State v. Collins , 147 Conn. App. 584 ( 2014 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ROGEAU
    R. COLLINS
    (AC 35401)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Sheldon and Foti, Js.
    Argued October 16, 2013—officially released January 21, 2014
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Hartford, Espinosa, J. [motion to preclude]; O’Keefe,
    J. [judgment].)
    Daniel J. Foster, assigned counsel, for the appel-
    lant (defendant).
    Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attor-
    ney, and Thomas R. Garcia, senior assistant state’s
    attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    FOTI, J. The defendant, Rogeau R. Collins, appeals
    from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
    jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Stat-
    utes § 53a-54c and robbery in the first degree in viola-
    tion of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2). On appeal,
    the defendant claims that the trial court improperly:
    (1) excluded a statement made by another suspect in
    the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, (2)
    excluded testimony regarding the defendant’s state-
    ments to police, and (3) excluded evidence of items
    seized from the residence of another suspect. We affirm
    the judgment of conviction.
    The jury reasonably could have found the following
    facts. In March, 2009, Robert Dixon, the victim, resided
    in Hartford with his girlfriend. Dixon always carried
    two cell phones. He used one cell phone to sell drugs
    and the other for personal matters. In addition, he
    always wore an expensive pair of Cartier glasses. He
    did not store the drugs he sold at his home, but kept
    them at a remote location secured in a safe. The key
    to the safe was on the same key ring as Dixon’s car keys.
    On March 9, 2009, Dixon exchanged several phone
    calls with an individual named Adrian Dean, a friend
    of the defendant. At approximately 9:25 p.m. that night,
    Dixon left his residence in his vehicle carrying both of
    his cell phones and wearing his Cartier glasses. Some-
    time thereafter, Dean joined Dixon in the vehicle. Dean
    then contacted the defendant, who was driving around
    the Hartford area in his girlfriend’s vehicle. Dean
    arranged to meet the defendant at a location in Bloom-
    field and gave the defendant directions to that location.
    The defendant followed Dean’s directions and arrived
    at the location at approximately the same time as Dean
    and Dixon. Dixon and the defendant then drove their
    vehicles toward a cul-de-sac at the end of the road.
    Dixon turned his vehicle in the cul-de-sac and came to
    a stop. The defendant pulled up and stopped his vehicle
    to the left of Dixon’s vehicle. The defendant then exited
    his vehicle. Both the defendant and Dean, who had
    exited Dixon’s vehicle, approached the driver’s side
    door of Dixon’s vehicle. Dixon was still sitting in the
    driver’s seat of his vehicle. Dean, with a firearm in one
    of his hands, opened the driver’s side door of Dixon’s
    vehicle and shot Dixon in the head. Dean then asked
    the defendant to search Dixon’s pockets. The defendant
    began patting Dixon’s pockets when Dixon flinched and
    attempted to escape the vehicle through the passenger
    side door. Dixon was shot seven times as he attempted
    to escape and died as a result of the multiple gunshot
    wounds. The defendant and Dean then left the scene
    in the defendant’s vehicle. The following morning, on
    March 10, 2009, Dixon was found dead by two fish-
    ermen. Dixon’s two cell phones, Cartier glasses, and
    keys were not found at the scene. The defendant was
    arrested on March 24, 2009.
    The state, in a long form information filed on January
    11, 2011, charged the defendant with murder in violation
    of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in viola-
    tion of § 53a-54c, conspiracy to commit murder in viola-
    tion of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-54a (a),
    robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a)
    (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
    degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (2).
    The jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder
    and robbery in the first degree, but not guilty on each
    of the remaining charges. The court sentenced the
    defendant to a total effective term of forty-five years
    of imprisonment.1 This appeal followed. Additional
    facts will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
    erly excluded testimony of an alleged statement made
    by Dean to Carlton Martin, Dean’s former cellmate in
    prison, as inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, the defen-
    dant contends that Martin’s testimony as to Dean’s
    alleged statement was admissible as a statement against
    penal interest pursuant to § 8-6 (4) of the Connecticut
    Code of Evidence. We disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are necessary to resolve this claim. During trial, defense
    counsel notified the court that he intended to call Martin
    to testify about a statement made by Dean while the
    two shared a prison cell. The prosecutor objected to
    Martin’s proffered testimony as inadmissible hearsay.
    Defense counsel, however, argued that Martin’s testi-
    mony was admissible as a statement against Dean’s
    penal interest. As part of defense counsel’s offer of
    proof, Martin testified outside the presence of the jury.
    Martin’s testimony revealed that he was serving a
    ninety-six year term of imprisonment and had shared
    a prison cell with Dean between May and December,
    2010. During this period, Dean and Martin watched an
    episode of the television show ‘‘Cold Case,’’ which
    involved betrayal between two codefendants to a crime.
    The show prompted a discussion about codefendants
    between Dean and Martin. During their discussion,
    Dean mentioned that he still had a codefendant on trial.
    He explained that he originally intended to take his
    case to trial, but decided to take a twenty-five year
    sentence plea deal after learning that the defendant had
    implicated him in the shooting. Dean was apparently
    upset, according to Martin, that the defendant gave a
    statement to the police: ‘‘[E]specially when [the defen-
    dant] didn’t know nothing about it . . . he didn’t even
    have to go that route, all he had to do was just shut
    up and go all the way.’’ The court excluded Martin’s
    testimony of Dean’s statement on the basis that it did
    not constitute a statement against penal interest and,
    therefore, was inadmissible hearsay.
    We begin by setting forth our standard of review.
    It is well established that ‘‘[w]e review a trial court’s
    decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on
    a correct view of the law . . . for an abuse of discre-
    tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Davis, 
    298 Conn. 1
    , 10–11, 
    1 A.3d 76
     (2010). ‘‘[A]fter
    a trial court has made the legal determination that a
    particular statement is or is not hearsay, or is subject
    to a hearsay exception, [it is] vested with the discretion
    to admit or to bar the evidence based upon relevancy,
    prejudice, or other legally appropriate grounds related
    to the rule of evidence under which admission is being
    sought.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Smith, 
    289 Conn. 598
    , 617–18, 
    960 A.2d 993
     (2008).
    Accordingly, ‘‘[w]e will make every reasonable pre-
    sumption in favor of upholding the trial’s court ruling
    and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Snelgrove,
    
    288 Conn. 742
    , 758, 
    954 A.2d 165
     (2008). ‘‘In determining
    whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the
    ultimate issue is whether the court . . . reasonably
    [could have] conclude[d] as it did.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Davis, 
    supra, 11
    .
    In the present case, the trial court excluded testimony
    with respect to Dean’s statement because it determined
    that it did not fall within the statement against penal
    interest exception to the hearsay rule. It is hornbook
    law that ‘‘hearsay statements may not be admitted into
    evidence unless they fall within a recognized exception
    to the hearsay rule.’’ State v. Smith, 
    supra,
     
    289 Conn. 618
    ; see Conn. Code Evid. § 8-2. Section 8-6 (4) of the
    Connecticut Code of Evidence embodies an exception
    to the hearsay rule for statements against penal interest.
    Section 8-6 (4) applies where a hearsay statement made
    by an unavailable declarant was ‘‘trustworthy . . .
    [and] at the time of its making, so far tended to subject
    the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable per-
    son in the declarant’s position would not have made
    the statement unless the person believed it to be true.’’
    Conn. Code Evid. § 8-6 (4). In short, the admissibility
    of Dean’s statement to Martin is subject to a binary
    inquiry: (1) whether Dean’s statement to Martin was
    against Dean’s penal interest and, if so, (2) whether the
    statement was sufficiently trustworthy.2 See State v.
    Pierre, 
    277 Conn. 42
    , 67, 
    890 A.2d 474
    , cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1197
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 2873
    , 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 904
     (2006).
    ‘‘As to what is against penal interest, quite obviously
    the essential characteristic is the exposure to risk of
    punishment for a crime . . . . Moreover, it is not the
    fact that the declaration is against interest but the
    awareness of that fact by the declarant which gives
    the statement significance.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 
    202 Conn. 676
    , 695–96, 
    523 A.2d 451
     (1987). Our review of the
    evidence before the court reveals that Dean’s statement
    was not against his penal interest because it did not
    subject him to criminal punishment. Prior to making the
    alleged statement to Martin, Dean already had pleaded
    guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
    degree, robbery in the first degree, and felony murder
    on February 3, 2010.3 During the plea canvass, Dean
    admitted that both he and the defendant had shot and
    robbed Dixon. Dean was subsequently sentenced to
    twenty-five years of imprisonment. Dean already was
    incarcerated when he made the alleged statement as a
    result of pleading guilty to the crimes that were the
    subject of his alleged statement. Because Dean could
    not have been subject to additional punishment as a
    result his statement to Martin, it cannot function as one
    against Dean’s penal interest.4 See State v. Thomas,
    
    296 Conn. 375
    , 384–85, 
    995 A.2d 65
     (2010) (where case
    disposed of on guilty plea, jeopardy attaches at least
    by time of sentencing); see also State v. Smith, 
    supra,
    289 Conn. 632
     (‘‘the admission of a crime supports an
    inference of reliability because people do not tend to
    subject themselves to criminal prosecution lightly’’). On
    the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that Dean’s
    alleged statement to Martin was not against his penal
    interest.5 Therefore, the court did not abuse its discre-
    tion by excluding Martin’s testimony as inadmissible
    hearsay.
    II
    The defendant next claims that the court improperly
    precluded evidence of the circumstances in which he
    made certain statements to the police and, in doing so,
    deprived him of his right to a present a complete defense
    as required by the fourteenth amendment to the federal
    constitution. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. We
    disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are necessary to resolve this claim. Prior to trial, the
    defendant filed a motion to suppress written statements
    he made in the presence of Bloomfield police Sergeant
    Shawn Bolden. Following a hearing, the court denied
    the defendant’s motion to suppress.6 During trial, the
    state called Bolden as part of its case-in-chief. On direct
    examination, Bolden testified about his interview with
    the defendant on March 19, 2009. He specifically testi-
    fied that, at the beginning of the interview, he informed
    the defendant that ‘‘he wasn’t under arrest . . . he was
    free to leave and . . . he didn’t have to submit to an
    interview.’’ Bolden also testified that the defendant did
    not seem to have any trouble understanding him and
    did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or
    alcohol. Thereafter, the state introduced the defen-
    dant’s written statements through Bolden.
    On cross-examination, defense counsel probed the
    circumstances surrounding the defendant’s ques-
    tioning. Through the cross-examination of Bolden,
    defense counsel established that (1) the defendant was
    at all times escorted by a police officer while at the
    police station for questioning, (2) the questioning lasted
    approximately nine hours, (3) the police utilized certain
    questioning techniques, (4) Bolden and the other officer
    present during questioning were physically large in
    comparison to the defendant’s stature, (5) the conversa-
    tion was not recorded, and (6) the defendant was born
    in Jamaica and came to the United States as a young boy.
    Defense counsel then inquired about the defendant’s
    waiver of his Miranda rights.7 Bolden testified that he
    had the defendant fill out a Miranda waiver form.
    Defense counsel asked Bolden, with respect to the
    Miranda waiver, ‘‘you put on there that [the defendant]
    understood English to a limited degree, could write
    to a limited degree, correct?’’ Bolden answered in the
    affirmative, prompting defense counsel to inquire:
    ‘‘Were you able to test . . . to what dimension that
    was, how limited he was in his understanding?’’ The
    prosecutor objected on relevance grounds and
    requested to be heard outside the presence of the jury.
    After the jury left the courtroom, the prosecutor
    argued that ‘‘[defense counsel] is getting into the cus-
    tody and voluntariness of the waiver . . . [t]here’s
    already been a prior ruling on this issue . . . .’’ The
    court sustained the objection and informed defense
    counsel: ‘‘[Y]ou can ask whatever you want [if] you’re
    trying to show coercion or that it’s a false statement
    or inaccurate. . . . But when [your questions] mix in
    legal issues like the question of voluntariness and cus-
    tody . . . [you’re arguing] legal conclusions that have
    already been visited and ruled on . . . . [Y]ou’re just
    trying to circumvent the ruling of the court . . . . [Y]ou
    can ask as many questions as you want about the
    circumstances of the encounter.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    The defendant’s claim of error is limited to the court’s
    ruling to exclude evidence with respect to the voluntari-
    ness of the defendant’s Miranda waiver.
    It is well established that ‘‘[a] defendant’s fundamen-
    tal right to present a defense, guaranteed by the due
    process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
    United States constitution, includes the right to present
    evidence of the circumstances under which a custodial
    statement was made.’’ State v. Fernandez, 
    27 Conn. App. 73
    , 78, 
    604 A.2d 1308
    , cert. denied, 
    222 Conn. 904
    ,
    
    606 A.2d 1330
     (1992); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 
    476 U.S. 683
    , 690–91, 
    106 S. Ct. 2142
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 636
     (1986).
    The reason for this rule is that certain of those circum-
    stances, such as a police interrogator’s use of coercive
    tactics to force or induce the defendant to make a
    statement or the defendant’s special susceptibility to
    being influenced by such tactics to make a false state-
    ment, may reasonably be claimed to cast doubt on the
    reliability of the statement.
    Our review of the record indicates that the court’s
    ruling did not violate this rule, or thereby undermine the
    defendant’s constitutional right to present a complete
    defense. Rather, the ruling was limited to precluding
    evidence concerning the voluntariness of the defen-
    dant’s Miranda waiver, except to the extent that such
    evidence was offered to test the reliability of the defen-
    dant’s statements in light of the circumstances in which
    they were made. Indeed, the court expressly permitted
    defense counsel to thoroughly probe the circumstances
    surrounding the defendant’s statements, which is
    exactly what the constitution requires. See Crane v.
    Kentucky, 
    supra,
     
    476 U.S. 689
    –90 (defendant must be
    afforded opportunity to challenge credibility of custo-
    dial statement). Accordingly, the defendant’s constitu-
    tional claim is without merit.8
    The defendant’s parallel claim of evidentiary error
    must also fail. Defense counsel offered the excluded
    testimony to show that the defendant’s statements were
    ‘‘not completely knowing and voluntarily given.’’ He
    never claimed, however, that the purpose or effect of
    such testimony would be to show that the defendant’s
    statements were unreliable in light of the circumstances
    in which they were made. A challenge to the voluntari-
    ness of a defendant’s statements to the police may be
    based upon a claim that the procedures used to obtain
    them were of the sort that tends to undermine the
    statements’ reliability. It may, by contrast, be based
    upon a claim that the defendant made the statements
    in question without knowing the full extent of his legal
    rights to remain silent and/or not to submit to custodial
    interrogation without the assistance of private or
    appointed counsel. Evidence supporting the former
    claim is, by its very nature, admissible in evidence to
    rebut admissions contained in the defendant’s custodial
    statements, and thus to support his defense. Evidence
    supporting the latter claim, by contrast, although poten-
    tially supportive of a motion to suppress the defendant’s
    statements based upon an alleged violation of the defen-
    dant’s privilege against self-incrimination and/or his
    right to counsel, does not necessarily bear upon, or
    thus constitute admissible trial evidence with respect
    to, the reliability of the challenged statements. Here,
    then, where the only proffered purpose of the excluded
    testimony was to undermine the voluntariness of the
    defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights, without any
    accompanying indication that such testimony was
    offered to challenge the reliability of those statements,
    its exclusion by the trial court was not erroneous.
    Accordingly, in these circumstances, we conclude that
    the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding testi-
    mony concerning the voluntariness of the defendant’s
    Miranda waiver.
    III
    The defendant next claims that the court improperly
    excluded as irrelevant evidence that Cartier glasses
    were found at Dean’s home. We disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are necessary to resolve this claim. Prior to the defen-
    dant’s case-in-chief during trial, defense counsel
    announced his intention to call Hartford police Detec-
    tive Brian Plourde. Plourde was involved in the execu-
    tion of a search warrant at Dean’s residence where the
    police discovered, inter alia, a safe containing four cell
    phones, a pair of Cartier glasses, and ammunition. The
    state objected to Plourde’s testimony on the ground
    that it was irrelevant. Specifically, the state argued that
    the Cartier glasses never were linked to the victim—a
    fact previously conceded by defense counsel. Defense
    counsel argued, however, that the Cartier glasses were
    relevant because they were found in Dean’s residence
    and ‘‘Cartier glasses were reported missing from
    [Dixon]. So circumstantially it ties . . . Dean to the
    incident as having taken those glasses from [Dixon].’’
    When the court asked defense counsel why he did not
    ask Dixon’s girlfriend to identify the Cartier glasses
    as Dixon’s during cross-examination, defense counsel
    stated: ‘‘Honestly, it didn’t occur to me at that point to
    go ahead and show her a picture of the glasses.’’ The
    state subsequently stated that the police did not link
    the Cartier glasses to Dixon. The court sustained the
    state’s objection in part, excluding evidence with
    respect to the Cartier glasses.9
    The principles governing our review of evidentiary
    claims are set forth in part I of this opinion. We supple-
    ment, however, the specific legal principles that govern
    our analysis of this particular claim. ‘‘Relevant evidence
    is evidence that has a logical tendency to aid the trier
    in the determination of an issue. . . . One fact is rele-
    vant to another if in the common course of events the
    existence of one, alone or with other facts, renders
    the existence of the other either more certain or more
    probable. . . . Evidence is irrelevant or too remote if
    there is such a want of open and visible connection
    between the evidentiary and principal facts that, all
    things considered, the former is not worthy or safe to
    be admitted in the proof of the latter. . . . Evidence
    is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclu-
    sive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to
    support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, so long
    as it is not prejudicial or merely cumulative. . . . The
    trial court has wide discretion to determine the rele-
    vancy of evidence and [e]very reasonable presumption
    should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s
    ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse
    of discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. Pena, 
    301 Conn. 669
    , 674, 
    22 A.3d 611
     (2011).
    The defendant contends that the Cartier glasses are
    relevant because ‘‘glasses costing $3000 are not a com-
    mon item, and evidence that Dean had them in his safe
    could be used to support an inference that it was Dean
    who robbed Dixon of the glasses.’’ Our review of the
    record indicates that the value of the Cartier glasses
    seized from Dean’s residence never was established.
    Moreover, the seized Cartier glasses never were identi-
    fied or connected as being the Cartier glasses owned
    and worn by Dixon. For all purposes, it appears that
    the defendant’s sole foundation for admitting the seized
    Cartier glasses was that they were the same brand as
    the glasses worn by Dixon. ‘‘[T]he proffering party bears
    the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered
    testimony. Unless a proper foundation is established,
    the evidence is irrelevant.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Deegan v. Simmons, 
    100 Conn. App. 524
    , 540,
    
    918 A.2d 998
    , cert. denied, 
    282 Conn. 923
    , 
    925 A.2d 1103
    (2007). Making every reasonable presumption in favor
    of the trial court’s ruling, we cannot conclude that the
    court abused its discretion by excluding the seized Car-
    tier glasses as evidence that it was Dean, not the defen-
    dant, who robbed Dixon of his Cartier glasses.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    Dean also was arrested and sentenced to twenty-five years of imprison-
    ment after negotiating a plea bargain with the state.
    2
    The issue of Dean’s unavailability was abandoned by the parties during
    oral argument before this court. Although the trial court did not expressly
    determine that Dean was unavailable, the parties stipulated ‘‘[t]hat if the
    court ordered [Dean] to testify, he would refuse . . . [and] if he refuses to
    testify before the court, which we agreed he would do, that would render
    him unavailable.’’ The court later instructed the jury with respect to the
    parties’ stipulation as follows: ‘‘[I]f . . . Dean was called as a witness by
    either the prosecutor or the defense, he would refuse to answer any
    questions.’’
    3
    Prior to pleading guilty, Dean offered conflicting accounts of what
    occurred on March 9, 2009, to the police. On March 18, 2009, Dean denied
    any involvement in Dixon’s murder. The next day, March 19, 2009, Dean
    then stated that the defendant was solely responsible for killing Dixon.
    4
    The defendant contends that Dean’s statement was against his penal
    interest because, if it were true, it follows that he was subject to criminal
    liability for making a false statement to police in March, 2009. See footnote
    3 of this opinion. We disagree. Dean did not face criminal liability for having
    made a false statement to the police at the time he made the alleged statement
    to Martin. Both of Dean’s statements to the police occurred in March, 2009.
    He made the alleged statement to Martin no earlier than May, 2010, more
    than one year after his statements to the police. Thus, the limitations period
    for prosecuting Dean for having made a false statement to the police had
    already expired. See General Statutes § 53a-157b (false statement is class
    A misdemeanor); General Statutes § 53a-36 (sentence of imprisonment for
    class A misdemeanor not to exceed one year); General Statutes § 54-193
    (c) (where punishment of offense does not exceed one year, state cannot
    prosecute if more than one year has passed from date offense is committed).
    5
    Because Dean’s statement was not against his penal interest, it is not
    necessary to determine if it was ‘‘trustworthy’’ for purposes of § 8-6 (4) of
    the Connecticut Code of Evidence.
    6
    In denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, the court determined
    that the defendant’s statements were not the fruit of ‘‘an illegal arrest or
    detention.’’ The court further determined that ‘‘[t]he defendant was properly
    advised of his Miranda rights and he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
    waived those rights. The statements were not the product of coercion,
    deception, manipulation or overreaching by the officers.’’
    7
    See Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 478–79, 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
     (1966).
    8
    Although the court, in making its evidentiary ruling, expressly noted that
    it had already decided the issue of voluntariness in making its ruling on the
    defendant’s motion to suppress statements, that ruling had no logical or
    legal bearing on the evidentiary question presented for its decision. Even
    if part of the court’s suppression ruling had rejected a claim that the police
    had subjected the defendant to the sort of coercive interrogation tactics
    that tend naturally to produce unreliable statements, the defendant retained
    the right to present evidence to the jury attacking the reliability of his
    statements on the basis of such coercive police tactics.
    9
    The court, however, permitted the defendant to introduce the ammuni-
    tion found in Dean’s safe. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court
    erred by excluding testimony concerning the Cartier glasses and the four
    cell phones found in Dean’s safe. The state, however, contends that the
    defendant’s claim with respect to the four cell phones was not preserved
    for appellate review. We agree. During trial, defense counsel indicated to
    the court that the police recovered several items from Dean’s safe, but
    stated that he only intended to introduce specific items: ‘‘[T]he specific
    items that I would seek to introduce would be limited to . . . [ammunition,
    two firearms and] a pair of Cartier glasses . . . .’’ The court then made its
    ruling based on defense counsel’s limited offer of evidence, which did not
    include the four cell phones found in Dean’s safe. The admissibility of
    the four cell phones, therefore, was never ruled upon by the court. ‘‘It is
    fundamental that claims of error must be distinctly raised and decided in
    the trial court . . . . [We] will not address issues not decided by the trial
    court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Faison, 
    112 Conn. App. 373
    , 379–80, 
    962 A.2d 860
     (2009). We, therefore, decline to review the defen-
    dant’s claim with respect to the admissibility of the four cell phones.