State v. Walker ( 2018 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. EUGENE L. WALKER
    (AC 39797)
    Alvord, Kahn and Bear, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted of the crimes of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree
    with a firearm, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and criminal
    possession of a pistol or revolver, the defendant appealed. The defen-
    dant’s conviction stemmed from his alleged involvement with that of his
    codefendant, A, in the shooting death of the victim during an attempted
    robbery in a parking lot. The defendant, who was wearing a bandana
    and carrying a revolver, and A’s cousin, D, had approached the victim’s
    Acura, and a struggle ensued during which the victim was shot. A ban-
    dana that the police recovered from the Acura, the victim’s bloodstain,
    and known samples that included buccal swabs from the defendant, A
    and D were sent to a state laboratory, where they were analyzed by a
    supervisory forensics examiner, H, and the laboratory’s known pro-
    cessing group. H determined that the defendant’s DNA profile matched
    the DNA found on the bandana. H testified about her findings and the
    DNA profile that another analyst in the laboratory had generated from
    the defendant’s buccal swab. M, who knew the defendant only by a
    nickname, identified the defendant during her testimony, which
    occurred after she previously had met with the prosecutor in his office.
    During a discussion about the defendant in the prosecutor’s office, M
    had identified the defendant by his nickname from a photograph that
    was on the prosecutor’s desk. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter
    alia, that the trial court violated his right to confrontation by permitting
    H to testify about a DNA sample that had been processed by a different
    analyst. The defendant also claimed that the trial court improperly
    denied his motion to sever his trial from that of A after the trial court had
    admitted into evidence certain statements of A under the coconspirator
    exception to the rule against hearsay. Held:
    1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial
    court violated his right to confrontation by allowing H to testify about
    a DNA sample that was processed by another analyst in the same labora-
    tory without requiring that analyst to testify; H, who had conducted the
    critical analysis and made the findings that connected the defendant’s
    DNA to the DNA found on the bandana, testified about the standard
    operating procedures of the laboratory, including the manner in which
    the known samples were processed and verified, she relied on her
    personal knowledge of the procedures performed by the analysts in the
    known processing group in reaching her own conclusions, her analysis
    was reviewed by another analyst at the laboratory who signed her report,
    and even if H’s testimony about the processing of the defendant’s known
    profile was considered a critical stage of the analysis or chain of custody,
    it did not implicate the confrontation clause because H was available
    and testified extensively on cross-examination.
    2. The defendant’s claim that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial
    by declining to grant his motion for a mistrial or to strike M’s in-court
    identification of him was unavailing:
    a. M’s pretrial identification of the defendant in the prosecutor’s office
    did not result from an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure
    and, thus, her subsequent in-court identification of the defendant did
    not violate his due process rights; M was not an eyewitness to the crimes
    at issue, she identified the defendant in the prosecutor’s office, and
    then in court, as the person she knew by a certain nickname, and the
    prosecutor did not ask M to identify the individual in the defendant’s
    photograph, but instead, M’s identification occurred spontaneously as
    a result of her familiarity with the individual she knew by the nickname,
    and not as the result of an arranged procedure by law enforcement.
    b. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike
    M’s in-court identification of the defendant or to declare a mistrial as
    sanctions for the state’s failure to disclose M’s pretrial identification of
    the defendant’s photograph in the prosecutor’s office: the defendant did
    not demonstrate that the prosecutor violated the rule of practice (§ 40-
    13A) that requires the prosecuting authority, upon written request of a
    defendant, to provide photocopies of all statements, law enforcement
    reports and affidavits within its possession concerning the offense
    charged, as the record did not indicate that the defendant made a written
    request as required by § 40-13A, and M’s comment to the prosecutor
    made prior to trial identifying the defendant was not a discoverable
    statement pursuant to § 40-13A because M’s comment to the prosecutor
    was oral and the record did not contain evidence that it had been
    recorded, and even if the prosecutor improperly withheld M’s statement
    from defense counsel, the defendant did not show any prejudice, as the
    jury reasonably could have found that M knew the defendant prior to
    the victim’s murder.
    3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in
    admitting certain hearsay testimony under the coconspirator exception
    to the hearsay rule, which was based on his claim that the court improp-
    erly concluded that a conspiracy existed when it admitted that testimony
    under the coconspirator exception; that court did not err in its prelimi-
    nary determination that a conspiracy existed, as the court admitted the
    hearsay testimony subject to the state’s later admission of sufficient
    foundational evidence and the state later introduced the necessary con-
    necting facts, the record did not indicate that the court improperly
    considered the hearsay statements in its analysis, and although the court
    mentioned coconspirator hearsay statements in addition to independent
    evidence when it discussed whether the state had established the exis-
    tence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
    based its ruling only on independent evidence.
    4. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial
    court improperly denied his motion to sever his trial from that of A,
    which was based on his assertion that evidence was admitted that would
    not have been admissible against him at a separate trial; although the
    trial court clearly raised potential joint trial issues with counsel, defense
    counsel reassured the trial court that such problems would not arise,
    the defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the admission of A’s
    statements so as to require a separate trial, as certain of A’s statements
    were admissible against the defendant under the coconspirator excep-
    tion to the hearsay rule, and the court’s curative instructions to the jury
    did not identify the defendant but were directed toward A.
    5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence a
    photograph of the bandana, the bandana and the DNA evidence that
    was derived from it; the police officer who testified that the photograph
    was a fair and accurate representation of what she personally had
    observed in the Acura was a competent witness, as her testimony pro-
    vided a proper foundation for the admission of the photograph, and
    there was a sufficient chain of custody for the admission of the bandana
    and, by extension, the DNA evidence derived from the bandana.
    6. The defendant’s conviction of felony murder and manslaughter in the first
    degree violated the constitutional provision against double jeopardy, as
    the conviction of both charges arose from the single act of killing the
    victim; accordingly, the conviction of manslaughter in the first degree
    was vacated and the case was remanded to resentence the defendant.
    Argued September 7, 2017—officially released March 20, 2018
    Procedural History
    Substitute information charging the defendant with
    the crimes of felony murder, manslaughter in the first
    degree with a firearm, manslaughter in the first degree,
    attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, conspir-
    acy to commit robbery in the first degree, carrying a
    pistol without a permit and criminal possession of a
    pistol or revolver, brought to the Superior Court in the
    judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, where the court,
    Iannotti, J., granted the state’s motion to consolidate
    the case with the case of a codefendant; thereafter,
    the state filed a substitute information charging the
    defendant with the crimes of felony murder, manslaugh-
    robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit rob-
    bery in the first degree, carrying a pistol without a
    permit and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver;
    subsequently, the matter was tried to the jury before
    Markle, J.; thereafter, the court, Markle, J., denied the
    defendant’s motions to sever and for a mistrial; subse-
    quently, the court, Markle, J., granted the defendant’s
    motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the charge of
    carrying a pistol without a permit; verdict of guilty of
    felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a
    firearm, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree
    and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver; there-
    after, the court, Markle, J., denied the defendant’s
    motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial,
    and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict,
    from which the defendant appealed. Reversed in part;
    judgment directed; further proceedings.
    Damian K. Gunningsmith, with whom were John
    L. Cordani, Jr., and, on the brief, Moira L. Buckley,
    assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
    Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Kevin D. Lawlor, state’s attor-
    ney, and Cornelius P. Kelly, supervisory assistant
    state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    KAHN, J. The defendant, Eugene L. Walker, appeals
    from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a
    jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General Stat-
    utes § 53a-54c; manslaughter in the first degree with a
    firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55a (a);
    attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in viola-
    tion of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-134
    (a) (2); and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver
    in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217c (a) (1). The
    defendant claims that the trial court (1) violated his
    right to confrontation by permitting a laboratory analyst
    to testify regarding a known DNA sample processed by
    another analyst in the same laboratory; (2) violated his
    right to due process when it declined to either strike
    certain testimony or grant the defendant’s motion for
    a mistrial; (3) erred in admitting certain testimony under
    the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule; (4)
    erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that
    of his codefendant; (5) erred in admitting certain evi-
    dence at trial; and (6) violated double jeopardy by con-
    victing him of both manslaughter and felony murder.
    We affirm the judgment in part, and we reverse the
    judgment in part.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our resolution of this appeal. On the night of
    October 28, 2012, Anthony Adams, the codefendant in
    this consolidated trial, telephoned Alexis Morrison to
    ask if she knew ‘‘somebody that could sell him some
    weed.’’ Morrison called Neville Malacai Registe, the vic-
    tim, to arrange for him to meet with Adams in the
    parking lot of her West Haven residence. When the
    victim received Morrison’s telephone call, he was with
    his friend, Stephon Green, at his mother’s home in New
    Haven. After some time, the victim and Green left in
    the victim’s Acura. As they approached the designated
    parking lot, the victim called Morrison. Morrison then
    telephoned Adams to tell him that the victim ‘‘was
    there.’’ Adams replied that he had already left because
    the victim ‘‘took too long . . . and that Day-Day and
    GZ [were] going to get the weed.’’ ‘‘Day-Day’’ and ‘‘GZ’’
    were nicknames for Daquane Adams, who is Anthony
    Adams’ cousin, and the defendant, respectively, both
    of whom Morrison knew.
    When the victim and Green arrived in the parking
    lot, the victim backed his car into a parking space.
    Green, who was rolling a marijuana joint in the front
    passenger seat, looked up and noticed two men
    approaching the Acura. He returned his attention to his
    task, and the victim opened the driver’s door to talk to
    one of the men. The man, who was wearing a black
    bandana and who was later identified as the defendant,
    held a revolver inside the car and said, ‘‘run it,’’ meaning,
    ‘‘give me it. It’s a robbery . . . .’’ A physical altercation
    ensued. The second man, later identified as Daquane
    Adams, stepped away from the Acura and placed a cell
    phone call to someone. A Toyota arrived, and a third
    man exited that car and asked the defendant for the
    gun.1 The struggle over the gun continued inside the
    victim’s Acura, and someone knocked Green into the
    backseat. Daquane Adams and the third man pulled the
    defendant out of the car and, as Green was climbing
    back into the front passenger seat, a shot was fired.
    Green heard the victim say, ‘‘oh, shit,’’ and then heard
    a second shot.
    The defendant, Daquane Adams, and the third man
    got in the Toyota and drove toward the parking lot exit.
    With the victim slumped over in the driver’s seat, Green
    pursued the Toyota. He caught up to it at the end of
    the street and rammed the Acura into the back of the
    Toyota. The victim’s Acura was disabled, but the Toyota
    was able to be driven away. The victim died of a gunshot
    wound to his head.
    The defendant’s case was consolidated for trial with
    that of his codefendant, Anthony Adams.2 Following
    trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of felony mur-
    der, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm,
    attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and crimi-
    nal possession of a pistol or revolver. The jury found
    him not guilty of the charge of conspiracy to commit
    robbery. The court imposed a total effective sentence
    of forty-five years incarceration followed by ten years
    special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts
    will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant first claims that he was deprived of
    his right to confrontation under the federal constitution
    when the court permitted a forensic science examiner
    to testify about the results of a comparison she made
    between (1) a DNA profile she generated from crime
    scene evidence and (2) a DNA profile another analyst
    in the laboratory generated from the defendant’s buccal
    swab, without requiring the other analyst to testify.3
    We disagree.
    The following additional facts that the jury reason-
    ably could have found are relevant to this claim. The
    police recovered a black bandana from the Acura and
    sent the bandana and the victim’s bloodstain to the
    state’s Division of Scientific Services laboratory for
    analysis. The police also obtained and sent additional
    known samples to the laboratory, including buccal
    swabs from the defendant, his codefendant and
    Daquane Adams. Although Heather Degnan, a supervi-
    sory forensics examiner, visually inspected all of the
    samples, including the buccal swab obtained from the
    defendant, per standard laboratory procedure the
    known samples were processed by the laboratory’s
    ‘‘known processing group’’ (group). Degnan processed
    the bandana using the standard forensic DNA typing
    techniques used in the laboratory. She isolated DNA
    from two sites on the bandana and generated DNA
    profiles (evidentiary profiles) that contained a mixture
    of DNA from at least two contributors, one of which
    was deemed a major contributor and the other, a minor
    contributor. An analyst in the group generated DNA
    profiles from the known samples (known profiles) and
    sent them to Degnan. Degnan compared the evidentiary
    profiles she had extracted from the DNA on the bandana
    with the known profiles. Degnan’s analysis determined
    that the defendant was included as a major contributor
    to the DNA that was on the bandana.4 She also entered
    the evidentiary profile of the major contributor to the
    DNA found on the bandana into the Connecticut and
    national DNA databases5 and obtained a ‘‘hit’’ for the
    defendant because his DNA profile had been entered
    due to a prior felony conviction. Degnan prepared a
    report summarizing her findings.6
    At trial, Tammy Murray, the detective who took the
    buccal swab from the defendant, testified that she
    obtained a subpoena for nontestimonial evidence and
    testified about the established procedure she followed
    to take the sample from the defendant. The buccal swab
    itself was introduced into evidence along with the ban-
    dana. After Murray’s testimony, the state called Degnan
    to testify about her analysis and findings. She first testi-
    fied about the procedures she followed when analyzing
    the DNA found on the bandana. Degnan explained that
    she swabbed the bandana and generated an evidentiary
    profile from each side of the bandana, and that the
    group processed and generated the known profiles from
    the defendant’s buccal swab and the victim’s blood-
    stain. According to Degnan, this division of tasks took
    place according to ‘‘standard operating procedure.’’ The
    group then provided the known profiles to Degnan for
    comparison with the evidentiary profiles.
    Prior to the admission of Degnan’s findings, defense
    counsel objected to Degnan’s testimony and the admis-
    sion of her report on the grounds that Degnan was not
    competent to testify about the known profiles and that
    there was a lack of foundation for this evidence. Specifi-
    cally, the defendant’s counsel objected because Degnan
    had not been formally qualified as an expert. Counsel
    for Anthony Adams objected on the ground that Degnan
    did not process the known samples herself but, rather,
    obtained the results ‘‘second hand.’’7 The court, Markle,
    J., overruled the objections and allowed Degnan to tes-
    tify as to the results of her analysis.
    Degnan testified that, on the basis of her analysis and
    comparison, the defendant was a major contributor to
    the DNA found on both sides of the bandana. On cross-
    examination, Degnan elaborated that she had ‘‘exam-
    ined the known samples and then sent those samples
    to the known processing group for extraction and ampli-
    fication,’’ but had not been present for that stage of the
    process. She was, however, familiar with the group’s
    functions. She noted that the laboratory’s use of known
    control samples ensured that the machines used in the
    testing processes were working properly. She further
    explained that whenever a DNA profile is generated,
    including a known profile, it is analyzed independently
    by a second analyst, who also reviews the paperwork
    associated with that analysis to determine if the initial
    analyst generated the profile properly. Degnan’s analy-
    sis of both the evidentiary and known profiles was
    independently reviewed by Dahong Sun, another DNA
    analyst at the laboratory, who cosigned Degnan’s
    report. The court admitted Degnan’s report8 containing
    her findings but redacted it to eliminate references to
    the known samples of the other defendants, Anthony
    Adams and Daquane Adams.
    On appeal, the defendant claims that he was deprived
    of his right to confrontation under the sixth amendment
    to the federal constitution when the court permitted
    Degnan to testify about the results of her comparison
    of the DNA profiles, without requiring an analyst from
    the known processing group to testify. The state argues
    that the defendant’s confrontation claim was not pre-
    served because it was not raised at trial and was not
    subsumed within the defendant’s evidentiary objections
    regarding lack of competence and foundation.9 The
    state further claims that had the defendant properly
    presented his claim as one of confrontation that was
    based on testimonial hearsay, as opposed to a challenge
    to Degnan’s competence to render an opinion regarding
    the known profile, the state may have chosen to call
    the known processing group analyst, assuming he or
    she was available to testify.10 The state argues that rais-
    ing the confrontation issue for the first time on appeal
    amounts to an ambush on the state and the trial court.
    Nonetheless, as the state concedes, our Supreme Court
    has reviewed a confrontation claim under the bypass
    rule of State v. Golding, 
    213 Conn. 233
    , 
    567 A.2d 823
    (1989), even when there was a claim of waiver. State
    v. Smith, 
    289 Conn. 598
    , 619, 
    960 A.2d 993
    (2008); see
    also State v. Holley, 
    327 Conn. 576
    , 590, 
    175 A.3d 514
    (2018). We will, therefore, review this unpreserved
    claim pursuant to Golding, as modified by In re Yasiel
    R., 
    317 Conn. 773
    , 781, 
    120 A.3d 1188
    (2015).
    ‘‘[A] defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional
    error not preserved at trial only if all of the following
    conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review
    the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitu-
    tional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental
    right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . .
    exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;
    and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
    has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
    constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
    (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) State v. Gold-
    
    ing, supra
    , 
    213 Conn. 239
    –40. The defendant claims that
    the court violated his right to confrontation by allowing
    Degnan to testify about the results of the comparison
    she made, without anyone from the known processing
    group being called to testify. Because Degnan, the ana-
    lyst who conducted the critical analysis and made the
    resulting findings, testified and was subject to cross-
    examination, we conclude that there was no confronta-
    tion clause violation, and thus this claim fails under the
    third prong of Golding. See 
    id., 240. The
    sixth amendment to the United States constitu-
    tion provides in relevant part: ‘‘In all criminal prosecu-
    tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
    confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .’’ The
    sixth amendment right of confrontation extends to the
    states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
    amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 
    380 U.S. 400
    , 403, 85 S.
    Ct. 1065, 
    13 L. Ed. 2d 923
    (1965).
    ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 177
    (2004)], the [United States]
    Supreme Court substantially revised its approach to
    confrontation clause claims. Under Crawford, testimo-
    nial hearsay is admissible against a criminal defendant
    at trial only if the defendant had a prior opportunity
    [to cross-examine the witness who is otherwise]
    unavailable to testify at trial. 
    Id., 68. In
    adopting this
    categorical approach, the court overturned existing
    precedent that had applied an open-ended balancing
    [test] . . . conditioning the admissibility of out-of-
    court statements on a court’s determination of whether
    the proffered statements bore adequate indicia of relia-
    bility. . . . Although Crawford’s revision of the court’s
    confrontation clause jurisprudence is significant, its
    rules govern the admissibility only of certain classes
    of statements, namely, testimonial hearsay.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Buckland, 
    313 Conn. 205
    , 212–13, 
    96 A.3d 1163
    (2014),
    cert. denied,       U.S.    , 
    135 S. Ct. 992
    , 
    190 L. Ed. 2d
    837 (2015). Even where the subject statement is
    testimonial hearsay, ‘‘[t]he [confrontation] [c]lause
    does not bar admission of a statement so long as the
    declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.’’
    Crawford v. 
    Washington, supra
    , 60 n.9.
    In the context of laboratory tests, ‘‘the analysts who
    write reports that the prosecution introduces must be
    made available for confrontation . . . .’’ Bullcoming v.
    New Mexico, 
    564 U.S. 647
    , 661, 
    131 S. Ct. 2705
    , 180 L.
    Ed. 2d 610 (2011). Nevertheless, ‘‘it is not the case
    . . . that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
    establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the
    sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear
    in person as part of the prosecution’s case.’’ Melendez-
    Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 311 n.1, 
    129 S. Ct. 2527
    , 
    174 L. Ed. 2d 314
    (2009). Although ‘‘[i]t is the
    obligation of the prosecution to establish the chain of
    custody . . . this does not mean that everyone who
    laid hands on the evidence must be called. . . . [G]aps
    in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of
    the evidence rather than its admissibility.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. As the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
    recently noted, ‘‘the Supreme Court has never held that
    the [c]onfrontation [c]lause requires an opportunity to
    cross-examine each lab analyst involved in the process
    of generating a DNA profile and comparing it with
    another . . . .’’ Washington v. Griffin, 
    876 F.3d 395
    ,
    407 (2d Cir. 2017); see also State v. 
    Buckland, supra
    ,
    
    313 Conn. 214
    (‘‘neither Melendez-Diaz nor Bullcoming
    require every witness in the chain of custody to testify’’).
    Generally, the ‘‘rules of evidence . . . permit experts
    to express opinions based on facts about which they
    lack personal knowledge . . . .’’ Williams v. Illinois,
    
    567 U.S. 50
    , 69, 
    132 S. Ct. 2221
    , 
    183 L. Ed. 2d 89
    (2012).11
    In the present case, Degnan, the analyst who con-
    ducted the critical analysis and made the findings that
    connected the defendant’s DNA to the DNA found on
    the bandana, testified and was subject to cross-exami-
    nation. Degnan explained the procedures she followed
    in processing the DNA found on the bandana and com-
    paring it to the known profiles. It was Degnan, and not
    the analyst from the group, who conducted the forensic
    analysis of the known profiles and the evidentiary pro-
    file and determined that the defendant’s DNA profile
    matched the DNA found on the bandana. See People v.
    Corey, 
    52 Misc. 3d 987
    , 992, 
    36 N.Y.S.3d 354
    (2016)
    (‘‘Nothing . . . supports the conclusion that the ana-
    lysts involved in the preliminary testing stages, specifi-
    cally, the extraction, quantification or amplification
    stages, are necessary witnesses . . . . Rather, it is the
    generated numerical identifiers and the calling of the
    alleles at the final stage of DNA typing that effectively
    accuses defendant of his role in the crime charged
    . . . .’’ [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.]). Although Degnan did not run the machines
    that extracted the DNA profiles from the known sam-
    ples, she was fully aware of, and testified to, the stan-
    dard operating procedures of the laboratory, including
    the manner in which the known samples are processed
    and verified. The defendant’s known profile was not
    inherently inculpatory. It was the forensic analysis con-
    ducted by Degnan that made it so. Degnan was exten-
    sively cross-examined about her analysis and findings.
    She was specifically questioned about the processing
    of the known samples and her lack of participation in
    the generation of the known profiles. She was the pri-
    mary analyst who made the findings and prepared the
    report, and was available to defend and explain her
    conclusion that the two DNA profiles matched.
    Nevertheless, in support of his contention that his
    right to confrontation was violated, the defendant cites
    Melendez-Diaz v. 
    Massachusetts, supra
    , 
    557 U.S. 305
    .
    This case, however, can be readily distinguished. In
    Melendez-Diaz, the Supreme Court addressed the issue
    of whether a petitioner’s right of confrontation was
    violated when the trial court admitted certificates of
    analysis reporting the results of a laboratory test, with-
    out the analysts who had prepared and signed the certif-
    icates appearing to testify. 
    Id., 308–309. The
    court held
    that the notarized certificates were ‘‘a solemn declara-
    tion or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
    or proving some fact’’; (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted) 
    id., 310; and
    thus, ‘‘[a]bsent a showing that the
    analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that
    the petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
    them,’’ the petitioner’s right to confrontation had been
    violated. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id., 311. In
    the present case, unlike in Melendez-Diaz, the analyst
    who conducted the analysis to establish ‘‘some fact’’
    and who prepared and signed the report, testified at
    trial and was therefore available for cross-examination.
    See Washington v. 
    Griffin, supra
    , 
    876 F.3d 401
    , 405
    (similarly distinguishing Melendez-Diaz in case where
    analyst who testified had conducted DNA extraction of
    evidentiary samples but not DNA extraction of defen-
    dant’s buccal swab, which she utilized in her analysis
    and conclusions).
    Even if we assume, arguendo, that the processing of
    the defendant’s known profile was considered a critical
    stage of the analysis or chain of custody, the admission
    of Degnan’s testimony referencing it did not implicate
    the confrontation clause because Degnan was available
    and testified extensively on cross-examination. This is
    particularly important where, as here, the laboratory
    testing functions are allocated among multiple employ-
    ees. Although not determinative of the outcome of this
    case, Williams v. 
    Illinois, supra
    , 
    567 U.S. 50
    , informs
    our opinion. See State v. Lebrick, 
    179 Conn. App. 221
    ,
    244,      A.3d      (‘‘[g]iven that no readily applicable
    rationale for the court’s holding in Williams obtained
    the approval of a majority of the justices, its preceden-
    tial value seems, at best, to be confined to the distinct
    factual scenario at issue in that case’’), cert. granted
    on other grounds, 
    328 Conn. 912
    ,         A.3d      (2018).
    ‘‘When lab technicians are asked to work on the produc-
    tion of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the
    consequences of their work will be. In some cases, a
    DNA profile may provide powerful incriminating evi-
    dence against a person who is identified either before
    or after the profile is completed. But in others, the
    primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect
    who has been charged or is under investigation. The
    technicians who prepare a DNA profile generally have
    no way of knowing whether it will turn out to be incrimi-
    nating or exonerating—or both.’’ Williams v. 
    Illinois, supra
    , 85. Here, only one of the three known profiles
    matched the crime scene evidence; the known profiles
    of Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams were elimi-
    nated. ‘‘When the work of a lab is divided up in such
    a way, it is likely that the sole purpose of each technician
    is simply to perform his or her task in accordance with
    accepted procedures.’’ 
    Id. Courts have
    consistently held that experts may rely
    on other experts’ findings in reaching their own inde-
    pendent conclusions. See State v. Hutchison, 
    482 S.W.3d 893
    , 914 (Tenn. 2016) (applying Williams to
    admission of autopsy report prepared by nontestifying
    medical examiner); see also Washington v. 
    Griffin, supra
    , 
    876 F.3d 395
    (testifying analyst who conducted
    comparisons of DNA profiles may rely on extractions
    conducted by other analysts without violating confron-
    tation clause). ‘‘When an expert testifies for the prose-
    cution in a criminal case, the defendant has the
    opportunity to cross-examine the expert about any
    statements that are offered for their truth. Out-of-court
    statements that are related by the expert solely for the
    purpose of explaining the assumptions on which that
    opinion rests are not offered for their truth and thus
    fall outside the scope of the [c]onfrontation [c]lause.’’
    Williams v. 
    Illinois, supra
    , 
    567 U.S. 58
    . That is precisely
    what occurred in this case when Degnan relied on her
    personal knowledge of the procedures performed by the
    analysts in the group in comparing the known profiles
    to the evidentiary profile and reaching her own conclu-
    sions. As she noted, all DNA profiles generated by each
    analyst are independently reviewed by a second analyst.
    ‘‘[T]he knowledge that defects in a DNA profile may
    often be detected from the profile itself provides a fur-
    ther safeguard.’’ 
    Id., 85. We
    conclude, therefore, that
    the defendant’s right to confrontation was not violated
    because Degnan, the primary analyst who performed
    and supervised the generation and analysis of the DNA
    profiles and resulting findings, testified and was avail-
    able for cross-examination. Accordingly, the defen-
    dant’s claim fails under the third prong of Golding.
    II
    The defendant next claims that the court erred by
    declining either to strike Morrison’s in-court identifica-
    tion of the defendant or to grant the defendant’s motion
    for a mistrial. The defendant primarily argues that Mor-
    rison’s identification of him was based on an unneces-
    sarily suggestive procedure and, thus, by declining to
    strike Morrison’s testimony or to declare a mistrial,
    the court violated his due process right to a fair trial
    pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
    United States constitution, and article first, § 8, of the
    Connecticut constitution.12 Additionally, the defendant
    argues that the court erred by declining to strike Mor-
    rison’s testimony or order a mistrial as a sanction pursu-
    ant to Practice Book § 40-5, for the state’s failure to
    disclose that Morrison had previously identified the
    defendant in a photograph. We disagree.
    We employ a plenary standard of review when analyz-
    ing whether a defendant was deprived of his right to
    due process. State v. Dickson, 
    322 Conn. 410
    , 423, 
    141 A.3d 810
    (2016), cert. denied,      U.S.      , 
    137 S. Ct. 2263
    , 
    198 L. Ed. 2d 713
    (2017). We review the court’s
    decision to refuse to impose sanctions for abuse of
    discretion. State v. Respass, 
    256 Conn. 164
    , 184, 
    770 A.2d 471
    , cert. denied, 
    534 U.S. 1002
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 478
    , 
    151 L. Ed. 2d 392
    (2001).
    The following additional facts are relevant. Morrison
    testified that Anthony Adams informed her that the
    victim was taking too long to arrive at the parking lot,
    so he was leaving and ‘‘Day-Day and GZ’’ would instead
    purchase the marijuana. Morrison knew that Day-Day
    was Daquane Adams, although she did not know his
    last name, and that GZ was Daquane Adams’ friend,
    whom she knew only by his nickname. She testified
    that, at the time of the incident, she had known Daquane
    Adams for a year or two, and had known the defendant
    for ‘‘a couple of years’’ and saw him ‘‘once in a blue
    moon.’’ The prosecutor asked her to identify GZ in the
    courtroom, and Morrison identified the defendant.
    Following a discussion outside the presence of the
    jury, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial and
    a motion for severance on the grounds that Morrison’s
    in-court identification of the defendant was inherently
    suggestive due to the courtroom setting and that it was
    a surprise, in that the state had never disclosed that
    Morrison would identify the defendant. The court
    denied the motions, reasoning that Morrison’s in-court
    identification of the defendant was based on prior
    knowledge and not based on any suggestive identifica-
    tion procedure. With respect to Morrison’s ability to
    identify the defendant, the prosecutor elaborated that
    ‘‘[l]ast week when [Morrison] was in my office . . . I
    had photos on my desk of all the defendants . . . .
    [W]e were talking about [the defendant], and there was
    a photo on the side of . . . where she was sitting, of
    [the defendant], she goes, ‘yeah, that’s GZ.’ ’’ Defense
    counsel then asked that Morrison’s in-court identifica-
    tion be stricken on the ground of late disclosure by the
    state of Morrison’s ability to identify the defendant in
    court. The court declined to strike Morrison’s tes-
    timony.
    A
    On appeal, the defendant argues that Morrison’s in-
    court identification of him was tainted by an unneces-
    sarily suggestive identification procedure in the prose-
    cutor’s office prior to trial. He argues that the procedure
    was unnecessarily suggestive because the photographs
    on the prosecutor’s desk were of the defendants, and
    that because Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams were
    well known to Morrison, ‘‘it would have been easy for
    her to determine that the photograph of the person she
    did not know was GZ. The nature and extent of [her]
    prior knowledge of GZ was questionable.’’13 We are
    not persuaded.
    In the context of eyewitness identifications, when a
    defendant claims ‘‘that an in-court identification fol-
    lowed an unduly suggestive pretrial identification pro-
    cedure that was conducted by a state actor . . . both
    the initial identification and the in-court identification
    may be excluded if the improper procedure created a
    substantial likelihood of misidentification. . . . In
    determining whether identification procedures violate
    a defendant’s due process rights, the required inquiry
    is made on an ad hoc basis and is two-pronged: first,
    it must be determined whether the identification proce-
    dure was unnecessarily suggestive; and second, if it is
    found to have been so, it must be determined whether
    the identification was nevertheless reliable based on
    examination of the totality of the circumstances. . . .
    If the trial court determines that there was no unduly
    suggestive identification procedure, that is the end of
    the analysis, and the identification evidence is admissi-
    ble.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. 
    Dickson, supra
    , 
    322 Conn. 420
    –21.
    On the basis of our plenary review, we conclude that
    the defendant cannot prevail on his claim that Morrison
    identified the defendant in the prosecutor’s office as
    a result of an unnecessarily suggestive identification
    procedure. Morrison was not an eyewitness to the
    crime; instead, she identified the defendant from a pho-
    tograph in the prosecutor’s office, and then in court,
    as the person she knew as GZ. Although the only photo-
    graphs in the prosecutor’s office were those of the
    defendants, and although Morrison only saw the defen-
    dant ‘‘once in a blue moon,’’ Morrison testified that at
    the time of the incident, she had known the defendant
    for, ‘‘[l]ike, a couple of years.’’ The prosecutor did not
    ask Morrison to identify the individual in the defen-
    dant’s photograph. Instead, she saw the photograph
    during her discussion with the prosecutor about the
    defendant, and told the prosecutor that it was a photo-
    graph of GZ. Morrison’s identification of the defendant
    occurred spontaneously as a result of her familiarity
    with GZ, and not as the result of an arranged procedure
    by law enforcement. See State v. Jones, 
    59 Conn. App. 762
    , 766, 
    757 A.2d 689
    (2000) (‘‘[i]f an identification of
    a defendant is done spontaneously and is not arranged
    by the police, the identification is not tainted by state
    action and due process rights are not violated’’), cert.
    denied, 
    255 Conn. 924
    , 
    767 A.2d 99
    (2001). Because
    the pretrial identification occurrence was not unduly
    suggestive, Morrison’s in-court identification of the
    defendant did not violate the defendant’s due process
    rights, and the court did not err in allowing that identifi-
    cation to stand.
    B
    The defendant also argues that the court erred in
    declining to strike Morrison’s identification testimony
    or to declare a mistrial because of the prosecutor’s
    violation of Practice Book § 40-13A,14 by failing to dis-
    close Morrison’s identification of the defendant’s photo-
    graph prior to trial. We are not persuaded.
    Citing Practice Book § 40-5,15 the defendant argues
    that if a party fails to comply with the rules of discovery,
    the court may preclude the evidence at issue. Section
    40-5 ‘‘gives broad discretion to the trial judge to fashion
    an appropriate remedy for non-compliance with discov-
    ery. . . . Generally, [t]he primary purpose of a sanc-
    tion for violation of a discovery order is to ensure that
    the defendant’s rights are protected, not to exact pun-
    ishment on the state for its allegedly improper conduct.
    As we have indicated, the formulation of an appropriate
    sanction is a matter within the sound discretion of the
    trial court. . . . In determining what sanction is appro-
    priate for failure to comply with court ordered discov-
    ery, the trial court should consider the reason why
    disclosure was not made, the extent of prejudice, if
    any, to the opposing party, the feasibility of rectifying
    that prejudice by a continuance, and any other relevant
    circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    State v. Hamlett, 
    105 Conn. App. 862
    , 873, 
    939 A.2d 1256
    , cert. denied, 
    287 Conn. 901
    , 
    947 A.2d 343
    (2008).
    In the present case, the defendant has not demonstrated
    that the court abused its discretion by declining to strike
    Morrison’s testimony or to declare a mistrial as a rem-
    edy for noncompliance with the discovery rules. First,
    the defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor
    violated Practice Book § 40-13A. As the state notes in
    its brief, the record does not indicate that the defendant
    made the written request required by § 40-13A. Addi-
    tionally, Morrison’s comment to the prosecutor, made
    prior to trial, identifying the defendant, was not a dis-
    coverable ‘‘statement’’ pursuant to § 40-13A. The term
    ‘‘statement,’’ as used in that section, is defined as ‘‘(1)
    A written statement made by a person and signed or
    otherwise adopted or approved by such person; or (2)
    A stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
    recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substan-
    tially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
    a person and recorded contemporaneously with the
    making of such oral statement.’’ Practice Book § 40-15.
    Morrison’s comment to the prosecutor was oral, and
    the record does not contain any evidence that it had
    been recorded.
    Moreover, even if we assume that the prosecutor
    improperly withheld Morrison’s statement from defense
    counsel, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in
    declining to impose sanctions under these circum-
    stances. At trial, the prosecutor explained that he had
    not disclosed the identification because ‘‘it wasn’t a
    situation where [Morrison] was identifying [the defen-
    dant] other than a situation that she had known [him]
    for a period of time. It wasn’t implicating him in the
    crime or anything along those lines. It was more of a
    situation of, yeah, I know who he is because I’ve been
    with him and I’ve been in his company for a number
    of years.’’ Further, although ‘‘the remedy of a mistrial
    is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored.
    [A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some
    occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is
    apparent to the court that because of it a party cannot
    have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings are
    vitiated. . . . In [its] review of the denial of a motion
    for mistrial, [our Supreme Court has] recognized the
    broad discretion that is vested in the trial court to decide
    whether an occurrence at trial has so prejudiced a party
    that he or she can no longer receive a fair trial.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. 
    Hamlett, supra
    , 
    105 Conn. App. 872
    . Because the jury
    reasonably could have found that Morrison knew the
    defendant prior to the incident that resulted in the vic-
    tim’s murder, the defendant did not show that he was
    prejudiced by Morrison’s identification of him. Under
    these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discre-
    tion by declining to strike Morrison’s identification testi-
    mony or to declare a mistrial as sanctions against the
    state.
    III
    The defendant next claims that the court erred in
    admitting certain hearsay testimony under the cocon-
    spirator exception to the hearsay rule.16 Specifically,
    the defendant argues that the court improperly con-
    cluded that a conspiracy existed when determining
    whether to admit the testimony of Morrison, Daniels,
    Green, and Jamila Bello, an acquaintance of Anthony
    Adams, under the coconspirator exception to the hear-
    say rule. We disagree.17
    ‘‘Statements made by coconspirators are recognized
    in Connecticut as an exception to the general prohibi-
    tion against hearsay. See State v. Vessichio, 
    197 Conn. 644
    , 653–60, 
    500 A.2d 1311
    (1985), cert. denied, 
    475 U.S. 1122
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 1642
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 2d 187
    (1986). However,
    [b]efore such statements may be admitted, the trial
    judge must make a preliminary determination that there
    is sufficient independent evidence to establish the fol-
    lowing: (1) that a conspiracy existed . . . (2) that the
    conspiracy was still in existence at the time the state-
    ment was made . . . (3) that the declarations were
    made in furtherance of the conspiracy . . . and (4) that
    both the declarant and the defendant participated in the
    conspiracy . . . . The court must make its preliminary
    determination by a fair preponderance of the evidence
    independent of the hearsay utterances . . . a standard
    which is lower than the standard of evidence required
    to submit a charge of conspiracy to the jury. . . . Once
    the threshold requirement for admissibility is satisfied
    by a showing of a likelihood of an illicit association
    between the declarant and the defendant . . . the con-
    spirators’ statements are admissible and they might tip
    the scale in favor of the defendant’s guilt . . . .’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Haggood, 
    36 Conn. App. 753
    , 766–68, 
    653 A.2d 216
    , cert. denied, 
    233 Conn. 904
    , 
    657 A.2d 644
    (1995).
    The following facts and procedural history are neces-
    sary for the resolution of the defendant’s claim. Mor-
    rison testified that Anthony Adams asked her to arrange
    a marijuana purchase and that he later informed her that
    Daquane Adams and the defendant would be making
    the purchase. The defendant did not object to this testi-
    mony. The defendant only later argued that the state
    had failed to satisfy the foundational requirements of
    State v. 
    Vessichio, supra
    , 
    197 Conn. 653
    –60, for the
    admission of Morrison’s statements under the cocon-
    spirator exception to the hearsay rule. According to the
    defendant, Morrison’s statements could not be used as
    evidence of a conspiracy for purposes of establishing
    a foundation for Daniels’ testimony because Morrison’s
    statements were also inadmissible.
    During the state’s offer of proof outside the presence
    of the jury, Daniels testified that when Daquane Adams
    came to see her at work at approximately midnight on
    October 29, 2012, he informed her that her car had been
    stolen and that she should report her car as having been
    stolen, implying that he had been robbed. The defendant
    objected on the ground that there was insufficient inde-
    pendent evidence to establish the existence of a con-
    spiracy. The defendant argued that the only potential
    evidence of a conspiracy was Morrison’s testimony
    regarding what Anthony Adams had told her about the
    marijuana purchase, which, likewise, was improperly
    admitted under the coconspirator exception. The court
    sustained the objection to Daniels’ testimony, reasoning
    that the state had not met its burden, at that time,
    of demonstrating that her statements were admissible
    under the coconspirator exception. Later in the trial,
    the state recalled Daniels to testify. The defendant again
    raised a Vessichio issue with respect to Daquane
    Adams’ statements to Daniels. The court ruled that it
    would allow the statements into evidence but the state
    would ‘‘have to tie it in at some point and . . . it’s
    subject to the tie-in.’’ Daniels then testified in front of
    the jury that Daquane Adams had told her that he had
    been robbed and to report her car as stolen.
    The defendant also objected to two portions of
    Green’s testimony on the ground that a conspiracy had
    not been established pursuant to Vessichio. First, the
    defendant objected to Green’s testimony that, while the
    victim and the individual with the bandana struggled
    over the gun, a third individual approached and said,
    ‘‘just give us the gun . . . .’’ The court overruled the
    objection, finding that the statement was admissible
    both under the coconspirator exception and to show the
    effect of the statement on Green. Second, the defendant
    objected to Green’s testimony that the individual with
    the bandana said, ‘‘run it,’’ which Green understood to
    mean that this was a robbery. The court also overruled
    the second objection.
    Later, Bello testified that after midnight on October
    29, 2012, Anthony Adams telephoned her and asked
    her for a favor. The defendant objected on Vessichio
    grounds. The court overruled the objection, subject to
    the state ‘‘linking it in . . . .’’ Bello proceeded to testify
    that Anthony Adams had telephoned her and asked her
    to ‘‘pick [Daquane Adams] up and bring him to the
    hospital’’ because he ‘‘had to pick keys up from the
    hospital.’’ She stated that when she arrived to pick up
    Daquane Adams, the defendant was also present, and
    he sat in the backseat while she drove Daquane Adams
    to the hospital. En route to the hospital, she heard the
    defendant exclaim, ‘‘[o]h, shit. Fuck.’’ The defendant
    objected to this testimony, and the court overruled the
    objection. Bello testified that later that night, Anthony
    Adams telephoned her to thank her and said that ‘‘some
    wild shit happened,’’ but that ‘‘we didn’t go into details
    about what the wild shit [that] had happened was.’’ After
    the state rested, the defendant renewed his objection
    to the hearsay statements by Morrison and Daniels
    regarding what Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams
    had said to them, respectively, and argued that the state
    had not proven the existence of a conspiracy suffi-
    ciently for the court to admit the coconspirator hearsay
    statements under the exception. The court stated that
    it had reserved judgment on Morrison’s statements and
    that it had let other statements in under the coconspira-
    tor exception. The court then ruled that the statements
    were admissible under the coconspirator exception.
    The defendant primarily challenges the sufficiency
    of the state’s evidence admitted to establish by a fair
    preponderance that a conspiracy to commit robbery
    existed. The defendant further contends that even
    assuming a conspiracy existed, there was no evidence
    that the defendant was a participant in that conspiracy.
    We conclude that the court did not err in its preliminary
    determination that a conspiracy existed.
    ‘‘The standard of proof of a fact by a fair preponder-
    ance has been met when all the evidence considered
    fairly and impartially evinces a reasonable belief that
    it is more probable than not that the fact is true. . . .
    In reviewing a claim that the state failed to meet the
    threshold of proof regarding the existence of a conspir-
    acy with the defendant as a participant to permit evi-
    dence of out-of-court statements by coconspirators, we
    must construe the evidence in a way most favorable to
    sustaining the preliminary determinations of the trial
    court; its conclusions will not be disturbed on appeal
    unless found to be clearly erroneous.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hag-
    
    good, supra
    , 
    36 Conn. App. 767
    –68; see also State v.
    Peeler, 
    267 Conn. 611
    , 628, 
    841 A.2d 181
    (2004).
    The defendant argues that the court erred in condi-
    tionally admitting into evidence hearsay testimony from
    Morrison and Daniels under the coconspirator excep-
    tion, subject to the state satisfying the foundational
    requirements of Vessichio at a later point in the trial.
    He contends that the court was required to make a
    determination regarding the admissibility of the testi-
    mony under the coconspirator exception based only on
    the evidence elicited at trial prior, and not subsequent,
    to the admission of the testimony. We disagree, as Ves-
    sichio contains no such requirement. The court’s condi-
    tional admission of the hearsay testimony subject to
    the state’s later admission of the sufficient foundational
    evidence is permitted under § 1-3 (b) of the Connecticut
    Code of Evidence, which provides: ‘‘When the admissi-
    bility of evidence depends upon connecting facts, the
    court may admit the evidence upon proof of the con-
    necting facts or subject to later proof of the connecting
    facts.’’ In such an instance, ‘‘there can be no prejudice
    where . . . the necessary foundation is finally estab-
    lished.’’ State v. Anonymous (83-FG), 
    190 Conn. 715
    ,
    725, 
    463 A.2d 533
    (1983).
    In the present case, the state later introduced the
    necessary connecting facts. During their investigation,
    the police found a black bandana containing the defen-
    dant’s DNA in the victim’s Acura. The center console
    of the Acura contained a bullet hole, and the interior
    frame on the driver’s side door had a ricochet mark
    from a bullet. The police discovered Daniels’ Toyota,
    which had been used in the robbery and which Daquane
    Adams had used to drive Daniels to work earlier that
    night, abandoned on a street near the West Haven park-
    ing lot in which the incident had occurred.
    Bello testified that she picked up the defendant and
    Daquane Adams on the night of October 28, 2012, at a
    nearby location in West Haven. On November 1, 2012,
    the defendant met with his probation officer, and when
    his probation officer asked him to remove his sun-
    glasses, he noticed that the defendant’s eyes were ‘‘a
    deep red.’’ Cell phone records showed calls between
    Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams during the time
    of the incident that utilized cell phone towers in West
    Haven. The cell phone records also showed calls that
    evening, at the times in question, between Anthony
    Adams and Morrison, between Anthony Adams and
    Daquane Adams, and between Anthony Adams and
    Bello.
    The defendant also argues that the court erred in
    relying on coconspirator hearsay testimony in reaching
    its determination that the hearsay testimony that it had
    conditionally admitted into evidence was supported by
    the necessary foundational evidence of a conspiracy.
    He contends that the court improperly failed to rely
    exclusively on independent evidence. We disagree.
    There is no indication from the record that the court
    improperly considered the hearsay statements in its
    analysis. The court mentioned coconspirator hearsay
    statements in addition to independent evidence when
    discussing whether the state had established the exis-
    tence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evi-
    dence. Defense counsel, however, asked the court to
    clarify its basis, arguing that it could not ‘‘take [into
    account] the coconspirator hearsay declaration state-
    ments themselves.’’ The court responded by specifying
    that it had relied on ‘‘the other independent evidence
    that was established.’’ Defense counsel asked the court
    to clarify whether this independent evidence included
    Morrison’s and Daniels’ hearsay statements, and the
    court confirmed that it did not. It is clear from this
    colloquy that the court based its ruling only on indepen-
    dent evidence.
    Because Vessichio does not require the court to deter-
    mine the admissibility of the testimony under the cocon-
    spirator exception based only on the evidence elicited
    at trial prior, and not subsequent, to the admission
    of the statement, and because the court considered
    independent evidence that could establish by a prepon-
    derance of the evidence that a conspiracy to rob the
    victim existed and that the defendant was a participant
    in that conspiracy, the court’s admission of the chal-
    lenged statements was not improper.18
    IV
    The defendant next claims that the court erred in
    denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his
    codefendant, Anthony Adams. We disagree.
    The following procedural history is relevant to this
    claim. Prior to the start of trial, the court, Iannotti, J.,
    granted the state’s motion to consolidate the trials of
    the defendant and Anthony Adams. At a hearing on
    the motion, defense counsel stated that he was not
    objecting to consolidation. Prior to jury selection, the
    court, Markle, J., questioned counsel regarding whether
    the joinder of the trials presented any issues under
    Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1620
    ,
    
    20 L. Ed. 2d 476
    (1968).19 The court expressed concern
    that Anthony Adams’ testimony could place the defen-
    dant at the scene of the crime. Anthony Adams’ counsel
    stated that defense counsel ‘‘freely admits that his client
    was in the vicinity around the time of the shooting and
    is . . . claiming mere presence.’’ Both counsel for the
    defendant and Anthony Adams stated that there were
    no Bruton issues, and that they did not object to the
    state’s motion to consolidate.20 The cases remained con-
    solidated.
    During Morrison’s direct examination, and after she
    testified that she knew the defendant by his nickname,
    defense counsel moved for severance. Defense counsel
    argued that Morrison testified that Anthony Adams
    stated that ‘‘Day-Day and GZ’’ would purchase the mari-
    juana, identifying ‘‘Day-Day’’ as Daquane Adams, and,
    to counsel’s surprise, ‘‘GZ’’ as the defendant. Defense
    counsel contended that he did not know that Morrison
    would identify the defendant as GZ, that her identifica-
    tion of GZ was a result of a suggestive pretrial proce-
    dure; see part II of this opinion; and that her testimony
    as to Daquane Adams arguably placed the defendant
    at the scene of the crime. The court denied the motion
    for severance.
    Later, Danielle Zakar, an acquaintance of Anthony
    Adams, testified that on December 27, 2012, while
    Anthony Adams and another man were at her New York
    residence, the police arrived, causing the two men to
    flee. On direct examination, Zakar denied hearing
    Anthony Adams say why he was in New York. Joseph
    Thomas, a detective with the Fugitive Task Force Mar-
    shal Service, then testified, under State v. Whelan, 
    200 Conn. 743
    , 
    513 A.2d 86
    , cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 994
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 597
    , 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 598
    (1986),21 that he took Zakar’s
    statement, in which she indicated that she had over-
    heard Anthony Adams state that he had killed a man
    in Connecticut and was now on the run from the Con-
    necticut police.
    On appeal, the defendant argues that severance was
    necessary because evidence was admitted at the joint
    trial that would not have been admissible against him
    at a separate trial. The evidence the defendant identifies
    as being inadmissible against him in a separate trial is
    as follows: hearsay statements Anthony Adams made
    to Morrison and Bello, which the defendant argues were
    inadmissible under the coconspirator exception to the
    hearsay rule; see part III of this opinion; and Zakar’s
    statement to the police that she had heard Anthony
    Adams say that he was on the run because he had
    killed someone in Connecticut. Although the defendant
    argues that this issue is reviewable, he did not move
    for severance on the basis of this evidence and, as
    such, his claim is unpreserved. In the alternative, the
    defendant seeks review under the bypass rule of State
    v. Gold
    ing, supra
    , 
    213 Conn. 239
    –40, but he has not
    demonstrated that a constitutional violation exists and,
    therefore, has not satisfied the third prong of Golding.
    The court clearly raised potential joint trial issues,
    specifying what types of evidence would create a Bru-
    ton issue.22 Defense counsel reassured the court that
    such problems would not arise. As we concluded in
    part III of this opinion, Anthony Adams’ statements to
    Morrison and Bello were admissible against the defen-
    dant under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay
    rule. Thus, the introduction of those statements did not
    create a Bruton issue. See State v. Robertson, 
    254 Conn. 739
    , 765, 
    760 A.2d 82
    (2000). As to Zakar’s Whelan state-
    ment, a Bruton issue ‘‘does not occur if the codefen-
    dant’s confession is redacted to omit any reference to
    the defendant, and a proper limiting instruction is given
    by the trial court.’’ State v. Edwards, 
    39 Conn. App. 242
    , 245, 
    665 A.2d 611
    , cert. denied, 
    235 Conn. 924
    , 925,
    
    666 A.2d 1186
    (1995). Zakar’s Whelan statement did
    not identify the defendant, and the court gave curative
    instructions, reminding the jury that Thomas’ testimony
    concerning his interview of Zakar was ‘‘directed toward
    the [codefendant] Anthony Adams.’’ ‘‘Accordingly, the
    defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice by the
    admission of the codefendant’s statement so as to
    require a separate trial.’’ State v. 
    Edwards, supra
    , 246.
    Because the defendant has not demonstrated that a
    constitutional violation exists, he cannot prevail under
    the third prong of Golding.23
    V
    The defendant next claims that the court erred in
    admitting into evidence (1) a photograph depicting a
    black bandana on the floor of the front passenger side
    of the Acura, and (2) a black bandana and the DNA
    evidence derived therefrom. We disagree.
    The following additional procedural history is rele-
    vant. Murray testified that as part of the investigation,
    the police seized both the Acura and the Toyota, and
    that a black bandana was seized from the front passen-
    ger seat floor of the Acura. The prosecutor showed
    Murray a photograph and asked if it was an accurate
    representation of what the bandana looked like and
    where it was located before it was seized. Murray
    responded affirmatively. The prosecutor then sought to
    offer the photograph as an exhibit, and defense counsel
    objected. During voir dire, Murray stated that she did
    not remember who took the photograph or whether it
    was taken at the scene or at the West Haven Police
    Department. The court admitted the photograph as a
    full exhibit on the basis of Murray’s testimony that it
    was a fair and accurate representation of what she
    observed at the West Haven Police Department.
    Murray further testified on direct examination that
    she recognized the black bandana as being the one
    recovered from the Acura, that the bandana was taken
    into police custody, and that it remained in the posses-
    sion of the West Haven Police Department prior to
    being sent to a laboratory for analysis. When the state
    sought to admit the bandana into evidence, defense
    counsel objected on the ground that Murray did not
    know the bandana’s location prior to seeing it at the
    West Haven Police Department after the Acura had
    been towed to that location and, therefore, a chain of
    custody had not been established. The court overruled
    the objection, and the bandana was admitted as a
    full exhibit.
    The defendant argues that the state failed to lay a
    proper foundation for the admission of the photograph,
    the bandana, and the DNA evidence. With respect to
    the photograph of the bandana, the defendant contends
    that the state failed to establish its authenticity because
    Murray could not identify who took it or where it had
    been taken. Regarding the bandana itself and the DNA
    evidence derived from the bandana, the defendant
    argues that the state failed to establish a sufficient chain
    of custody because the state ‘‘could not demonstrate
    that the bandana was originally in the Acura at the
    scene, and had not been moved or tampered with in
    any respect before it was seized at the police depart-
    ment.’’ In making this argument, the defendant contends
    that Green had not seen the shooter without the ban-
    dana, the first officer to arrive at the scene did not see
    the bandana in the Acura after conducting a plain view
    search of the vehicle, and an inventory listed the black
    bandana as having been seized from the Toyota rather
    than from the Acura. The defendant argues that the
    only evidence linking the bandana to the Acura was
    Murray’s testimony, which related to the bandana’s
    location at the police department, not at the scene.
    We first address the defendant’s claim with respect
    to the photograph and conclude that the court did not
    abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph into
    evidence. ‘‘Under [the foundational] standard [for pho-
    tographs], all that is required is that a photograph be
    introduced through a witness competent to verify it as
    a fair and accurate representation of what it depicts.’’
    State v. Swinton, 
    268 Conn. 781
    , 802, 
    847 A.2d 921
    (2004). ‘‘[T]he testimony of the photographer is not
    essential for the authentication of a photograph, as long
    as other evidence is produced that satisfies the court.’’
    Gioielli v. Mallard Cove Condominium Assn., Inc., 
    37 Conn. App. 822
    , 834, 
    658 A.2d 134
    (1995). ‘‘Verification
    of a photograph is a preliminary question of fact to be
    determined by the trial court. . . . Whether a photo-
    graph shows a situation with sufficient accuracy to
    render it admissible, is a preliminary question for the
    court . . . . [T]he trial court has wide discretion in
    admitting photographic evidence and its determination
    will stand unless there has been a clear abuse of that
    discretion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Walker, 
    215 Conn. 1
    , 6, 
    574 A.2d 188
    (1990). Although the photographer did not
    testify, Murray’s testimony that the photograph was a
    fair and accurate representation of what the bandana
    looked like before it was seized satisfied the court as
    to the photograph’s authenticity. See State v. 
    Swinton, supra
    , 802; Gioielli v. Mallard Cove Condominium
    Assn., 
    Inc., supra
    , 834. Regardless of whether Murray
    remembered who took the photograph or knew whether
    the photograph was taken at the scene or at the police
    department, the court did not clearly abuse its discre-
    tion in finding that Murray was a competent witness to
    testify that the photograph was a fair and accurate
    representation of what she personally observed in the
    car. See State v. 
    Walker, supra
    , 6. Thus, Murray’s testi-
    mony provided a proper foundation for the admission
    of the photograph.
    We next address the defendant’s argument regarding
    the admissibility of the bandana, and the DNA evidence
    derived therefrom. ‘‘Appellate courts grant great defer-
    ence to a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of
    evidence . . . and will not disturb such rulings absent
    a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion. . . . As a
    general rule, it may be said that the prosecution is
    not required or compelled to prove each and every
    circumstance in the chain of custody beyond a reason-
    able doubt . . . . It is not necessary for every person
    who handled the item to testify in order to establish
    the chain of custody. It is sufficient if the chain of
    custody is established with reasonable certainty to elim-
    inate the likelihood of mistake or alteration.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lowe, 
    61 Conn. App. 291
    , 303, 
    763 A.2d 680
    (2001).
    ‘‘The state’s burden with respect to chain of custody
    is met by a showing that there is a reasonable probabil-
    ity that the substance has not been changed in important
    respects. . . . The court must consider the nature of
    the article, the circumstances surrounding its preserva-
    tion and custody and the likelihood of intermeddlers
    tampering with it . . . . Thus, this court has found suf-
    ficient evidence to establish an adequate chain of cus-
    tody where there is testimony that evidence was
    transferred between law enforcement personnel, deliv-
    ered and received by the state toxicology laboratory
    and was identified at trial as the same evidence in an
    unchanged condition with no indication of tampering.’’
    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    
    Id. ‘‘An object
    connected with the commission of a
    crime must be shown to be in substantially the same
    condition as when the crime was committed before it
    can be properly admitted into evidence. . . . There is
    no hard and fast rule that the prosecution must exclude
    or disprove all possibility that the article or substance
    has been tampered with; in each case the trial court
    must satisfy itself in reasonable probability that the
    substance had not been changed in important respects.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pollitt, 
    205 Conn. 61
    , 88, 
    530 A.2d 155
    (1987).
    The court reasonably could have concluded that the
    bandana had not been tampered with. Following the
    incident, Green, who was driving the Acura, followed
    the Toyota. The Acura became disabled after hitting
    the Toyota in the vicinity of Glade Street and Terrance
    Street in West Haven. Seth Twohill, an officer with the
    West Haven Police Department, arrived on the scene
    at approximately midnight, and saw the Acura at that
    location and Green attempting to revive the victim.
    Twohill blocked off the area with crime scene tape.
    Joseph D’Amato, another responding officer, testified
    that Green and the victim were in the Acura when he
    arrived, and that he did not see anyone disturbing the
    integrity of the crime scene. Murray testified that the
    Acura was later towed from its location in West Haven
    to the West Haven Police Department. Robert Fazzino,
    a detective with the West Haven Police Department,
    and Murray testified that the black bandana was
    removed from the Acura. Murray further testified that
    the black bandana was in police custody prior to being
    sent to the laboratory. At trial, Murray recognized her
    initials on the packaging containing the bandana. Deg-
    nan testified that she received the bandana from the
    West Haven Police Department, designated the front
    and back side of the bandana with numbers, placed her
    initials on the barcode and sealed it with evidence tape
    that also had her initials on it.
    The defendant’s argument that the bandana could
    have been tampered with between the time of the com-
    mission of the crime and the time the bandana was
    recovered by police is pure speculation. State v.
    Estrada, 
    71 Conn. App. 344
    , 354, 
    802 A.2d 873
    (mere
    speculation of tampering insufficient to show break in
    chain of custody), cert. denied, 
    261 Conn. 934
    , 
    806 A.2d 1068
    (2002). There is no evidence to support the defen-
    dant’s claim that the bandana could have been tampered
    with between the time Green followed the Toyota, hit
    the Toyota, and tried to revive the victim, and when the
    Acura was towed to the West Haven Police Department.
    The defendant incorrectly suggests that an absence of
    evidence of tampering weighs in his favor. In the
    absence of ‘‘an affirmative showing that the evidence
    was in some way tampered with, misplaced, mislabeled
    or otherwise mishandled’’; (internal quotation marks
    omitted) State v. 
    Lowe, supra
    , 
    61 Conn. App. 304
    ; we
    cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
    in admitting the bandana into evidence. See State v.
    Johnson, 
    162 Conn. 215
    , 233, 
    292 A.2d 903
    (1972) (where
    there was no affirmative showing that evidence was
    tampered with, it cannot be said that court abused dis-
    cretion in admitting evidence).24 Because there was a
    sufficient chain of custody for the admission of the
    bandana and, by extension, the DNA evidence derived
    from the bandana, we conclude that the court did not
    abuse its discretion in admitting these two items into
    evidence.
    VI
    The defendant last claims that his conviction of both
    felony murder and manslaughter in the first degree with
    a firearm, which arose from the act of killing the victim,
    violates his right against double jeopardy and, accord-
    ingly, his manslaughter conviction should be vacated.
    The state agrees that the manslaughter conviction
    should be vacated.
    The defendant seeks review of his unpreserved dou-
    ble jeopardy claim pursuant to State v. Gold
    ing, supra
    ,
    
    213 Conn. 239
    –40. We review this claim because the
    record is adequate for review and the claim is of consti-
    tutional magnitude. See State v. Barber, 
    64 Conn. App. 659
    , 671, 
    781 A.2d 464
    (‘‘[i]f double jeopardy claims
    arising in the context of a single trial are raised for
    the first time on appeal, these claims are reviewable’’
    [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 
    258 Conn. 925
    , 
    783 A.2d 1030
    (2001).
    ‘‘The fifth amendment to the United States constitu-
    tion provides in relevant part: No person shall . . . be
    subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy
    of life or limb . . . . The double jeopardy clause of
    the fifth amendment is made applicable to the states
    through the due process clause of the fourteenth
    amendment. . . . Double jeopardy prohibits . . .
    multiple punishments for the same offense.’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Carlos P., 
    171 Conn. App. 530
    , 537, 
    157 A.3d 723
    , cert.
    denied, 
    325 Conn. 912
    , 
    158 A.3d 321
    (2017). In State v.
    Polanco, 
    308 Conn. 242
    , 245, 
    61 A.3d 1084
    (2013), our
    Supreme Court held that if a defendant is convicted of
    greater and lesser included offenses, the trial court must
    vacate the conviction of the lesser offense. Our
    Supreme Court in State v. Miranda, 
    317 Conn. 741
    , 751,
    
    120 A.3d 490
    (2015), extended the rule of vacatur in
    Polanco for double jeopardy claims to apply in a situa-
    tion such as this, where there are multiple homicide
    convictions that are based on a single act. In the present
    case, the defendant’s conviction of felony murder and
    manslaughter violate his constitutional protections
    against double jeopardy. Accordingly, the third prong
    of Golding is met, and the defendant prevails on his
    claim. See State v. Biggs, 
    176 Conn. App. 687
    , 714,
    
    171 A.3d 457
    , cert. denied, 
    327 Conn. 975
    , 
    174 A.3d 193
    (2017).
    The judgment is reversed only as to the defendant’s
    conviction of manslaughter in the first degree and the
    case is remanded with direction to vacate that convic-
    tion and to resentence the defendant consistent with
    this opinion. The judgment is affirmed in all other
    respects.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The Toyota was discovered to belong to Ronja Daniels, Daquane Adams’
    girlfriend. Daniels testified that earlier that night, Daquane Adams had
    dropped her off at work and borrowed her car.
    2
    Anthony Adams was charged with felony murder in violation of § 53a-
    54c; manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of § 53a-
    55a (a); attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-
    49 (a) (2), 53a-134 (a) (2); and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first
    degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a). Daquane
    Adams was also a codefendant but was tried separately.
    3
    The defendant mentions in his brief that the court also violated his right
    under article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution; however, he fails
    to provide an independent analysis of his state constitutional claim. We,
    accordingly, deem his state constitutional claim abandoned. See State v.
    Pierre, 
    277 Conn. 42
    , 74 n.12, 
    890 A.2d 474
    (‘‘[w]ithout a separately briefed
    and analyzed state constitutional claim, we deem abandoned the defendant’s
    claim’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1197
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 2873
    , 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 904
    (2006).
    4
    According to Degnan’s findings, the expected statistical frequency that
    an individual could be a contributor to the DNA profile found on the bandana
    was less than one in seven billion in a random population.
    5
    Degnan testified that she did not enter the profile of the minor contributor
    into the databases because it did not meet the guidelines to qualify for entry.
    6
    Anthony Adams and Daquane Adams were eliminated as contributors
    to the DNA extracted from the bandana.
    7
    Neither counsel raised a Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 61, 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 177
    (2004), or a confrontation issue.
    8
    On appeal, the defendant does not argue that admitting Degnan’s report
    violated his right to confrontation.
    9
    Because confrontation claims that involve testimonial hearsay raise due
    process concerns, and because those claims are not determined on the basis
    of the rules of evidence after Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 61, 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 177
    (2004), it is particularly important that trial
    counsel articulate whether they are raising a constitutional due process claim
    or an evidentiary issue. See, e.g., Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Rozbicki,
    
    326 Conn. 686
    , 695, 
    167 A.3d 351
    (2017) (‘‘to permit a party to raise a claim
    on appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial
    court or the opposing party to address the claim—would encourage trial
    by ambuscade, which is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing
    party’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Hilton, 
    45 Conn. App. 207
    , 222, 
    694 A.2d 830
    (‘‘[w]e are not bound to consider claims of law not
    properly raised at trial’’), cert. denied, 
    243 Conn. 925
    , 
    701 A.2d 659
    (1997),
    cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 1134
    , 
    118 S. Ct. 1091
    , 
    140 L. Ed. 2d 147
    (1998).
    10
    There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the analyst was not
    available to be called to testify by either the state or the defendant.
    11
    Similarly, under the Connecticut Code of Evidence, ‘‘[t]he facts in the
    particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion may be those per-
    ceived by or made known to the expert at or before the proceeding. The
    facts need not be admissible in evidence if of a type customarily relied on
    by experts in the particular field in forming opinions on the subject. . . .’’
    Conn. Code Evid. § 7-4 (b).
    12
    Although the defendant raises this claim under the Connecticut constitu-
    tion, he does not provide a separate analysis of the claim under the Connecti-
    cut constitution and, accordingly, we deem that claim abandoned. See
    footnote 3 of this opinion.
    13
    On appeal, unlike at trial, the defendant does not argue that Morrison’s
    in-court identification of him was the product of an inherently suggestive
    procedure due to the courtroom setting but, instead, focuses on the out-of-
    court identification procedure’s effect on the in-court identification.
    14
    Practice Book § 40-13A provides that ‘‘[u]pon written request by a defen-
    dant and without requiring any order of the judicial authority, the prosecuting
    authority shall, no later than forty-five days from receiving the request,
    provide photocopies of all statements, law enforcement reports and affida-
    vits within the possession of the prosecuting authority and his or her agents,
    including state and local law enforcement officers, which statements, reports
    and affidavits were prepared concerning the offense charged . . . .’’
    15
    Practice Book § 40-5 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[i]f a party fails to
    comply with disclosure as required under these rules, the opposing party
    may move the judicial authority for an appropriate order’’ and sets forth a
    nonexhaustive list of sanctions to be imposed ‘‘as it deems appropriate
    . . . .’’
    16
    The defendant also argues that the admission of this evidence violated
    his right to confrontation under the federal and state constitutions. We
    conclude that the court properly admitted the statements because coconspir-
    ator statements, ‘‘by their nature [are] not testimonial.’’ Crawford v. Wash-
    
    ington, supra
    , 
    541 U.S. 56
    . As Crawford acknowledged, ‘‘generally speaking,
    the admission of out-of-court statements for purposes other than their truth,
    such as statements in furtherance of a conspiracy, do not raise confrontation
    clause issues.’’ State v. Azevedo, 
    178 Conn. App. 671
    , 679,              A.3d
    (2017), cert. denied, 
    328 Conn. 908
    ,          A.3d      (2018).
    17
    Insofar as the defendant argues that the court erroneously found that
    these statements were reliable, we hold that the court did not abuse its
    discretion in deciding to admit these statements. See, e.g., State v. Camacho,
    
    282 Conn. 328
    , 363, 
    924 A.2d 99
    , cert. denied, 
    552 U.S. 956
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 388
    ,
    
    169 L. Ed. 2d 273
    (2007).
    18
    Furthermore, as the state suggests in its brief, Green’s testimony that
    he heard the man with the bandana say, ‘‘just give us the gun,’’ and, ‘‘run
    it,’’ as well as Bello’s testimony that she heard the defendant exclaim, ‘‘[o]h,
    shit. Fuck,’’ as she drove him to the hospital were also admissible as to the
    defendant as statements by a party opponent. Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (1).
    Section 8-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part
    that ‘‘[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
    declarant is available as a witness (1) . . . [a] statement that is being offered
    against a party and is . . . the party’s own statement, in either an individual
    or a representative capacity . . . .’’
    These statements were offered against the defendant and were the defen-
    dant’s own statements. The statements were both relevant and material,
    providing inculpatory evidence against the defendant, and thus, were admis-
    sible under this exception to the hearsay rule, in addition to the coconspirator
    exception. See State v. Ferguson, 
    260 Conn. 339
    , 357–58, 
    796 A.2d 1118
    (2002) (‘‘[s]tatements made out of court by a party-opponent are universally
    deemed admissible when offered against him . . . so long as they are rele-
    vant and material to issues in the case’’ [citation omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted]).
    19
    ‘‘[I]n Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is
    deprived of his rights under the confrontation clause when his codefendant’s
    incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is
    instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant. . . .
    In Bruton, however, the court emphasized that it was dealing with a case in
    which the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible
    against him under traditional rules of evidence. . . . Several lower courts
    have thus concluded that Bruton has no application when the statements
    of a codefendant are otherwise admissible against the defendant.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robertson, 
    254 Conn. 739
    , 765, 
    760 A.2d 82
    (2000).
    20
    At oral argument before this court, the state maintained that there was
    no Bruton violation or evidence that triggered Bruton.
    21
    State v. 
    Whelan, supra
    , 
    200 Conn. 753
    , established a hearsay exception
    that allows ‘‘the substantive use of prior written inconsistent statements,
    signed by the declarant, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated,
    when the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination.’’
    22
    The court explained that ‘‘the legal issues that are addressed under the
    Bruton issue that would prohibit joinder [are] whether or not there are any
    postarrest statements made by codefendants and/or confessions that can
    be used to prejudice another codefendant. And if those statements or confes-
    sions are entered into during the course of the evidence, Bruton says clearly
    that there is a conflict and the codefendant can’t be prejudiced by that, and
    therefore you can’t join the cases together; you have to have separate trials.’’
    23
    The reason stated by the defendant for moving for severance was Mor-
    rison’s identification of the defendant as ‘‘GZ.’’ This identification was based
    on Morrison’s prior knowledge of the defendant and would have been admis-
    sible against the defendant in a separate trial. See part II of this opinion;
    see also State v. Johnson, 
    29 Conn. App. 394
    , 396, 
    615 A.2d 512
    (1992)
    (defendant withdrew motion to suppress upon learning that witness’ identifi-
    cation of him was based, ‘‘in part, on her prior knowledge of and contact
    with him’’), appeal dismissed, 
    227 Conn. 611
    , 
    630 A.2d 69
    (1993).
    24
    Evidence that an inventory listed the bandana as having been recovered
    from the Toyota, instead of the Acura, does not render the bandana inadmis-
    sible. Fazzino testified that, as the lead investigator, he signed an inventory
    mistakenly indicating that the black bandana had been recovered from the
    Toyota. He testified that he personally saw the black bandana in the Acura
    and that it was recovered from the Acura, not the Toyota. That an inventory
    sheet listed the bandana as having been seized from the Toyota goes to the
    weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See, e.g., State v. John, 
    210 Conn. 652
    , 678, 
    557 A.2d 93
    (‘‘fact that there was conflicting evidence regarding
    the [fact] in question would go to the weight of [witness’] opinion and not
    to its admissibility’’), cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 824
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 84
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 50
    (1989).