Godfrey v. Commissioner of Correction ( 2021 )


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    ROBERT C. GODFREY v. COMMISSIONER
    OF CORRECTION
    (AC 42890)
    Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Suarez, Js
    Syllabus
    The petitioner, who had pleaded guilty to murder, appealed to this court
    from the judgment of the habeas court, which denied his petition for a
    writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that his guilty
    plea should be vacated pursuant to the doctrine of frustration of purpose
    because the subsequent abolishment of the death penalty in Connecticut
    frustrated his principal purpose in accepting the plea agreement, namely,
    to avoid the death penalty. The relief he sought was a judgment vacating
    the original plea agreement and the remand of his case for resentencing
    in accordance with a plea that would have been negotiated had the
    death penalty been unavailable. The habeas court, after a trial at which
    both of the petitioner’s trial counsel testified, concluded that the peti-
    tioner failed to prove that his principal purpose for agreeing to enter a
    guilty plea was substantially frustrated by the subsequent abolition of
    the death penalty and that he had assumed the risk that the death penalty
    subsequently might be abolished. On the granting of certification, the
    petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the petitioner cannot prevail
    on his claim that he was entitled to relief under the frustration of purpose
    doctrine because, even if this court assumed that the frustration of
    purpose doctrine applied to plea agreements, by accepting the plea
    agreement, contract principles dictate that the petitioner assumed the
    risk that at some point the death penalty could be abolished: the record
    demonstrated that the terms of the agreement were unambiguous, that
    the petitioner was fully aware of the consequences of his bargain, and
    the parties, having been made aware of the potential for future favorable
    changes to the law, intended for the plea agreement to remain enforce-
    able notwithstanding any future changes to the law, including the subse-
    quent abolition of the death penalty in Connecticut, which did not change
    the petitioner’s expectations under the agreement, namely, that he serve
    a full sixty year sentence and not be permitted to appeal or withdraw his
    guilty plea after the court imposed the agreed upon sentence; moreover,
    although the petitioner may have miscalculated the likely penalties
    attached to alternative courses of action, an individual cannot withdraw
    a guilty plea merely because a subsequent change in the law rendered
    the maximum penalty for the crime in question less than was reasonably
    assumed at the time the plea was entered, even when the maximum
    penalty at issue was death, and any such miscalculation did not provide
    a basis to grant habeas relief to the petitioner regarding his guilty plea;
    furthermore, as our Supreme Court unequivocally has rejected the ame-
    lioration doctrine, which provides that amendments to statutes that
    lessen their penalties are applied retroactively, it would be improper to
    vacate the petitioner’s guilty plea pursuant to the frustration of purpose
    doctrine, which in this instance is the functional equivalent of applying
    the amelioration doctrine and which would work a substantial injustice
    on the state in new plea negotiations as the petitioner would enjoy a
    much greater degree of leverage than in the first negotiation because
    of the numerous difficulties attendant to securing a conviction at trial
    nearly twenty years after the crime was committed, including evidence
    that has become stale, memories that have faded, and witnesses that
    may no longer be available.
    Argued October 8, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021
    Procedural History
    Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
    brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
    of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
    denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
    granting of certification, appealed to this court.
    Affirmed.
    Vishal K. Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellant
    (petitioner).
    Tamara Grosso, assistant state’s attorney, with
    whom, on the brief, were Laurie N. Feldman, deputy
    assistant state’s attorney, and Gail P. Hardy, former
    state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
    Opinion
    PRESCOTT, J. This appeal presents the important
    question of whether, under the common-law contrac-
    tual ‘‘frustration of purpose’’ doctrine, a habeas peti-
    tioner who had been charged with a capital felony and
    pleaded guilty to murder in order to avoid the imposi-
    tion of the death penalty is entitled to withdraw his
    guilty plea sixteen years later because the death penalty
    has since been abolished. We conclude that, even if the
    frustration of purpose doctrine applies to criminal plea
    agreements, the petitioner, Robert C. Godfrey, is not
    entitled to relief under that doctrine because by entering
    into the plea agreement, he assumed the risk that the
    death penalty might be abolished at some point while he
    was serving his sentence of sixty years of incarceration.
    The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the
    habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus.1 On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court
    improperly concluded that he was not entitled to habeas
    relief with respect to a collateral attack on his guilty
    plea because (1) he failed to prove that his principal
    purpose for entering into a guilty plea with an agreed
    upon sixty year sentence was substantially frustrated
    by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty and
    (2) he had assumed the risk that the law might change in
    his favor.2 We conclude that the habeas court properly
    determined that the petitioner had assumed the risk
    that the death penalty might be abolished at some point
    while he was serving his sixty year sentence, and, there-
    fore, we do not reach his first claim. Accordingly, we
    affirm the judgment of the habeas court.
    The following facts and procedural history are rele-
    vant to our disposition of the petitioner’s claims.3 On
    November 9, 2001, the East Hartford police responded
    to apartment 209 of an apartment complex on a report
    that a woman was found dead. Upon arrival, the police
    observed the woman’s nude body, with a large open
    wound to the back of her head, lying face down next
    to the bed. There were large amounts of blood on the
    walls, the bed, and the floors of the apartment. In the
    kitchen, there were what appeared to be bloody foot-
    prints. The footprints led from apartment 209, up the
    outer staircase, to the door of apartment 309, which is
    where the petitioner lived. When the petitioner first was
    interviewed by the police, he indicated that he knew
    the victim, and that they may have had a few beers
    together, but he did not know how the bloody footprints
    could have ended up outside of his doorway. The peti-
    tioner consented to the taking of a DNA sample, which
    later was determined by the medical examiner to match
    the semen found in the victim. The cause of the victim’s
    death was cranial cerebral trauma, caused by ten to
    fifteen blows from a sharp instrument. A search warrant
    was executed at the petitioner’s apartment, where the
    police found bloody footprints inside, which later were
    determined to match the petitioner’s own footprints,
    and clothes stained with the victim’s blood.
    On November 27, 2001, the petitioner was charged
    with capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
    to 2001) § 53a-54b (7), murder in violation of General
    Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General
    Statutes § 53a-54c, two counts of burglary in the first
    degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1)
    (2), and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree
    in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1). There-
    after, the petitioner entered into a plea agreement with
    the state. Pursuant to the agreement, the state filed a
    substitute information charging the petitioner with one
    count of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a), to which
    he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of
    sixty years of incarceration. On March 11, 2004, the
    court canvassed the petitioner regarding his guilty plea.
    Through that canvass, the court determined, inter alia,
    that the petitioner understood that (1) the guilty plea
    was ‘‘for keeps,’’ meaning that he would not be permit-
    ted to ‘‘change his mind later and take it back,’’ (2) he
    could not withdraw his guilty plea ‘‘unless the court
    doesn’t impose a sentence agreed upon,’’ (3) he was
    ‘‘giving up any rights to an appeal,’’ and (4) the sentenc-
    ing statute required that he serve the sixty years ‘‘day
    for day.’’ The court found that there was a factual basis
    for the petitioner’s guilty plea and that it was knowingly
    and voluntarily made. The court then accepted the plea
    and later sentenced the petitioner, consistent with the
    plea agreement, to a term of sixty years of impris-
    onment.
    On April 25, 2012, No. 12-5 of the 2012 Public Acts
    (P.A. 12-5) was signed into law, prospectively repealing
    the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after
    that date, and retaining the death penalty for capital
    felonies committed prior to that date. Three years later,
    our Supreme Court, in State v. Santiago, 
    318 Conn. 1
    ,
    119, 
    122 A.3d 1
     (2015), held that the imposition of the
    death penalty on offenders who committed capital
    crimes prior to the enactment of P.A. 12-5 would violate
    article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution,
    thus effectively abolishing the death penalty in Con-
    necticut.
    Following the release of the Santiago decision, the
    petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    On April 17, 2018, the petitioner filed an amended peti-
    tion that alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel
    in count one and, in count two, that his guilty plea
    should be vacated pursuant to the doctrine of frustra-
    tion of purpose because the abolishment of the death
    penalty in Connecticut frustrated his principal purpose
    in accepting the plea agreement, namely, to avoid the
    death penalty. The relief sought in the petition is a
    judgment vacating the original plea agreement and the
    remand of his case for resentencing ‘‘in accordance
    with the plea that would have been negotiated had the
    death penalty been unavailable.’’ The respondent, the
    Commissioner of Correction, filed a return on May 21,
    2018, in which he asserted that the petitioner failed to
    state a ground on which relief can be granted, and
    raised the defense of procedural default. Thereafter,
    the respondent filed a motion to dismiss count two of
    the petition on the same grounds alleged in the return.
    At the habeas trial, on September 4, 2018, the petitioner
    withdrew count one of the petition and three witnesses
    testified, including the petitioner and both of his trial
    counsel, as to count two.
    Specifically, both trial counsel testified, inter alia,
    that they recommended to the petitioner that he plead
    guilty because there was a significant likelihood that
    he would receive the death penalty if the case went to
    trial because of the ‘‘horrific’’ nature of the crime and
    the weakness of evidence regarding any mitigating fac-
    tors that might persuade the jury to decline to vote in
    favor of the death penalty.4 One of the petitioner’s trial
    counsel, Attorney Barry Butler, stated that he advised
    the petitioner that a sixty year sentence, which he would
    be required to serve in full, thereby rendering him ineli-
    gible for release until he is approximately ninety years
    old, was more favorable than a life sentence without
    the possibility of parole because of the potential for
    future changes to the law that would make someone
    with a finite sentence eligible for early release.5 Attor-
    ney Butler also stated that he had discussed with the
    petitioner the possibility that one day the state might
    abolish the death penalty, although he did not have
    a specific expectation at that time that it would be
    abolished. The petitioner testified, inter alia, that
    avoiding the death penalty was ‘‘somewhat important’’
    to him, that he was scared of the death penalty, and
    that he would not have pleaded guilty and agreed to
    a sixty year sentence if the death penalty had been
    unavailable. In addition, he stated that he did not want
    to plead guilty to a sexual assault, which was consistent
    with Attorney Butler’s testimony that pleading guilty to
    sexual assault was a ‘‘deal breaker’’ for the petitioner.
    The habeas court rendered judgment on March 8, 2019,
    denying the amended habeas petition.6 Specifically, the
    court concluded that, as a matter of first impression,
    the frustration of purpose doctrine, which is typically
    applied in civil cases alleging breach of contract, also
    applies to criminal plea agreements. The court then
    applied that doctrine and found that the petitioner failed
    to prove that (1) his principal purpose for agreeing to
    enter a guilty plea was substantially frustrated by the
    subsequent abolition of the death penalty,7 and (2) he
    did not assume the risk that the death penalty subse-
    quently might be abolished.8 On March 18, 2019, the
    habeas court granted the petitioner certification to
    appeal the habeas court’s judgment. This appeal fol-
    lowed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.
    On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
    properly determined that the frustration of purpose doc-
    trine applies to plea agreements, but improperly con-
    cluded that he was not entitled to habeas relief because
    (1) he failed to prove that his principal purpose for
    entering into a guilty plea was substantially frustrated
    by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty and
    (2) he had assumed the risk that the law might change
    in his favor. In response, the respondent argues that
    this court need not decide whether the frustration of
    purpose doctrine applies to plea agreements in general
    or in all circumstances because, even assuming
    arguendo that it does apply, the petitioner has failed
    to satisfy all four factors required for its applicability.
    We agree with the respondent.
    We begin by setting forth certain governing principles
    of law as well as our standard of review. ‘‘It is well
    settled that [p]rinciples of contract law and special due
    process concerns for fairness govern our interpretation
    of plea agreements. . . . As has previously been
    explained in the context of plea agreements, [t]he pri-
    mary goal of contract interpretation is to effectuate the
    intent of the parties . . . . In ascertaining that intent,
    we employ an objective standard and look to what the
    parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the
    plea agreement on the basis of their words and conduct,
    and in light of the circumstances surrounding the mak-
    ing of the agreement and the purposes they sought to
    accomplish. . . . [T]he threshold determination as to
    whether a plea agreement is ambiguous as to the parties’
    intent is a question of law subject to plenary review.’’
    (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation
    marks omitted.) State v. Kallberg, 
    326 Conn. 1
    , 14–16,
    
    160 A.3d 1034
     (2017).
    ‘‘The doctrine of frustration of purpose . . . excuses
    a promisor in certain situations where the objectives
    of the contract have been utterly defeated by circum-
    stances arising after the formation of the agreement.
    . . . Excuse is allowed under this rule even though
    there is no impediment to actual performance. . . . A
    party claiming that a supervening event or contingency
    has frustrated, and thus excused, a promised perfor-
    mance must demonstrate that: (1) the event substan-
    tially frustrated his principal purpose; (2) the nonoccur-
    rence of the supervening event was a basic assumption
    on which the contract was made; (3) the frustration
    resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be
    excused; and (4) the party has not assumed a greater
    obligation than the law imposes.’’ (Citation omitted;
    internal quotation marks omitted.) Howard-Arnold,
    Inc. v. T.N.T. Realty, Inc., 
    315 Conn. 596
    , 605, 
    109 A.3d 473
     (2015). Moreover, ‘‘[t]he establishment of the
    defense requires convincing proof of a changed situa-
    tion so severe that it is not fairly regarded as being
    within the risks assumed under the contract.’’ (Footnote
    omitted.) 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 640 (2020). ‘‘The
    doctrine of frustration of purpose is given a narrow
    construction so as to preserve the certainty of contracts
    . . . .’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., § 641.9
    ‘‘The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole
    arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight
    to be given to their testimony. . . . [T]his court cannot
    disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas court
    unless they are clearly erroneous . . . .’’ (Citation
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brooks v.
    Commissioner of Correction, 
    105 Conn. App. 149
    , 153,
    
    937 A.2d 699
    , cert. denied, 
    286 Conn. 904
    , 
    943 A.2d 1101
    (2008). ‘‘The application of the habeas court’s factual
    findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, pre-
    sents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject
    to plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    306 Conn. 664
    ,
    677, 
    51 A.3d 948
     (2012). ’’The excuse of frustration [of
    purpose] is a question of law, to be determined by the
    court from the facts of the case.’’ 17A Am. Jur. 2d, supra,
    § 640. Accordingly, we apply a plenary standard of
    review to the present case, and will not disturb the
    underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they
    are clearly erroneous.
    I
    As the respondent correctly recognizes, we do not
    need to determine definitively whether the frustration
    of purpose doctrine applies to plea agreements in Con-
    necticut because, even if we assume, consistent with
    the conclusion of numerous state and federal courts,
    that it does, the petitioner would not be entitled to
    relief under the doctrine because, by accepting the plea
    agreement, contract principles dictate that he assumed
    the risk that at some point the death penalty could be
    abolished. See United States v. Morgan, 
    406 F.3d 135
    ,
    137 (2d Cir. 2005) (‘‘the possibility of a favorable change
    in the law after a plea is simply one of the risks that
    accompanies pleas and plea agreements’’), cert. denied,
    
    546 U.S. 980
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 549
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 465
     (2005);
    see also United States v. Bradley, 
    400 F.3d 459
    , 464
    (6th Cir. 2005) (‘‘Plea bargains always entail risks for
    the parties . . . [including] risks relating to future
    developments in the law. The salient point is that a plea
    agreement allocates risk between the two parties as
    they see fit. If courts disturb the parties’ allocation of
    risk in an agreement, they threaten to damage the par-
    ties’ ability to ascertain their legal rights when they sit
    down at the bargaining table and, more problematically
    for criminal defendants, they threaten to reduce the
    likelihood that prosecutors will bargain away counts
    . . . with the knowledge that the agreement will be
    immune from challenge on appeal.’’), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 862
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 145
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 144
     (2005).
    Here, the record is clear that the terms of the agree-
    ment were unambiguous and that the petitioner was
    fully aware of the consequences of his bargain. In other
    words, he knew precisely what he was gaining and what
    he was giving up when he opted for the certainty of
    pleading guilty to a single count of murder in exchange
    for a sixty year sentence, as opposed to standing trial
    for capital felony, murder, felony murder, burglary in
    the first degree, and sexual assault in the first degree
    and facing a potential sentence of (1) death, (2) life in
    prison without the possibility of parole, or (3) a sen-
    tence of 100 years or more of incarceration. See United
    States v. Roque, 
    421 F.3d 118
    , 123 (2d Cir. 2005) (‘‘View-
    ing this plea agreement as a contract, we agree that
    certain conditions have changed since the bargain was
    struck. We further acknowledge that, had the parties
    known what they know now . . . they might have bar-
    gained differently and might even have reached a differ-
    ent bargain. This is simply not relevant to whether [the
    defendant’s] plea is enforceable, however. [The defen-
    dant] understood fully the consequences of his bargain,
    both in terms of what he was gaining and what he was
    giving up. . . . [I]n opting for certainty, both parties
    accepted the risk that conditions relevant to their then-
    contemporary bargain, including [the law], might
    change.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.)), cert. denied sub nom. Delahoz v. United
    States, 
    546 U.S. 1120
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1094
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 908
     (2006).
    Specifically, Attorney Butler advised the petitioner
    that a sixty year sentence, which he would be required
    to serve in full, is preferable to a life sentence without
    the possibility of parole because of the potential for
    future changes to the law that would make someone
    with a finite sentence eligible for early release. Attorney
    Butler likewise discussed with the petitioner the possi-
    bility that one day the state might abolish the death
    penalty. In addition, both of the petitioner’s trial counsel
    recommended to him that he take the plea deal in view
    of what they perceived to be a significant likelihood
    that he would be convicted at trial and sentenced to
    death. With this knowledge, the petitioner elected to
    limit his criminal exposure, forgo a lengthy capital trial
    and its attendant stress for himself and his family,10
    and accept a sixty year sentence, which left open the
    potential for him to be released at age ninety or earlier
    if he became eligible for parole because of a favorable
    change in our parole eligibility laws. Moreover, as the
    trial court’s thorough canvass illustrates, the petitioner
    understood that under the terms of the agreement (1)
    his guilty plea was ‘‘for keeps’’ in that he would not be
    permitted to ‘‘change his mind later and take it back,’’
    (2) he was waiving ‘‘any rights to an appeal,’’ (3) he
    could not withdraw his guilty plea unless the court did
    not impose the agreed upon sentence, and (4) he would
    serve a sixty year sentence ‘‘day for day.’’ See United
    States v. Roque, supra, 
    421 F.3d 123
     (‘‘In no circum-
    stances . . . may a defendant, who has secured the
    benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and volunta-
    rily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then
    appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agree-
    ment. Such a remedy would render the plea bargaining
    process and the resulting agreement meaningless.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), quoting United
    States v. Salcido-Contreras, 
    990 F.2d 51
    , 53 (2d Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    509 U.S. 931
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 3060
    , 
    125 L. Ed. 2d 742
     (1993). That the petitioner agreed to these unam-
    biguous terms, after having been made aware of the
    potential for future favorable changes to the law, indi-
    cates that the parties intended for the plea agreement to
    remain enforceable notwithstanding any future changes
    to the law.11 See State v. Kallberg, supra, 
    326 Conn. 15
     (‘‘An unambiguous agreement is presumptively an
    accurate reflection of the parties’ intent. Thus, [when]
    the language is unambiguous, we must give the contract
    effect according to its terms.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.)). In addition, because the petitioner’s counsel
    specifically discussed with the petitioner the possibility
    that one day the state might abolish the death penalty,
    the fact that this ultimately happened cannot be consid-
    ered ‘‘a change so severe that it is unfair to regard it
    as being within the risks assumed under the contract.’’12
    See 17A Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 640.
    Furthermore, the subsequent abolition of the death
    penalty in Connecticut did not change the petitioner’s
    expectations under the agreement, namely, that he
    serve a full sixty year sentence and not be permitted
    to appeal or withdraw his guilty plea after the court
    imposed the agreed upon sentence. See United States
    v. Archie, 
    771 F.3d 217
    , 222 (4th Cir. 2014) (‘‘[A]lthough
    the law changed after [the defendant] [pleaded] guilty,
    his expectations (as reflected in the plea agreement)
    did not. . . . A plea agreement, like any contract, allo-
    cates risk. . . . And the possibility of a favorable
    change in the law occurring after a plea is one of the
    normal risks that accompan[ies] a guilty plea.’’ (Cita-
    tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert.
    denied, 
    575 U.S. 925
    , 
    135 S. Ct. 1579
    , 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 660
    (2015). The petitioner struck a deal, the terms of which
    were unambiguous, and he is now seeking to retain the
    benefits of the bargain while reneging on his commit-
    ments to not withdraw his guilty plea and serve a sixty
    year sentence. See United States v. Bradley, 
    supra,
     
    400 F.3d 465
     (‘‘[h]aving voluntarily and knowingly bar-
    gained for a decrease in the number of counts charged
    against him and for a decreased sentence, [the defen-
    dant] cannot now extract two components of that bar-
    gain . . . on the basis of changes in the law after that
    bargain was struck’’). As succinctly stated by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, ‘‘con-
    tract principles [simply] do not support [the petition-
    er’s] attempt to have his cake and eat it, too.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Roque,
    supra, 
    421 F.3d 124
    .
    II
    We next turn to a discussion of factually related prec-
    edent from other jurisdictions that informs our applica-
    tion of the frustration of purpose doctrine to the peti-
    tioner’s plea agreement. We begin by addressing two
    lines of cases in which courts have excused a party’s
    performance under a plea agreement pursuant to the
    frustration of purpose doctrine. In the first line of cases,
    the frustrating event at issue was a change in the law
    subsequent to a criminal defendant’s guilty plea. These
    cases are fundamentally distinguishable, however,
    because the change in the law affected the criminality
    of the conduct for which the defendant pleaded guilty.
    For instance, in United States v. Bunner, 
    134 F.3d 1000
    (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 830
    , 
    119 S. Ct. 81
    , 
    142 L. Ed. 2d 64
     (1998), after the defendant had served three
    years of a five year sentence, the United States Supreme
    Court issued a decision; Bailey v. United States, 
    516 U.S. 137
    , 
    116 S. Ct. 501
    , 
    133 L. Ed. 2d 472
     (1995); under
    which the facts supporting the defendant’s plea no
    longer constituted a crime. The defendant successfully
    moved to vacate his sentence pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255.13
     See United States v. Bunner, 
    supra, 1002
    . The
    government then moved to reinstate the counts of the
    original indictment that it had dismissed in exchange
    for the defendant’s guilty plea. The United States Court
    of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled that it was proper
    for the District Court to allow the government to rein-
    state the counts previously dismissed because the vaca-
    tur frustrated the government’s principal purpose for
    entering the plea agreement. 
    Id., 1003
    ; see also United
    States v. Moulder, 
    141 F.3d 568
    , 572 (5th Cir. 1998)
    (‘‘[T]he parties’ assumptions and obligations were
    altered by Bailey and the subsequent successful [28
    U.S.C.] § 2255 challenges. As a result of those events
    the underlying purpose of the [plea] agreement [was]
    frustrated and the basis of the government’s bargain
    [was] destroyed. Thus, under the frustration of purpose
    doctrine, the government’s plea agreement obligations
    became dischargeable.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.)); United States v. Samuels, 
    454 F. Supp. 3d 595
    ,
    602–603 (E.D. Va. 2020) (‘‘[U]nder the frustration of
    purpose doctrine, the [g]overnment’s obligations under
    the plea agreement would become dischargeable should
    [the d]efendant successfully vacate his . . . convic-
    tions by way of his [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 [m]otion. . . .
    Then . . . the [g]overnment could move to reinstate
    the [i]ndictment . . . .’’ (Citations omitted.)), cert.
    pending, United States Court of Appeals, Docket No.
    20-6894 (4th Cir. June 17, 2020). The subsequent change
    in the law that forms the basis for the petitioner’s claim
    in the present case did not render legal the conduct for
    which the petitioner pleaded guilty.
    In a second line of cases in which the frustration of
    purpose doctrine has been applied to plea agreements,
    courts have held that the principal purpose of the agree-
    ment was substantially frustrated when the specific
    terms of the agreement were not actually imposed. See
    United States v. Thompson, 
    237 F.3d 1258
    , 1260–61
    (10th Cir.) (federal government charged defendant with
    crime and defendant entered into plea agreement with
    government to plead guilty in Oklahoma state court and
    be sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, but when
    state failed to charge defendant within applicable stat-
    ute of limitations, government no longer bound by plea
    agreement), cert. denied, 
    532 U.S. 987
    , 
    121 S. Ct. 1637
    ,
    
    149 L. Ed. 2d 497
     (2001); United States v. Jureidini,
    
    846 F.2d 964
    , 965 (4th Cir. 1988) (parties agreed that
    for purposes of parole consideration defendant would
    be classified as having committed category six offense
    but parole board placed him in category eight); see also
    United States v. Torres, 
    926 F.2d 321
    , 322, 325–26 (3d
    Cir. 1991) (parties agreed that defendant’s sentencing
    range was to be based on lesser quantity of drugs than
    that which court ultimately relied when sentencing
    defendant); United States v. Kemper, 
    908 F.2d 33
    , 37
    (6th Cir. 1990) (same). These cases are readily distin-
    guishable because, here, the court imposed the agreed
    upon sentence, and there is no claim that the agreement
    has been breached.
    The cases that are most instructive to our analysis
    of the assumption of risk prong of the frustration of
    purpose doctrine involve defendants charged with a
    capital felony, who pleaded guilty to avoid capital pun-
    ishment, and, after a subsequent change in the law
    that would have rendered them ineligible for the death
    penalty if the new law was in place at the time they
    were charged, sought to withdraw the guilty plea.14
    For example, in Dingle v. Stevenson, 
    840 F.3d 171
    ,
    172–73 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied,     U.S. , 
    137 S. Ct. 2094
    , 
    197 L. Ed. 2d 897
     (2017), the defendant, who
    was seventeen years old when he pleaded guilty to
    several charges to avoid the death penalty, sought to
    invalidate his plea after the United States Supreme
    Court held, in Roper v. Simmons, 
    543 U.S. 551
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 1183
    , 
    161 L. Ed. 2d 1
     (2005), that imposing capital
    punishment on juvenile offenders was a violation of the
    eighth amendment to the United States constitution.
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
    cuit rejected the defendant’s claim, holding that Roper
    could not be applied retroactively to invalidate the
    defendant’s guilty plea. Dingle v. Stevenson, supra, 175.
    In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned: ‘‘Con-
    tracts in general are a bet on the future. Plea bargains
    are no different: a classic guilty plea permits a defendant
    to gain a present benefit in return for the risk that he
    may have to [forgo] future favorable legal develop-
    ments. [The defendant] received that present benefit—
    avoiding the death penalty and life without parole—
    under the law as it existed at the time. Although Roper,
    in hindsight, altered the calculus underlying [the defen-
    dant’s] decision to accept a plea agreement, it does
    not undermine the voluntariness of his plea. . . . [T]he
    tradeoff between present certainty and future uncer-
    tainty is emblematic of the process of plea bargaining.
    Brady [v. United States, 
    397 U.S. 742
    , 
    90 S. Ct. 1463
    ,
    
    25 L. Ed. 2d 747
     (1970)] makes all that exceptionally
    clear . . . .’’ Dingle v. Stevenson, supra, 
    840 F.3d 175
    –76; see also Brant v. State, 
    830 S.E.2d 140
    , 142 (Ga.
    2019) (rejecting claim by defendant, who was seventeen
    years old when he entered plea agreement to avoid
    possibility of receiving death penalty, that his plea was
    rendered involuntary by Roper).
    Indeed, in Brady, the Supreme Court ruled that the
    petitioner, who was charged with kidnapping pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1201
     (a), and had pleaded guilty to avoid
    the death penalty, was not entitled to withdraw his
    guilty plea in light of the court’s subsequent holding in
    United States v. Jackson, 
    390 U.S. 570
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1209
    ,
    
    20 L. Ed. 2d 138
     (1968), that 
    18 U.S.C. § 1201
     (a) was
    unconstitutional. Brady v. United States, supra, 
    397 U.S. 743
    –45. The court reasoned, inter alia: ‘‘Often the
    decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the
    defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case against
    him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency
    should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considera-
    tions like these frequently present imponderable ques-
    tions for which there are no certain answers; judgments
    may be made that in the light of later events seem
    improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at
    the time. . . .
    ‘‘A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea
    merely because he discovers long after the plea has
    been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the
    quality of the [s]tate’s case or the likely penalties
    attached to alternative courses of actions. More particu-
    larly, absent misrepresentation or other impermissible
    conduct by state agents . . . a voluntary plea of guilty
    intelligently made in the light of the then applicable
    law does not become vulnerable because later judicial
    decisions indicate that the plea rested on a faulty prem-
    ise.’’ (Citation omitted.) 
    Id.,
     756–57. In other words,
    ‘‘[a] plea of guilty triggered by the expectations of a
    competently counseled defendant that the [s]tate will
    have a strong case against him is not subject to later
    attack because the defendant’s lawyer correctly advised
    him with respect to the then existing law as to possible
    penalties but later pronouncements of the courts, as in
    this case, hold that the maximum penalty for the crime
    in question was less than was reasonably assumed at
    the time the plea was entered.’’ Id., 757.
    As Dingle, Brant, and Brady illustrate, an individual
    cannot withdraw a guilty plea merely because a subse-
    quent change in the law renders the maximum penalty
    for the crime in question less than was reasonably
    assumed at the time the plea was entered—even when
    the maximum penalty at issue was death. The natural
    implication of these cases is that a criminal defendant
    who negotiates a plea agreement ‘‘in the shadow of the
    death penalty’’ assumes the risk that the law subse-
    quently could change such that the death penalty is no
    longer a permissible punishment for the crime(s) for
    which the defendant originally was charged. Dingle v.
    Stevenson, supra, 
    840 F.3d 174
    .
    As in Brady, the petitioner here may have miscalcu-
    lated the likely penalties attached to alternative courses
    of action. Despite being aware that it was possible that
    the state someday might abolish the death penalty, the
    petitioner and his counsel possibly misjudged the likeli-
    hood of this happening at some point while he was
    serving his sixty year sentence. Any such miscalcula-
    tion, however, does not provide a basis to grant habeas
    relief to the petitioner regarding his guilty plea. See
    State v. Reid, 
    277 Conn. 764
    , 788–89, 
    894 A.2d 963
     (2006)
    (‘‘[I]mperfect knowledge of future developments in the
    law has no bearing on the validity of a [guilty plea].
    . . . More than [thirty] years later the Supreme Court
    reaffirmed Brady and explained that the [c]onstitution
    . . . permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its
    accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights,
    despite various forms of misapprehension under which
    a defendant might labor.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.)), citing Brady v. United
    States, supra, 
    397 U.S. 742
    , and United States v. Ruiz,
    
    536 U.S. 622
    , 630, 
    122 S. Ct. 2450
    , 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 586
    (2002). Accordingly, we conclude that the petitioner
    has failed to satisfy the assumption of risk prong of the
    frustration of purpose doctrine and, therefore, is not
    entitled to any relief.
    III
    Finally, our conclusion that the petitioner’s guilty
    plea cannot be withdrawn pursuant to the frustration
    of purpose doctrine is buttressed by two policy ratio-
    nales: (1) fundamental fairness; and (2) our Supreme
    Court’s refusal to adopt the amelioration doctrine. We
    address each of these in turn.
    Our habeas corpus statute, General Statutes § 52-470
    (a), requires that ‘‘the court or judge hearing any habeas
    corpus shall . . . dispose of the case as law and justice
    require.’’ See Summerville v. Warden, 
    229 Conn. 397
    ,
    415, 
    641 A.2d 1356
     (1994). Here, if we were to hold that
    the petitioner is entitled to vacate his plea agreement,
    it would work a substantial injustice on the state. That
    is, the case would be returned to the criminal trial court
    for plea negotiations, in which the petitioner would
    enjoy a much greater degree of leverage than in the
    first negotiation because of the numerous difficulties
    attendant to securing a conviction at trial nearly twenty
    years after the crime was committed. During this time,
    evidence has become stale, memories have faded, and
    witnesses may no longer be available. See State v. Cole-
    man, 
    202 Conn. 86
    , 91, 
    519 A.2d 1201
     (1987) (noting
    that unduly delayed trial creates ‘‘potential for inaccu-
    racy and unfairness that stale evidence and dull memo-
    ries may occasion’’ (emphasis in original; internal quota-
    tion marks omitted)). Requiring the state to negotiate
    at such a disadvantage, and actually proceed to trial
    if the plea negotiations were unsuccessful, would be
    fundamentally unfair to the state, which, according to
    the petitioner’s own trial counsel, had a significant like-
    lihood of securing a conviction against the petitioner
    in 2004. This concern about fundamental fairness to
    both sides further supports our decision to leave undis-
    turbed the parties’ original allocation of risk in the plea
    agreement and to require the petitioner to perform his
    obligations accordingly.
    In addition, because our Supreme Court repeatedly
    has refused to adopt the amelioration doctrine, it would
    be improper to vacate the petitioner’s guilty plea pursu-
    ant to the frustration of purpose doctrine in this
    instance where it would accomplish the same objective.
    In State v. Kalil, 
    314 Conn. 529
    , 
    107 A.3d 343
     (2014), our
    Supreme Court discussed that doctrine and declined to
    adopt it, stating: ‘‘In criminal cases, to determine
    whether a change in the law applies to a defendant, we
    generally have applied the law in existence on the date
    of the offense . . . . This principle is derived from the
    legislature’s enactment of saving statutes such as Gen-
    eral Statutes § 54-194, which provide that [t]he repeal
    of any statute defining or prescribing the punishment
    for any crime shall not affect any pending prosecution
    or any existing liability to prosecution and punishment
    therefor, unless expressly provided in the repealing stat-
    ute that such repeal shall have that effect . . . . The
    amelioration doctrine, [however], provides that amend-
    ments to statutes that lessen their penalties are applied
    retroactively . . . . [T]his court has not previously
    held that ameliorative changes to criminal statutes
    apply retroactively . . . and we decline to do so in the
    present case because the doctrine is in direct contraven-
    tion of Connecticut’s savings statutes.’’ (Citations omit-
    ted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) Id., 552–53; see also State v. Bischoff,       Conn.
    ,    A.3d       (2021) (declining invitation to overrule
    Kalil and adopt amelioration doctrine).
    By holding that the petitioner cannot withdraw his
    guilty plea and be resentenced in accordance with the
    plea that would have been negotiated if the death pen-
    alty had been unavailable, we are effectively requiring
    adherence to the law that was in existence on the date
    of the offense. Stated differently, to allow the petitioner
    to be resentenced, in accordance with the plea that
    would have been negotiated if the death penalty was
    not available at the time of the offense, would be the
    functional equivalent of applying the amelioration doc-
    trine because it would allow the petitioner to benefit
    from the retroactive application of a law that lessened
    the penalty for the crimes for which he originally was
    charged. Because our Supreme Court unequivocally has
    rejected the amelioration doctrine, it likewise is proper
    for us to decline the petitioner’s invitation to reach the
    same result by virtue of the frustration of purpose
    doctrine.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The habeas court granted the petitioner certification to appeal from
    the judgment.
    2
    Specifically, the petitioner challenges the habeas court’s conclusion that
    he failed to satisfy two of the four prongs of the frustration of purpose test:
    (1) the event substantially frustrated his principal purpose for entering into
    the plea agreement; and (2) he did not assume the risk that the event
    would occur.
    3
    We rely on the facts as found and as set forth by the habeas court in
    its memorandum of decision as well as on undisputed facts disclosed in
    the record.
    4
    The law in existence at the time was as follows: ‘‘Capital felony trials
    are divided into two phases: the guilt phase and the penalty phase. . . . In
    the penalty phase . . . the jury is charged with both fact-finding and non-
    fact-finding tasks. . . . Its fact-finding task involves determining whether
    the state has established the facts of an aggravant beyond a reasonable
    doubt and whether the defendant has established the facts of a mitigant by
    a preponderance of the evidence. . . . Its nonfact-finding task involves
    determining, based on its reasoned and moral judgment, whether: (1) the
    factually established mitigant is mitigating in nature; and (2) the aggravant
    outweighs the mitigant. . . . Following this weighing process, the jury must
    ultimately determine whether the defendant shall live or die, which requires
    the jury to make a reasoned moral and individualized determination that
    death is the appropriate punishment in the case.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Peeler v. Commissioner of Correction, 
    170 Conn. App. 654
    , 664 n.6, 
    155 A.3d 772
    , cert. denied, 
    325 Conn. 901
    , 
    157 A.3d 1146
     (2017).
    Moreover, the sentencing statute for capital felonies committed prior to
    April 25, 2012, General Statutes § 53a-46a, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) In
    determining whether a mitigating factor exists concerning the defendant’s
    character, background or history, or the nature and circumstances of the
    crime . . . the jury or, if there is no jury, the court shall first determine
    whether a particular factor concerning the defendant’s character, back-
    ground or history, or the nature and circumstances of the crime, has been
    established by the evidence, and shall determine further whether that factor
    is mitigating in nature, considering all the facts and circumstances of the
    case. Mitigating factors are such as do not constitute a defense or excuse
    for the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted, but which,
    in fairness and mercy, may be considered as tending either to extenuate or
    reduce the degree of his culpability or blame for the offense or to otherwise
    constitute a basis for a sentence less than death.’’ In addition, the aggravating
    factors to be considered include, inter alia, whether ‘‘the defendant commit-
    ted the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner . . . .’’
    General Statutes § 53a-46a (i) (4).
    5
    The petitioner was thirty years old when he was arrested. Attorney
    Butler noted that, in light of his age, a sixty year sentence is effectively a
    life sentence.
    6
    The court denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss in the same decision,
    finding that there was no procedural default on the petitioner’s part. In
    addition, with regard to habeas jurisdiction, the court determined that
    because the petitioner is seeking a judgment vacating his conviction, if he
    proves his claim ‘‘it may warrant habeas relief.’’ The court also suggested
    that habeas review is proper because the petitioner’s claim, like claims
    of ineffective assistance of counsel, requires further record development,
    including testimony about the intent of the parties in entering into the
    agreement and their assumptions of risk while doing so, and ‘‘this cannot
    be discerned from the record of the trial proceedings below.’’ Specifically,
    the court reasoned ‘‘our courts have a well established practice of deferring
    review . . . to collateral review by habeas corpus in order to allow for
    necessary record development.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) On
    appeal, the respondent does not contend that the habeas court improperly
    determined that it had jurisdiction over the amended petition, therefore,
    we do not address this issue further.
    7
    Specifically, the court found that ‘‘the [petitioner’s] purposes for entering
    into this plea were to avoid the death penalty and to avoid a conviction
    on a sexual assault charge.’’ (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the court rea-
    soned that performance of the agreement ‘‘is not worthless’’ to the petitioner
    because ‘‘he still avoids a sexual assault conviction and a potential sentence
    of up to 100 years.’’
    8
    The court concluded that the petitioner had satisfied the other two
    prongs of the test, namely (1) the nonoccurrence of the supervening event
    was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and (2) the
    frustration resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be excused.
    See Howard-Arnold, Inc. v. T.N.T. Realty, Inc., 
    315 Conn. 596
    , 605, 
    109 A.3d 473
     (2015).
    9
    The paradigmatic example of an instance in which a party is entitled to
    relief under the frustration of purpose doctrine is Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740
    (1903), the case in which this doctrine was first recognized. See DDS Wireless
    International, Inc. v. Nutmeg Leasing, Inc., 
    145 Conn. App. 520
    , 526, 
    75 A.3d 86
     (2013). In Krell, a spectator entered into a contract to rent an
    apartment for the purpose of viewing the procession for the coronation of
    King Edward VII. See 
    id.
     The king became ill, the procession was cancelled,
    and the spectator refused to pay for the rental. See 
    id.
     When the apartment
    owner sued for breach of contract, the court excused the spectator’s breach,
    holding that the coronation procession was the foundation of the contract.
    See 
    id.
     ‘‘The court implicitly determined that had the parties contemplated
    the possibility of the coronation being cancelled, they would have included
    a provision in the contract allowing the spectator to terminate the contract
    under those circumstances.’’ 
    Id.
    10
    The petitioner’s trial counsel, Attorney Fred DeCaprio, testified, and
    the habeas court made a factual finding, that one of the petitioner’s consider-
    ations with regard to pleading guilty included avoiding the stress of a capital
    trial on himself and his family.
    11
    The petitioner argues that he did not assume the risk of the abolition
    of the death penalty because this topic was not explicitly discussed during
    the court’s canvass of him. In essence, the petitioner argues that, in the
    absence of a specific provision of his plea agreement that required him to
    serve the agreed upon sentence even if the death penalty was later abolished,
    he cannot be deemed to have assumed that risk. We disagree.
    ‘‘[A] voluntary and intelligent guilty plea operates as a waiver of all nonju-
    risdictional defects. . . . A plea of guilty is, in effect, a conviction, the
    equivalent of a guilty verdict by a jury. . . . In choosing to plead guilty, the
    defendant is waiving several constitutional rights . . . . The . . . constitu-
    tional essentials for the acceptance of a plea of guilty are included in our
    rules and are reflected in Practice Book §§ [39-19 and 39-20]. . . . The
    failure to inform a defendant as to all possible indirect and collateral conse-
    quences does not render a plea unintelligent or involuntary in a constitutional
    sense.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reid,
    
    277 Conn. 764
    , 780, 
    894 A.2d 963
     (2006).
    Specifically, ‘‘[t]he rules governing the acceptance of guilty pleas, set forth
    in Practice Book §§ 39-19 and 39-20, provide that the trial court must not
    accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally in
    open court and determining that the defendant fully understands the items
    enumerated in § 39-19, and that the plea is made voluntarily pursuant to
    § 39-20. There is no requirement, however, that the defendant be advised
    of every possible consequence of such a plea. . . . Although a defendant
    must be aware of the direct consequences of such a plea, the scope of direct
    consequences is very narrow. . . . In Connecticut, the direct consequences
    of a defendant’s plea include only the mandatory minimum and maximum
    possible sentences; Practice Book § [39-19 (2) and (4)]; the maximum possi-
    ble consecutive sentence; Practice Book § [39-19 (4)]; the possibility of
    additional punishment imposed because of previous conviction(s); Practice
    Book § [39-19 (4)]; and the fact that the particular offense does not permit
    a sentence to be suspended. Practice Book § [39-19 (3)] . . . .’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greene, 
    274 Conn. 134
    , 145, 
    874 A.2d 750
    (2005), cert. denied, 
    548 U.S. 926
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 2981
    , 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 988
     (2006).
    Here, the court’s canvass was more than adequate. The canvass went beyond
    apprising the petitioner of the direct consequences of his plea, even though
    it was not required to do so.
    Moreover, the authority on which the petitioner premises his argument
    does not set forth the stringent standard for which he advocates. It merely
    requires the state, ‘‘as the drafting party wielding disproportionate power,
    [to] memorialize any and all obligations for which it holds the defendant
    responsible. . . . The terms of the agreement should be stated clearly and
    unambiguously, so that the defendant . . . knows what is expected of him
    and what he can expect in return.’’ State v. Kallberg, supra, 
    326 Conn. 23
    . Kallberg also is factually distinguishable, in that the terms of the plea
    agreement at issue there were ambiguous. See 
    id., 19
    . In contrast, the terms
    of the agreement here unambiguously set forth the petitioner’s obligations,
    specifically that once the court accepted the petitioner’s guilty plea and
    sentenced him to the agreed upon sixty year term of incarceration, he was
    waiving his right to appeal, prohibited from withdrawing his plea regardless
    of whether he later changed his mind, and required to serve every day of
    his sixty year sentence. The state is not required to specifically address all
    possible contingencies in a plea agreement, particularly when the terms of
    the agreement make clear that the parties intended for any such future
    events to not affect the petitioner’s obligations.
    12
    That Attorney Butler discussed this possibility with the petitioner is
    one of the habeas court’s findings of fact. The court went on to conclude,
    with regard to the second prong of the frustration of purpose doctrine, that
    the abolition of the death penalty was not reasonably foreseeable, was not
    contemplated, and could not have been anticipated by the parties. We do
    not need to address the propriety of those conclusions in light of our determi-
    nation that the petitioner has not satisfied the assumption of risk prong of
    the frustration of purpose doctrine.
    13
    Title 28 of the United States Code, § 2255, provides in relevant part:
    ‘‘(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
    Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
    was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
    or that the court was without justification to impose such sentence, or that
    the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is other-
    wise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the
    sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.’’
    14
    The defendants in these cases did not base their claims on the frustration
    of purpose doctrine. Instead, they all argued that their guilty pleas were
    rendered involuntary by a subsequent change in the law that made the death
    penalty inapplicable to them. Here, the petitioner makes no such claim
    regarding the voluntariness of his plea. Nevertheless, the reasoning underly-
    ing these cases applies with equal force here.