rocque v. Farri-
    cielli, 
    269 Conn. 187
    , 
    848 A.2d 1206
    (2004); Walsh v.
    Stonington Water Pollution Control Authority, 
    250 Conn. 443
    , 
    736 A.2d 811
    (1999); Water Pollution Control
    Authority v. Keeney, 
    234 Conn. 488
    , 
    662 A.2d 124
    (1995);
    Waterbury v. Phoenix Soil, LLC, Superior Court, judi-
    cial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket,
    Docket No. CV-98-0146037-S (March 26, 2009) (Crem-
    ins, J.), aff’d, 
    128 Conn. App. 619
    , 
    20 A.3d 1
    (2011);
    Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority v. Dept. of
    Environmental Protection, Superior Court, judicial dis-
    trict of Hartford, Docket No. CV-95-0544912-S (May 1,
    1996) (Hodgson, J.); Wright v. Woodridge Lake Sewer
    District, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield,
    Docket No. CV-0043504-S (January 7, 1992) (Susco, J.).
    The consent order, issued pursuant to General Statutes
    §§ 22a-5, 22a-5a,15 22a-6, 23-5, and 23-5c, demonstrates
    the environmental policy for the preservation and main-
    tenance of state land and forests.
    Furthermore, the legislative scheme supports the
    commissioner’s discretionary authority. In § 22a-5, the
    legislature provided that ‘‘[t]he commissioner shall
    carry out the energy and environmental policies of the
    state and shall have all powers necessary and conve-
    nient to faithfully discharge this duty. In addition to
    and consistent with the environment policy of the state,
    the commissioner shall (1) promote and coordinate
    management of water, land and air resources to assure
    their protection, enhancement and proper allocation
    and utilization; (2) provide for the protection and man-
    agement of plants, trees, fish, shellfish, wildlife and
    other animal life of all types, including the preservation
    of endangered species; (3) provide for the protection,
    enhancement and management of the public forests,
    parks, open spaces and natural area preserves . . . .’’
    In § 23-5, the legislature provided that ‘‘ [t]he Commis-
    sioner of Energy and Environmental Protection shall
    have charge and supervision of all lands acquired by
    the state, as public reservations, for the purposes of
    public recreation or the preservation of natural beauty
    or historic association, except such lands as may be
    placed by law in the charge and under the supervision
    of other commissions or officials.’’ In § 23-5c, the legis-
    lature gave the ‘‘responsibility for selection, care, con-
    trol, supervision and management of all natural area
    preserves within the system’’ to the commissioner with
    the obligation to ‘‘maintain such preserves in as natural
    and wild a state as is consistent with the preservation
    and enhancement of protected resources and educa-
    tional, scientific, biological, geological, paleontological
    and scenic purposes. . . .’’ These statutes and espe-
    cially § 22a-6 (a) (3) provide authority to order alterna-
    tive remedies for environmental harm, particularly in
    light of the discretionary language of § 52-560a (c). Sec-
    tion 22a-6 (a) (3), in relevant part, provides that ‘‘[t]he
    commissioner shall have the power to . . . enter
    orders’’ and gives the commissioner a statutory avenue
    to address BNE’s acts. The invasive species studies
    and passive growth management process fall within the
    legislature’s grant of authority to the commissioner set
    forth in the statutes.16
    The commissioner also argues that his administrative
    options to deal with the BNE violations are not circum-
    scribed by § 52-560a; that is, it is not his sole enforce-
    ment tool.17 He posits that the plaintiff has no standing
    to challenge his discretionary authority found within
    the terms of the consent order. Our Supreme Court has
    stated, ‘‘Agencies, in general, are given broad discretion
    to exercise their regulatory authority. . . . The United
    States Supreme Court has compared an agency’s exer-
    cise of its enforcement power to that of a prosecutor.
    . . . In Connecticut, the legislature has granted the
    department broad discretion to enforce the environ-
    mental laws. . . . This court has held specifically that
    the department has the discretion to choose the appro-
    priate enforcement action to remedy pollution.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted.) Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture,
    L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection,
    
    253 Conn. 661
    , 670, 
    757 A.2d 1
    (2000), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 1148
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1089
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 963
    (2001).
    This view is consistent with that of our federal courts.
    ‘‘This Court has recognized on several occasions over
    many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute
    or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is
    a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute
    discretion. . . . This recognition of the existence of
    discretion is attributable in no small part to the general
    unsuitability for judicial review of agency decisions to
    refuse enforcement. The reasons for this general unsuit-
    ability are many. First, an agency decision not to enforce
    often involves a complicated balancing of a number of
    factors which are peculiarly within its expertise. Thus,
    the agency must not only assess whether a violation
    has occurred, but whether agency resources are best
    spent on this violation or another, whether the agency
    is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular
    enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s
    overall policies, and, indeed, whether the agency has
    enough resources to undertake the action at all. An
    agency generally cannot act against each technical vio-
    lation of the statute it is charged with enforcing. The
    agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal
    with the many variables involved in the proper ordering
    of its priorities.’’ (Citations omitted.) Heckler v. Chaney,
    
    470 U.S. 821
    , 831–32, 
    105 S. Ct. 1649
    , 
    84 L. Ed. 2d 714
    (1985).
    The commissioner has the discretion to utilize differ-
    ent statutory remedies available to him; a referral pursu-
    ant to § 52-560a (c) is but one possibility and not the
    only remedy. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Reynolds, 
    122 Conn. App. 465
    , 471–72, 
    1 A.3d 125
    (‘‘it is clear that
    the power to enforce zoning regulations conferred by
    [General Statutes] § 8-12 on town officials is discretion-
    ary’’), cert. denied, 
    298 Conn. 922
    , 
    4 A.3d 1226
    (2010).
    The commissioner also has the choice not to pursue a
    remedy under § 52-560a, but to enter into a consent
    order pursuant to § 22a-6 (a) (3), which, in this case,
    provides for the ‘‘passive restoration of the site through
    the regrowth of vegetation while controlling for inva-
    sive species.’’
    Finally, the plaintiff’s allegations most closely resem-
    ble an improper permitting claim. ‘‘In order to read
    our environmental protection statutes so as to form a
    consistent and coherent whole, we infer a legislative
    purpose that those other enactments are to be read
    together with CEPA, and that, when they apply to the
    conduct questioned in an independent action under
    CEPA, they give substantive content to the meaning
    of the word ‘unreasonable’ in the context of such an
    independent action.’’ Waterbury v. Washington, 
    260 Conn. 506
    , 559, 
    800 A.2d 1102
    (2002). As explained pre-
    viously, authority to enter a consent order is part of
    the legislative scheme for environmental protection and
    as such should be construed under ‘‘the permitting pro-
    cess’’ rule of Waterbury v. 
    Washington, supra
    , 506.
    In Rocque v. Mellon, 
    275 Conn. 161
    , 168, 
    881 A.2d 972
    (2005), cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1111
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1913
    , 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 664
    (2006), the court reviewed its decision
    in Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. 
    Rocque, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 116
    –18, 134, and stated that ‘‘[a]llega-
    tions of improper decisions by the commissioner for
    failure to comply with the statutory requirements
    regarding permit renewal proceedings and emergency
    authorizations cannot be construed as anything other
    than a licensing claim . . . . Relying on a long series
    of cases in which we had held that § 22a-16 does not
    confer standing to litigate permitting decisions that are
    within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state agency, we
    concluded that the trial court properly had dismissed
    the plaintiffs’ claims. . . . In doing so, we distin-
    guished other cases in which we had determined that
    the plaintiffs had standing under § 22a-16 because,
    although the lack of an appropriate permit had been
    alleged, the plaintiffs had raised independent claims of
    unreasonable pollution [that] were directed primarily
    to the polluting activity itself, and not . . . to the valid-
    ity of an existing permit or authorization . . . .’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Rocque v. 
    Mellon, supra
    , 168.
    Similarly, in Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecti-
    cut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 545
    , the federal Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission approved an increase in the
    plaintiff’s licensed core power. The plaintiff alleged vio-
    lation of CEPA, among other things, based upon unrea-
    sonable pollution caused by an increase in radioactive
    discharge and the temperature of the thermal plume.
    
    Id., 549. The
    court held that ‘‘the plaintiff has failed
    to make a colorable claim sufficient to establish her
    standing under § 22a-16 because her complaint does
    not contain allegations of . . . pollution in excess of
    that permitted under the regulatory scheme . . . .’’
    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id., 557. Thus,
    it is Connecticut law that ‘‘[w]here the alleged
    conduct involves a permitting claim . . . there is no
    standing pursuant to § 22a-16 to bring the claim directly
    in the Superior Court . . . .’’ Connecticut Coalition
    Against Millstone v. 
    Rocque, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 148
    .
    Standing exists, however, where the complaint contains
    ‘‘allegations of substantive violations giving rise to
    unreasonable pollution . . . that is, allegations of pol-
    lution in excess of that permitted under the regulatory
    scheme . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion
    Nuclear Connecticut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 557
    .
    Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 542
    , in which the court held that the
    plaintiff lacked standing, must be distinguished from
    Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental 
    Protection, supra
    , 
    291 Conn. 789
    , in which the court held that the
    plaintiff had standing. In Burton v. Commissioner of
    Environmental 
    Protection, supra
    , 804–805, the
    Supreme Court concluded ‘‘that the plaintiff’s complaint
    adequately sets forth facts to support an inference that
    unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction of
    a natural resource will probably result from Millstone’s
    operation. The complaint contains specific allegations
    of harm to the marine life in the Long lsland Sound,
    Niantic Bay and Jordan Cove, both through the dis-
    charge of contaminated and heated water into those
    bodies of water and through the ‘entrainment and
    impingement’ of marine organisms at the reactor
    intakes. The plaintiff also specifically alleged that the
    existing permit renewal proceeding is inadequate to
    protect the rights recognized by the act because the
    hearing officer is biased and the department has pre-
    judged the matter, thereby entitling her to judicial
    review of the proceeding under [General Statutes]
    § 22a-20. In essence, therefore, the plaintiff alleges that,
    if the hearing officer and the department had fairly and
    impartially conducted the permit renewal proceeding,
    they would not have allowed Dominion to continue
    Millstone’s operations under the emergency authoriza-
    tion or issued the tentative decision to renew the dis-
    charge permit because the impact of the operations on
    the marine life in the neighboring bodies of water is
    more harmful than that permitted by the applicable
    regulatory scheme.’’
    In Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 557
    –59, the Supreme Court held that
    the plaintiff lacked standing because her allegations
    did ‘‘not support an inference that the increase in the
    temperature of the thermal plume will exceed the tem-
    perature permitted under the applicable legislative and
    regulatory scheme. The allegations merely state in the
    most generic terms that the uprate will elevate the tem-
    perature of the thermal plume and thus cause harm to
    the environment. In other words, the plaintiff s allega-
    tions are without the kind of substantive heft required
    under § 22a-16. Moreover, the plaintiff neither filed an
    affidavit containing such allegations nor adduced evi-
    dence at the hearing on motion to dismiss to remedy
    this defect.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)
    The allegations in the present case are unlike those in
    Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental 
    Protection, supra
    , 
    291 Conn. 804
    –805. Here, the plaintiff does not
    allege bias, conflict of interest, or make any allegations
    regarding § 22a-20. Instead, as in Burton v. Dominion
    Nuclear Connecticut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 
    300 Conn. 557
    –59, the
    plaintiff’s allegations vaguely conclude that the defen-
    dants’ failure to restore the forest pursuant to § 52-560a
    has unreasonably impaired or destroyed, and continues
    to unreasonably impair and destroy, the natural
    resources of the state. Ultimately, the plaintiff lacks
    standing because its allegations are without the sub-
    stantive heft required by § 22a-16, and it has not filed
    an affidavit containing such allegations nor provided
    evidence at the hearing on the motion to dismiss to
    remedy this defect. See 
    id., 557–59. Additionally,
    the
    plaintiff has not raised independent claims of unreason-
    able pollution that are directed primarily to the polluting
    activity itself, and instead focuses its claims on the
    validity of the consent order. See Rocque v. 
    Mellon, supra
    , 
    275 Conn. 168
    . Furthermore, the plaintiff does
    not make allegations of pollution in excess of a regula-
    tory scheme . See Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Con-
    necticut, 
    Inc., supra
    , 557. Therefore, the plaintiff has
    failed to make a colorable claim sufficient to establish
    its standing under § 22a-16.
    B
    The attorney general also seeks individually to have
    this case dismissed. In the plaintiff’s memorandum of
    law in opposition to the motion to dismiss on page
    three, it argues that, if the consent order is invalidated,
    then the attorney general may decide within his discre-
    tion to bring a lawsuit. The plaintiff also asserts that
    the attorney general was named because it decided that
    he was a necessary party in light of the relief requested.
    Nevertheless, other than the allegation that the commis-
    sioner ‘‘should have referred the matter to the Attorney
    General for enforcement’’ under § 52-560a, nothing in
    the plaintiff’s amended complaint suggests that the
    attorney general has violated any statute or failed to
    act in any way. For the reasons set forth previously,
    the motion to dismiss is also granted as to the attor-
    ney general.
    Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted based
    upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and judgment
    is entered for the defendants.
    * Affirmed. Berkshire-Litchfield Environmental Council, Inc. v. Esty, 
    162 Conn. App. 478
    ,        A.3d     (2015).
    1
    In paragraph forty of the plaintiff’s amended complaint, it alleges that
    it is ‘‘a Connecticut nonprofit corporation with an office in North Canaan,
    Connecticut. [The plaintiff] is a science-based organization that focuses on
    environmental issues affecting the Northwest Corner of Connecticut and
    the Berkshire region of Massachusetts, including but not limited to Canaan
    Mountain, water and air contamination, zoning controls, vernal pools protec-
    tion, good forestry practices, farmland protection, scenic ridgeline protec-
    tion and inappropriate telecommunications tower siting.’’
    2
    General Statutes § 22a-16, in relevant part, provides: ‘‘[A]ny person, part-
    nership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity may
    maintain an action in the superior court for the judicial district wherein the
    defendant is located, resides or conducts business, except that where the
    state is the defendant, such action shall be brought in the judicial district
    of Hartford, for declaratory and equitable relief against the state, any political
    subdivision thereof, any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political
    subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corporation, association, orga-
    nization or other legal entity, acting alone, or in combination with others,
    for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural
    resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruc-
    tion . . . .’’
    3
    In General Statutes § 23-5a, the legislature declared, ‘‘Connecticut is a
    state of relatively small area, undergoing rapid industrialization and rapid
    diminution of areas remaining in their natural condition. It is, therefore,
    declared to be the public policy that carefully selected areas of land and
    water of outstanding scientific, educational, biological, geological, paleonto-
    logical or scenic value be preserved. In implementation of this policy, there
    is established a Connecticut system of natural area preserves.’’
    4
    The consent order filed with the complaint (# 101.00) states that BNE
    entered an agreement with landowners adjacent to the forest to determine
    the feasibility of generating electricity by wind on the landowners’ property.
    The consent order further states that BNE cut down trees relying on bound-
    aries from a map prepared by a surveyor in 1987 for the department of
    agriculture, which was recorded on North Canaan’s land records, and on a
    field survey that confirmed the boundaries of the 1987 map.
    5
    General Statutes § 22a-6 (a), in relevant part, provides: ‘‘The commis-
    sioner may . . . (3) initiate and receive complaints as to any actual or
    suspected violation of any statute, regulation, permit or order administered,
    adopted or issued by him. The commissioner shall have the power to hold
    hearings, administer oaths, take testimony and subpoena witnesses and
    evidence, enter orders and institute legal proceedings including, but not
    limited to, suits for injunctions, for the enforcement of any statute, regula-
    tion, order or permit administered, adopted or issued by him . . . .’’
    6
    General Statutes § 52-560a provides: ‘‘(a) As used in this section, ‘open
    space land’ includes, but is not limited to, any park, forest, wildlife manage-
    ment area, refuge, preserve, sanctuary, green or wildlife area owned by the
    state, a political subdivision of the state or a nonprofit land conservation
    organization and ‘encroach’ means to conduct an activity that causes damage
    or alteration to the land or vegetation or other features thereon, including,
    but not limited to, erecting buildings or other structures, constructing roads,
    driveways or trails, destroying or moving stone walls, cutting trees or other
    vegetation, removing boundary markers, installing lawns or utilities, or using,
    storing, or depositing vehicles, materials or debris.
    ‘‘(b) No person may encroach or cause another person to encroach on
    open space land or on any land for which the state, a political subdivision of
    the state or a nonprofit land conservation organization holds a conservation
    easement interest, without the permission of the owner of such open space
    land or holder of such conservation easement or without other legal authori-
    zation.
    ‘‘(c) Any owner of open space land or holder of a conservation easement
    subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section or the Attorney
    General may bring an action in the superior court for the judicial district
    where the land is located against any person who violates the provisions
    of said subsection with respect to such owner’s land or land subject to such
    conservation easement. The court shall order any person who violates the
    provisions of subsection (b) of this section to restore the land to its condition
    as it existed prior to such violation or shall award the landowner the costs
    of such restoration, including reasonable management costs necessary to
    achieve such restoration. In addition, the court may award reasonable attor-
    ney’s fees and costs and such injunctive or equitable relief as the court
    deems appropriate.
    ‘‘(d) In addition to any damages and relief ordered pursuant to subsection
    (c) of this section, the court may award damages of up to five times the
    cost of restoration or statutory damages of up to five thousand dollars. In
    determining the amount of the award, the court shall consider the willfulness
    of the violation, the extent of damage done to natural resources, if any, the
    appraised value of any trees or shrubs cut, damaged, or carried away as
    determined in accordance with the latest revision of The Guide for Plant
    Appraisal, as published by the International Society of Arboriculture, Urbana,
    Illinois, or a succeeding publisher, any economic gain realized by the violator
    and any other relevant factors.’’
    7
    To the contrary, the consent order requires BNE to have a new survey
    completed, establish a new boundary line, submit an invasive species moni-
    toring and control plan through 2016, conduct an environmental research
    plan on the state parcel, and pay $10,000 for a supplemental environmental
    research project.
    8
    The commissioner cited § 52-560a, as well as § 22a-6, as authority in the
    consent order. The commissioner acknowledges that § 52-560a does not
    authorize him to enter into a consent order, notwithstanding his reference
    to the statute. Nevertheless, standing is not conferred under CEPA as a
    result of a technical error. See Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New
    London, 
    282 Conn. 791
    , 808, 
    925 A.2d 292
    (2007) (‘‘the mere allegation
    that a defendant has failed to comply with certain technical or procedural
    requirements of a statute imposing environmental standards does not, in
    and of itself, give rise to a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution under
    the act’’); Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. 
    Rocque, supra
    , 
    267 Conn. 141
    n.21 (‘‘Here, the claim of unreasonable pollution is based on
    allegations that Millstone is operating without a valid permit and emergency
    authorization, a claim of improper conduct under the licensing statutes that
    does not directly threaten the environment. The alleged improprieties in
    the present case were, therefore, not the type of conduct that we were
    contemplating when we decided Waterbury [v. Washington, 
    260 Conn. 506
    ,
    560, 
    800 A.2d 1102
    (2002)].’’); see also Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
    sion, 
    275 Conn. 383
    , 393–94, 
    880 A.2d 865
    (2005) (holding that plaintiff had
    no standing to challenge alleged flawed inland wetlands permit under § 22a-
    16 because claim of unreasonable pollution was predicated entirely on defect
    in permitting process and because no allegation sufficiently independent of
    permitting claim).
    9
    The plaintiff argues that the statute was passed in 2006 in response to
    Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 
    275 Conn. 105
    , 149–50, 
    881 A.2d 937
    (2005), cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1111
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1913
    , 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 664
    (2006).
    In Ventres, the court concluded ‘‘that the court was not required to create
    and impose on the airport defendants a plan of its own to restore the land
    to its condition prior to the violation. Nor was it required to issue a general
    order to the airport defendants that they restore the land to its prior condi-
    tion, which almost certainly would have led to additional litigation.’’ 
    Id. 10 ‘‘The
    process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of
    the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case,
    including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . . When
    construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give
    effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek
    to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language
    as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the
    language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
    General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute
    itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text
    and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
    unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual
    evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The
    test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is
    susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Buttermilk Farms, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commis-
    sion, 
    292 Conn. 317
    , 328, 
    973 A.2d 64
    (2009).
    11
    General Statutes § 26-303 ‘‘declares it is a policy of the state to conserve,
    protect, restore and enhance any endangered or threatened species and
    essential habitat.’’
    12
    In 16 U.S.C. § 6101, Congress found ‘‘that—(1) of the nearly 800 bird
    species known to occur in the United States, approximately 500 migrate
    among countries, and the large majority of those species, the neotropical
    migrants, winter in Latin America and the Caribbean but breed in Canada
    and the United States;
    ‘‘(2) neotropical migratory bird species provide invaluable environmental,
    economic, recreational, and aesthetic benefits to the United States, as well
    as to the Western Hemisphere;
    ‘‘(3) (A) many neotropical migratory bird populations, once considered
    common, are in decline, and some have declined to the point that their long-
    term survival in the wild is in jeopardy; and
    ‘‘(B) the primary reason for the decline in the populations of those species
    is habitat loss and degradation (including pollution and contamination)
    across the species’ range; and
    ‘‘(4) (A) because neotropical migratory birds range across numerous inter-
    national borders each year, their conservation requires the commitment and
    effort of all countries along their migration routes; and
    ‘‘(B) although numerous initiatives exist to conserve migratory birds and
    their habitat, those initiatives can be significantly strengthened and enhanced
    by increased coordination.’’
    13
    Congress provides in 16 U.S.C. § 668 (b), in relevant part, for civil
    penalties for ‘‘[w]hoever, within the United States or any place subject to
    the jurisdiction thereof, without being permitted to do so as provided in
    this [Act] [16 U.S.C. §§ 668 through 668d], shall take, possess, sell, purchase,
    barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or import, at any
    time or in any manner, any bald eagle, commonly known as the American
    eagle, or any golden eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg thereof
    of the foregoing eagles, or whoever violates any permit or regulation issued
    pursuant to this [Act] [16 U.S.C. §§ 668 through 668d], may be assessed
    a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $ 5,000 for each such
    violation. . . .’’
    14
    Inasmuch as the plaintiff may be trying to imply violation of the endan-
    gered species act, General Statutes §§ 26-310 (a) and (b), in relevant part,
    provide that ‘‘[e]ach state agency, in consultation with the commissioner,
    shall conserve endangered and threatened species and their essential habi-
    tats, and shall ensure that any action authorized, funded or performed by
    such agency does not threaten the continued existence of any endangered
    or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
    of habitat designated as essential to such species, unless such agency has
    been granted an exemption as provided in subsection (c) of this section’’;
    General Statutes § 26-310 (a); and that ‘‘[e]ach state agency responsible for
    the primary recommendation or initiation of actions on land or in aquatic
    habitats which may significantly affect the environment, as defined in section
    22a-1c, shall ensure that such actions are consistent with the provisions of
    sections 26-303 to 26-312, inclusive, and shall take all reasonable measures
    to mitigate any adverse impacts of such actions on endangered or threatened
    species or essential habitat . . . .’’ General Statutes § 26-310 (b). According
    to § 26-310 (c) and (d), the secretary of the office of policy and management
    and the commissioner would review the environmental impact in determin-
    ing violations and exemptions. Nevertheless, in the present case, the defen-
    dants did not take action or permit it and any alleged violation of the
    endangered species act is tenuous at best.
    15
    General Statutes § 22a-5a provides: ‘‘Except as otherwise provided,
    whenever any section in this title authorizes the commissioner to order a
    person to abate, correct or remedy any violation, condition, pollution or
    potential source of pollution, such order may require investigation, study,
    data gathering or monitoring as the commissioner deems appropriate to
    assure that the violation, condition or pollution is abated, corrected or
    remedied.’’
    16
    It is noted that if the commissioner could only refer the matter to the
    attorney general who, in turn, decided to bring a suit, the court would
    then need to hear evidence, presumably from the commissioner, on the
    appropriate remedy for restoration.
    17
    Of course, ‘‘[i]t is well established that an administrative agency pos-
    sesses no inherent power. Its authority is found in a legislative grant, beyond
    the terms and necessary implications of which it cannot lawfully function.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic 
    Commission, supra
    , 
    259 Conn. 155
    (discussing jurisdictional limits of administrative agen-
    cies and Connecticut Fund for the Environment v. Stamford, 
    192 Conn. 247
    , 
    470 A.2d 1214
    [1984]). Nevertheless, ‘‘we are guided by the principle
    that the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and
    consistent body of law . . . . Legislation never is written on a clean slate,
    nor is it ever read in isolation or applied in a vacuum. Every new act takes
    its place as a component of an extensive and elaborate system of written
    laws. . . . Construing statutes by reference to others advances [the values
    of harmony and consistency within the law]. In fact, courts have been
    said to be under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can
    reasonably be done. . . . Accordingly, [i]f two statutes appear to be in
    conflict but can be construed as consistent with each other, then the court
    should give effect to both. . . . Therefore, [w]e must, if possible, read the
    two statutes together and construe each to leave room for the meaningful
    operation of the other.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic 
    Commission, supra
    , 157.