State v. Yusef L. ( 2021 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. YUSEF L.*
    (AC 43612)
    Elgo, Cradle and DiPentima, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted, on guilty pleas of the crimes of violation of a protective order
    and strangulation in the second degree and on an admission to violation
    of probation, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the
    trial court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
    because they were not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
    Held:
    1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly
    denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas because it failed to
    determine whether he fully understood the maximum possible sentence
    that could result from consecutive sentences: the court informed the
    defendant that, if he were to plead guilty, he could receive up to five
    years in prison and five years of probation for each charge, and, although
    the defendant gave one word responses, they still represented a clear
    communication from the defendant to the court that he understood the
    maximum possible sentence before him; moreover, the defendant had
    prior experience with criminal proceedings, and, by his own admission,
    received adequate representation by counsel; accordingly, the court
    substantially complied with the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-19 (4)).
    2. The trial court properly rejected the defendant’s unpreserved claims
    seeking review pursuant to State v. Golding (
    213 Conn. 233
    ), which
    challenged the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas:
    a. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court
    incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum sentence applied:
    although the defendant was correct that no mandatory minimum sen-
    tence applied with respect to the charges of strangulation in the second
    degree and violation of a protective order, his claim failed under the
    third prong of Golding because no constitutional violation occurred; the
    court never informed the defendant of the application of any mandatory
    minimum sentence, rather, the court explained the structure of the sen-
    tence to be imposed, and the record indicated that the defendant under-
    stood that explanation; thus, because the court did not misinform the
    defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence, the defendant’s due pro-
    cess rights were not implicated.
    b. The defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to determine whether
    he fully understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and the
    right to the assistance of counsel was unavailing: the court explicitly
    informed the defendant that if he did not plead guilty he would proceed
    to trial, at which time he potentially could be found guilty, and the
    defendant indicated to the court that he understood that he had a right
    to plead not guilty; moreover, the defendant’s familiarity with the criminal
    justice system supported the conclusion that he knew that he had the
    right to plead not guilty, and the court reasonably could have relied on
    the fact that the defendant was represented by counsel in all pretrial
    proceedings in the present case in concluding that the defendant under-
    stood the role of counsel and that he had the right to the assistance
    of counsel.
    Argued May 25—officially released September 14, 2021
    Procedural History
    Information, in the first case, charging the defendant
    with violation of probation, and information, in the sec-
    ond case, charging the defendant with the crimes of
    breach of the peace in the second degree and strangula-
    tion in the second degree, and information, in the third
    case, charging the defendant with the crime of violation
    of a protective order, brought to the Superior Court
    in the judicial district of Waterbury, geographical area
    number four, where the defendant was presented to
    the court, Doyle, J., on an admission of guilt to violation
    of probation and pleas of guilty to strangulation in the
    second degree and violation of a protective order; there-
    after, the state entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge
    of breach of the peace in the second degree; subse-
    quently, the court denied the defendant’s motion to
    withdraw and vacate his guilty pleas, and rendered judg-
    ment revoking probation and judgments of guilty in
    accordance with the pleas, from which the defendant
    appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Raymond L. Durelli, assigned counsel, for the appel-
    lant (defendant).
    Christopher W. Iverson, certified legal intern, with
    whom, on the brief, was Michele C. Lukban, senior
    assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Yusef L., appeals from
    the judgment revoking his probation and the judgments
    of conviction, rendered after his admission to a viola-
    tion of his probation in violation of General Statutes
    § 53a-32 and after pleas of guilty, pursuant to the Alford
    doctrine,1 of violation of a protective order in violation
    of General Statutes § 53a-223 and strangulation in the
    second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
    64bb. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial
    court improperly denied his motion to withdraw his
    guilty pleas because they were not made knowingly,
    voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, the defendant
    claims that the court (1) failed to determine whether
    he fully understood the maximum possible sentence
    that could result from consecutive sentences, (2) incor-
    rectly advised him that a mandatory minimum sentence
    applied, and (3) failed to determine whether he fully
    understood that he had the right to plead not guilty and
    the right to the assistance of counsel.2 We affirm the
    judgments of the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to this appeal. On January 11, 2019, the defendant,
    while represented by counsel, admitted that he violated
    his probation and entered guilty pleas pursuant to North
    Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 37, 
    91 S. Ct. 160
    , 
    27 L. Ed. 2d 162
     (1970), to the charges of violation of a
    protective order and strangulation in the second degree
    with an agreed on sentence of ‘‘four years and two days
    to serve, followed by 2184 days of special parole.’’ After
    conducting a plea canvass, the court, Doyle, J., found
    that the defendant’s admission and pleas were made
    knowingly and voluntarily, and accepted each of them.
    The court then ordered a presentence investigation
    report and continued the case for sentencing.
    On January 12, 2019, the defendant sent a letter to
    the court seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas because
    he was ‘‘confused [as] to what [he] plead[ed] guilty to.’’
    On January 14, 2019, the defendant sent a second letter
    to the court, again stating that he wanted to withdraw
    his guilty pleas, and stating that he was not satisfied
    with the representation that he had received and that
    he was prepared to go trial. The court construed these
    letters as a motion by the defendant to withdraw his
    guilty pleas. On March 18, 2019, the defendant and his
    counsel appeared before the court. At that time, the
    defendant stated that he ‘‘was confused’’ and ‘‘didn’t
    know what was going on’’ during the January 11, 2019
    plea hearing. The court ordered a copy of the transcript
    from the January 11, 2019 hearing and informed the
    defendant that they would discuss its contents at a
    hearing on April 1, 2019.
    At the April 1, 2019 hearing, the court stated to the
    defendant: ‘‘I reviewed the transcript [from the January
    11, 2019 plea hearing] and I think it’s pretty clear to
    me that, at the time, you understood everything that I
    asked you based on your responses. In the letter you
    seem to be more interested in just—you’re not happy
    with the sentence, which I get, but that’s not a basis
    for changing a plea. So what I’m inclined to do is I’ll
    give you a copy of the transcript and I’ll give you a new
    date to look it over.’’ The defendant persisted in his
    claim that he did not understand what had happened
    at the January 11, 2019 plea hearing, and the court
    responded that the defendant would receive a copy of
    the transcript so that he could ‘‘tell [the court] where
    [he] . . . [didn’t] understand . . . .’’
    On April 26, 2019, the defendant sent a third letter
    to the court, this time requesting to represent himself
    in future proceedings. At a hearing on May 22, 2019,
    concerning his request for self-representation and after
    a lengthy canvass of the defendant, the court found:
    ‘‘[T]he defendant has knowingly and intelligently
    waived his right to counsel . . . he wants to represent
    himself or get a private attorney.3 I’m going to continue
    the case one month to see if he gets a private attorney
    . . . [then] we are going forward on [the defendant’s]
    motion to vacate if [he] wants to pursue it, or we are
    going to be going to sentencing.’’ (Footnote added.) The
    court also ordered that the defendant’s former attorney,
    Christopher J. Molyneaux, act as standby counsel for
    the defendant if he did not retain a private attorney.
    On June 26, 2019, the self-represented defendant,
    with standby counsel present, argued that he should
    be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the
    sentence ‘‘exceed[ed] the specified agreement [to]
    which [he] pleaded . . . .’’ Specifically, the defendant
    stated that he understood that he was accepting five
    and one-half years of special parole, and that he did
    not agree to ‘‘shy of six years’’ of special parole. The
    defendant further argued that he should be permitted
    to withdraw his guilty pleas because the court never
    used the word ‘‘ ‘consecutive’ ’’ when it canvassed him
    with regard to the charges to which he was pleading
    guilty. The defendant gave no other reasons to withdraw
    his plea. The court denied the defendant’s motion to
    withdraw his guilty plea, stating: ‘‘I don’t think that
    you’ve provided a sufficient factual basis that requires
    a further evidentiary hearing. You’ve basically made
    some vague and conclusory allegations that you weren’t
    sure about the sentence and exceeding it. It does not
    exceed the proposed agreement. You did not carry your
    burden to put forth sufficient facts that would warrant
    a further hearing . . . to address your motion to with-
    draw [your guilty plea].’’
    On July 9, 2019, after reviewing the presentence inves-
    tigation report, the court sentenced the defendant as
    agreed. The defendant then appealed from the judg-
    ments of conviction, claiming that the court improperly
    denied his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Addi-
    tional facts will be set forth as necessary.
    ‘‘Our standard of review for the trial court’s decision
    on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Practice
    Book § 39-27 is abuse of discretion. . . . After a guilty
    plea is accepted but before the imposition of sentence
    the court is obligated to permit withdrawal upon proof
    of one of the grounds in [§ 39-27]. An evidentiary hearing
    is not required if the record of the plea proceeding
    and other information in the court file conclusively
    establishes that the motion is without merit. . . .
    ‘‘In considering whether to hold an evidentiary hear-
    ing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea the court may
    disregard any allegations of fact, whether contained in
    the motion or made in an offer of proof, which are either
    conclusory, vague or oblique. For the purposes of
    determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the
    court should ordinarily assume any specific allegation
    of fact to be true. If such allegations furnish a basis for
    withdrawal of the plea under [Practice Book § 39-27]
    and are not conclusively refuted by the record of the
    plea proceedings and other information contained in
    the court file, then an evidentiary hearing is required.
    . . . We further [note] that the burden [is] on the defen-
    dant to show a plausible reason for the withdrawal.’’
    (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) State v. Warner, 
    165 Conn. App. 185
    , 191–92, 
    138 A.3d 463
     (2016).
    I
    The defendant’s first claim challenging the court’s
    denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is that
    the court failed to determine whether he fully under-
    stood the maximum possible sentence that could result
    from consecutive sentences.4 Specifically, the defen-
    dant argues that ‘‘[n]othing in the record suggests [that]
    [he] was aware of the actual sentencing possibilities,’’
    and that ‘‘[t]here was no substantial compliance with
    Practice Book § 39-19 (4).’’5 The state counters that the
    record shows substantial compliance with § 39-19 (4),
    and that the defendant was aware of the maximum
    possible sentence that would result from consecutive
    sentences. We agree with the state.
    It is well established that ‘‘[a] defendant can volunta-
    rily and understandingly waive [his] rights without lit-
    eral compliance with the prophylactic safeguards of
    Practice Book §§ [39-19 and 39-20]. Therefore . . . pre-
    cise compliance with the provisions [of §§ 39-19 and
    39-20] is not constitutionally required.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted.) State v. Badgett, 
    200 Conn. 412
    , 418, 
    512 A.2d 160
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 940
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 423
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 373
     (1986). Accordingly, ‘‘[o]ur courts repeatedly have
    held that only substantial compliance is required when
    warning the defendant of the direct consequences of a
    . . . plea pursuant to . . . § 39-19 in order to ensure
    that the plea is voluntary pursuant to . . . § 39-20.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hanson,
    
    117 Conn. App. 436
    , 444, 
    979 A.2d 576
     (2009), cert.
    denied, 
    295 Conn. 907
    , 
    989 A.2d 604
     (2010), cert. denied,
    
    562 U.S. 986
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 425
    , 
    178 L. Ed. 2d 331
     (2010).
    ‘‘[W]hen determining whether there has been sub-
    stantial compliance with Practice Book § 39-14 (4), we
    must conduct a two part inquiry. Our first inquiry is to
    determine whether the court accepted the defendant’s
    pleas without first determining whether he was aware
    of and understood the maximum possible sentence to
    which he was exposed. . . . Next, if we conclude that
    the court failed to determine whether the defendant
    was aware of and understood the maximum possible
    sentence, we examine the record to determine whether,
    despite the court’s failure, he nevertheless had actual
    knowledge of the maximum possible consequences of
    his pleas. . . . If either prong is satisfied, the pleas
    were accepted with substantial compliance with Prac-
    tice Book § 39-19 (4).’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Car-
    melo T., 
    110 Conn. App. 543
    , 552–53, 
    955 A.2d 687
    , cert.
    denied, 
    289 Conn. 950
    , 
    960 A.2d 1037
     (2008).
    During the court’s plea canvass of the defendant, the
    following exchange took place:
    ‘‘The Court: [D]id [defense counsel] explain to you
    for each of [the] charges you could get up to five years
    in prison [and] five years of probation . . . ?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Do you understand everything he
    explained to you about the court’s offer?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Are you satisfied with how your attorney
    represented you, sir?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Counsel, did you go over all of this with
    your client?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: I did, Your Honor.
    ‘‘The Court: And did he have any trouble understand-
    ing you?
    ‘‘[Defense Counsel]: He did not, Your Honor.’’
    (Emphasis added.)
    Our Supreme Court has held that, in the context of
    a plea canvass, ‘‘[a]lthough some form of meaningful
    dialogue is preferable to monosyllabic responses by the
    defendant . . . single-word responses [do not] require
    an automatic vacation of a guilty plea.’’ State v. Torres,
    
    182 Conn. 176
    , 179–80, 
    438 A.2d 46
     (1980). Moreover, it
    is well established that a court may rely on a defendant’s
    responses during a plea canvass in determining whether
    the guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. See, e.g., State
    v. Young, 
    186 Conn. App. 770
    , 780, 
    201 A.3d 439
    , cert.
    denied, 
    330 Conn. 972
    , 
    200 A.3d 1151
     (2019).
    In the present case, as the exchange referenced
    reflects, the court informed the defendant that, if he
    were to plead guilty, he could face up to five years
    in prison and five years of probation for each charge.
    Furthermore, although the defendant gave one word
    responses, they still represented a clear communication
    from the defendant to the court that he understood
    the maximum possible sentence before him. This is
    especially true considering that the defendant had prior
    experience with criminal proceedings—prior to the
    charges in the present case, he had pleaded guilty to a
    variety of charges, including a charge of possession of
    narcotics—and, by his own admission, received ade-
    quate representation by counsel with respect to the
    maximum possible sentence that he faced in the present
    case. See, e.g., State v. Claudio, supra, 
    123 Conn. App. 293
     (holding that prior experience with criminal pro-
    ceedings and adequate representation by counsel are
    factors to be considered in determination of whether
    plea canvass was constitutionally sufficient); see also,
    e.g., State v. Lage, 
    141 Conn. App. 510
    , 524–25, 
    61 A.3d 581
     (2013) (same). These facts, considered as a whole,
    demonstrate that the court correctly determined that
    the defendant was aware of and understood the maxi-
    mum possible sentence to which he was exposed and
    thus, there was substantial compliance with the require-
    ments of Practice Book § 39-19 (4).6
    II
    We now turn to the defendant’s claims that were not
    properly preserved. The defendant claims that the court
    (1) incorrectly advised him that a mandatory minimum
    sentence applied and (2) failed to determine whether
    he fully understood that he had the right to plead not
    guilty and the right to the assistance of counsel. The
    defendant acknowledges that these claims are unpre-
    served, and seeks review pursuant to State v. Golding,
    
    213 Conn. 233
    , 239–40, 
    567 A.2d 823
     (1989), as modified
    by In re Yasiel R., 
    317 Conn. 773
    , 781, 
    120 A.3d 1188
    (2015).
    ‘‘Under Golding, a [party] can prevail on a claim of
    constitutional error not preserved at trial only if the
    following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate
    to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of
    constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fun-
    damental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation
    . . . exists and . . . deprived the [party] of a fair trial;
    and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
    has failed to demonstrate the harmlessness of the
    alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable
    doubt. In the absence of any one of these conditions,
    the [party’s] claim will fail. The appellate tribunal is free,
    therefore, to respond to a [party’s] claim by focusing on
    whichever condition is most relevant in the particular
    circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In
    re Madison C., 
    201 Conn. App. 184
    , 190, 
    241 A.3d 756
    ,
    cert. denied, 
    335 Conn. 985
    , 
    242 A.3d 480
     (2020).
    A
    The defendant’s first unpreserved claim is that the
    court ‘‘incorrectly advised [him] that a mandatory mini-
    mum sentence was required on the two [charges] [he]
    was pleading [guilty] to . . . [because] [s]trangulation
    in the second degree and violation of a protective order
    have no mandatory minimums . . . [a]nd neither . . .
    mandates probation or special parole.’’ According to
    the defendant, this claim should be reviewed under
    Golding because it is of ‘‘constitutional dimension
    . . . .’’ In response, the state argues that this claim fails
    under the third prong of Golding, because the court
    ‘‘never mistakenly stated that either of the defendant’s
    two criminal charges carried a mandatory minimum
    sentence.’’ We agree with the state.
    It is well established that ‘‘[t]o ensure that a defendant
    is accorded due process . . . [a] plea must be volunta-
    rily and intelligently entered.’’ State v. Domian, 
    235 Conn. 679
    , 686, 
    668 A.2d 1333
     (1996). To this end, Prac-
    tice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he
    judicial authority shall not accept [a] plea without first
    addressing the defendant personally and determining
    that he or she fully understands . . . (2) [t]he manda-
    tory minimum sentence, if any . . . .’’
    The defendant is correct in his assertion that no man-
    datory minimum sentence applies with regard to the
    crimes of strangulation in the second degree and viola-
    tion of a protective order. The defendant’s claim fails,
    however, under the third prong of Golding because, as
    the record indicates, no constitutional violation
    occurred. In claiming that the court incorrectly advised
    him that a mandatory minimum sentence applied, the
    defendant relies on the following language employed
    by the court: ‘‘Right now, you’re going to plead [guilty]
    to two class D felonies. One is strangulation in the
    second degree and the other is violation of a protective
    order. You have to, on each one, to get special parole,
    get on the bottom part two years and [one] day. So
    you’re going to get two years and [one] day on each,
    okay, and then you’re going to get the remainder in
    special parole.’’ According to the defendant, this lan-
    guage shows that the court, ‘‘in effect . . . incorrectly
    advised [him] that two years and [one] day was a manda-
    tory minimum on each felony and that just shy of three
    years [of] special parole was also required on the bot-
    tom part of each felony.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) This,
    however, is not the case.
    The record reflects that the court never informed the
    defendant, either explicitly or impliedly, of the applica-
    tion of any mandatory minimum sentence. From an
    examination of the context of the language referenced
    by the defendant, it is clear that the court was explaining
    the structure of the sentence to be imposed and not
    the existence of a mandatory minimum sentence.7 More-
    over, the record shows that the defendant had a clear
    understanding of that explanation. Because the record
    clearly indicates that the court did not misinform the
    defendant of a mandatory minimum sentence, we con-
    clude that the defendant’s due process rights are not
    implicated and no constitutional violation exists.
    Accordingly, the defendant’s claim fails under the third
    prong of Golding.
    B
    The defendant’s second unpreserved claim is that the
    court failed to determine whether he fully understood
    that he had the right to plead not guilty or to persist
    in that plea if it already had been made, as well as the
    right to the assistance of counsel. According to the
    defendant, ‘‘there is nothing in the record that supports
    a finding that [he] was aware . . . that he had the right
    to plead not guilty . . . [or] that he had the right to
    the assistance of counsel at trial.’’ The defendant further
    argues that the court failed to comply with Practice
    Book § 39-19 (5).8 In response, the state argues that this
    claim fails because ‘‘the record shows that the defen-
    dant was aware of his right to plead not guilty and of
    his right to the assistance of counsel at trial.’’ We agree
    with the state.
    The due process rights of a defendant are implicated
    if his plea has not been voluntarily and knowingly
    entered. See State v. Domian, supra, 
    235 Conn. 686
    . The
    defendant argues that this claim qualifies for Golding
    review because the court’s alleged failure to inform him
    of his right to plead not guilty and of his right to the
    assistance of counsel implicates his due process rights.
    The record indicates, however, that such a failure did
    not occur. During the court’s canvass of the defendant,
    the following exchange took place:
    ‘‘The Court: On the criminal charges, you [pleaded]
    [guilty] under the Alford doctrine. I need to make sure
    you understand what that means. When you do that,
    you’re telling me that you don’t agree with some or all
    the facts put on the record about those incidents; is
    that correct?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Even though you don’t agree with some
    or all the facts, you recognize you could be found guilty
    of those or some other charges. After you’ve thought
    about it and discussed it with your attorney, you, on
    your own, have decided it’s in your best interest to
    accept the proposed offer rather than risk going to
    trial and getting a longer sentence if you’re found
    guilty after trial; is that correct, sir?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Even though you dispute the factual basis
    of the pleas, once I accept them, I’ll be finding you
    guilty. Do you understand that, sir?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.
    ‘‘The Court: Are you entering these pleas of your own
    free will?
    ‘‘The Defendant: Yes.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    This exchange demonstrates that the court made it
    clear to the defendant that he had the right to plead
    not guilty. The court explicitly stated that if the defen-
    dant did not plead guilty he would proceed to trial, at
    which time he potentially could be found guilty. More-
    over, the defendant, through his responses, indicated
    that he understood that he had the right to plead not
    guilty. It is well established that ‘‘[a] court is permitted
    to rely on a defendant’s responses during a plea canvass.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Young,
    supra, 
    186 Conn. App. 780
    .
    We again note the undisputed fact that the defendant
    was familiar with the criminal justice system. As this
    court has held, prior experience with criminal proceed-
    ings is a factor to be considered in determining whether
    a defendant’s guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. See,
    e.g., State v. Claudio, supra, 
    123 Conn. App. 293
    . The
    defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system
    further supports the conclusion that he knew that he
    had the right to plead not guilty. He also conceded
    that he had never gone to trial on a criminal charge,
    indicating that he understood that he had right to plead
    not guilty and to proceed to trial.
    Additionally, the court reasonably could have relied
    on the defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice
    system in determining that he understood that he had
    the right to the assistance of counsel. The defendant
    stated, in reference to his prior criminal charges while
    being canvassed by the court regarding his request to
    represent himself, that he had ‘‘[o]nce in [his] life’’ been
    represented by an attorney from the public defender’s
    office, and had been represented by private counsel
    ‘‘[a] majority of the time,’’ indicating that he clearly
    understood both the role of counsel and his right to
    the assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the court rea-
    sonably could have relied on the fact that the defendant
    had been represented by counsel in all pretrial proceed-
    ings, through his entry of guilty pleas, in the present
    case. See State v. Badgett, supra, 
    200 Conn. 420
    –21 n.7
    (holding that ‘‘[i]t would defy reality to suppose that
    [the defendant] had any doubts about his continued
    right to assistance of counsel,’’ when defendant was
    represented by counsel throughout pretrial proceedings
    and his plea was ‘‘a tactical one and the product of
    discussion . . . [with] his counsel’’ (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the
    defendant’s due process rights are not implicated and
    no constitutional violation exists. Therefore, the defen-
    dant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding.
    The judgments are affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of
    victims of family violence, we decline to use the defendant’s full name or
    to identify the victim or others through whom the victim’s identity may be
    ascertained. See General Statutes § 64-86e.
    Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
    (2018); we decline to identify any party protected or sought to be protected
    under a protective order or a restraining order that was issued or applied
    for, or others through whom that party’s identity may be ascertained.
    1
    See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 37, 
    91 S. Ct. 160
    , 
    27 L. Ed. 2d 162
     (1970). ‘‘A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does
    not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is
    so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Webb, 
    62 Conn. App. 805
    , 807 n.1, 
    772 A.2d 690
     (2001).
    2
    For convenience, we have reordered the defendant’s claims as they are
    set forth in his brief.
    3
    Although the court noted that the defendant’s April 26, 2019 letter indi-
    cated that the defendant sought to represent himself, at the May 22, 2019
    hearing he requested time to retain a private attorney.
    4
    As the state acknowledges in its appellate brief, the defendant raised
    this claim before the trial court, thereby preserving it.
    5
    Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority
    shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally
    and determining that he or she fully understands . . . (4) [t]he maximum
    possible sentence on the charge, including, if there are several charges, the
    maximum sentence possible from consecutive sentences . . . .’’
    6
    We observe that, although the court’s explanation of the defendant’s
    maximum sentence substantially complies with the requirements of Practice
    Book § 39-19 (4), the best practice is for the court to state the maximum
    sentence for each individual charge, and then state a total maximum expo-
    sure that is the sum of the maximum sentence for each individual charge.
    7
    We note that, in order for a defendant to be eligible for special parole,
    ‘‘a definite sentence of more than two years’’ must be imposed. General
    Statutes § 54-125e (a).
    8
    Practice Book § 39-19 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial authority
    shall not accept the plea without first addressing the defendant personally
    and determining that he or she fully understands . . . (5) [t]he fact that he
    or she has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has
    already been made . . . and the right to the assistance of counsel . . . .’’
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC43612

Filed Date: 9/14/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/13/2021