In re Aisjaha N. ( 2020 )


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    IN RE AISJAHA N.*
    (AC 43680)
    DiPentima, C. J., and Moll and Harper, Js.**
    Syllabus
    The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
    trial court adjudicating her minor child, A, neglected. On appeal, the
    mother claimed that the trial court violated her due process rights when
    it denied her counsel’s oral motion for a continuance of the neglect
    trial because the mother was allegedly hospitalized. The mother had
    previously been found to be incompetent and was appointed a guardian
    ad litem. On the day of trial, the mother failed to appear. Counsel for
    the mother moved for a continuance, indicating to the court that she
    had been informed by the mother’s social worker that she could not
    attend because she had been hospitalized and asked that the trial not
    proceed without her. The mother’s guardian ad litem also objected to
    proceeding without her. Counsel for A objected to the continuance and
    contended that further delay would not be in the best interest of A. The
    court denied the motion and the trial proceeded without the mother. A
    was adjudicated neglected and committed to the custody of the peti-
    tioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. Held that the respon-
    dent mother’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court’s
    denial of her motion for a continuance of the neglect trial; this court,
    considering the three-pronged test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge (
    424 U.S. 319
    ), determined that the mother failed to present any authority
    for her proposition that a neglect proceeding necessarily implicates
    the fundamental right to parent one’s child, and her reliance on cases
    involving the termination of parental rights was misplaced because ter-
    mination proceedings differ vastly from neglect proceedings, as a peti-
    tion for neglect does not seek the permanent and irrevocable ending of
    parental rights, the mother had both an attorney and a guardian ad litem
    present to advocate on her behalf and, thus, the probable value of a
    continuance was lessened, and the government’s interest in ensuring
    the health and safety of A was significant, an interest that would have
    been substantially impacted by further delaying the resolution of A’s
    custodial placement, particularly in light of the fact that at the time of
    the trial, A was been under a temporary order of custody for almost
    one year.
    Argued May 18—officially released August 3, 2020***
    Procedural History
    Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
    lies to adjudicate the respondents’ minor child
    neglected, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
    district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, and tried to the
    court, Hon. John Turner, judge trial referee; judgment
    adjudicating the minor child neglected and ordering
    commitment to the custody of the Commissioner of
    Children and Families, from which the respondent
    mother appealed to this court. Affirmed.
    Benjamin M. Wattenmaker, assigned counsel, for the
    appellant (respondent mother).
    Stephen G. Vitelli, assistant attorney general, with
    whom were Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney gen-
    eral, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general,
    for the appellee (petitioner).
    Opinion
    DiPENTIMA, C. J. The sole issue in this appeal is
    whether the court, Hon. John Turner, judge trial ref-
    eree, erroneously denied the respondent mother’s
    motion for a continuance during a trial in which her
    daughter, Aisjaha N. (child), was adjudicated neglected.
    The oral motion, made by counsel for the respondent
    mother at the start of the hearing, was based on her
    alleged emergency hospitalization at the time of the
    hearing. The court denied the motion and the neglect
    hearing proceeded without the respondent mother pres-
    ent. The court found that the child was neglected and
    committed her to the care of the petitioner, the Commis-
    sioner of Children and Families. This appeal followed.
    In her appeal, the respondent mother argues that the
    trial court violated her due process rights under the
    fifth amendment to the United States constitution by
    denying her motion for a continuance of the petitioner’s
    neglect petition. The petitioner argues that the court
    properly denied her motion for a continuance and that
    the respondent mother’s due process rights were not
    implicated. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to this appeal. The petitioner filed a petition for
    neglect on November 25, 2018, alleging that the child
    had been abandoned, had been denied proper care and
    attention and was living under conditions injurious to
    her well-being. The respondent mother was served with
    an order for temporary custody, petition, summons,
    notice and an order to appear on December 7, 2018,
    and January 9, 2019. She appeared on December 7, 2018,
    and entered a plea of denial. The case was continued
    until January 23, 2019, for a case status conference and
    for the respondent mother to undergo a competency
    examination. The respondent mother failed to attend
    the hearing and the trial was continued to February
    20, 2019, when the respondent mother again failed to
    appear. On March 14, 2019, after a competency hearing,
    the respondent mother was found to be incompetent
    and proceedings were stayed for sixty days to allow
    the respondent mother to be restored to competency.
    On May 29, 2019, the court found that the respondent
    mother had not been restored to competency and
    appointed a guardian ad litem for her. The case then
    was continued to July 16, 2019, for a case status confer-
    ence at which a trial on the neglect petition was sched-
    uled for October 28, 2019.
    The respondent mother failed to appear for the Octo-
    ber 28, 2019 trial. At trial, counsel for the respondent
    mother reported that the respondent mother would not
    be present because she was hospitalized. Counsel
    stated: ‘‘I received word from [the social worker for
    the respondent mother] last week that she—although
    she had no verification because she didn’t have a release
    that she was told by the maternal grandmother that my
    client had been admitted to the hospital. This weekend
    I actually did receive a voice mail from my client stating
    that she was admitted to the hospital and would not
    be at today’s court date. She was anticipating that she
    would be released tomorrow, however, I’m not so sure
    that that will actually happen. I do not have a release.
    I just found out where she was and they’re not going
    to talk to me at the hospital. We’re hoping that perhaps
    the guardian ad litem will be able to . . . verify infor-
    mation with— by presenting papers to them that she’s
    been appointed as . . . the guardian ad litem.’’ Follow-
    ing a discussion between the attorneys and the court
    about the role of the guardian ad litem, the court asked
    if the parties were ready to proceed. Counsel for the
    respondent mother objected: ‘‘We are not [ready], Your
    Honor . . . [b]ecause my client is not present. She’s
    not competent. She can’t be defaulted and she’s admit-
    ted to the hospital. . . . And she also left me a voice
    mail requesting that because she can’t be present that
    we not proceed without her and that we continue the
    matter. So I cannot agree to proceed in her absence.’’
    The court stated: ‘‘Your client is not being defaulted.
    Your client is incompetent and because she is incompe-
    tent a guardian ad litem was appointed because she
    was unable to understand the nature of the proceedings
    and to assist her counsel in her defense. That’s the
    reason that we have [the] guardian ad litem.’’
    The guardian ad litem for the respondent mother
    also opposed proceeding: ‘‘I also object to the matter
    proceeding because although she is not competent to
    assist her counsel, that does not mean she is not compe-
    tent to assist me as her guardian ad litem and, in fact,
    I believe it is required of me as guardian ad litem to
    first attempt to . . . explain proceedings in a manner
    that she can understand. She has the right to be present
    during her trial and it is also incumbent upon me as
    her guardian ad litem to request such accommodations
    as are necessary to best serve . . . my ward given her
    limitations.’’ The attorney for the minor child stated
    that further delaying the proceedings would not be in
    the best interest of the child. After a brief recess, the
    hearing began with counsel for the respondent mother
    renewing her objection to the trial proceeding: ‘‘Your
    Honor, at this time I . . . would like to renew my objec-
    tion to proceeding in my client’s absence given that she
    is incompetent. The guardian ad litem is supposed to
    explain the process as it goes . . . along in a manner
    she can understand. She can’t do that without her being
    present and my client did leave me a voice mail saying
    that she was involuntarily hospitalized and that she
    wanted this matter continued.’’
    The court then stated: ‘‘I’ll point out that mother
    underwent a competency evaluation. It was determined
    that she is incompetent and in need of a guardian ad
    litem. She was determined to be incompetent because
    she was unable to understand the nature of the proceed-
    ings and to assist her lawyer with regard to her defense,
    and that [the guardian ad litem] was appointed . . .
    in May of 2019 and [the guardian ad litem] filed her
    appearance as [guardian ad litem] for mother shortly
    thereafter, and I understand it’s been orally represented
    without any documentation or other corroboration that
    mother is not present today because she is undergoing
    treatment in a facility . . . .’’
    During the trial, the child’s maternal grandmother
    testified that her daughter, the respondent mother, was
    hospitalized at the time of trial at Saint Raphael’s Hospi-
    tal. She testified that she knew that because she went
    to visit her there during the week before trial. The
    child’s grandmother brought forms completed by the
    respondent mother’s physician that the grandmother
    planned to submit to the Probate Court in order to seek
    conservatorship. These forms, admitted into evidence
    during the hearing, however, did not indicate that the
    respondent mother was hospitalized the morning of
    trial.
    In the court’s memorandum of decision finding the
    petitioner had proved the allegations of neglect as to
    the child, the court set forth the explanation for the
    respondent mother’s failure to appear provided by her
    counsel. ‘‘Counsel for [the respondent mother] reported
    that she believed [respondent mother] was not present
    because [she] was in a hospital. Reportedly, her client’s
    mother (maternal grandmother) had been told a week
    prior to the trial (by someone not identified) that
    [respondent mother] had been admitted to the hospital.
    Counsel’s representation that [respondent mother] had
    been admitted to the hospital was based on a message
    from a social worker stating she’d been told by the
    maternal grandmother that her client had been admitted
    to the hospital. The social worker further stated to . . .
    counsel she’d been unable to verify the information.
    Counsel’s representation that [her client] had been
    admitted to the hospital and could not attend the trial
    was further based on a voice mail message from an
    unidentified person (whom counsel believed to be [her
    client]), that she ‘was admitted to the hospital and
    would not be at today’s court date.’ Counsel stated
    because she had no release, no verification or other
    corroboration to offer the court, she was unable to
    confirm that [respondent mother] was in fact in the
    hospital. Counsel was without knowledge or reliable
    information regarding [her client’s] purported admis-
    sion to a hospital or whether [she] had been discharged
    from the hospital and was unable to come to court
    following her discharge. Given the above, the court
    ordered the parties to proceed with the trial.’’ The court
    further noted that the ‘‘request for a continuance was
    predicated upon counsel’s unsubstantiated and uncor-
    roborated hearsay twice removed. If true, [the respon-
    dent] mother had been hospitalized for about one week
    thus, there had been adequate time to obtain some
    written corroboration of [the respondent] mother’s hos-
    pitalization and moreover, a written motion for a contin-
    uance of the trial should have been filed. Neither
    occurred. The court regarded counsel’s statement of
    what was reported to her via a voice mail message
    from an unidentified person, to be untrustworthy and
    unreliable. The court declined to rely on it and attached
    no weight or credibility to it. Counsel’s objection to
    proceeding with the trial was overruled and her request
    for a continuance was denied.’’ The court also noted
    that, following the objection, the attorney for the minor
    child ‘‘immediately requested the court to proceed with
    the trial citing her client has been under an order of
    temporary custody for a long time and averring that
    further delay was not in the child’s best interest.’’ The
    court found that the child was in a state of neglect. The
    court determined that it was in the best interest of the
    child that she be placed in the custody of the petitioner.
    This appeal followed.
    We first address the standard of review. The peti-
    tioner and the respondent mother differ on the applica-
    ble standard of review that should guide our review of
    the respondent mother’s claim. The respondent mother
    argues that our review is plenary because her due pro-
    cess rights were implicated in the court’s denial of her
    continuance. In support of her argument that plenary
    review should apply, the respondent mother empha-
    sizes that the right to parent a child is a fundamental
    one and discusses the procedural protections that are
    offered during a hearing on the termination of parental
    rights. A motion for a continuance that is denied, if
    it implicates a fundamental right, can prompt plenary
    review to determine if it constituted a denial of proce-
    dural due process. See In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.
    App. 592, 602, 
    767 A.2d 155
    (2001) (reviewing denial of
    motion for continuance during petition for termination
    of parental rights). Here, however, the motion for a
    continuance was denied during a trial on a petition for
    neglect, not a petition for the termination of parental
    rights, as in In re Shaquanna M.
    Conversely, the petitioner argues that, because the
    respondent mother’s due process rights were not
    affected, the applicable standard of review is abuse of
    discretion. Further, the petitioner emphasizes that we
    generally review a denial of a motion for a continuance
    for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Beckenbach, 
    198 Conn. 43
    , 47, 
    501 A.2d 752
    (1985).
    To determine which standard of review is applicable,
    we turn to In re Shaquanna 
    M., supra
    , 
    61 Conn. App. 594
    . In that case, the respondent claimed that she was
    denied her procedural due process rights when the trial
    court denied her motion for a continuance during a
    termination of parental rights trial.
    Id. This court framed
    the issue as ‘‘whether a continuance was necessary to
    ensure the respondent’s right to due process.’’
    Id., 600.
    In addressing the respondent’s claim, this court began
    its analysis with the following: ‘‘Whether the denial of
    a continuance has been shown by the respondent to
    have interfered with her basic constitutional right to
    raise her children, thereby depriving her of procedural
    due process, is the issue of this case. Its resolution is
    a question of law for which our review is plenary. . . .
    The abuse of discretion standard does not apply to
    constitutional . . . claims, which are reviewed de novo
    by the courts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Id. Although, in the
    present case, the respondent’s
    motion for a continuance was denied in a neglect pro-
    ceeding, and not a termination of parental rights pro-
    ceeding, the respondent’s claim and arguments in sup-
    port thereof are similar to those presented in In re
    Shaquanna M.—that the denial of the motion for a
    continuance interfered with her fundamental right.
    Therefore, in accordance with In re Shaquanna M., we
    exercise plenary review and, accordingly, we conclude
    that the trial court did not err in denying the respondent
    mother’s motion for a continuance and proceeding to
    trial on the neglect petition.1
    A denial of procedural due process triggers analysis
    under the three-pronged test developed in Mathews v.
    Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 
    96 S. Ct. 893
    , 
    47 L. Ed. 2d 18
    (1976). This test balances three competing interests:
    ‘‘[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the
    official action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
    tion of such interest through the procedures used, and
    the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
    procedural safeguards; and finally, the [g]overnment’s
    interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
    and the administrative burdens that the additional or
    substitute procedural requirements would entail.’’
    Id., 335.
       As to the first prong, the respondent mother argues
    that the interest involved here is her fundamental right
    to parent her child. She contends that the petitioner’s
    neglect petition, which sought to place her child in the
    custody of the petitioner, infringed on that constitu-
    tional right. In support of this position, the respondent
    mother cites to cases involving the termination of paren-
    tal rights. See In re Matthew P., 
    153 Conn. App. 667
    ,
    
    102 A.3d 1127
    , cert. denied, 
    315 Conn. 902
    , 
    104 A.3d 106
    (2014); In re Shaquanna 
    M., supra
    , 
    61 Conn. App. 592
    . At issue here, however, is a petition for neglect.
    General Statutes § 46b-129 (b) provides in relevant part
    that a child may be found neglected if ‘‘there is reason-
    able cause to believe that (1) the child or youth is
    suffering from serious physical illness or serious physi-
    cal injury or is in immediate physical danger from the
    child’s or youth’s surroundings, and (2) as a result of
    said conditions, the child’s or youth’s safety is endan-
    gered and immediate removal from such surroundings
    is necessary to ensure the child’s or youth’s safety
    . . . .’’ The court then either holds a hearing with the
    parents or caretaker of the child to determine whether
    the court should vest the child’s temporary care and
    custody in another person or suitable agency, or issues
    an ex parte order vesting the child’s temporary care in
    another person or agency. See General Statutes § 46b-
    129 (b). Following the hearing, the court shall issue
    ‘‘specific steps the commissioner and the parent or
    guardian shall take for the parent or guardian to regain
    or to retain custody of the child or youth . . . .’’ Gen-
    eral Statutes § 46b-129 (c) (6).
    The respondent mother argues that the neglect pro-
    ceeding is an infringement on her fundamental right to
    parent her child. She cites no authority for the proposi-
    tion that a neglect proceeding necessarily implicates
    that right. Moreover, the right to parent a child is not
    limitless. See Roth v. Weston, 
    259 Conn. 202
    , 224, 
    789 A.2d 431
    (2002). In fact, the state has the responsibility
    to act in order to protect the health and safety of chil-
    dren.
    Id. Indeed, ‘‘it is
    unquestionable that in the face of
    allegations that parents are unfit, the state may intrude
    upon a family’s integrity.§ Id.; see also General Statutes
    §§ 17a-112 (j) and 45a-717.
    The respondent mother’s argument also overlooks
    the fact that a neglect petition initiates a proceeding
    that has a distinctly different goal from that of a termina-
    tion of parental rights proceeding. A petition for neglect
    does not seek the permanent and irrevocable ending
    of the parental rights that is central to the termination
    proceeding. See, e.g., In re Jermaine S., 
    86 Conn. App. 819
    , 828 n.7, 
    863 A.2d 720
    , cert. denied, 
    273 Conn. 938
    ,
    
    875 A.2d 43
    (2005). Indeed, one of the goals of a neglect
    proceeding is the development of specific steps that
    will allow the parent to regain custody of his or her
    child. Accordingly, the respondent mother’s reliance on
    termination of parental rights cases is misplaced.
    The second prong of Mathews addresses the risk of
    an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of
    additional or substitute procedural safeguards. See
    Mathews v. 
    Eldridge, supra
    , 
    424 U.S. 335
    . The respon-
    dent mother contends that granting her motion for a
    continuance was an additional procedure that would
    have substantial value. She argues further that the pres-
    ence of the guardian ad litem and attorney were not
    enough to protect the respondent mother from wrongful
    deprivation. The petitioner maintains that granting the
    continuance would not have added significant value
    because the respondent mother’s interests were pro-
    tected sufficiently by her attorney and the guardian ad
    litem who was assigned to represent the respondent
    mother’s interests.
    It is well established that ‘‘each party to a litigation
    has the undoubted right to be present at the trial.’’
    Anderson v. Snyder, 
    91 Conn. 404
    , 408, 
    99 A. 1032
    (1917). This right, however, is not absolute. If a litigant
    does not appear or is voluntarily absent from court,
    the court is not required to halt proceedings until that
    person can attend. See Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein,
    
    138 Conn. 28
    , 35, 
    82 A.2d 146
    (1951).
    The guardian ad litem supported the respondent
    mother’s motion for continuance and told the court that,
    ‘‘although [the respondent mother] is not competent
    to assist her counsel, that does not mean she is not
    competent to assist me as her guardian ad litem and,
    in fact, I believe it is required of me as guardian ad
    litem to first attempt to . . .explain proceedings in a
    matter that she can understand. She has the right to be
    present during her trial and it is incumbent upon me
    as her guardian ad litem to request such accommoda-
    tions as are necessary to best serve . . . my ward given
    her limitations.’’
    The court denied the motion for a continuance and
    stated: ‘‘Your client is not being defaulted. Your client
    is incompetent and because she is incompetent a guard-
    ian ad litem was appointed because she was unable to
    understand the nature of the proceedings and to assist
    her counsel in her defense.’’
    The record reveals that the respondent mother’s
    attorney and her guardian ad litem advocated zealously
    on her behalf throughout the trial. Further, the court
    did not default the respondent mother for not attending
    the hearing. Although the guardian ad litem does not
    replace the respondent mother at trial, the potential
    value of a continuance was lessened by the presence
    of the guardian ad litem and the previous finding that
    the respondent mother was incompetent. Significantly,
    in response to the request for the continuance, the attor-
    ney for the minor child stated: ‘‘Your Honor, I ask that
    the trial proceed. . . . [T]his child has been under an
    order of temporary custody for quite a long time. Mother
    is incompetent to participate in any proceedings at any
    rate. I just think that further delay is not in the best
    interest of the child.’’ In addition, as noted by the trial
    court, if the respondent mother had been hospitalized
    since the prior week, ‘‘there had been adequate time
    to obtain some written corroboration of [her] hospital-
    ization and moreover, a written motion for a continu-
    ance of the trial should have been filed.’’
    The final prong to be considered is the government’s
    interest, including the financial and administrative bur-
    dens of additional procedures. See Mathews v.
    
    Eldridge, supra
    , 
    424 U.S. 335
    . The government’s interest
    here, ensuring the health and safety of the child, is
    significant. Granting the continuance likely would have
    placed a substantial burden on this governmental inter-
    est, particularly, as noted by the attorney for the minor
    child, in light of the prior repeated delays in this case,
    mostly as a result of the respondent mother’s failure
    to appear. As discussed previously in this opinion, the
    petitioner invoked a ninety-six hour hold on November
    25, 2018, and then moved for an order of temporary
    custody and a neglect petition on November 28, 2018.
    The respondent mother appeared on the first court date
    on December 7, 2018, but failed to appear on January
    23 and February 20, 2019, for subsequent hearings. At
    the time of the trial on October 28, 2019, the child had
    been under an order of temporary custody for almost
    one year. As discussed previously in this opinion, at
    trial, the attorney for the minor child noted that the
    child had been under the order of temporary custody
    for a lengthy period of time and argued that further
    delay was not in the best interest of the child.
    Although the financial and administrative burdens of
    continuing the hearing may not have been significant,
    the delay in resolving the child’s custodial placement
    would have substantially impacted the government’s
    interest in resolving the child’s custodial determination
    swiftly and ensuring the care and safety of the child.
    We note the importance of individuals, especially par-
    ents in child custody proceedings, being able to attend
    hearings in which their fundamental rights are at issue.
    This, however, is not such a case. Accordingly, our
    consideration of the Mathews factors leads us to con-
    clude that the respondent mother’s procedural due pro-
    cess rights were not violated by the court’s denial of her
    motion for a continuance of the neglect proceeding.2
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
    (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
    appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
    for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
    order of the Appellate Court.
    ** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
    the date of oral argument.
    *** August 3, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip
    opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
    1
    This claim was preserved, and thus we need not consider the Golding
    factors as presented in the respondent mother’s brief. See State v. Golding,
    213 Conn, 233, 239–40, 
    567 A.2d 823
    (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,
    
    317 Conn. 773
    , 781, 
    120 A.3d 1188
    (2015).
    2
    We also note that the court did not default the respondent mother for
    not attending the hearing and, therefore, the petitioner was put to her proof
    on the allegations of the petition.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: AC43680

Filed Date: 8/11/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021