Fronsaglia v. Fronsaglia ( 2021 )


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    LISA FRONSAGLIA v. BENIGNO FRONSAGLIA
    (AC 42685)
    Lavine, Moll and Bishop, Js.*
    Syllabus
    The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
    dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and issuing certain financial
    orders. Held:
    1. Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
    tion in issuing its financial orders by making a grossly disproportionate
    property distribution in the plaintiff’s favor and assigning the majority
    of the marital debt to the defendant; that court’s property distribution
    was not grossly disproportionate, as the defendant had dissipated
    $550,000 of marital assets in violation of the automatic orders, and the
    court merely reattributed those assets to the defendant.
    2. There was ample evidence before the trial court to support its finding
    that the defendant had actual earnings of $160,000; evidence in the
    record of the defendant’s past earnings and spending habits, as evinced
    by his bank statements and credit card accounts, supported the court’s
    finding, and the defendant’s reliance on Keusch v. Keusch (
    184 Conn. App. 822
    ) was misplaced, as the reasoning in that case on which he
    relied had no bearing on the merits of this case.
    3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred
    by basing its alimony award to the plaintiff solely on his gross income
    rather than on his net income; the record revealed that that court did
    not rely solely on the defendant’s gross income in determining its alimony
    award and that it did not state that it relied on the defendant’s gross
    income, but merely referenced it; moreover, although the court did not
    expressly state that it considered the defendant’s net income, this court
    inferred that it considered the relevant statutory factors (§ 46b-82) and
    all of the evidence submitted by the parties.
    4. The defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
    alimony to the plaintiff to punish him for his purported misdeeds was
    unavailing; that court was permitted to take into consideration all the
    causes for the dissolution of the marriage in fashioning its alimony
    award, including the defendant’s extramarital affair and poor busi-
    ness decisions.
    Argued October 15, 2020—officially released February 23, 2021
    Procedural History
    Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
    relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
    trict of Fairfield and tried to the court, Grossman, J.;
    judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
    other relief, from which the defendant appealed to this
    court; thereafter, the court, Grossman, J., issued an
    articulation of its decision. Affirmed.
    William W. Taylor, for the appellant (defendant).
    Campbell D. Barrett, with whom were Johanna S.
    Katz and, on the brief, Jon T. Kukucka, for the appel-
    lee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    BISHOP, J. The defendant, Benigno Fronsaglia,
    appeals from the judgment of the trial court dissolving
    his marriage to the plaintiff, Lisa Fronsaglia. On appeal,
    the defendant claims that the court (1) abused its discre-
    tion in fashioning its financial orders by making a
    grossly disproportionate property distribution in the
    plaintiff’s favor and by assigning the majority of the
    marital debt to him, (2) erred by basing its orders on
    the defendant’s assumed earning capacity of $160,000,
    where no evidence existed to support the earning capac-
    ity determined by the court, (3) erred in basing its ali-
    mony award on gross income rather than net income,
    when there was no evidence to support a net income
    based on the defendant’s assumed gross income, and
    (4) abused its discretion by awarding alimony to the
    plaintiff to punish the defendant for his purported mis-
    deeds. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    The following facts, as found by the trial court or as
    undisputed in the record, and procedural history are
    relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties
    were married on June 20, 1992, in Trumbull. They have
    two children, one of whom was a minor at the time of
    the dissolution. The plaintiff commenced the dissolu-
    tion action on November 28, 2016, seeking a dissolution
    of her marriage to the defendant on the ground that
    the marriage had broken down irretrievably without
    the chance of reconciliation. The plaintiff also sought,
    inter alia, joint legal and primary physical custody of
    the minor child, equitable distribution of all marital
    debts and assets, and orders for payment of alimony,
    child support, postsecondary education, and attorney’s
    fees. At the time of the dissolution proceeding, the
    plaintiff was fifty-two years old and working as a regis-
    tered nurse. The defendant was fifty-four years old with
    a bachelor’s degree in business and working as a self-
    employed businessman importing and selling furniture
    through his limited liability company, Meeting Interna-
    tional.
    During the pendency of the action, the court incorpo-
    rated into an order the parties’ pendente lite stipulation
    in which the defendant agreed, inter alia, to continue
    to pay the mortgage for the family home, cell phone
    bills, automobile insurance, homeowners insurance,
    and other household bills.
    On November 7, 2018, after a five day trial, the court
    issued an oral ruling, which was later signed as its
    memorandum of decision, dissolving the marriage and
    issuing financial orders. In its decision, the court found
    the plaintiff’s gross income to be $115,000 per year, and
    the defendant’s gross income for 2018 to be $160,000.
    During the pendente lite period, the defendant termi-
    nated his association with emuamericas, LLC, a furni-
    ture wholesale company based in Italy with which he
    had been doing business for many years. In doing so, the
    defendant sold his 12.5 percent interest in emuamericas,
    LLC, for $550,000 without the court’s permission and
    without informing the plaintiff. The defendant disclosed
    that he depleted the entire $550,000 sum pendente lite.
    The defendant had also invested tens of thousands of
    dollars in a restaurant, Thigh High Chicken Co., LLC,
    pendente lite in violation of the automatic orders.1
    The defendant did not file his tax returns for the two
    years prior to the dissolution action. The court found
    that he intentionally had delayed filing his taxes so that
    he could file them when the dissolution proceedings
    were over. Further, the court found that, because the
    defendant had commingled his business and personal
    finances and had no current employee who could attest
    to his income, the only way to determine his income
    was by looking at his historical annual earnings, his
    profit and loss statements that he had submitted into
    evidence, his bank account and credit card records,
    e-mail exchanges between the defendant and the com-
    panies Pedrali and emuamericas, LLC,2 the testimony
    of his former employee, and by taking judicial notice
    of prior court orders and arrangements, such as the
    parties’ agreement that the defendant would continue
    paying the family’s household bills. The defendant also
    filed two financial affidavits with the court, in which
    he listed his total net weekly income, total weekly
    expenses and liabilities, total cash value of assets, and
    total liabilities after breaking down his expenses in
    detail.
    On the basis of that evidence, the court found that
    the defendant’s ‘‘actual income range [was] between
    $150,000 and $175,000 annually.’’ Moreover, the court
    determined that the defendant’s actual personal gross
    earnings for 2018, the calendar year in question, were
    $160,000.
    Thereafter, the court ordered the defendant to pay
    alimony to the plaintiff based on the length of the par-
    ties’ marriage, the reason for the breakdown of the
    marriage,3 the disparity in the parties’ earnings, the par-
    ties’ earning capacities,4 ‘‘as well as the myriad of factors
    in [General Statutes §] 46b-82 . . . .’’ In doing so,
    among other orders, the court awarded the plaintiff
    alimony for twenty years, a nonmodifiable term, during
    which the plaintiff was to receive $1500 per month from
    the defendant, which was nonmodifiable for the first
    five years. The court assigned any debts arising from
    the defendant’s business ventures to the defendant, as
    well as any tax liabilities in the defendant’s name and
    those tax obligations arising from his businesses. The
    defendant retained his interest in his companies and
    any interest he had in his mother’s home. The plaintiff
    was ordered to pay all of the debts that she incurred.
    The court awarded the family home to the plaintiff.
    The court found that the home had an approximate
    value of $477,000 with $127,000 remaining on the mort-
    gage, and liens on the home in the amount of $203,000
    due to the defendant’s decision to use the home as
    collateral for his business loans. Consequently, there
    was only $147,000 of equity in the home. The court also
    ordered that, because the defendant was responsible
    for the business debts secured by the home, in the event
    that the plaintiff was to sell the home in the future, the
    defendant would be obligated to pay the plaintiff an
    amount sufficient to satisfy any remaining liens so that
    the net proceeds due to the plaintiff upon the sale would
    not be reduced by the amount of those liens, other than
    the mortgage, remaining on the property. The court
    further ordered that, in the event that the defendant is
    unable to pay the plaintiff or secure the release of the
    liens prior to the sale of the home, he must pay the
    plaintiff $18,000 per year until the full amount of the
    lien balances has been reduced to zero. The court
    ordered the defendant to make the $18,000 payments
    in order to reimburse the plaintiff for any amount of
    the sale proceeds that would have been used to pay
    the liens before the sale of the home, thereby reducing
    the amount of the encumbrances on the property. The
    court also ordered that, should the defendant procure
    releases or reductions for some of the liens prior to
    any sale, ‘‘it [would] reduce the total amount due to
    the [plaintiff] from him.’’ The court also ordered that
    the defendant continue to seek releases of the business
    debts after the marital dissolution in order to clear the
    title to the home of the liens that were associated with
    his business debts.
    The defendant filed a postjudgment motion for articu-
    lation on November 26, 2018. He sought to have the
    court articulate the factual basis for its findings as to
    his purported gross income, net income, and the basis
    for the court’s distribution of the parties’ assets and
    debts. The court granted the motion in part and issued
    an articulation. In its articulation, the court stated that,
    in fashioning its distribution of assets award, it took
    into consideration the defendant’s dissipation of the
    $550,000 that he had obtained from the sale of his inter-
    est in emuamericas, LLC. Specifically, in fashioning its
    property allocation award, the court stated that it had
    included the $550,000 in the defendant’s portion of the
    marital assets because it had found that he ‘‘received,
    concealed and spent approximately $550,000 in marital
    assets during the pendente lite period.’’ The court stated
    that, by doing so, the parties were awarded an approxi-
    mate equal share of the marital assets. The court also
    clarified its reasoning regarding the distribution of the
    parties’ debts. The court based its division of the marital
    debts on its finding that the defendant had incurred
    debt and spent money frivolously during the pendente
    lite period in violation of the automatic orders. Particu-
    larly, the court had found that the defendant continued
    to accumulate credit card debt while failing to pay the
    household bills and mortgage as required by the pen-
    dente lite orders, and that the defendant also had
    incurred debts associated with Thigh High Chicken Co.,
    LLC. Noting that the defendant’s representations of his
    financial status were given little weight due to his
    numerous misrepresentations to the court, the court
    explained that the defendant was assigned the debts
    related to the many failed business ventures that he
    had undertaken, most of which were undertaken with-
    out the plaintiff’s knowledge and over which she exer-
    cised no control. The defendant himself stated that the
    plaintiff was not responsible for his business debts.
    This appeal followed.
    Before addressing the defendant’s claims, we set
    forth the well settled standard of review applicable to a
    court’s decision regarding financial orders. ‘‘We review
    financial awards in dissolution actions under an abuse
    of discretion standard. . . . In order to conclude that
    the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that
    the court either incorrectly applied the law or could
    not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Evans v. Taylor, 
    67 Conn. App. 108
    ,
    111, 
    786 A.2d 525
     (2001).
    ‘‘In determining whether the trial court’s broad legal
    discretion is abused, great weight is due to the action
    of the trial court and every reasonable presumption
    should be given in favor of its correctness.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Febbroriello v. Febbroriello,
    
    21 Conn. App. 200
    , 202, 
    572 A.2d 1032
     (1990). ‘‘We apply
    that standard of review because it reflects the sound
    policy that the trial court has the unique opportunity
    to view the parties and their testimony, and is therefore
    in the best position to assess all of the circumstances
    surrounding a dissolution action, including such factors
    as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties.’’ (Inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Hughes v. Hughes, 
    95 Conn. App. 200
    , 203, 
    895 A.2d 274
    , cert. denied, 
    280 Conn. 902
    , 
    907 A.2d 90
     (2006).
    I
    The defendant first claims that the court abused its
    discretion in issuing its financial orders by making a
    grossly disproportionate property distribution in the
    plaintiff’s favor and assigning the majority of the marital
    debt to the defendant. We are not persuaded.
    ‘‘Generally, we will not overturn a trial court’s divi-
    sion of marital property unless it misapplies, overlooks,
    or gives a wrong or improper effect to any test or consid-
    eration which it was [its] duty to regard.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, 
    275 Conn. 348
    , 355, 
    880 A.2d 872
     (2005). The defendant claims
    that the court made a grossly disproportionate property
    distribution in the plaintiff’s favor by purportedly
    awarding the plaintiff $331,897 in assets while awarding
    him $53,964. The defendant expounds on his argument
    by positing that the court’s financial award essentially
    will force him into ‘‘financial poverty’’ because the plain-
    tiff purportedly was awarded approximately 87 percent
    of the total marital assets compared to the defendant’s
    13 percent, where the defendant claims the total value
    of marital assets was $385,861.
    ‘‘[General Statutes §] 46b-81 governs the distribution
    of the assets in a dissolution case. . . . That statute
    authorizes the court to assign to either spouse all, or
    any part of, the estate of the other spouse. . . . In
    fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to
    be assigned, the court, after considering all the evidence
    presented by each party, shall consider the length of
    the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
    of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health,
    station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
    earning capacity, vocational skills, education, employ-
    ability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties
    and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of
    capital assets and income. The court shall also consider
    the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition,
    preservation or appreciation in value of their respective
    estates.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Kent v. DiPaola, 
    178 Conn. App. 424
    , 430–31,
    
    175 A.3d 601
     (2017). Moreover, ‘‘[w]e have iterated that
    there is no set formula the court is obligated to apply
    when dividing the parties’ assets and . . . the court
    is vested with broad discretion in fashioning financial
    orders.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id.,
     441–42.
    As a panel of this court once expressed, the court has
    ‘‘vast discretion’’ in fashioning its orders. Damon v.
    Damon, 
    23 Conn. App. 111
    , 114, 
    579 A.2d 124
     (1990).
    At the outset, we note that the defendant’s claim
    of disproportionality is factually untenable. The court
    found that the defendant received approximately
    $550,000 in lump sum payments over the course of a
    few months after selling his 12.5 percent interest in
    emuamericas, LLC, during the pendente lite period. The
    court determined that the payments for the defendant’s
    interest in emuamericas, LLC, were marital assets sub-
    ject to division by the court because they were earned
    entirely during the marriage. Notably, the court found
    that the defendant had misappropriated the $550,000,
    only later revealing that he had spent the entire sum.
    The court also found that the defendant spent all of
    this money on his own needs and wants and did not
    use any of this sum to pay down any of the family’s
    debts or outstanding obligations. Specifically, the court
    found that the defendant failed to ‘‘pay down and secure
    releases for any of the over $200,000 worth of liens on
    the family home.’’ In essence, the defendant dissipated
    a marital asset. ‘‘[D]issipation in the marital dissolution
    context requires financial misconduct involving marital
    assets, such as intentional waste or a selfish financial
    impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the
    marriage.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gong v.
    Huang, 
    129 Conn. App. 141
    , 153, 
    21 A.3d 474
    , cert.
    denied, 
    302 Conn. 907
    , 
    23 A.3d 1247
     (2011). As correctly
    noted by the court, the payments should have been
    ‘‘held secure or subject to the automatic orders,’’ which
    the defendant failed to do; instead, he spent the entire
    sum in violation of the automatic orders.5
    The defendant asserts that the court abused its discre-
    tion when it included the $550,000 payment in dividing
    the marital assets because the funds were no longer
    part of the marital estate. ‘‘[W]e reiterate that [t]he
    power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s
    ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circum-
    stances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.
    Without this wide discretion and broad equitable power,
    the courts in some cases might be unable fairly to
    resolve the parties’ dispute . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Greco v. Greco, supra, 
    275 Conn. 362
    .
    Moreover, it has been established by our Supreme
    Court that a trial court can take the dissipation of assets
    into consideration when fashioning alimony orders in
    a dissolution action. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 
    326 Conn. 81
    , 102–104, 
    161 A.3d 1236
     (2017) (court is authorized
    to consider party’s dissipation of marital assets and to
    reduce party’s share of marital assets accordingly where
    party is found to have dissipated assets in violation of
    automatic orders).
    As noted previously herein, the court found that the
    defendant was not a credible witness and, thus, gave
    no credence to his claims that he believed that the
    $550,000 belonged to him and that he could spend it
    without restrictions. We will not disturb credibility
    determinations made by the court. See Greco v. Greco,
    supra, 
    275 Conn. 359
     (on appeal, ‘‘[w]e cannot retry
    the facts or pass on the credibility of the witnesses’’
    (internal quotation marks omitted)). We cannot say that
    the court inaccurately determined that the defendant
    dissipated the $550,000 and expended this amount on
    himself where the record shows that he made expensive
    purchases and supported his paramours financially
    while the mortgage on the family home went unpaid
    and one of the children’s cars was repossessed. See
    Gershman v. Gershman, 
    286 Conn. 341
    , 346, 
    943 A.2d 1091
     (2008). Moreover, the defendant often was found
    to be in contempt during the pendency of this action
    for not making payments on the household bills and
    mortgage, as required under the pendente lite orders.
    In Greco, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial
    court abused its discretion in awarding the plaintiff
    more than 98 percent of the marital property, alimony,
    and attorney’s fees because the financial award far
    exceeded the defendant’s income. Greco v. Greco,
    supra, 
    275 Conn. 349
    –50. Unlike the defendant in Greco,
    the defendant in the present case misappropriated and
    dissipated a marital asset of $550,000 for his own benefit
    in violation of the automatic orders, as none of the
    money was found to have paid off any of the family’s
    obligations, including the liens levied on the family
    home for debts owed as a result of the defendant’s poor
    business decisions. The defendant fails to account for
    the fact that the debts apportioned to him included
    business obligations that he solely and unilaterally accu-
    mulated throughout the marriage, largely without the
    plaintiff’s knowledge and over which the plaintiff had
    no control.
    Consequently, we conclude that the court did not
    abuse its discretion as the distribution was not grossly
    disproportionate where the court found that the defen-
    dant misappropriated and dissipated $550,000 of marital
    assets in violation of the automatic orders, and the court
    merely reattributed those assets to the defendant, as
    the law permits. See O’Brien v. O’Brien, supra, 
    326 Conn. 102
    –104; Shaulson v. Shaulson, 
    125 Conn. App. 734
    , 736, 739–42, 
    9 A.3d 782
     (2010), cert. denied, 
    300 Conn. 912
    , 
    13 A.3d 1102
     (2011).
    II
    The defendant’s second claim is that the court erred
    when it found that he had actual earned income or an
    earning capacity of $160,000 per year because there
    was no evidence to support such a finding. For the
    reasons that follow, we are not persuaded.
    The defendant argues that the court erred in finding
    that he had an earning capacity of $160,000 in gross
    income per year. In making this claim, the defendant
    appears to have conflated earning capacity with actual
    earnings, as the transcript clearly shows that the court
    determined his actual earnings, not his earning capac-
    ity.6 Because the court’s orders were based on the defen-
    dant’s actual earnings and not his earning capacity, we
    need to determine only whether the court had evidence
    before it from which it could have determined the defen-
    dant’s actual earnings.
    In finding that the defendant had actual earnings of
    $160,000, the court considered the defendant’s past
    earnings and his spending history. Specifically, due to
    the defendant’s lack of candor toward the court regard-
    ing his financial status, as noted previously in this opin-
    ion, in order to determine the defendant’s actual earn-
    ings, the court took into consideration the defendant’s
    past earnings from documents, such as those he submit-
    ted to the court detailing his historical earnings and
    liabilities, his bank accounts and credit card statements,
    and e-mail correspondence between the defendant and
    his employer and potential employer.
    The defendant’s reliance on Keusch v. Keusch, 
    184 Conn. App. 822
    , 
    195 A.3d 1136
     (2018), to argue that the
    court’s finding was based on insufficient evidence is
    misplaced. In Keusch, this court held that the trial court
    abused its discretion when it calculated the defendant’s
    child support obligation on the basis of the defendant’s
    earning capacity rather than his actual earnings without
    ‘‘first stating the presumptive support amount at which
    it arrived by applying the guidelines and using the par-
    ent’s actual income and second finding application of
    the guidelines to be inequitable or inappropriate.’’
    (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted.) 
    Id., 829
    . The reasoning in Keusch on which the
    defendant relies has no bearing on the merits of the
    present case because the holding in Keusch was con-
    strained by the requirements delineated under the child
    support guidelines and regulatory framework. See 
    id.
    Moreover, in the present case, the court indeed deter-
    mined the defendant’s actual earnings on the basis of
    ample evidence in the record. The evidence of his past
    earnings and his spending habits, as evidenced by his
    bank statements and credit card accounts, supported
    the court’s finding that the defendant had actual earn-
    ings of $160,000. Thus, the defendant’s second claim
    fails.
    III
    The defendant next claims that the court erred by
    basing its alimony award solely on the defendant’s gross
    income as opposed to his net income. Specifically, he
    asserts that the court made no effort to determine his
    net income in fashioning the alimony award and there
    was no evidence presented from which the court could
    have calculated his net income. We disagree.7
    ‘‘It is well settled that a court must base child support
    and alimony orders on the available net income of the
    parties, not gross income.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Tuckman v. Tuckman, 
    308 Conn. 194
    , 209,
    
    61 A.3d 449
     (2013); see also Tobey v. Tobey, 
    165 Conn. 742
    , 747, 
    345 A.2d 21
     (1974) (establishing that gross
    earnings is not criterion for alimony awards, but net
    income available to defendant should be considered).
    ‘‘Although our case law consistently affirms the basic
    tenet that support and alimony orders must be based
    on net income, the proper application of this principle
    is context specific. . . . [W]e differentiate between an
    order that is a function of gross income and one that
    is based on gross income. . . . [T]he term based as
    used in this context connotes an order that only takes
    into consideration the parties’ gross income and not
    the parties’ net income. Consequently, an order that
    takes cognizance of the parties’ disposable incomes
    may be proper even if it is expressed as a function of
    the parties’ gross earnings.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Leonova v. Leonov, 
    201 Conn. App. 285
    , 300,
    A.3d       (2020).
    ‘‘[We have] previously . . . overlooked the failure of
    the trial court to make a finding as to a party’s net
    income. . . . We have concluded that such an omission
    does not compel the conclusion that the court’s order
    was improperly based on gross income if the record
    indicates that the court considered evidence from
    which it could determine a party’s net income, and it
    did not state that it had relied on the party’s gross
    earnings to form the basis of its order. . . .
    ‘‘In Kelman v. Kelman, 
    86 Conn. App. 120
    , 123, 
    860 A.2d 292
     (2004), cert. denied, 
    273 Conn. 911
    , 
    870 A.2d 1079
     (2005), this court rejected a similar claim on the
    ground that, although the trial court, in its decision,
    made reference to the parties’ gross incomes, it did
    not expressly state that it was relying solely on gross
    earnings in framing its order.’’ (Citation omitted.) Leo-
    nova v. Leonov, supra, 
    201 Conn. App. 300
    –301. Gener-
    ally, when a court fails to state explicitly that an award
    for alimony is based on net income, it has been estab-
    lished that this failure does not automatically negate
    the validity of the award on appeal when there is ample
    evidence from which the court could have determined
    the parties’ net income. See Febbroriello v. Febbroriello,
    supra, 
    21 Conn. App. 202
    –203 (trial court’s award is not
    solely based on defendant’s gross income where court
    had ample evidence ‘‘from which it could have deter-
    mined the defendant’s net income’’); Valentine v. Valen-
    tine, 
    164 Conn. App. 354
    , 368–69, 
    141 A.3d 884
     (trial
    court did not improperly base its decision on defen-
    dant’s gross income because financial affidavits submit-
    ted as evidence reflected parties’ net income after man-
    datory deductions and court stated it considered
    amount and sources of income in fashioning financial
    order), cert. denied, 
    321 Conn. 917
    , 
    136 A.3d 1275
    (2016); Hartney v. Hartney, 
    83 Conn. App. 553
    , 558–59,
    
    850 A.2d 1098
     (trial court did not improperly base its
    alimony award on defendant’s gross income where
    court did not make repeated references or comparisons
    to defendant’s gross income, it heard testimony about
    parties’ net and gross income, and its memorandum of
    decision stated that it took § 46b-82 into consideration
    when it fashioned award), cert. denied, 
    271 Conn. 920
    ,
    
    859 A.2d 578
     (2004).
    In the present case, the court found that the defen-
    dant was not credible because he made various misrep-
    resentations to the court about his earnings and was
    less than candid toward the court in an effort to ‘‘deprive
    [the plaintiff] of financial support . . . .’’ The record
    reveals that the court assigned to the defendant a gross
    income of $160,000 for 2018 on the basis of the evidence
    before it.
    As noted, the defendant failed to provide any tax
    information from which the court could ascertain his
    net income, leaving the court to derive the defendant’s
    net income from the evidence it had. The court’s deci-
    sion reflects that it considered evidence such as the
    defendant’s historical annual earnings, his profit and
    loss statements, his bank accounts and credit card
    records, various e-mail exchanges between the defen-
    dant and employers or potential employers, and the
    testimony of his former employee. The court also took
    judicial notice of prior court orders and arrangements
    (such as the parties’ agreement for the defendant to
    continue paying household bills). The defendant also
    had filed financial affidavits with the court pendente
    lite in which he had listed his total net weekly income
    while notating mandatory deductions (such as manda-
    tory state and federal income tax deductions), total
    weekly expenses and liabilities, total cash value of
    assets, and his total liabilities after breaking down his
    expenses in detail. Although the court deemed the
    defendant’s financial documents and business records
    to be untrustworthy standing alone, it took them and
    the defendant’s spending habits into consideration in
    fashioning the alimony award.
    Although the defendant argues that the court used
    ‘‘fictitious numbers’’ and had no evidence before it to
    support a finding of his net income, that argument is
    without merit for two principal reasons. First, as noted,
    the court found the defendant totally lacking in candor
    during the trial. Indeed, the court found that the defen-
    dant endeavored to misrepresent facts before the court.
    We have often said that a party who fails to provide
    information to the court will not later be heard to com-
    plain that the court made orders without sufficient
    information. See Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 
    115 Conn. App. 570
    , 581, 
    974 A.2d 40
     (2009) (‘‘[w]here a party’s own
    wrongful conduct limits the financial evidence available
    to the court, that party cannot complain about the
    resulting calculation of a monetary award’’ (internal
    quotation marks omitted)). Second, the court had
    before it evidence of the defendant’s historic spending
    and previous findings regarding his routine deductions
    from gross income. In sum, the court considered the
    defendant’s spending habits when it looked to the defen-
    dant’s bank accounts and credit cards statements, as
    well as the other bills the defendant was required to and
    agreed to pay during the pendency of the proceedings.
    Moreover, it is not improper for a court to look at a
    party’s financial affidavits and to consider the ample
    evidence before it to ‘‘determine the [party’s] net
    income and the respective financial needs and abilities
    of each party.’’ Hughes v. Hughes, supra, 
    95 Conn. App. 206
    –207.
    On the basis of our careful review of the record, we
    cannot conclude that the court solely relied on the
    defendant’s gross income to form the basis of its ali-
    mony award. We note, as well, that the court did not
    state that it relied on the defendant’s gross income but,
    instead, merely referenced it, which is not improper.
    See id., 207. ‘‘Consequently, an order that takes cogni-
    zance of the parties’ disposable incomes may be proper
    even if it is expressed as a function of the parties’ gross
    earnings.’’ Id.
    Additionally, even though the court did not expressly
    state that it was basing the alimony award on the defen-
    dant’s net income, ‘‘[o]ur Supreme Court has repeatedly
    held . . . that the trial court is not required to make
    specific reference to the criteria that it considered in
    making its decision. . . . [W]e are . . . of the opinion
    that a trial court need not expressly state that it has
    considered the appropriate factors in reaching its deci-
    sion. According the court every reasonable presump-
    tion in favor of the correctness of its decision, we
    assume that the court considered the appropriate statu-
    tory and evidentiary underpinnings in fashioning its
    financial orders.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 207–208.
    Therefore, although the court did not expressly state
    that it considered the defendant’s net income in
    determining the alimony award, we infer that the court
    considered the relevant statutory factors and all of the
    evidence submitted by the parties.
    Accordingly, this claim fails.
    IV
    The defendant’s final claim is that the court abused
    its discretion by awarding alimony to the plaintiff to
    punish him for his ‘‘alleged bad behavior.’’ We disagree.
    The purpose of alimony is not to punish but ‘‘to meet
    one’s continuing duty to support . . . .’’ (Citation omit-
    ted.) Weiman v. Weiman, 
    188 Conn. 232
    , 234, 
    449 A.2d 151
     (1982); see also Greco v. Greco, supra, 
    275 Conn. 361
    . In determining whether to award alimony, the court
    ‘‘shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes
    for the . . . dissolution of the marriage or legal separa-
    tion, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
    sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills,
    education, employability, estate and needs of each of
    the parties and [any property] award . . . pursuant to
    section 46b-81 . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-82 (a).8
    Moreover, ‘‘[t]he court is not obligated to make express
    findings on each of these statutory criteria.’’ Weiman
    v. Weiman, 
    supra, 234
    .
    In essence, the defendant argues that the court erred
    by taking his misdeeds into consideration when fashion-
    ing the alimony award and that doing so resulted in an
    alimony award designed to punish him. In pursuing this
    argument, the defendant ignores the breadth of § 46b-
    82 (a), which, inter alia, permits the court to take into
    consideration the causes for the breakdown of the mar-
    riage in fashioning its alimony award. Although the stat-
    ute provides many factors that a court must consider
    upon determining whether to award alimony, there is
    no requirement that the court must weigh the factors
    equally. See Horey v. Horey, 
    172 Conn. App. 735
    , 741,
    
    161 A.3d 579
     (2017) (‘‘The court is to consider these
    factors [under § 46b-82 (a)] in making an award of ali-
    mony, but it need not give each factor equal weight.
    . . . We note also that [t]he trial court may place vary-
    ing degrees of importance on each criterion according
    to the factual circumstances of each case. . . . There
    is no additional requirement that the court specifically
    state how it weighed the statutory criteria or explain in
    detail the importance assigned to each statutory factor.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
    The court’s findings that the defendant’s extramarital
    affair with his twenty-two year old employee and his
    unilateral, poor business decisions led to the break-
    down of the marriage is amply supported by the record.
    The court found that there was evidence that the defen-
    dant paid all of his paramour’s bills, including those
    for her car insurance, car payment, gym membership,
    student loans, and credit card bills. The court also deter-
    mined that the evidence supported the finding that the
    defendant and his paramour went on vacations or took
    trips together where they shared a hotel room, and that
    the defendant bought her expensive gifts and paid for
    all of her expenses in violation of the court’s pendente
    lite orders.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse
    its discretion by considering the defendant’s extramari-
    tal affair and poor business decisions in fashioning the
    alimony award. The court is permitted to take into con-
    sideration all causes for the dissolution of the marriage
    in determining whether to award alimony. See Dubicki
    v. Dubicki, 
    186 Conn. 709
    , 715–16, 
    443 A.2d 1268
     (1982).
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
    the date of oral argument.
    2
    The plaintiff provided the defendant with notice of the automatic orders
    pursuant to Practice Book § 25-5, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[n]ei-
    ther party shall incur unreasonable debts hereafter, including, but not limited
    to, further borrowing against any credit line secured by the family residence,
    further encumbrancing any assets, or unreasonably using credit cards or
    cash advances against credit cards.’’ Practice Book § 25-5 (b) (5).
    3
    After leaving emuamericas, LLC, the defendant entered into negotiations
    with another company, Pedrali, for a potential employment opportunity.
    After many months of negotiating, Pedrali eventually withdrew its offer
    of employment.
    4
    The court found that the defendant was largely to blame for the break-
    down of the marriage due to his extramarital affair with his twenty-two
    year old employee.
    5
    As delineated in part II of this opinion, although the court referenced
    the earning capacities of the parties in its decision, its orders were based
    on the parties’ actual earnings as determined by the court.
    6
    ‘‘[W]hile the dissolution proceedings are pending, no party shall sell,
    transfer, [or] exchange any property without permission from the other
    party or the court. . . . The automatic orders are intended to keep the
    financial situation of the parties at a status quo during the pendency of the
    dissolution action.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    O’Brien v. O’Brien, 
    326 Conn. 81
    , 101, 
    161 A.3d 1236
     (2017); see Practice
    Book § 25-5 (b) (1).
    7
    Of course, in the proper case, a court may base its orders on a party’s
    earning capacity; see Tanzman v. Meurer, 
    309 Conn. 105
    , 113–14, 
    70 A.3d 13
     (2013); but because that was not the court’s undertaking in this case,
    we do not discuss the propriety of finding earning capacity.
    8
    We note that the plaintiff asserts in her appellate brief that the record
    is inadequate for us to review this claim because the defendant failed to
    adequately preserve it by failing to file a motion for review, presumably of
    the court’s articulation. This argument is of no avail because the record is
    adequate for review as the basis of the court’s orders is plain in the record.
    9
    General Statutes § 46b-82 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘At the time of
    entering the decree, the Superior Court may order either of the parties to
    pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to
    section 46b-81. . . . In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and
    the duration and amount of the award, the court shall consider the evidence
    presented by each party and shall consider the length of the marriage, the
    causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation,
    the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, earning
    capacity, vocational skills, education, employability, estate and needs of
    each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant
    to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor
    children has been awarded, the desirability and feasibility of such parent’s
    securing employment.’’