United States v. Ruiz-Castillo , 432 F. App'x 229 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 09-4016
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    RENE ALEJO RUIZ-CASTILLO,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
    Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00020-WO-2)
    Submitted:   November 8, 2010                 Decided:   May 26, 2011
    Before KING, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    K.E. Krispen Culbertson, CULBERTSON & ASSOCIATES, Greensboro,
    North Carolina, for Appellant.      Anna Mills Wagoner, United
    States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Rene Alejo Ruiz-Castillo appeals his jury conviction
    for conspiracy to distribute and possession with the intent to
    distribute more than fifty kilograms of marijuana, in violation
    of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    , 846 (2006).                 Ruiz-Castillo asserts that the
    district court erred when it admitted into evidence a statement
    made by his co-conspirator and instructed the jury on willful
    blindness.      We affirm.
    Although “[r]ulings related to admission and exclusion
    of   evidence        are   addressed    to       the    sound     discretion    of    the
    [district court] and will not be reversed absent an abuse of
    that    discretion,”       United    States      v.     Stitt,    
    250 F.3d 878
    ,   896
    (4th Cir. 2001), we review for plain error where, as here, no
    objection to the evidentiary ruling is made at trial, United
    States v. Perkins, 
    470 F.3d 150
    , 155 (4th Cir. 2006).
    A statement is not hearsay if it is offered against
    the defendant and is a statement of a co-conspirator of the
    defendant       “during      the    course       and     in     furtherance     of    the
    conspiracy.”         Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).                For a statement to be
    admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), there “must be evidence that
    there    was     a     conspiracy      involving         the     declarant     and    the
    nonoffering party, and that the statement was made during the
    course    and   in     furtherance     of    the       conspiracy.”      Bourjaily     v.
    United    States,      
    483 U.S. 171
    ,    175       (1987)    (internal     quotation
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    marks omitted).            Accordingly, when the Government shows by a
    preponderance of the evidence that (i) a conspiracy existed of
    which the defendant was a member, and (ii) the co-conspirator’s
    statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of
    the conspiracy, the statement is admissible.                                United States v.
    Neal,    
    78 F.3d 901
    ,    905     (4th       Cir.    1996);         United    States     v.
    Blevins, 
    960 F.2d 1252
    , 1255 (4th Cir. 1992).
    We   conclude       that        the    Government’s              evidence      amply
    demonstrated that a conspiracy to distribute more than fifty
    kilograms of marijuana existed between June and December 2007
    and     that     Ruiz-Castillo           was     a    member          of    the     conspiracy.
    We further       conclude       that     the    admitted         statement        was    made    in
    furtherance         of    the      conspiracy,         as        it     pertained        to     the
    declarant’s plan for obtaining some of the conspiracy’s supply
    of marijuana for further distribution.                       Accordingly, we conclude
    that    the    district     court      committed       no    error         in    admitting      the
    statement.
    Ruiz-Castillo        also       contends     that       the      district      court
    erred in instructing the jury on willful blindness.                                     We review
    this issue for abuse of discretion.                         United States v. Jeffers,
    
    570 F.3d 557
    , 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 645
    (2009).        “A willful blindness . . . instruction allows the jury
    to    impute    the      element    of    knowledge         to    the      defendant       if   the
    evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid
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    knowing what was taking place around him.”                                United States v.
    Ruhe,   
    191 F.3d 376
    ,      384   (4th    Cir.      1999)       (internal     quotation
    marks omitted); see also United States v. Whittington, 
    26 F.3d 456
    , 463 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The record need not contain direct
    evidence . . . that the defendant deliberately avoided knowledge
    of wrongdoing; all that is necessary is evidence from which the
    jury    could       infer    deliberate        avoidance        of    knowledge.”).             “A
    willful       blindness      instruction        is       proper      when    the    defendant
    asserts a lack of guilty knowledge but the evidence supports an
    inference      of    deliberate         ignorance”        on    the       defendant’s         part.
    Ruhe, 
    191 F.3d at 384
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Ruiz-Castillo’s defense was that he did not know that
    bales of marijuana were hidden inside the pallets of ceramic
    tile a co-conspirator instructed him to break.                              After review of
    the record, we conclude that the jury could properly infer that
    Ruiz-Castillo         closed      his   eyes       to    his   involvement         in     a    drug
    operation.       Moreover, the district court properly instructed the
    jury    not    to    infer     guilty     knowledge           from    a    mere    showing      of
    careless      disregard      or    mistake.             See    United      States    v.       Guay,
    
    108 F.3d 545
    , 551 (4th Cir. 1997).                        We therefore conclude that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing
    on willful blindness.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We   dispense       with    oral    argument        because       the      facts    and       legal
    4
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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