Salvador Lara Reyes, Jr. v. State ( 2012 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-12-00284-CR
    Salvador Lara Reyes, Jr., Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RUNNELS, 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. 6124, HONORABLE BEN WOODWARD, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    After Salvador Lara Reyes, Jr. pled guilty to the first-degree felony offense of
    aggravated sexual assault of a child, the jury assessed punishment at forty years in prison. See
    Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2012).1
    Reyes’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by a
    brief concluding that this appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements
    of Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the
    records demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. 
    See 386 U.S. at 744
    ;
    see also Penson v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    (1988); High v. State, 
    573 S.W.2d 807
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);
    Currie v. State, 
    516 S.W.2d 684
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 
    485 S.W.2d 553
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 
    436 S.W.2d 137
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Reyes was sent
    1
    Because recent amendments to the penal code did not change the substance of the statute
    relevant to this appeal, we cite to its current version.
    a copy of counsel’s brief and was advised of his right to examine the appellate record and to file a
    pro se brief. See 
    Anders, 386 U.S. at 744
    . No pro se brief has been filed and no extension of time
    was requested.
    We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. See Garner v. State,
    
    300 S.W.3d 763
    , 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 826-27 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2005). We agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is
    granted.
    However, we conclude that the judgment of conviction contains a clerical error,
    listing the statute for offense as “22.011(A) (4) (B).” This Court has the authority to modify
    incorrect judgments when the necessary information is available to do so. See Tex. R. App.
    P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 
    865 S.W.2d 26
    , 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); see also McDonald
    v. State, No. 03-11-00540-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 2592, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 30,
    2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment to correct
    citation). Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect the proper citation to the statute for the
    first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child, which is “Texas Penal Code
    § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(ii).” As modified, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    Jeff Rose, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Rose and Goodwin
    Modified and, as Modified, Affirmed
    Filed: October 31, 2012
    Do Not Publish
    2