Keller v. Keller , 167 Conn. App. 138 ( 2016 )


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    BETH KELLER v. RICHARD KELLER
    (AC 37263)
    (AC 37560)
    Beach, Mullins and Mihalakos, Js.
    Argued May 10—officially released July 26, 2016
    (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of
    Middlesex, Adelman, J.)
    Karen L. Dowd, with whom was Brendon P. Lev-
    esque, for the appellant (plaintiff).
    Steven R. Dembo, with whom were Caitlin E. Koz-
    loski and, on the brief, P. Jo Anne Burgh, for the appel-
    lee (defendant).
    Opinion
    MIHALAKOS, J. The plaintiff, Beth Keller, appeals
    from the judgment of the trial court dissolving her mar-
    riage to the defendant, Richard Keller, and entering
    related financial orders. On appeal, the plaintiff claims
    that the trial court improperly (1) relied on gross income
    in making its financial orders, (2) concluded that the
    plaintiff had engaged in litigation misconduct and bad
    faith litigation, and (3) imputed income of $72,000 to
    the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claims that the totality
    of the trial court’s orders constituted an abuse of discre-
    tion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    We first set forth the following relevant facts and
    procedural history. The parties married on August 15,
    1992, and the plaintiff brought this dissolution action
    in May, 2011. The trial court issued pendente lite orders
    in early August, 2011, which were appealed to this court.
    We reversed the judgment and remanded the case for
    further proceedings. See Keller v. Keller, 
    141 Conn. App. 681
    , 685, 
    64 A.3d 776
     (2013). The court held hearings
    on remand and issued new pendente lite orders in an
    August 6, 2013 memorandum of decision. This decision
    was then the subject of a second appeal. Following the
    defendant’s motions for articulation and review and
    pursuant to an order of this court, the trial court issued
    an articulation of its August 6, 2013 decision on January
    29, 2014. It subsequently dissolved the parties’ marriage
    and issued final orders on July 9, 2014. We then dis-
    missed the appeal of the August 6, 2013 judgment as
    moot.
    In its July 9, 2014 memorandum of decision, the trial
    court found the following relevant facts.1 The parties
    were married on August 15, 1992, and during the course
    of their marriage had three children. As of July 9, 2014,
    the children were eighteen, fifteen, and twelve.
    The plaintiff obtained a master’s degree in clinical
    nutrition from Boston University and worked in public
    relations doing food and nutrition marketing. She had
    only worked outside the home in a limited capacity
    between the births of the parties’ first and second chil-
    dren, and after the birth of their second child did not
    work outside of the home for the fourteen years prior
    to filing for dissolution. Her recent attempts to find
    meaningful employment have met with limited success.
    At the time of the July 9, 2014 memorandum of decision
    she was earning $500 per month, and the court deter-
    mined that she had an earning capacity of $26,000
    per year.
    The defendant was educated as a lawyer and spent
    most of his adult career in finance. Up to the end of
    2010, he was the owner of Angler, a hedge fund that
    he started in 2006, which, at its peak, had between 50
    and 100 investors and managed up to $150 million in
    assets. The fund crashed in the fall of 2008 and finally
    was closed out effective December 31, 2010. He lost a
    substantial part of the family’s wealth along with that
    of his investors. The defendant, in an attempt to develop
    investment opportunities, has continued to maintain
    the lifestyle of a successful hedge fund manager despite
    his very limited income and resources. The court heard
    varied expert opinions regarding his likelihood of suc-
    cess, with the plaintiff’s expert predicting that he had
    an earning capacity between $800,000 and $1.5 million
    per year, and the defendant’s expert predicting that his
    likely employment would be as an investment analyst
    making between $60,000 and $175,000 per year. The
    court determined that he had an earning capacity of
    $175,000, but also noted that his finances could improve
    dramatically over time.
    Both parties had received significant amounts of
    money, primarily from their parents, which they classi-
    fied as loans. They used this money to fund this litigation
    and to fund their lifestyles. The trial court determined
    the plaintiff had received $30,000 per month from her
    parents, and imputed $78,000 of it per year as income.
    The defendant owed $651,498 to his parents, but the
    court did not impute any income based on this amount.
    The court entered the following relevant financial
    orders on July 9, 2014. It ordered the defendant to pay
    the plaintiff as periodic alimony the sum of $3000 per
    month. It ordered that the plaintiff transfer her interest
    in the family home, the present equity value being
    approximately $1,139,000, to the defendant via quit-
    claim deed, and that the defendant pay the plaintiff
    $225,000. It ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff
    90 percent of any money paid to him from an undistribu-
    ted ‘‘carried interest’’ account with Sandler Entities
    (Sandler), a New York investment firm for which he
    previously had worked, the remaining balance of which
    was $639,200.2 Having awarded custody of the children
    to the defendant and having found that the parties
    exceeded the maximum combined net weekly income
    under the child support guidelines, the court declined
    to order the plaintiff to pay child support. Finally, it
    ordered ‘‘that the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant
    the sum of $25,000 toward his legal fees expended in
    work done regarding her litigation misconduct . . . .’’
    This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
    as necessary.
    We first set forth our standard of review. ‘‘We will
    not reverse a trial court’s rulings regarding financial
    orders unless the court incorrectly applied the law or
    could not reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . A
    fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a
    trial court may exercise broad discretion in awarding
    alimony and dividing property as long as it considers
    all relevant statutory criteria. . . . In reviewing the
    trial court’s decision under [an abuse of discretion]
    standard, we are cognizant that [t]he issues involving
    financial orders are entirely interwoven. The rendering
    of judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a care-
    fully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be
    dependent on the other. . . .
    ‘‘A reviewing court must indulge every reasonable
    presumption in favor of the correctness of the trial
    court’s action to determine ultimately whether the court
    could reasonably conclude as it did. . . . This standard
    of review reflects the sound policy that the trial court
    has the opportunity to view the parties first hand and
    is therefore in the best position to assess all of the
    circumstances surrounding a dissolution action, in
    which such personal factors . . . as the demeanor and
    the attitude of the parties are so significant.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino, 
    155 Conn. App. 298
    , 302–303, 
    109 A.3d 546
    , cert. denied,
    
    316 Conn. 912
    , 
    111 A.3d 886
     (2015).
    I
    The plaintiff claims that the court improperly relied
    on gross income rather than net income in making its
    financial orders. She asserts that because the court
    found that the plaintiff had a yearly gross income of
    $78,000 and the defendant had a yearly gross income
    of $175,000, it clearly based its financial orders on gross
    income. The defendant replies that the court specifi-
    cally referenced net income when applying the child
    support guidelines, had information from which it could
    calculate net income, and was otherwise silent regard-
    ing whether it was using gross or net income. The defen-
    dant urges us to conclude that the court properly used
    net income. We agree with the defendant.
    ‘‘It is well settled that a court must base child support
    and alimony orders on the available net income of the
    parties, not gross income.’’ Morris v. Morris, 
    262 Conn. 299
    , 306, 
    811 A.2d 1283
     (2003). Where ‘‘the trial court
    expressly and affirmatively state[s] that it relied on
    gross income in determining the defendant’s support
    obligation, the trial court abuse[s] its discretion because
    it applied the wrong legal standard.’’ Id., 307. On the
    other hand, where the trial court states that it is relying
    on ‘‘all of the relevant information, including the parties’
    financial affidavits and their child support guideline
    worksheets, both of which [include] the parties’ net
    incomes, as well as the testimony of the parties’’; (inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted) Kelman v. Kelman, 
    86 Conn. App. 120
    , 123–24, 
    860 A.2d 292
     (2004), cert.
    denied, 
    273 Conn. 911
    , 
    870 A.2d 1079
     (2005); we may
    conclude that the trial court properly used net income.
    This may be true even if an order ‘‘is expressed as
    a function of the parties’ gross earnings.’’ Hughes v.
    Hughes, 
    95 Conn. App. 200
    , 207, 
    895 A.2d 274
    , cert.
    denied, 
    280 Conn. 902
    , 
    907 A.2d 90
     (2006). ‘‘[W]e differ-
    entiate between an order that is a function of gross
    income and one that is based on gross income. . . .
    [T]he term ‘based’ as used in this context connotes an
    order that only takes into consideration the parties’
    gross income and not the parties’ net income. Conse-
    quently, an order that takes cognizance of the parties’
    disposable incomes may be proper even if it is
    expressed as a function of the parties’ gross earnings.’’
    
    Id.
     In short, although ‘‘[i]t is well settled that a court
    must base its child support and alimony orders on the
    available net income of the parties, not gross income
    . . . [w]hether or not an order falls within this prescrip-
    tion must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
    while our decisional law in this regard consistently
    affirms the basic tenet that support and alimony orders
    must be based on net income, the proper application
    of this principle is context specific.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Cleary v. Cleary, 
    103 Conn. App. 798
    ,
    801, 
    930 A.2d 811
     (2007).
    In the July 9, 2014 memorandum of decision, the
    court found the plaintiff’s earning capacity to be $26,000
    gross per year, plus reoccurring gifts in the amount of
    $72,000 gross per year for an effective income of $98,000
    annually, and the defendant’s earning capacity to be
    $175,000 gross per year. When calculating child support,
    it stated that ‘‘the combined estimated net weekly
    income of the parties would exceed the four thousand
    dollar ($4000) maximum . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) It
    then stated that it was entering its orders ‘‘in consider-
    ation of the findings of fact enumerated above and in
    consideration of the criteria as set forth in General
    Statutes §§ 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, 46b-62, 46b-81, and
    46b-82 as explained by our case law . . . .’’ The court
    ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff alimony in
    the amount of $3000 per month, without stating how it
    had arrived at this amount. The parties also filed child
    support guideline worksheets and financial affidavits,
    although as stated previously the court relied on earning
    capacity and imputed income for each party.
    The court did not state how it used its gross income
    findings in entering its orders. It did state that it was
    fashioning an award as equitably as possible given the
    constraints of incomplete information. See Commis-
    sioner of Transportation v. Larobina, 
    92 Conn. App. 15
    , 32, 
    882 A.2d 1265
    , cert. denied, 
    276 Conn. 931
    , 
    889 A.2d 816
     (2005). Also of note, in the articulation of
    its August 6, 2013 memorandum of decision, the court
    articulated the method it used to arrive at the child
    support guidelines amounts in its August 6, 2013 memo-
    randum of decision: ‘‘Using . . . gross amounts, the
    court took the appropriate deductions to reach a guide-
    line net amount for the calculation.’’ We have no reason
    to conclude that the court did not perform the same
    analysis for its July 9, 2014 judgment.3
    In short, the child support calculation clearly states
    that it is based on net income, and the alimony award
    does not state whether it is based on any income finding.
    The court stated that it relied on case law which clearly
    requires that net income be used, and it had demon-
    strated in an earlier articulation that it understood how
    to calculate net income as a function of gross income.
    We therefore conclude that the court used the proper
    standard. See National City Real Estate Services, LLC
    v. Tuttle, 
    155 Conn. App. 290
    , 298, 
    109 A.3d 932
     (2015)
    (absent evidence to contrary, we assume that court
    acted properly).
    II
    The plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding
    that she engaged in litigation misconduct. She asserts
    that the court confused litigation misconduct and bad
    faith litigation, and moreover that the evidence does
    not show that she acted in bad faith and without any
    colorable claim. The defendant responds that the court
    utilized the proper standard and properly found that
    the plaintiff was required to pay his attorney’s fees for
    her actions during the course of the litigation. We agree
    that the court’s analysis blends litigation misconduct
    and bad faith litigation when they are in fact discrete
    doctrines, but we conclude that the court nonetheless
    applied the proper standard, and we affirm its findings.
    Litigation misconduct may be sanctioned at the dis-
    cretion of the court under Ramin v. Ramin, 
    281 Conn. 324
    , 353, 
    915 A.2d 790
     (2007), where a party has engaged
    in egregious litigation misconduct. Our Supreme Court
    clarified in Berzins v. Berzins, 
    306 Conn. 651
    , 658, 
    51 A.3d 941
     (2012), that Ramin was applicable only to
    discovery misconduct. It then considered whether the
    trial court ‘‘could have acted within its inherent author-
    ity to impose sanctions against a litigant for filing frivo-
    lous and duplicative postjudgment motions.’’ Id., 660.
    It ruled that the court could do so under the bad faith
    exception to the American rule if it made ‘‘the required,
    two part finding pursuant to Maris v. McGrath, [
    269 Conn. 834
    , 844, 
    850 A.2d 133
     (2004)]—namely, that the
    [litigant’s] claims were entirely without color and that
    the [litigant] acted in bad faith . . . .’’ Berzins v. Ber-
    zins, supra, 660. In the present case, the trial court
    blended the Ramin and Maris standards in that it
    referred to litigation misconduct under Ramin as the
    ‘‘ ‘bad faith exception to the American Rule’ ’’ and stated
    that Berzins demonstrated that ‘‘litigation misconduct
    in dissolution matters was not limited to discovery mis-
    conduct,’’ whereas Berzins in fact demonstrated that
    litigation misconduct was so limited, but held that in
    the alternative courts could use their inherent power
    pursuant to the bad faith exception to sanction other
    conduct provided they made the more stringent findings
    required by Maris. The court in the present case went
    on, however, to correctly quote and apply the two part
    test for the bad faith exception as quoted in Maris
    and Berzins. The court therefore applied the correct
    legal standard.
    The following additional facts are necessary to deter-
    mine whether the court abused its discretion by order-
    ing the plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees under the bad
    faith exception. The court found that the plaintiff had
    been in contempt of court for multiple incidents.4 It
    found that she had violated its order that the defendant
    would have exclusive use of the marital home when
    she entered and stole his garbage. It also found her in
    contempt for making changes to her Facebook account
    after the court had ordered her to preserve information
    in social media websites and for portraying the defen-
    dant in a negative light in the eyes of the children and
    others. Finally, it found her in contempt for failing to
    supply her iPhone password after being ordered to do
    so on multiple occasions.
    In claiming that the court abused its discretion in
    awarding attorney’s fees, the plaintiff focuses on what
    the trial court terms the ‘‘damaging materials allegedly
    belonging to the defendant’’ that the plaintiff initially
    claimed to have found in 2006, but later claimed to have
    stolen from the defendant’s garage in 2013. The plaintiff
    asserts that these materials were pornographic in
    nature and that she had disclosed them during a confi-
    dential mediation session. She maintains that the defen-
    dant’s counsel then made the materials the centerpiece
    of the case, seeking extensive discovery in order to
    prove that the plaintiff had manufactured them. She
    contends that she should not be blamed for the defen-
    dant’s tactical decision to make this issue a part of the
    litigation. The attorney for the minor children con-
    firmed that the plaintiff had never asserted that the
    materials were relevant to the custody issues, and the
    trial court stated that ‘‘it was not possible to make any
    clear determination as to whether or not the material
    came from the defendant’s computer hard drive or was
    fabricated by the plaintiff in an attempt to gain an advan-
    tage in the case.’’
    An award of attorney’s fees, including for bad faith,
    is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Richter v. Rich-
    ter, 
    137 Conn. App. 231
    , 235, 
    48 A.3d 686
    , cert. denied,
    
    307 Conn. 926
    , 
    55 A.3d 568
     (2012). ‘‘To determine
    whether the bad faith exception applies, the court must
    assess whether there has been substantive bad faith as
    exhibited by, for example, a party’s use of oppressive
    tactics or its wilful violations of court orders; [t]he
    appropriate focus for the court . . . is the conduct of
    the party in instigating or maintaining the litigation.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maris v. McGrath,
    supra, 
    269 Conn. 845
    –46. The court must also determine
    whether the claim is colorable; if the claimant is a party
    to the litigation, ‘‘a claim is colorable, for purposes
    of the bad faith exception to the American rule, if a
    reasonable person, given his or her first hand knowl-
    edge of the underlying matter, could have concluded
    that the facts supporting the claim might have been
    established.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
    847. Finally, the court must set forth its factual findings
    with specificity. See Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 
    146 Conn. App. 79
    , 97–98, 
    78 A.3d 860
     (2013).
    We first note that the court based its determination
    of bad faith in part on its finding that the plaintiff had
    committed numerous wilful violations of court orders,
    a finding that the plaintiff has not attacked.5 The plaintiff
    makes two assertions regarding the pornographic mate-
    rials, namely, that it was never proven that she manufac-
    tured them and that the defendant chose to engage in
    extensive discovery regarding them. Neither argument
    is availing. The court clearly stated that even if the
    plaintiff’s claims were true, no reasonable person would
    find that her actions were justified. Even under the
    plaintiff’s version of events, she stole the materials
    while under a court order not to enter the house, and
    she lied under oath about when she obtained them. The
    plaintiff has not provided any justification for pre-
    senting the materials to the defendant, and we see no
    reason to disturb the court’s finding that there was
    none.
    The plaintiff also claims that it was the defendant’s
    choice to make the pornographic materials a significant
    part of the litigation. The trial court, however, cognizant
    of the circumstances of the case and the acrimonious
    nature of the parties’ relationship, did not fault the
    defendant for attempting to demonstrate the prove-
    nance of the images. We see no reason to conclude that
    this determination was in error.
    Furthermore, both the plaintiff and her attorney
    acknowledged her fault. Her attorney stated that the
    plaintiff’s actions regarding the pornographic materials
    ‘‘blew up into a firestorm that wasted a lot of time and
    resources’’ and the plaintiff herself stated: ‘‘I feel badly
    because [lying about when she found the pornographic
    materials] caused three months of chaos for
    everybody.’’
    The plaintiff has not claimed that she failed to receive
    notice of the possibility she could be required to pay
    the defendant’s attorney’s fees, or that the trial court
    failed to make sufficiently detailed findings to justify
    its award. See Maris v. McGrath, supra, 
    269 Conn. 844
    .
    Having reviewed the record, we conclude that she did
    have notice and the court’s findings that she acted in
    bad faith and without colorable claims were suffi-
    ciently detailed.
    On the basis of all of the foregoing, we conclude that
    the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the
    defendant attorney’s fees under the bad faith exception
    to the American rule.
    III
    The plaintiff claims that the court improperly imputed
    income to her based on payments by her parents that
    she asserts were loans. She argues that the court found
    it found her credible and should have construed the
    payments as loans. She further argues that the court
    created her inability to pay by its financial orders
    because it did not award her sufficient resources to
    pay, and, therefore, she should not be penalized. The
    defendant replies that the court properly imputed
    income to the plaintiff. We agree with the defendant.
    Whether money should be characterized as income
    or a loan is a question of fact for the trial court. See
    Zahringer v. Zahringer, 
    262 Conn. 360
    , 369–71, 
    815 A.2d 75
     (2003); Zahringer v. Zahringer, 
    124 Conn. App. 672
    , 679–80, 
    6 A.3d 141
     (2010). This is often a matter
    that turns on the credibility of the parties and whether
    any documentation of the loans was provided. Compare
    Zahringer v. Zahringer, supra, 
    124 Conn. App. 678
    –79
    (court, after determining that parties, including father’s
    accountant, were credible and that documentation had
    been created, held that payments were loans), with
    Desai v. Desai, 
    119 Conn. App. 224
    , 236–37, 
    987 A.2d 362
     (2010) (court, after determining that parties were
    not credible and that documentation was lacking, held
    that payments were not loans).
    In the present case, the court found that the payments
    from the plaintiff’s parents initially may have been made
    with the intention that they would be repaid, but that
    this changed over time into outright support payments.
    It also found that the plaintiff acknowledged that some
    payments were not loans, and that she was unsure
    whether others were loans. The plaintiff claims that by
    stating that the plaintiff would repay the money if she
    could, the court was finding credible her contention
    that the payments were loans. We disagree with the
    plaintiff’s conclusion. When the court determined that
    the payments were not loans, it considered the actual
    situation faced by the plaintiff, in which she was
    unlikely to be able to repay the money, and therefore
    concluded that the payments were gifts because they
    were made without likelihood of repayment. Whether,
    in a theoretical situation, the plaintiff would repay these
    gifts does not contradict this assessment. The court’s
    statement that the plaintiff would repay if she could is
    not contradictory to its holding that, given the plaintiff’s
    current situation, the payments were not loans.
    The plaintiff also claims that the court created a situa-
    tion where she could not repay the alleged loans
    because it divided the assets as it did and permitted
    the defendant to use two prior Sandler distributions to
    repay his own loans. We are not persuaded.
    The defendant had received two earlier distributions
    from Sandler in the combined amount of $1,271,300,
    which he used to repay loans from his parents. The
    court did not fault him for this action, or order that he
    provide equalization payments to the plaintiff. We will
    return to the question of whether this division of assets
    constituted an abuse of discretion in part IV of this
    opinion. Regarding how the Sandler distribution affects
    whether the court abused its discretion in treating the
    money received by the plaintiff as income, the plaintiff
    has not pointed to any testimony that her parents were
    expecting payment from the Sandler distribution or
    other assets when they made the payments. The court
    based its determination on the plaintiff’s testimony,
    spending habits, and financial situation. We conclude,
    therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in
    making this determination.
    IV
    The plaintiff claims that the totality of the court’s
    orders constituted an abuse of discretion. She points
    to the court’s disparate treatment of family loans to
    each party, the defendant’s use of marital assets to pay
    his loans, the court’s disparate treatment of the parties’
    potential bankruptcies, the court’s disparate treatment
    of the parties’ conduct, and the overall financial orders
    being grossly inequitable. The defendant responds that
    all of these orders were proper exercises of the trial
    court’s discretion. We agree with the defendant.
    ‘‘The power to act equitably is the keystone to the
    court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of
    circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a
    marriage.’’ Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 
    168 Conn. 579
    ,
    585, 
    362 A.2d 835
     (1975). ‘‘[A] fundamental principle in
    dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise
    broad discretion in . . . dividing property as long as
    it considers all relevant statutory criteria.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Coleman v. Coleman, 
    151 Conn. App. 613
    , 617, 
    95 A.3d 569
     (2014). ‘‘It is well
    settled that [i]n dissolution proceedings, the court must
    fashion its financial orders in accordance with the crite-
    ria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-81 (division of
    marital property), 46b-82 (alimony) and 46b-84 (child
    support). All three statutory provisions require consid-
    eration of the parties’ amount and sources of income
    in determining the appropriate division of property and
    size of any child support or alimony award. . . . We
    note also that [t]he trial court may place varying degrees
    of importance on each criterion according to the factual
    circumstances of each case. . . . There is no additional
    requirement that the court specifically state how it
    weighed the statutory criteria or explain in detail the
    importance assigned to each statutory factor.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kac-
    zynski v. Kaczynski, 
    124 Conn. App. 204
    , 210–11, 
    3 A.3d 1034
     (2010). ‘‘[Section] 46b–81 (c) directs the court
    to consider numerous separately listed criteria. No lan-
    guage of presumption is contained in the statute.
    Indeed, § 46b-81 (a) permits the farthest reaches from
    an equal division as is possible, allowing the court to
    assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of
    the estate of the other. . . . On the basis of the plain
    language of § 46b-81, there is no presumption in Con-
    necticut that marital property should be divided equally
    prior to applying the statutory criteria.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Id., 213. ‘‘[T]he specified criteria
    are not exhaustive, and the court properly may consider
    other equitable factors when crafting its property distri-
    bution and alimony orders.’’ Loughlin v. Loughlin, 
    93 Conn. App. 618
    , 625, 
    889 A.2d 902
    , aff’d, 
    280 Conn. 632
    ,
    
    910 A.2d 963
     (2006).
    We already have touched on the court’s characteriza-
    tion of payments made to the parties by their families.
    The court did not state why it considered the money
    provided to the defendant by his parents to be loans
    rather than income. As we stated previously in this
    opinion, this was a question of the parties’ credibility
    and the court’s consideration of the overall situation.
    The defendant had received loans from nonfamily mem-
    bers and had paid back some of the loans using the
    Sandler distribution. In addition, given his former posi-
    tion as a hedge fund manager, repayment was likely a
    more reasonable prospect. Any of these reasons could
    account for the court’s disparate treatment of the pay-
    ments made to the parties.6
    The court also did not state why it permitted the
    defendant to use a portion of the Sandler distribution for
    his own purposes. Doing so amounted to distribution of
    an asset, which is left to the court’s discretion. See
    Coleman v. Coleman, supra, 
    151 Conn. App. 617
    –18.
    The Sandler distribution amounts to compensation for
    the defendant’s former employment, and we previously
    have stated that there is no presumption that assets
    should be distributed equally. See Kaczynski v. Kac-
    zynski, 
    supra,
     
    124 Conn. App. 213
    . The court therefore
    was within its discretion to choose not to order any
    equalization payment to the plaintiff.
    The court made passing reference to whether bank-
    ruptcy was a viable option for either party. It noted
    that many of the plaintiff’s loans were dischargeable in
    bankruptcy, but that if the defendant declared bank-
    ruptcy he would not be able to work as a hedge fund
    manager again. The plaintiff claims that this was an
    improper conclusion to draw, citing to the many nega-
    tive consequences that could befall her if she declared
    bankruptcy, such as damage to her credit rating, thereby
    impairing her ability to obtain a mortgage on a home.
    Although this may be true, we do not interpret the
    court’s mention of bankruptcy as anything other than
    a passing reference. The court did not order the plaintiff
    to declare bankruptcy, and did not hold that it distrib-
    uted assets in the manner it did because of the possibil-
    ity of bankruptcy. Without further insight into the
    reason why the court referenced bankruptcy, by way
    of articulation, we are left to conclude that the court
    properly exercised its discretion.
    The plaintiff also argues that although she was sanc-
    tioned for her actions, the court took a blind eye to
    the defendant’s misdeeds, which included recording the
    plaintiff and their children and installing spyware on
    the plaintiff’s computer. The court addressed the defen-
    dant’s conduct in its July 9, 2014 memorandum of deci-
    sion: ‘‘The defendant is certainly not without fault for
    poor judgment during this case. The testimony was
    clear that early on he recorded conversations of his
    wife and children on a fairly routine basis, mostly with-
    out their knowledge. Prior to the commencement of
    the case, he had installed software capable of allowing
    him to monitor use of the family computer—so-called
    ‘spyware’—without either his wife or his children know-
    ing about his actions. He also confiscated one of his
    daughter’s cell phones to have it forensically examined.
    The difference between such behavior and that of the
    plaintiff is that the defendant seems to have learned
    from his mistakes while the plaintiff did not. His poor
    judgment calls were, for the most part, early in the
    dispute and they stopped; hers continued until very
    shortly before the trial.’’ The plaintiff contends that
    certain conduct had not stopped, in that the defendant
    had not removed the spyware and the defendant testi-
    fied that he had stopped taping the plaintiff ‘‘ ‘except
    in particular circumstances.’ ’’ Determining what
    actions to sanction is within the trial court’s discretion.
    Moreover, the defendant’s actions were not taken in
    violation of court orders, whereas the plaintiff’s were,
    and the court made no finding and there is no evidence
    in the record that the defendant’s actions caused signifi-
    cant litigation expenses, whereas the court found that
    the plaintiff’s actions did cause significant expenses.
    The court, therefore, was within its discretion to distin-
    guish between the parties’ actions in this manner.
    Finally, the plaintiff claims that the financial orders
    were grossly inequitable. In Casey v. Casey, 
    82 Conn. App. 378
    , 385, 
    844 A.2d 250
     (2004), this court reversed
    financial orders that left the defendant ‘‘saddled with
    a sizeable mortgage debt, when the proceeds of the
    increased debt inured almost exclusively to the plain-
    tiff’s benefit and when the plaintiff was awarded the
    property that enjoyed an appreciation in value and net
    equity as a result of the mortgage debt.’’ In Greco v.
    Greco, 
    275 Conn. 348
    , 361, 
    880 A.2d 872
     (2005), our
    Supreme Court reversed financial orders that resulted
    in an income deficit following payment of alimony and
    insurance premiums. In contrast, here the plaintiff is
    not saddled with any debt by the court, and she has
    not been ordered to pay anything by the court. She will
    receive a payment of $225,000 from the defendant, will
    receive $3000 a month in alimony, and will obtain 90
    percent of the remaining $639,200 Sandler distribution
    if Sandler chooses to make the distribution. She claims
    that this will be inadequate to pay her debts and
    expenses. These are debts and expenses of her own
    making, and the defendant has similar debts and
    expenses that his portion of the assets, even including
    the equity in the home and the Sandler distribution that
    he already used to pay down his debts somewhat, will
    not cover. As the trial court stated, ‘‘both parties have,
    to a very great extent, continued to live their lives over
    the last three years of litigation as if nothing has hap-
    pened financially. The court can only deal with what it
    has been given and that is the reality of this case; it
    will be up to the parties to make their respective
    futures work.’’
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The trial court had incorporated into its July 9, 2014 memorandum of
    decision certain findings it had made in its August 6, 2013 memorandum of
    decision regarding pendente lite orders. We therefore include facts found
    in both memoranda.
    2
    As we will discuss in this opinion, the defendant had already received
    distributions from Sandler during the pendency of the divorce action, which
    he used for his own benefit.
    3
    The plaintiff also claims that the court’s calculations do not work using
    net income and the child support guidelines worksheets provided by the
    parties. The plaintiff first raises this claim in her reply brief, therefore the
    defendant was unable to reply to this argument aside from briefly touching
    on it at oral argument before this court. As both this court and our Supreme
    Court have stated, ‘‘we do not address claims raised for the first time in a
    party’s reply brief.’’ Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut
    Siting Council, 
    286 Conn. 57
    , 87 n.29, 
    942 A.2d 345
     (2008).
    4
    The court summarized the plaintiff’s violations as follows: ‘‘[L]eaving the
    jurisdiction to avoid service; multiple violations of the exclusive possession
    order to which she had agreed; taking personal items from the marital home;
    stealing the defendant’s garbage from the marital home [while] searching
    for potential evidence to use against her husband; stealing a computer hard
    drive used by the defendant from the marital home; copying the data on
    that hard drive and showing it to others even though some of that material
    was clearly covered by prior court orders . . . regarding confidentiality
    because it included information about the defendant’s former investors and
    other restricted information relating to the defendant’s prior financial work;
    accessing without permission e-mail accounts of the defendant; accessing
    without permission various other online accounts of the defendant; and not
    complying in a timely fashion with the court’s order directing the plaintiff
    to turn over to a marshal certain electronic devices.’’
    5
    The court also discussed the significant expenditure of time and money
    as a result of the plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant was hiding money
    in offshore accounts. After extensive discovery, with which the discovery
    special master found that the defendant fully complied, no ‘‘evidence to
    support the allegations originally made by the plaintiff was ever provided
    to the court.’’ It is not clear from the court’s memorandum whether the
    plaintiff’s investigation into possible offshore accounts held by the defendant
    was an additional basis for its finding of bad faith.
    6
    Both parties provided documentation of their respective loans. The
    defendant maintains that the plaintiff’s documentation was suspect and
    incomplete. The court did not make a finding as to the authenticity of either
    parties’ documentation or otherwise consider it in its analysis; therefore,
    we likewise do not consider the documentation in our analysis.