State v. Gray-Brown ( 2019 )


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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DOVANTE
    GRAY-BROWN
    (AC 41385)
    Alvord, Prescott and Flynn, Js.
    Syllabus
    Convicted of the crimes of felony murder, robbery in the first degree and
    carrying a pistol without a permit in connection with the shooting death
    of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the trial
    court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence that
    the police had seized from the bedroom of his home. The defendant
    and a friend, G, had arranged a drug deal with the victim in order to
    rob the victim of drugs and money. During the robbery, the defendant
    shot and killed the victim. Subsequently, the police went to the apartment
    where the defendant lived with his mother, C, and her husband at about
    six o’clock in the morning to execute an arrest warrant for the defendant.
    C told the police that the defendant was not home and gave the officers
    verbal consent to search the home for him, including his bedroom. A
    detective, L, thereafter obtained a consent form from his vehicle and
    observed C as she read and signed the consent form before the police
    began to search the bedroom. The police seized from the bedroom an
    empty ammunition tray, rubber gloves and an electronic scale. Held:
    1. The trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the
    evidence that the police seized during their search of his bedroom, as
    that court’s findings that C had actual authority to consent to the search
    of the defendant’s bedroom and that her consent was voluntary were
    not clearly erroneous: C and her husband presumptively had actual
    authority to consent to the search, as they were the leaseholders of the
    apartment and the parents of the defendant, all of the twelve police
    officers who came to the home, except L and two other detectives, left
    before C consented to the search of the bedroom, C was unaware of
    whether weapons were being carried by the officers, who obtained
    verbal and written consent from C, and L reviewed the consent form
    with her; moreover, the officers did not forcefully enter the home, there
    was no evidence that they roused C out of bed, pointed their handguns
    at anyone or used loud or threatening language, there was no evidence
    that C initially refused to consent to the search or that the officers
    implied that they would obtain a warrant upon her refusal to consent,
    and C did not suggest that her decision to let the officers into her
    apartment was anything but the product of her own free will; further-
    more, the court’s conclusion that the defendant did not establish suffi-
    ciently exclusive control of his bedroom so as to render C’s consent
    ineffective was supported by the evidence, as his bedroom door, which
    was not always locked, was not locked at the time of the search, C
    testified that she regularly entered the bedroom to clean the floor and
    that the defendant had never told her that she was not allowed in the
    room, and although C testified that the defendant helped pay bills and
    rent, which could tend to show that he had exclusive control over the
    room, C did not provide concrete details about those financial contri-
    butions.
    2. The defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
    into evidence the ammunition tray, latex gloves and electronic scale
    was unavailing, as that court reasonably concluded that the evidence
    the police seized from the defendant’s bedroom was relevant and that
    its probative value outweighed any undue prejudice; the ammunition
    tray was probative to show that the defendant stored and used nine
    millimeter bullets, such as those that were used in the victim’s murder,
    the latex gloves were relevant to explain why none of the DNA evidence
    or fingerprints collected at the shooting scene were attributable to the
    defendant, and the electronic scale was corroborative of G’s testimony
    that the defendant participated in the scheme to rob the victim of drugs
    and money, and tended to demonstrate that the defendant was involved
    in the sale of drugs, which made his involvement in a scheme to steal
    drugs more likely, and the items were not unduly prejudicial and were
    not likely to arouse the emotions of the jury.
    3. The evidence was insufficient to prove that the firearm used in the underly-
    ing crime had a barrel of less than twelve inches in length, which was
    required to sustain the defendant’s conviction of carrying a pistol without
    a permit in violation of statute (§ 29-35 [a]): the testimony of F, a police
    officer who used the generic term handgun to describe a spent shell
    casing, was not evidence from which the jury could have reasonably
    concluded that the firearm used in the victim’s shooting had a barrel
    that was less than twelve inches in length, F did not testify that the
    spent shell casings found at the crime scene came from a handgun, the
    state presented no evidence that shell casings are ejected only from
    handguns and that the shell casings could not have come from a firearm
    with a barrel length of twelve inches or more, and the state’s ballistics
    expert did not testify that bullets found at the crime scene had been
    fired from a handgun; moreover, any inference that a sawed-off gun
    barrel that was seized from the basement of the defendant’s home was
    connected to the firearm used in the victim’s shooting would amount
    to speculation, as there was no evidence as to what type of firearm the
    sawed-off barrel came from, when the gun barrel was sawed off, if the
    remaining portion of the barrel would be less than twelve inches in
    length or whether the firearm would still be capable of firing without
    the sawed-off portion, and L’s testimony that the sawed-off barrel could
    fit into a .22 caliber weapon did not tie the barrel to the evidence
    that was found at the crime scene or to any specific type of firearm;
    furthermore, the type of ammunition that was used in the victim’s shoot-
    ing did not help to establish that the length of the barrel of the firearm
    was less than twelve inches, and G’s testimony was too vague and
    imprecise to permit a jury reasonably to infer that the defendant had
    used a firearm with a barrel length of less than twelve inches to shoot
    the victim.
    4. The trial court properly declined the defendant’s request to give the jury
    a third-party culpability instruction, which the defendant claimed was
    necessary due to the presence of a partial fingerprint of a third person
    on the rental car that the victim had driven to the crime scene; the
    defendant did not establish a direct connection between the third party
    and the offense with which the defendant was charged, as the fingerprint
    could have been left from innocuous activity rather than by someone
    involved in the victim’s shooting, and there was no other evidence that
    tended to show that the third party was involved in the victim’s shooting
    or had a motive to commit the crime, or that the third party’s involvement
    necessarily exculpated the defendant.
    5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to question
    a juror, who had been dismissed after the jury returned its verdict, about
    the defendant’s claim that the juror became aware that the defendant
    was incarcerated when the juror saw him being transported to court
    by a correctional officer during the first week of trial; it was within the
    court’s discretion, especially in light of the limitations of the applicable
    rule of practice (§ 42-33) and the state’s interest in preventing juror
    harassment, to decline to question the dismissed juror after the court
    conducted a hearing, evaluated the evidence from the hearing and deter-
    mined that the defendant’s allegations were not credible.
    Argued October 10, 2018—officially released March 12, 2019
    Procedural History
    Substitute information charging the defendant with
    the crimes of felony murder, robbery in the first degree
    and carrying a pistol without a permit brought to the
    Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where
    the court, Kahn, J., denied the defendant’s motion to
    suppress certain evidence; thereafter, the matter was
    tried to the jury; verdict and judgment of guilty, from
    which the defendant appealed. Reversed in part; judg-
    ment directed.
    Pamela S. Nagy, assistant public defender, for the
    appellant (defendant).
    Laurie N. Feldman, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
    with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state’s
    attorney, and Colleen P. Zingaro, senior assistant state’s
    attorney, for the appellee (state).
    Opinion
    PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Dovante Gray-Brown,
    appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after
    a jury trial, of felony murder in violation of General
    Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in viola-
    tion of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (1) and carrying
    a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes
    § 29-35 (a). The defendant claims on appeal that (1) the
    trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress
    several items of evidence taken from his bedroom
    because his mother lacked authority to consent to a
    search of his bedroom, (2) the court abused its discre-
    tion by admitting those same items into evidence
    because they were not relevant and were more prejudi-
    cial than probative, (3) there was insufficient evidence
    to prove, as required for the crime of carrying a pistol
    without a permit, that the defendant possessed a fire-
    arm that had a gun barrel less than twelve inches in
    length, (4) the court improperly denied the defendant’s
    request for a third-party culpability instruction, and (5)
    the court improperly refused to question a juror regard-
    ing an issue of juror partiality that was raised after
    conviction. We agree with the defendant that there was
    insufficient evidence to prove, as required by § 29-35
    (a), that the length of the barrel of the firearm used to
    commit the crime was less than twelve inches. Accord-
    ingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction as to that
    count with direction to render a judgment of acquittal
    on the charge of carrying a pistol without a permit. We
    are not persuaded, however, by the remainder of the
    defendant’s claims and, accordingly, affirm the judg-
    ment of conviction in all other respects.
    The facts, as could have been reasonably found by
    the jury, and procedural history, are as follows. The
    defendant and his friend, Dominick Gonzalez, arranged
    a drug deal with the victim, Dewayne Gardner, Jr., in
    order to rob him of drugs and money. Gonzalez knew
    the victim because the victim regularly supplied him
    with drugs that he then resold. Gonzalez asked the
    victim to meet him at 178 Poplar Street in Bridgeport
    so that he could purchase drugs from him.
    In the early morning of December 16, 2013, the victim,
    believing he was going to sell narcotics to Gonzalez,
    drove a rental car to 178 Poplar Street. Prior to the
    meeting, the victim had exchanged text messages with
    Gonzalez. Gonzalez texted the victim that he was on
    his way to make the purchase and later texted that he
    had arrived at 178 Poplar Street. Gonzalez, however,
    had sent these text messages from several miles across
    town. Gonzalez, who was unable to get a ride to the
    agreed upon location, did not want to inform the victim
    that the defendant would be engaging in the transaction
    because the victim trusted Gonzalez more than the
    defendant.
    In addition to exchanging text messages with the
    victim, Gonzalez was also in contact with the defendant.
    Gonzalez exchanged more than one dozen calls with
    the defendant between 12:30 a.m. and 3 a.m. The defen-
    dant was at his home on 1022 Hancock Avenue in
    Bridgeport during these calls. Hancock Avenue runs
    parallel to Poplar Street, with direct access to 178 Pop-
    lar Street through a vacant lot. The victim was in his
    car when the defendant arrived, with a firearm, to carry
    out the robbery. During the robbery, the defendant fired
    multiple gunshots into the car from the front passenger
    side, striking the victim.
    Gonzalez later called the defendant to see if he had
    succeeded in the robbery. The defendant admitted to
    Gonzalez that he had shot the victim. The defendant
    also told Gonzalez that, after shooting the victim and
    fleeing the scene, he returned to take the victim’s phone
    in order to dispose of it.
    The police were called to the scene to respond to a
    report of a car accident. After being shot, the victim
    apparently attempted to flee the scene, but his vehicle
    hit a parked car at 211 Poplar Street. The police found
    an unspent nine millimeter bullet and two spent shell
    casings in the street at 178 Poplar Street. In the victim’s
    car, they found bulletholes, bullets, and shell casings
    showing that a gunman had shot into the car from the
    passenger side. The victim sat dead in the driver’s seat,
    with multiple gunshot wounds.
    Although the victim habitually carried a cell phone
    and money with him, no wallet, money, cell phone, or
    drugs, other than a small amount of marijuana, were
    found in the car. A pocket of the victim’s pants was
    turned inside out.
    After obtaining the victim’s phone records, the police
    spoke with Gonzalez and seized his phone for evidence.
    The police arrested Gonzalez on a charge of felony
    murder on December 21, 2013. Gonzalez initially lied
    to the police to protect himself and the defendant, but
    eventually cooperated with police and testified at trial
    pursuant to a plea deal.
    Gonzalez told police that they could find ammunition
    that he and the defendant had been trying to sell in
    the basement of the multifamily house in which the
    defendant lived on the third floor. After obtaining con-
    sent from the owner of the house, the police searched
    the basement and did, in fact, find ammunition, as well
    as the sawed off barrel of a gun. A few days later,
    after obtaining consent from the defendant’s mother to
    search the defendant’s bedroom, the police found, inter
    alia, an electronic scale, rubber gloves, and a Remington
    ammunition tray for nine millimeter bullets in his room.
    Forensic testing of the bullets and casings found at
    the crime scene indicated that they were fired from the
    tured, however, by three different companies and dif-
    fered in metal, shape and stampings.
    The defendant eventually was charged with felony
    murder, robbery in the first degree and carrying a pistol
    without a permit. On November 30, 2016, the jury found
    the defendant guilty of all charges. On the conviction
    of felony murder, the court, Kahn, J., sentenced the
    defendant to forty-five years of incarceration and five
    years of special parole. Additionally, the court sen-
    tenced the defendant to a concurrent ten year term of
    incarceration on the count of robbery and a concurrent
    five year term of incarceration for carrying a pistol
    without a permit. This appeal followed. Additional facts
    will be set forth as necessary.
    I
    The defendant first claims that the trial court improp-
    erly denied his motion to suppress evidence collected
    from his bedroom because the police illegally had
    searched his room without a search warrant. Specifi-
    cally, the defendant contends that the trial court
    improperly concluded that his mother had the authority
    to consent to the search of his bedroom and that she
    did so voluntarily. According to the defendant, the war-
    rantless entry by police into his bedroom violated his
    constitutional rights, and, therefore, the evidence seized
    from this search should have been suppressed. We
    disagree.
    In its oral decision on the defendant’s motion to sup-
    press, the court found the following additional facts.
    At approximately 6 a.m. on January 11, 2014, police
    officers arrived at the defendant’s residence to execute
    an arrest warrant for the defendant charging him with
    felony murder. Approximately eight detectives and four
    uniformed officers arrived at the residence.
    The defendant’s mother, Claudette Brown, opened
    the door. The officers advised her that they had a war-
    rant to arrest the defendant on the charge of felony
    murder. Brown told them that he was not home and
    gave the officers verbal consent to search the home for
    him. After searching the apartment and not locating
    the defendant, many of the law enforcement officers
    departed in an attempt to find the defendant at his
    girlfriend’s house, where Brown said he might be. The
    only officers who remained at the defendant’s residence
    were Lieutenant Christopher Lamaine and two police
    detectives.
    Brown identified the defendant’s bedroom to the offi-
    cers. Lamaine noticed that the door was open and that
    the inside of the room was visible.1 Brown was coopera-
    tive and gave permission to the officers to search the
    bedroom. Brown was calm and did not have difficulty
    communicating with the officers. Brown was aware that
    the police were investigating the homicide for which
    they had obtained an arrest warrant for her son.
    Although the officers carried weapons at the time of
    the search, at no point did they unholster their weapons
    during their initial search for the defendant or during
    the subsequent search of his bedroom.
    After Brown gave verbal consent to search the defen-
    dant’s bedroom, Lamaine left the apartment to retrieve
    a consent form from his vehicle, which Brown subse-
    quently signed.2 After reviewing the form with Brown,
    and observing her reading and signing it, the officers
    began to search the defendant’s bedroom. The detec-
    tives seized a number of items from the bedroom,
    including an ammunition tray, gloves, and an elec-
    tronic scale.
    We turn next to the well established law and standard
    of review that governs the defendant’s claim. ‘‘A war-
    rantless search is not unreasonable under either the
    fourth amendment to the constitution of the United
    States or article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connect-
    icut if a person with authority to do so has freely con-
    sented to the search. . . . The state bears the burden
    of proving that the consent was free and voluntary
    and that the person who purported to consent had the
    authority to do so. . . . The state must affirmatively
    establish that the consent was voluntary; mere acquies-
    cence to a claim of lawful authority is not enough to
    meet the state’s burden. . . . The question whether
    consent to a search has in fact been freely and volunta-
    rily given, or was the product of coercion, express or
    implied, [as well as whether the individual providing
    consent possessed the requisite authority] is a question
    of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
    circumstances. . . . As a question of fact, it is . . . to
    be decided by the trial court upon the evidence before
    that court together with the reasonable inferences to be
    drawn from that evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Azukas, 
    278 Conn. 267
    , 275, 
    897 A.2d 554
     (2006).
    ‘‘On appeal, we apply a familiar standard of review
    to a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection
    with a motion to suppress. A finding of fact will not be
    disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the
    evidence and pleadings in the whole record . . . . The
    conclusions drawn by the trial court will be upheld
    unless they are legally and logically inconsistent with
    the evidence. . . . Because a trial court’s determina-
    tion of the validity of a . . . [seizure] implicates a
    defendant’s constitutional rights, however, we engage
    in a careful examination of the record to ensure that
    the court’s decision was supported by substantial evi-
    dence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Douros, 
    90 Conn. App. 548
    , 553–54, 
    878 A.2d 399
    , cert.
    denied, 
    276 Conn. 914
    , 
    888 A.2d 85
     (2005).
    ‘‘In order for third-party consent to be valid, the con-
    senting party must have possessed common authority
    over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or
    effects sought to be inspected. . . . The authority that
    justifies the third party consent rests on mutual use of
    the property by persons who have joint access or con-
    trol for most purposes, so that any of the inhabitants
    has the right to permit the inspection in his own right,
    and the others have assumed the risk that any of the
    cohabitants might permit the common area to be
    entered. . . .
    ‘‘We also note that the overwhelming majority of the
    cases hold that a parent may consent to a police search
    of a home that is effective against a child, if a son or
    a daughter, whether or not still a minor, is residing in
    the home with the parents . . . . To overcome this
    authority, the child must establish sufficiently exclusive
    possession of the room to render the parent’s consent
    ineffective. . . . Factors that [our Supreme Court] pre-
    viously [has] considered when evaluating whether a
    child has established sufficiently exclusive possession
    of the room include: whether the child is paying rent;
    who has ownership of the home; whether the door to
    the bedroom is generally kept closed; whether there is
    a lock on the door; whether other members of the family
    use the room; and whether other members of the family
    had access to the room for any reason.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Azukas,
    supra, 
    278 Conn. 277
    –78.
    In its oral decision on the motion to suppress, the
    trial court relied on State v. Douros, 
    supra,
     
    90 Conn. App. 548
    , to support its conclusion that the defendant’s
    mother had the authority to permit the police to search
    the defendant’s bedroom.3 Douros is factually analo-
    gous to the present case. In Douros, after the adult
    defendant fled the scene of a domestic dispute, his
    mother gave the police permission to search his bed-
    room. 
    Id.,
     551–52. This court held that there was evi-
    dence to support the trial court’s finding that the
    defendant’s mother exercised sufficient control over
    his bedroom to validly consent to a search of it by
    the police. Id., 555. In Douros, the defendant’s mother
    owned the house in which the defendant and his mother
    resided. Id., 555–56. Additionally, she stated that she
    had access to the room and gave the police permission
    to search the room. Id., 552. This court concluded that
    the evidence supported the trial court’s factual findings.
    Id., 556.
    In the present case, the trial court’s finding that
    Brown had actual authority to consent to the search of
    the defendant’s bedroom is not clearly erroneous. She
    and her husband were the leaseholders of the apartment
    and the parents of the defendant and, thus, presump-
    tively had actual authority to consent to a search. In
    order to refute this presumption, the defendant must
    establish sufficiently exclusive possession of the room
    to render the parent’s consent ineffective.4 To establish
    that he had exclusive control over the room, the defen-
    dant argued that the door to his room had a lock. His
    bedroom door, however, was not always locked and
    was not locked at the time of the search. Brown testified
    that she regularly entered the defendant’s bedroom to
    clean the floor and that the defendant had never told
    her that she was not allowed in the room. Although she
    would knock if he was home, if the defendant was not
    home and the door was unlocked, she would enter the
    room. Brown also testified that the defendant ‘‘chipped
    in’’ with bills and rent, which could tend to show that
    he had exclusive control over the room. Brown did not,
    however, provide concrete details about these financial
    contributions, such as whether the defendant paid a
    fixed amount of rent. In sum, the court’s conclusion
    that Brown had actual authority to consent to the police
    search was supported by the evidence. Further, the
    court’s conclusion that the defendant did not establish
    sufficiently exclusive control of his bedroom that would
    render Brown’s consent ineffective was supported by
    the evidence.
    We next review the court’s finding that the consent
    to search was voluntarily given. The defendant argues
    that, under the totality of the circumstances, Brown’s
    consent was not valid because she had been coerced
    to give her consent. Specifically, the defendant argues
    that Brown’s consent was coerced because the search
    occurred in the early morning and twelve police officers
    were present at the house.
    The trial court’s finding that Brown’s consent was
    voluntary was supported by the evidence and, therefore,
    not clearly erroneous. Although twelve officers initially
    arrived at the home, that number reflected the fact that
    they had come to arrest someone who they believed to
    be armed and responsible for a homicide. All of the
    officers except Lamaine and two police detectives left
    the house before the consent to the search occurred.
    Brown was unaware as to whether the officers carried
    weapons. The officers obtained both verbal and written
    consent from Brown, and Lamaine reviewed the con-
    sent form with her.
    Although the officers arrived at about six o’clock in
    the morning, the officers did not forcefully enter the
    home. There is no evidence that the officers roused
    Brown out of bed in the middle of the night, broke
    down the door in the early hours of the morning, pointed
    their handguns at anyone or used loud or threatening
    language. See State v. Reynolds, 
    264 Conn. 1
    , 45, 
    836 A.2d 224
     (2003), cert. denied, 
    541 U.S. 908
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1614
    , 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 254
     (2004). Additionally, there is no
    evidence that Brown initially refused to consent to the
    search or that the officers implied that they would
    obtain a warrant upon her refusal to consent to the
    search. Cf. State v. Brunetti, 
    279 Conn. 39
    , 57, 70, 
    901 A.2d 1
     (2006), cert. denied, 
    549 U.S. 1212
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 1328
    , 
    167 L. Ed. 2d 900
     (2007). Finally, Brown did not
    herself suggest, during her testimony or otherwise, that
    her decision to let the officers into her apartment was
    anything but the product of her own free will. See State
    v. Reynolds, supra, 45–46. Therefore, the court properly
    denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence
    seized by the police from the defendant’s room.
    II
    The defendant next claims that the trial court abused
    its discretion by admitting into evidence the ammuni-
    tion tray,5 latex gloves, and electronic scale6 found in
    the defendant’s bedroom because the items were not
    relevant and, even if relevant, they were more prejudi-
    cial than probative. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to this
    claim. During Lamaine’s testimony, the defendant
    objected to the admission into evidence of the ammuni-
    tion tray, latex gloves, and electronic scale, arguing that
    they were not relevant and were unduly prejudicial.
    Specifically, the defendant argued that the Remington
    brand ammunition tray, which was empty when police
    seized it, was not relevant because the bullets recovered
    at the crime scene were not made by Remington. Fur-
    ther, the defendant argued that the scale did not have
    relevance to the present case because, although it may
    have been relevant to a drug related crime, it did not
    relate to the murder of the victim. The defendant further
    argued that the plastic gloves were not relevant because
    they could be used for many legal purposes, and the
    defendant had been training for employment in the
    health care field.
    The state argued that the items were relevant and
    more probative than prejudicial because the ammuni-
    tion tray linked the defendant to the bullets found in
    the basement and at the crime scene, the scale tended
    to prove that the defendant was meeting the victim to
    steal drugs, which could later be resold, and the gloves
    tended to explain why the defendant’s DNA and finger-
    prints were not found at the crime scene. The court
    agreed, ruling that the items were relevant and that
    their probative value outweighed their prejudicial
    effect.
    ‘‘Relevant evidence is evidence that has a logical ten-
    dency to aid the trier in the determination of an issue.
    . . . Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the exis-
    tence or nonexistence of any other fact more probable
    or less probable than it would be without such evidence.
    . . . To be relevant, the evidence need not exclude all
    other possibilities; it is sufficient if it tends to support
    the conclusion [for which it is offered], even to a slight
    degree. . . . Evidence is not rendered inadmissible
    because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that
    the evidence tend[s] to support a relevant fact even to
    a slight degree, so long as it is not prejudicial or merely
    cumulative. . . .
    ‘‘Although relevant, evidence may be excluded by the
    trial court if the court determines that the prejudicial
    effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value.
    . . . Of course, [a]ll adverse evidence is damaging to
    one’s case, but it is inadmissible only if it creates undue
    prejudice so that it threatens an injustice were it to be
    admitted. . . . The test for determining whether evi-
    dence is unduly prejudicial is not whether it is damaging
    to the defendant but whether it will improperly arouse
    the emotions of the jury. . . . Reversal is required only
    [if] an abuse of discretion is manifest or [if an] injustice
    appears to have been done.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 
    308 Conn. 412
    , 429–30, 
    64 A.3d 91
     (2013).
    In the present case, we agree with the court that the
    empty ammunition tray was probative to show that the
    defendant stored and used nine millimeter bullets such
    as those that were used in the underlying murder.
    Lamaine testified that it appeared that nine millimeter
    bullets would fit in the empty Remington ammunition
    tray. Thus, the empty ammunition tray found in the
    defendant’s bedroom provided a potential link to the
    nine millimeter bullets and shell casings that were found
    at the scene of the shooting, as well as the ammunition
    seized from the basement of the defendant’s home.
    Moreover, the fact that the ammunition tray was manu-
    factured by Remington, but none of the bullets or shell
    casings found at the scene were made by Remington,
    does not vitiate the probative value of the ammunition
    tray because the assortment of bullets in the basement
    and at the crime scene tended to demonstrate that the
    defendant did not use bullets from a single manufac-
    turer. In sum, the empty ammunition tray tended to
    demonstrate that these items were all connected to
    the defendant.
    We also agree that the latex gloves were relevant to
    explain why none of the DNA evidence or fingerprints
    collected at the scene was attributable to the defendant.
    Gonzalez testified that the defendant wore gloves when
    he committed robberies. A forensic scientist, called as
    a witness by the state, testified that gloves could prevent
    the transfer of fingerprints. Additionally, a forensic sci-
    entist, called by the defense, admitted that gloves could
    prevent the transfer of DNA. Therefore, the defendant’s
    possession of latex gloves provided an explanation for
    the absence of his DNA and fingerprints at the crime
    scene and was, therefore, highly probative.
    Finally, the presence of an electronic scale in the
    defendant’s bedroom tended to demonstrate that the
    defendant was involved in the sale of drugs and was
    corroborative of Gonzalez’ testimony that the defendant
    participated in the scheme to rob the victim of drugs
    and money. Although the defendant argues that a scale
    was not needed for this particular robbery, it was none-
    theless relevant to show that he sold drugs, making his
    involvement in a scheme to steal drugs more likely.
    Although damaging to the defendant, these items
    were not unduly prejudicial. The admission of the elec-
    tronic scale, which tends to show that the defendant
    was involved in the sale of drugs, was unlikely to shock
    the jury because Gonzalez later testified, without objec-
    tion, that the defendant used and sold drugs. Gonzalez
    also testified, without objection, that the defendant car-
    ried firearms and wore gloves during robberies to pre-
    vent leaving evidence that would connect him to the
    crime. Thus, these items were not likely to arouse the
    emotions of the jury any more than the testimony pro-
    vided by Gonzalez. Moreover, there is nothing inherent
    in the nature of the items that would likely overcome
    the reason of, or, ‘‘ ‘improperly arouse the emotions’ ’’
    of the jury. State v. Wilson, supra, 
    308 Conn. 430
    . There-
    fore, the court reasonably concluded that the evidence
    was relevant and that its probative value outweighed
    any undue prejudice to the defendant.
    III
    The defendant next claims that there was insufficient
    evidence to sustain his conviction of carrying a pistol
    without a permit under § 29-35 (a). Specifically, the
    defendant argues that the state failed to introduce suffi-
    cient evidence from which the jury reasonably could
    have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the
    length of the barrel of the firearm used to commit the
    crime was less than twelve inches. In support of his
    insufficiency claim, the defendant points to the fact that
    there were no known eyewitnesses to the shooting and
    that the firearm used to shoot the victim was never
    found. Additionally, the defendant argues that the jury
    was not presented with other circumstantial evidence
    from which it reasonably could have inferred that the
    length of the barrel of the firearm used to commit the
    crime was less than twelve inches.
    In response, the state contends that the following
    circumstantial evidence presented to the jury permitted
    it reasonably to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that
    the defendant had used a firearm with a barrel less
    than twelve inches in length to shoot the victim: (1)
    testimony that the spent casings at the scene were fired
    from a handgun; (2) the sawed-off barrel the police
    discovered in the defendant’s basement; (3) the ballis-
    tics evidence recovered at the crime scene and ammuni-
    tion found in the defendant’s basement; (4) the fact that
    the crime scene bullets and casings came from the same
    gun; and (5) testimony that Gonzalez and the defendant
    carried guns whenever they sold drugs, the defendant
    was a ‘‘stickup guy,’’ and, in a prior robbery, the defen-
    dant used a .22 caliber revolver. We agree with the
    defendant that the evidence was insufficient to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that he violated § 29-35 (a).
    ‘‘The standard of review we apply to a claim of insuffi-
    cient evidence is well established. In reviewing the suffi-
    ciency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction
    we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence
    in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.
    Second, we determine whether upon the facts so con-
    strued and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom
    the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded
    that the cumulative force of the evidence established
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
    ‘‘We note that the jury must find every element proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defen-
    dant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the
    basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions
    need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
    If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude
    that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is
    permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider
    it in combination with other proven facts in determining
    whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves
    the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime
    charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins, 
    271 Conn. 218
    , 246, 
    856 A.2d 917
     (2004).
    ‘‘Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized
    by the law is a reasonable one [however] . . . any such
    inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or
    conjecture. . . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny
    [inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon
    the evidence. . . . [T]he line between permissible
    inference and impermissible speculation is not always
    easy to discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion
    from proven facts because such considerations as expe-
    rience, or history, or science have demonstrated that
    there is a likely correlation between those facts and the
    conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling,
    the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation
    between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a
    different conclusion is more closely correlated with the
    facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less
    reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts
    and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it
    speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a
    matter of judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) State v. Reynolds, supra, 
    264 Conn. 93
    .
    ‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force
    of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of
    evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .
    It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multi-
    tude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving
    substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating
    evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept
    as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with
    the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact]
    may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or
    facts established by the evidence it deems to be reason-
    able and logical. . . .
    ‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable
    doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt
    . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require
    acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by
    the defendant that, had it been found credible by the
    [finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal.
    . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reason-
    able view of the evidence that would support a reason-
    able hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether
    there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports
    the [finder of fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins,
    
    supra,
     
    271 Conn. 246
    –47.
    Finally, ‘‘[w]e . . . emphasize the weighty burden
    imposed on the state by the standard of proof beyond
    a reasonable doubt. Under bedrock principles of our
    criminal justice system, it is obviously not sufficient
    for the state to prove simply that it is more likely than
    not that the defendant was convicted of [the offense],
    or even that the evidence is clear and convincing that
    he was so convicted. . . . Our Supreme Court has
    described the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as
    a subjective state of near certitude . . . .’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
    Tenay, 
    156 Conn. App. 792
    , 810, 
    114 A.3d 931
     (2015).
    We now turn to the essential elements of the offense.
    Section 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person
    shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person,
    except when such person is within the dwelling house
    or place of business of such person, without a permit
    to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28
    . . . .’’ ‘‘[T]o obtain a conviction for carrying a pistol
    without a permit, the state [is] required to prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) carried a
    pistol, (2) for which he lacked a permit, (3) while out-
    side his dwelling house or place of business. . . .
    ‘‘The term pistol and the term revolver . . . as used
    in [General Statutes §§] 29-28 to 29-38, inclusive, mean
    any firearm having a barrel less than twelve inches in
    length. General Statutes § 29-27. In cases in which a
    violation of § 29-35 is charged, the length of the barrel
    is . . . an element of [the] crime and must be proven
    beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . We observe, however,
    that, like the other essential elements of the offense,
    the length of the barrel of a pistol or revolver may be
    proven by circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence.
    Direct numerical evidence is not required to establish
    the length of the barrel of a handgun in question.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
    v. Covington, 
    184 Conn. App. 332
    , 340, 
    194 A.3d 1224
    ,
    cert. granted on other grounds, 
    330 Conn. 933
    , 
    195 A.3d 383
     (2018).
    Next, we examine the circumstantial evidence pre-
    sented at trial from which the state contends a jury
    reasonably could conclude that the firearm carried by
    the defendant had a barrel length of less than twelve
    inches. First, the state cites Officer Thomas Flaherty’s
    testimony that the shell casings ‘‘were fired from a
    handgun.’’ The state argues that ‘‘Officer Flaherty’s tes-
    timony alone, that the bullet casings were shot from a
    ‘handgun,’ satisfies the element.’’7
    The state, however, takes this testimony out of con-
    text. The following exchange occurred between the
    prosecutor and Officer Flaherty:
    ‘‘Q. And with regard to the spent casings, can you
    describe to the jury what that means?
    ‘‘A. Rounds that were fired from a handgun. There’s—
    a projectile discharged from the firearm. It’s just the
    shell casing itself that, after a—after being fired, it’s
    going to be in the area of—where the shots were fired.’’
    When Officer Flaherty used the word ‘‘handgun,’’ he
    was speaking in general terms. Indeed, in the very next
    sentence, he refers more generally to a ‘‘firearm.’’ In
    context, Officer Flaherty was not testifying that the
    spent shell casings found at the scene came specifically
    from a handgun. The state did not present any evidence
    that shell casings are ejected only from handguns and
    that the shell casings could not have come from a fire-
    arm with a barrel length of twelve inches or more.
    Moreover, the state’s ballistics expert did not testify
    that the bullets found at the crime scene had been fired
    from a handgun. The use of the generic term ‘‘handgun’’
    during Officer Flaherty’s testimony to describe a spent
    shell casing for the jury was not evidence from which
    the jury could have reasonably concluded that the fire-
    arm used in the crime in this case had a barrel that was
    less than twelve inches in length.
    Next, the state argues that the jury could infer that
    the defendant carried a short-barreled firearm because
    the police seized a sawed-off gun barrel from his base-
    ment. In its brief, the state argues that ‘‘[t]he sawed-
    off barrel in his basement showed that [the defendant]
    had customized a long-barreled gun into a short-bar-
    reled gun.’’ There is no evidence, however, that con-
    nects the gun barrel found in the basement to any
    firearm carried by the defendant or used to shoot the
    victim. The state’s ballistics expert did not testify about
    the gun barrel. There is no evidence as to what type of
    firearm the barrel came from, when the gun barrel was
    sawed off, if the remaining portion of the barrel would
    be less than twelve inches in length, or whether the
    firearm would still be capable of firing without the
    sawed-off portion. The only testimony regarding what
    type of firearm the barrel came from was during the
    following colloquy between the prosecutor and
    Lamaine:
    ‘‘Q. Detective, do you have any knowledge as to what
    type of weapon that barrel could fit into?
    ‘‘A. I believe it was a .22 caliber.
    ‘‘Q. Do you want to look at it?
    ‘‘A. May I look at it?
    ‘‘Q. Yeah.
    ‘‘A. Refresh my recollection. It’s been a while. I don’t
    see any markings. I mean, if you want to draw my
    attention to some but—
    ‘‘Q. No. I just thought you might know.
    ‘‘A. No.
    ‘‘Q. But that particular item is meant to fit into a
    gun; correct?
    ‘‘A. It is a gun barrel that’s been sawed off, yes.’’
    Lamaine’s testimony simply establishes only that it
    was, in fact, a sawed-off gun barrel. This testimony does
    not tie the barrel to the evidence found at the crime
    scene or to any specific type of firearm whatsoever.
    Further, there was no testimony that a .22 caliber fire-
    arm was capable of shooting nine millimeter bullets,
    such as those recovered from the scene. Thus, any
    inference that the gun barrel was connected to the
    firearm used in the shooting would amount to sheer
    speculation.
    The state also asserts that the jury was entitled to
    infer that the length of the barrel of the firearm used
    to commit the shooting was less than twelve inches
    from the ballistics evidence found at the crime scene
    and in the defendant’s basement. We are not persuaded.
    The state’s expert in the field of firearm and tool mark
    examinations provided no testimony about the types
    of firearms that use nine millimeter ammunition or the
    barrel lengths of such firearms. Therefore, the type of
    ammunition, without more, does not help to establish
    that the length of the barrel of the firearm used to
    commit the offense was less than twelve inches.
    Finally, the state relies on certain portions of Gonza-
    lez’ testimony as circumstantial evidence that the barrel
    of the firearm was less than twelve inches. Specifically,
    the state relies on Gonzalez’ acknowledgment that the
    defendant was a stickup guy in response to a question
    by defense counsel, and his testimony that the defen-
    dant had used a .22 caliber revolver in a prior robbery
    and that he and the defendant kept guns on them ‘‘[j]ust
    in case.’’ Specifically, the state argues that the jury could
    infer from this testimony that the defendant carried a
    handgun that he could easily conceal and, thus, that
    the gun used in the shooting must have had a barrel
    less than twelve inches in length.
    Regarding Gonzalez’ acknowledgment that the defen-
    dant was a stickup guy, the state cites to Augustine v.
    State, 
    201 Miss. 277
    , 291, 
    28 So. 2d 243
     (1946), to contend
    that ‘‘the common understanding of ‘stick-up’ is a hold-
    up, usually by use of a pistol.’’8 Therefore, the state
    asserts, Gonzalez’ acknowledgment that the defendant
    was a stickup guy supports a finding that the gun used
    by the defendant was a pistol or a gun with a barrel
    length less than twelve inches. We are not persuaded
    by this argument. The word ‘‘stickup’’ is commonly
    understood as meaning a robbery with the use of any
    weapon. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed.
    2014) p. 1640 (defining ‘‘stickup’’ as ‘‘[a]n armed robbery
    in which the victim is threatened by the use of weap-
    ons’’). Therefore, testimony that the defendant was a
    stickup guy was not circumstantial evidence from
    which the jury reasonably could infer that the length
    of the gun barrel of the firearm used to commit the
    offense was less than twelve inches.
    We are also unpersuaded that Gonzalez’ testimony
    that the defendant used a revolver in a prior robbery
    and kept a gun on him ‘‘[j]ust in case’’ was evidence
    from which the jury reasonably could infer that the
    defendant had used a revolver or other short-barreled
    firearm in the present case. Testimony that the defen-
    dant merely carried a ‘‘gun’’ on him, with no specificity
    regarding the size of the firearm, is not probative of
    whether the firearm used in the present case was a
    handgun with a barrel length of less than twelve inches.
    Moreover, Gonzalez’ testimony that the defendant pos-
    sessed a .22 caliber revolver is actually inconsistent
    with the ballistics evidence collected at the crime scene.
    That evidence suggests that a nine millimeter firearm
    was used. Consequently, the defendant’s prior posses-
    sion of a .22 caliber revolver lacks probative value
    regarding the type of firearm used in the present case.
    The testimony of Gonzalez is simply too vague and
    imprecise to permit a jury reasonably to infer that the
    defendant used a firearm with a barrel length of less
    than twelve inches to shoot the victim in the present
    case.
    In sum, the jury reasonably could not have concluded
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm used by the
    defendant in the underlying crime had a barrel of less
    than twelve inches in length. We therefore conclude that
    there was insufficient evidence to prove the required
    elements under § 29-35 and the defendant’s conviction
    on that charge must be reversed.
    IV
    The defendant next claims that the court improperly
    declined his request to give a third-party culpability
    instruction to the jury. We disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to this
    claim. The police found two fingerprints on the column
    along the passenger door of the victim’s car. The loca-
    tion of the fingerprints suggested that ‘‘somebody [had
    been] reaching in [to the car].’’ One of the fingerprints
    matched with someone named Allen Garrett through
    the Automated Fingerprint Identification System.9 The
    defendant offered no other information about Garrett
    into evidence.
    Prior to the close of evidence, the defendant submit-
    ted a written request for a third-party culpability instruc-
    tion. The court held a charge conference in which it
    heard argument on the defendant’s request for a third-
    party culpability instruction. The defendant argued that,
    on the basis of the presence of Garrett’s fingerprint on
    the victim’s vehicle, he was entitled to a third-party
    culpability instruction. The court denied the defen-
    dant’s request for a third-party culpability instruction,
    concluding that ‘‘the factual predicate for [it did] not
    exist.’’10
    ‘‘In determining whether the trial court improperly
    refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evi-
    dence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
    supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request
    to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and
    which is an accurate statement of the law must be given.
    . . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably
    support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court
    has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a
    trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with
    a party’s request to charge [only] if the proposed instruc-
    tions are reasonably supported by the evidence. . . .
    ‘‘It is well established that a defendant has a right to
    introduce evidence that indicates that someone other
    than the defendant committed the crime with which
    the defendant has been charged. . . . The defendant
    must, however, present evidence that directly connects
    a third party to the crime. . . . It is not enough to show
    that another had the motive to commit the crime . . .
    nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some
    other person may have committed the crime of which
    the defendant is accused. . . .
    ‘‘The admissibility of evidence of third party culpabil-
    ity is governed by the rules relating to relevancy. . . .
    Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to
    make the existence of any fact that is material to the
    determination of the proceeding more probable or less
    probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .
    Accordingly, in explaining the requirement that the
    proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a
    third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion
    regarding a third party, we have stated: Such evidence
    is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather than merely
    tenuous evidence of third party culpability [introduced
    by a defendant] in an attempt to divert from himself
    the evidence of guilt. . . . In other words, evidence
    that establishes a direct connection between a third
    party and the charged offense is relevant to the central
    question before the jury, namely, whether a reasonable
    doubt exists as to whether the defendant committed the
    offense. Evidence that would raise only a bare suspicion
    that a third party, rather than the defendant, committed
    the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury’s
    determination. A trial court’s decision, therefore, that
    third party culpability evidence proffered by the defen-
    dant is admissible, necessarily entails a determination
    that the proffered evidence is relevant to the jury’s
    determination of whether a reasonable doubt exists as
    to the defendant’s guilt. . . .
    ‘‘[I]f the evidence pointing to a third party’s culpabil-
    ity, taken together and considered in the light most
    favorable to the defendant, establishes a direct connec-
    tion between the third party and the charged offense,
    rather than merely raising a bare suspicion that another
    could have committed the crime, a trial court has a duty
    to submit an appropriate charge to the jury.’’ (Citations
    omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) State v. Arroyo, 
    284 Conn. 597
    , 607–10, 
    935 A.2d 975
     (2007).
    In the present case, the trial court concluded that a
    third-party culpability instruction was not warranted
    by a partial fingerprint of a third person on the vehicle
    in the absence of other evidence connecting that person
    to the crime. The fingerprint could have been left from
    innocuous activity, rather than from someone involved
    in the commission of the crime. Although there was no
    direct evidence as to the ownership of the vehicle the
    victim used on the night of the shooting, the victim was
    known to use rental cars, and, in such instances, third
    parties would readily have had access to the same car.
    With nothing more, a partial fingerprint on the outside
    of the car door does not satisfy the requirement that
    there be a direct connection between a third party and
    the crime.
    The present case is factually analogous to State v.
    James, 
    141 Conn. App. 124
    , 136–37, 
    60 A.3d 1011
    , cert.
    denied, 
    308 Conn. 932
    , 
    64 A.3d 331
     (2013). In James,
    two pieces of evidence, a hat with a ‘‘mixed sample’’
    of DNA and multiple fingerprints lifted from a car, were
    linked to the defendant, as well as unidentified persons.
    
    Id.
     136–37. The hat was a ‘‘mixed sample,’’ meaning that
    more than one person, including the defendant, had
    contributed to its DNA profile. 
    Id.
     The car had finger-
    prints of the defendant and his accomplice, as well as
    five fingerprints that did not belong to them. Id., 136.
    Prior to closing arguments, the defendant requested a
    third-party culpability charge on the basis of this infor-
    mation, which the trial court denied. Id., 137. This court
    ultimately held that ‘‘when viewed in a light most favor-
    able to the defendant, the proffered DNA and fingerprint
    evidence only indirectly and tenuously implicated third
    parties without directly absolving or exculpating the
    defendant, [and] the court did not abuse its discretion
    by refusing to give a third party culpability instruction.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Id., 138–39. As in James, the finger-
    print evidence relating to Garrett only indirectly and
    tenuously implicated him in this case.
    There simply was no other evidence that could tend
    to show that Garrett was somehow involved in the
    commission of the victim’s murder, had a motive to
    commit the crime, or that his involvement necessarily
    exculpated the defendant from involvement as well.
    Thus, even when we consider this evidence in the light
    most favorable to the defendant, it did not establish a
    direct connection between the third party and the
    charged offense. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
    court properly determined that the defendant was not
    entitled to a jury instruction on third-party culpability.
    V
    The defendant’s final claim on appeal is that the court
    improperly declined to question a juror regarding an
    issue of juror partiality that was raised after the jury
    returned its verdict. Specifically, the defendant claims
    that the court’s inquiry was inadequate under State v.
    Brown, 
    235 Conn. 502
    , 
    668 A.2d 1288
     (1995), and that
    the court should have summoned the identified juror
    back to court and questioned him regarding the event
    that gave rise to a question about his partiality. We
    disagree.
    The following additional facts are relevant to this
    claim. On January 27, 2017, after the defendant was
    found guilty, but prior to sentencing, he filed a motion
    for a hearing. The defendant claimed in that motion
    that a juror had seen him being transported to court
    by a correctional officer during the first week of trial
    and thus became aware that he was incarcerated. This
    knowledge, the defendant argues, violated his constitu-
    tional right to the presumption of innocence. The court
    granted the motion in part and a hearing was held on
    the issue.
    At the hearing, the defendant testified to the following
    facts. A juror, who was driving a truck behind the defen-
    dant, saw the defendant while he was being transported
    to court in a prisoner transport vehicle. During trans-
    port, the defendant was wearing an orange jumpsuit,
    shackles and handcuffs, and was traveling in a light
    gray sedan with no markings and windows that were
    not tinted.11 The defendant was sitting across the seat
    with his back to the driver’s side door and his legs up.
    When he saw the defendant, the juror covered his face
    with a folder and slowed his vehicle in order to put
    distance between the two cars. The defendant first testi-
    fied that this interaction took five to six minutes, but
    on cross-examination, stated it was likely just over a
    minute. He also testified that he immediately told his
    attorney about the incident. His attorney, however, did
    not remember the defendant informing him of the inci-
    dent and had no notes recounting it.
    After the hearing, the court denied the defendant’s
    request to question the juror who allegedly saw him
    being transported to court. The court found that the
    defendant was not credible, and that even if the facts
    alleged by the defendant were to be believed, there was
    no basis for further inquiry.
    We turn to the law that governs the defendant’s
    claim.12 ‘‘Jury impartiality is a core requirement of the
    right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of
    Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amend-
    ment to the United States constitution. . . . In essence,
    the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally
    accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent
    jurors. . . . The modern jury is regarded as an institu-
    tion in our justice system that determines the case solely
    on the basis of the evidence and arguments given [it]
    in the adversary arena after proper instructions on the
    law by the court. . . . Consideration [by the jury] of
    extrinsic evidence is presumptively prejudicial because
    it implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to a
    fair trial before an impartial jury. . . .
    ‘‘In the past, [our Supreme Court has] recognized that
    the trial court has broad discretion to determine the
    form and scope of the proper response to allegations
    of jury misconduct. . . . In exercising that discretion,
    the trial court must zealously protect the rights of the
    accused. . . . We have limited our role, on appeal, to
    a consideration of whether the trial court’s review of
    alleged jury misconduct can fairly be characterized as
    an abuse of its discretion. . . . Even with this circum-
    scribed role, we have reserved the right to find an abuse
    of discretion in the highly unusual case in which such
    an abuse has occurred. . . . The trial judge’s discre-
    tion, which is a legal discretion, should be exercised
    in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner
    to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of
    substantial justice.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Id., 522–24.
    ‘‘Although both the state and a criminal defendant
    have an interest in impartial jury trials . . . after a jury
    verdict has been accepted, other state interests emerge
    that favor proceedings limited in form and scope. The
    state has a strong interest in the finality of judgments
    . . . and in protecting the privacy and integrity of jury
    deliberations, preventing juror harassment and main-
    taining public confidence in the jury system.’’ (Citations
    omitted.) Id., 531.
    Finally, Practice Book § 42-33 provides: ‘‘Upon
    inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be
    received to show the effect of any statement, conduct,
    event or condition upon the mind of a juror nor any
    evidence concerning mental processes by which the
    verdict was determined. Subject to these limitations, a
    juror’s testimony or affidavit shall be received when it
    concerns any misconduct which by law permits a jury
    to be impeached.’’ Therefore, a trial court must proceed
    carefully in examining jurors regarding their verdict for
    fear of straying into an improper examination of the
    mental processes used by the jurors in reaching their
    verdict. Cf. State v. Johnson, 
    288 Conn. 236
    , 264–65,
    
    951 A.2d 1257
     (2008).
    In the present case, the court held a hearing regarding
    the alleged misconduct and concluded that the defen-
    dant’s allegations were not credible. The court simply
    did not believe that the defendant told his attorney
    about the alleged incident or that the incident happened
    at all. After listening to testimony from the defendant
    and reviewing cases cited by counsel, the trial court
    held that there was ‘‘no factual or legal basis to conduct
    any further inquiry into [the] matter, nor [was] there a
    factual or legal basis for either the relief requested,
    which [was] further inquiry of . . . the juror who alleg-
    edly saw the defendant in a vehicle . . . [and] a motion
    for a new trial.’’ The court concluded that, even if the
    allegations were credited, the defendant was essentially
    in a civilian vehicle, that due to his position in the
    vehicle, his shackles and handcuffs would not have
    been visible, and that it was unclear whether his cloth-
    ing would have been visible.
    The defendant relies on State v. Brown, supra, 
    235 Conn. 502
    , to argue that the court was required to sum-
    mon the juror for questioning. Brown, however, is not
    factually similar to the present case. In Brown, an anon-
    ymous letter was sent to a judge alleging jury miscon-
    duct in a case over which the judge had presided. 
    Id.,
    519–20. Defense counsel learned of the letter on the
    day of sentencing. Id., 520. At that time, the defendant
    orally amended his motion for a new trial to include
    the alleged jury misconduct. Id., 520–21. The court
    heard brief argument on both the defendant’s motion
    for a judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial,
    and subsequently denied both motions. Id., 521. On
    appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court had
    violated his state and federal constitutional rights by
    failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to investigate
    the allegations of jury misconduct in the letter. Id. Our
    Supreme Court held that, although an evidentiary hear-
    ing was not required, ‘‘in the circumstances of this case,
    the trial court improperly failed to conduct any inquiry
    whatsoever specifically addressing the allegations of
    jury misconduct contained in the letter.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Id.
    Brown was ‘‘one of [the] highly unusual cases of an
    abuse of discretion.’’ Id., 524. ‘‘Although written anony-
    mously, the letter was accurately addressed to the judge
    who had presided over the defendant’s trial and con-
    tained accurate information about the defendant and
    the charges involved in the case. The letter also con-
    tained specific and facially credible allegations of jury
    exposure to racially derogatory remarks regarding the
    defendant allegedly made by court officials, and named
    as the source of these allegations a person who was
    accurately identified as a juror.’’ Id., 524–25.
    In the present case, and unlike Brown, the court held
    a hearing regarding the alleged juror misconduct and
    determined that the defendant’s allegations were not
    credible. It was well within the discretion of the court,
    especially considering the limitations of Practice Book
    § 42-33 and the state’s interest in preventing juror
    harassment, to decline to question a dismissed juror
    after evaluating the evidence from the hearing and
    determining that the allegations of misconduct simply
    were not credible. Brown does not require the court
    to conduct a full evidentiary hearing, and certainly does
    not require the court always to question a juror. There-
    fore, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining
    to question the juror regarding the alleged incident and
    by denying the defendant’s request for a new trial.
    The judgment is reversed only as to the conviction
    of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of § 29-
    35 (a) and the case is remanded with direction to render
    judgment of not guilty on that charge; the judgment is
    affirmed in all other respects.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The record is unclear as to whether Lamaine observed that the defen-
    dant’s bedroom door was open when the officers first arrived to the apart-
    ment, or after the initial search for the defendant.
    2
    The form stated: ‘‘I, Claudette Brown, having been informed of my consti-
    tutional right not to have a search conducted without a search warrant and
    my right to refuse to consent to such a search, I do hereby consent to have
    the following members conduct a complete search of my residence, place
    of business, garage and/or place located at 1022 Hancock [Avenue], third
    floor, Bridgeport, Connecticut.’’ The notice further stated that ‘‘these officers
    are authorized to take from the aforesaid mentioned location such materials
    or other property as they may desire and examine and perform tests on any
    and all items seized.’’ It also states that ‘‘this written permission is being
    given by me to the above named officers voluntarily and without duress,
    threats, intimidation, or promises of any kind.’’ The notice was then signed
    by Brown and two of the detectives or officers as witnesses.
    3
    If a person who does not have actual authority consents to a search,
    the search may still be valid under the doctrine of apparent authority. The
    United States Supreme Court has recognized an apparent authority doctrine,
    under which ‘‘a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of
    a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe
    to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not
    do so.’’ Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
    497 U.S. 177
    , 179, 
    110 S. Ct. 2793
    , 
    111 L. Ed. 2d 148
     (1990). The defendant argues that the trial court decided the motion
    to suppress on the basis of the doctrine of apparent authority, rather than
    actual authority, because it relied on Douros, which the defendant argues
    is an apparent authority case. We are not persuaded by the defendant’s
    argument that Douros was decided on the doctrine of apparent authority.
    See State v. Azukas, supra, 
    278 Conn. 280
     n.6. The court in Douros, and the
    trial court in the present case, decided their respective cases on the basis
    of the consenting party’s actual authority. Therefore, we do not undergo an
    analysis of the reasonableness of the officer’s inquiry as required by the
    apparent authority doctrine. See generally State v. Buie, 
    312 Conn. 574
    , 
    94 A.3d 608
     (2014).
    4
    Our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Azukas, supra, 
    278 Conn. 278
    ,
    imposes a burden shifting framework in circumstances in which ‘‘a son or
    daughter, whether or not still a minor, is residing in the home with the
    parents . . . .’’ In such circumstances, our Supreme Court has concluded
    that the child must overcome the presumptive authority of a parent to
    consent to search with sufficient evidence that the child has exclusive
    possession of the bedroom.
    5
    An ammunition tray is a tray designed to store bullets. Each hole in the
    tray is designed to hold one round of ammunition. The tray is a part of the
    packaging that is often included with the purchase of rounds of ammunition.
    6
    An electronic scale is customarily used by narcotics sellers to weigh
    narcotics in order to package and sell them. See State v. McNeil, 
    154 Conn. App. 727
    , 731, 
    106 A.3d 320
    , cert. denied, 
    316 Conn. 908
    , 
    111 A.3d 884
     (2015).
    7
    The state relies on State v. Miles, 
    97 Conn. App. 236
    , 242, 
    903 A.2d 675
    (2006), for the proposition that testimony that a ‘‘handgun’’ was used in the
    commission of the offense is enough to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
    that the firearm had a barrel of less than twelve inches. See also State v.
    Williams, 
    231 Conn. 235
    , 252, 
    645 A.2d 999
     (1994), overruled in part on
    other grounds by State v. Murray, 
    254 Conn. 472
    , 487, 
    757 A.2d 578
     (2000);
    State v. Covington, supra, 
    184 Conn. App. 345
    ; State v. Fleming, 
    111 Conn. App. 337
    , 347, 
    958 A.2d 1271
     (2008), cert. denied, 
    290 Conn. 903
    , 
    962 A.2d 794
     (2009); State v. Williams, 
    48 Conn. App. 361
    , 370–72, 
    709 A.2d 43
    , cert.
    denied, 
    245 Conn. 907
    , 
    718 A.2d 16
     (1998). The state places far more weight
    on Miles than it will bear. In Miles, and the other cases cited previously,
    there was testimony by an eyewitness who actually saw the firearm that
    was used during the commission of the offense and described it to be a
    ‘‘handgun,’’ a small pistol, or otherwise described how the firearm was
    handled or stored in a way such that it was likely to have a barrel length
    of less than twelve inches. Here, there was no eyewitness who observed
    the firearm used by the defendant and stated that it could be held in one
    hand or concealed in a small space.
    8
    We note that the Mississippi Supreme Court cited no authority for this
    common understanding. Moreover, this case was decided almost seventy-
    five years ago and common parlance changes over time and geographic areas.
    9
    The Automated Fingerprint Identification System is a database of all the
    images of the fingerprints taken either during an arrest booking procedure
    or fingerprints submitted for background checks through job application
    procedures. The database is kept in the state police bureau of identification.
    10
    The court however, did not preclude the defendant from arguing during
    closing arguments that the presence of Garrett’s fingerprint raised a reason-
    able doubt regarding the defendant’s guilt.
    11
    After the hearing had concluded, but before sentencing, the court con-
    tacted marshals at the Department of Correction and determined that the
    windows were, in fact, tinted. The court noted that this information did not
    affect the outcome of the hearing.
    12
    Although we examine the defendant’s claim under the rubric of juror
    misconduct, we recognize that even if the defendant’s version of events
    were true, these events would not constitute misconduct by a juror, but
    are more properly characterized as implicating the juror’s partiality. See
    generally Daley v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 
    187 Conn. App. 587
    ,        A.3d
    (2019) (contrasting juror misconduct from questions of juror com-
    petency).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC41385

Judges: Alvord, Prescott, Flynn

Filed Date: 3/12/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2024